Speaker Recognition in Unconstrained Environments by Andreas, Nautsch
S P E A K E R R E C O G N I T I O N I N U N C O N S T R A I N E D E N V I R O N M E N T S
andreas nautsch
Dissertation
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doctor rerum naturalium
(Dr. rer. nat.)
genehmigte Dissertationsschrift in englischer Sprache
von Andreas Nautsch, M.Sc.
geboren in Greifswald
Erstreferent: Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Max Mühlhäuser
Korreferent: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Christoph Busch
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Didier Meuwly
Tag der Einreichung: 28. Mai 2019
Tag der Prüfung: 10. Oktober 2019
Fachgebiet Telekooperation
Fachbereich Informatik
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Hochschulkennziffer D-17
Darmstadt 2019
Andreas Nautsch: Speaker Recognition in Unconstrained Environments,
Darmstadt, Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Jahr der Veröffentlichung der Dissertation auf TUprints: 2019
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 10. Oktober 2019
Editorin: Elisabeth Neuhaus
Veröffentlicht unter CC BY-SA 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses
A B S T R A C T
Speaker recognition is applied in smart home devices, interactive
voice response systems, call centers, online banking and payment
solutions as well as in forensic scenarios. This dissertation is con-
cerned with speaker recognition systems in unconstrained environ-
ments. Before this dissertation, research on making better decisions in
unconstrained environments was insufficient. Aside from decision mak-
ing, unconstrained environments imply two other subjects: security
and privacy. Within the scope of this dissertation, these research sub-
jects are regarded as both security against short-term replay attacks
and privacy preservation within state-of-the-art biometric voice com-
parators in the light of a potential leak of biometric data. The afore-
mentioned research subjects are united in this dissertation to sustain
good decision making processes facing uncertainty from varying sig-
nal quality and to strengthen security as well as preserve privacy.
Conventionally, biometric comparators are trained to classify be-
tween mated and non-mated reference – probe pairs under idealistic
conditions but are expected to operate well in the real world. How-
ever, the more the voice signal quality degrades, the more erroneous
decisions are made. The severity of their impact depends on the re-
quirements of a biometric application. In this dissertation, quality es-
timates are proposed and employed for the purpose of making bet-
ter decisions on average in a formalized way (quantitative method),
while the specifications of decision requirements of a biometric appli-
cation remain unknown. By using the Bayesian decision framework,
the specification of application-depending decision requirements is
formalized, outlining operating points: the decision thresholds. The
assessed quality conditions combine ambient and biometric noise,
both of which occurring in commercial as well as in forensic appli-
cation scenarios. Dual-use (civil and governmental) technology is in-
vestigated. As it seems unfeasible to train systems for every possible
signal degradation, a low amount of quality conditions is used. After
examining the impact of degrading signal quality on biometric fea-
ture extraction, the extraction is assumed ideal in order to conduct
a fair benchmark. This dissertation proposes and investigates meth-
ods for propagating information about quality to decision making. By
employing quality estimates, a biometric system’s output (compari-
son scores) is normalized in order to ensure that each score encodes
the least-favorable decision trade-off in its value. Application devel-
opment is segregated from requirement specification. Furthermore,
class discrimination and score calibration performance is improved
over all decision requirements for real world applications.
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In contrast to the ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 standard on biometric per-
formance (error rates), this dissertation is based on biometric infer-
ence for probabilistic decision making (subject to prior probabilities
and cost terms). This dissertation elaborates on the paradigm shift
from requirements by error rates to requirements by beliefs in priors
and costs. Binary decision error trade-off plots are proposed, interrelat-
ing error rates with prior and cost beliefs, i.e., formalized decision
requirements. Verbal tags are introduced to summarize categories of
least-favorable decisions: the plot’s canvas follows from Bayesian deci-
sion theory. Empirical error rates are plotted, encoding categories of
decision trade-offs by line styles. Performance is visualized in the la-
tent decision subspace for evaluating empirical performance regard-
ing changes in prior and cost based decision requirements.
Security against short-term audio replay attacks (a collage of sound
units such as phonemes and syllables) is strengthened. The unit-selec-
tion attack is posed by the ASVspoof 2015 challenge (English speech
data), representing the most difficult to detect voice presentation at-
tack of this challenge. In this dissertation, unit-selection attacks are
created for German speech data, where support vector machine and
Gaussian mixture model classifiers are trained to detect collage edges
in speech representations based on wavelet and Fourier analyses. Com-
petitive results are reached compared to the challenged submissions.
Homomorphic encryption is proposed to preserve the privacy of
biometric information in the case of database leakage. In this disser-
tation, log-likelihood ratio scores, representing biometric evidence ob-
jectively, are computed in the latent biometric subspace. Conventional
comparators rely on the feature extraction to ideally represent biomet-
ric information, latent subspace comparators are trained to find ideal
representations of the biometric information in voice reference and
probe samples to be compared. Two protocols are proposed for the
the two-covariance comparison model, a special case of probabilis-
tic linear discriminant analysis. Log-likelihood ratio scores are com-
puted in the encrypted domain based on encrypted representations
of the biometric reference and probe. As a consequence, the biomet-
ric information conveyed in voice samples is, in contrast to many
existing protection schemes, stored protected and without informa-
tion loss. The first protocol preserves privacy of end-users, requiring
one public/private key pair per biometric application. The latter pro-
tocol preserves privacy of end-users and comparator vendors with
two key pairs. Comparators estimate the biometric evidence in the la-
tent subspace, such that the subspace model requires data protection
as well. In both protocols, log-likelihood ratio based decision making
meets the requirements of the ISO/IEC 24745:2011 biometric informa-
tion protection standard in terms of unlinkability, irreversibility, and
renewability properties of the protected voice data.
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Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Die biometrische Sprechererkennung findet Anwendung in Smart-
Home-Lösungen, interaktiven Sprachdialogsystemen, Call Centern,
Online-Banking und mobilen Zahlungsverfahren sowie in in der fo-
rensischen Fallarbeit. Die vorliegende Dissertation konzentriert sich
auf die biometrische Sprechererkennung bei unkontrollierbaren Ein-
flussfaktoren. Vor dieser Dissertation war die Forschung zum Fäl-
len besserer Entscheidungen bei unkontrollierbaren Einflussfaktoren unzu-
reichend. Abgesehen von Betrachtungen zur Entscheidungsfindung
beinhalten unkontrollierbare Einflussfaktoren zwei weitere Themen-
komplexe: Sicherheit und Datenschutz. Im Rahmen dieser Disserta-
tion werden beide Gebiete bezüglich der Sicherheit gegen Kurzzeit-
Replay-Angriffe und der Wahrung von Privatsphäre im Hinblick auf
mögliche Leaks biometrischer Daten betrachtet. Die oben genannten
Forschungsthemen werden vereint, um einerseits das Treffen guter
Entscheidungen trotz variierender Unsicherheit (aufgrund variabler
Signalqualität) zu verbessern und andererseits die Sicherheit biome-
trischer Sprecherkennungssysteme zu härten. Die Privatsphäre wird
gleichzeitig geschützt.
Normalerweise werden biometrische Mustererkenner trainiert, um
zwischen gepaarten und nicht gepaarten Teilen biometrischer Re-
ferenzen und Proben unter idealen Bedingungen zu klassifizieren,
aber es wird auch erwartet, dass diese Erkenner in der realen Welt
gut funktionieren. Je mehr sich jedoch die Qualität von Sprachsi-
gnalen verschlechtert, desto häufiger werden Fehlentscheidungen ge-
troffen. Dabei hängt die Folgenschwere der Fehlentscheidungen von
den Anforderungen an eine biometrischen Anwendung ab. In die-
ser Arbeit werden Qualitätsschätzer vorgeschlagen und eingesetzt
(quantitative Methode), um im Schnitt (innerhalb eines formalen Fra-
meworks) bessere Entscheidungen zu treffen, während die Spezifi-
kationen der Entscheidungsanforderungen einer biometrischen An-
wendung beliebig, aber fest sind. Durch den Einsatz des Bayes’schen
Entscheidungs-Frameworks wird die Spezifikation der anwendungs-
abhängigen Entscheidungsanforderungen formalisiert. Darauf basie-
rend wird ein Schwellenwert abgeleitet, anhand dessen Entscheidun-
gen automatisiert gefällt werden können. Die betrachteten Qualitäts-
bedingungen kombinieren Umgebungs- und biometrische Störsigna-
le, die sowohl in kommerziellen als auch in forensischen Anwen-
dungsszenarien auftreten können. Es wird die (zivile und staatli-
che) Dual-Use-Technologie untersucht. Mehrere Qualitätsbedingun-
gen werden betrachtet, da es nicht möglich erscheint, für jede mögli-
che Signalverschlechterung ein Erkennungssystem zu trainieren. Die
Auswirkungen aufgrund von Signalqualitätsverschlechterung auf die
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biometrische Merkmalsextraktion werden untersucht. Nach der Un-
tersuchung wird diese Extraktion als ideal angesehen, um anschlie-
ßend faire Benchmarks durchzuführen. Diese Dissertation schlägt
Methoden zur Anwendung von Informationen über die Qualität in
der (biometrischen) Entscheidungsfindung vor und untersucht diese.
Durch die Verwendung von Qualitätsschätzern werden die Resultate
eines biometrischen Systems (Vergleichswerte) normiert, um sicher-
zustellen, dass jeder Wert den geringsten-günstigsten Entscheidungs-
kompromiss in seinem Wert kodiert. Die Anwendungsentwicklung
wird von der Anforderungsspezifikation getrennt. Dies ist aufgrund
des Bayes’schen Entscheidungs-Frameworks möglich: Risikoanalysen
und maschinelles Lernen sprechen die gleiche Sprache, wenn Bayes
Wahrscheinlichkeiten diskutiert werden. Dadurch werden sowohl die
Klassenunterscheidung als auch die Kalibrierungsleistung über alle
Entscheidungsanforderungen für reale Anwendungen verbessert.
Im Gegensatz zur Norm ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 über die biometri-
sche Performanzauswertung (Fehlerraten aus Beobachtungen) basiert
diese Arbeit auf biometrischer Inferenz für probabilistische Entschei-
dungsfindung (in Anbetracht verschiedener a-priori-Wahrscheinlich-
keiten und Kosten für verschiedene Fehlertypen). Diese Dissertati-
on trägt zum Paradigmenwechsel von Anforderungen durch Fehlerra-
ten zu Anforderungen durch Annahmen von Wahrscheinlichkeiten und
Kosten bei. Binary Decision Error Trade-off (BET) Plots werden vorge-
schlagen, die die Fehlerraten mit den Annahmen von Wahrschein-
lichkeiten und Kosten in Beziehung setzen (in Bezug zu formali-
sierten Entscheidungsanforderungen). Verbale Annotationen werden
eingeführt, um Kategorien von Entscheidungen minimalen Vorteils zu-
sammenzufassen: Das Koordinaten-Design des BET-Plots folgt aus
der Bayes’schen Entscheidungstheorie, sodass Entscheidungskompro-
misse formalisierter Annahmen auf den Achsen abgetragen werden.
Empirische Fehlerraten werden grafisch dargestellt. Dies hat den
Mehrwert, dass Kategorien von Entscheidungskompromissen in der
Performanz-Darstellung eines Erkennungssystems mit verschiedenen
Linienstilen abgetragen werden. Die Performanz wird nicht im beob-
achteten Raum, sondern im latenten Unterraum der biometrischen
Klassifikation visualisiert. Dadurch können Veränderungen in den
Entscheidungen bezüglich angenommener Wahrscheinlichkeiten und
Kosten in exaktem Bezug zur empirisch evaluierten Performanz eines
Erkennungssystems bewertet werden.
Die Sicherheit gegen Angriffe wird somit erhöht; konkret gegen
Angriffe, in denen Audios in kurzen Zeitsegmenten aufgenommen
und wieder abgespielt werden (eine Collage von Sound-Einheiten
wie Phonemen und Silben). Der sogenannte Unit-Selection-Angriff
wird auf den Daten der ASVspoof 2015 Challenge (englische Sprach-
daten) untersucht, die den am schwersten zu erkennenden Angriff
dieser Challenge darstellen. In dieser Arbeit werden Unit-Selection-
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Angriffe für deutsche Sprachdaten erstellt, bei denen Support Vector
Machine und Gauß’sche Mischmodell-Klassifikatoren trainiert wer-
den, um Collage-Kanten in Sprachdarstellungen aus Wavelet- und
Fourier-Analysen zu erkennen. Im Vergleich zu den ASVspoof 2015
Teilnehmern werden vergleichbare Ergebnisse erzielt.
Zum Schutz der Privatsphäre biometrischer Informationen im Falle
eines Datenbanklecks wird homomorphe Verschlüsselung vorgeschla-
gen. In dieser Dissertation werden sogenannte Log-Likelihood Ratio
Scores berechnet, die die biometrische Beweislast im latenten biome-
trischen Unterraum objektiv darstellen. Herkömmliche Komparato-
ren verlassen sich darauf, dass die Merkmalsextraktion biometrische
Informationen ideal darstellt (unter der Annahme von hoher Signal-
qualität). Für die biometrische Erkennung unter variierender Signal-
qualität hingegen sind genauere Methoden notwendig. Biometrische
Mustererkenner werden trainiert, um Entscheidungen im latenten
biometrischen Unterraum zu treffen, d.h. nur die biometrischen Infor-
mationen aus Sprachreferenzen und -proben werden miteinander ver-
glichen (und keine anderen Faktoren haben darauf Einfluss). In die-
ser Dissertation werden zwei Protokolle für biometrische Kompara-
toren der sogenannten Probabilistischen Linearen Diskriminanz-Analyse
(PLDA) vorgeschlagen, im konkreten Fall für das Zwei-Kovarianz Ver-
gleichsmodell, einem PLDA Sonderfall. Die Vergleichswerte werden
in Form von Log-Likelihood Ratios berechnet. Zum Datenschutz fin-
den Berechnungen im verschlüsselten Raum, basierend auf verschlüs-
selten Darstellungen der biometrischen Referenz und Probe, statt. Da-
durch werden die in den Sprachproben übermittelten biometrischen
Informationen im Gegensatz zu vielen bestehenden Lösungen ge-
schützt und ohne Informationsverlust gespeichert. Das erste Proto-
koll schützt die Privatsphäre der Endnutzer und erfordert ein Schlüs-
selpaar aus einem öffentlichen und einem privaten Schlüssel für jede
biometrische Anwendung. Das letztgenannte Protokoll schützt die
Privatsphäre von Endnutzern und Herstellern biometrischer Erken-
ner unter der Verwendung von zwei Schlüsselpaaren. Da die verwen-
deten biometrischen Erkenner die biometrische Beweislast in einem
trainierten latenten Unterraum berechnen, stellt auch das Unterraum-
modell selbst sensitive Daten für einen Hersteller dar. Der Schutz die-
ser sensiblen Daten ist ein zweites Ziel, weshalb ein zweites Schlüs-
selpaar notwendig ist. Beide Protokolle, die Log-Likelihood-Ratio-ba-
sierte Entscheidungen fällen, erfüllen die Anforderungen des Stan-
dards zum Schutz biometrischer Informationen, ISO/IEC 24745:2011,
besonders in Bezug auf Unverkettbarkeit, Irreversibilität und Erneu-
erbarkeit von abgespeicherten, geschützten biometrischen Daten.
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Information is not knowledge.
Knowledge is not wisdom.
Wisdom is not truth.
Truth is not beauty.
Beauty is not love.
Love is not music.
Music is the best.
— Frank Zappa, 1979.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Biometric speaker recognition is an emerging market, growing along-
side the rising popularity of mobile end-user devices. In contrast
to conventional authentication methods based on knowledge or to-
kens, biometric recognition aims at sustaining security while provid-
ing higher levels of convenience, e.g., passwords can be forgotten or
cards can be lost, whereas biometric characteristics cannot. Based on
behavioral and biological characteristics, biometric recognition sys-
tems extract and compare features in order to distinguish between
individuals [1]. As speech is present in daily life, biometric voice
authentication is utilized in many interactive application scenarios,
e.g., contact centers and online banking, but also by governmental
organizations to provide evidence in court or track suspects in in-
vestigations, among others. Capturing natural and free speech, it be-
comes relevant to address changes in environmental conditions, es-
pecially when it comes to noise degrading the biometric recognition
performance. As mobile devices are increasing in availability, speaker
recognition systems, in which voice samples are being captured, are
increasingly facing unconstrained environments.
Biometric applications compare probe samples to previously en-
rolled biometric references with verification and identification recog-
nition tasks. Identification systems either narrow down a short list of
matching subjects or identify an individual as an element of a list of
subjects, e.g., a visa black list in border control [2] or a member list
of recent visitors with time-limited access [3]. Verifications are one-
to-one comparisons, stating a binary decision problem of whether
or not reference and probe samples stem from the same source, e.g.,
identity claims in banking [4] or forensic evidence reporting on the
comparison of specimens and control samples [5]. Among others, bio-
metric application domains are in payments, aviation, border control,
and mobile devices with emerging domains in health care and pri-
vacy. The general process flow of biometric verification is depicted
in Fig. 1.1: biometric features are extracted from segmented reference
and probe samples and compared yielding a similarity score, such
that an accept or reject decision is made by comparing a score to a
threshold.
Biometric reference Segmentation Feature extraction
Biometric probe Segmentation Feature extraction
Comparison Score
Accept
Reject
Decision
Figure 1.1: General process flow of biometric verification.
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2 introduction
1.1 biometric application scenarios
Speaker recognition is dual-use technology. Biometric voice compari-
son provides a convenient level of security in commercial application
scenarios. It may furthermore provide evidence about identities in
governmental scenarios.
1.1.1 Voice Verification in Daily Commercial Use
Commercial speaker recognition applications operate in stationary
and mobile environments. Stationary environments are outdoor, e.g.,
facility access control gates [6, 7]; indoor, e.g., at home as well as
with smart home applications like Amazon Alexa [8, 9] or authentica-
tion for e-learning platforms [10], office voice interactive help desk
and password reset services [11], and at industrial workplaces. By
contrast, mobile environments are shaped by smartphone based use
cases, e.g., fraud prevention in contact centers [12], banking and pay-
ments applications [13] as well as smartphone voice authentication on
Android [14, 15] and iOS devices [16]. Research in commercial appli-
cations concerns robust speaker modeling, the assessment of natural
speech (text-independent recognition) and passphrases (text-depen-
dent recognition), and the detection of presentation attacks. Privacy-
preserving technology is in high demand [17], speech services rely on
data annotation which possibly includes sensitive information (e.g.,
names and bank accounts).1
1.1.2 Governmental Use: Forensics
In forensic speaker recognition [5], case dependent specimen, e.g.,
voice probe samples, are compared with text-independent methods to
controlled reference samples, which can stem from police interviews
or other taped conversations. Usually, reference voice samples com-
prise natural, unaltered speech. However, probe voice samples might
have been altered for disguise purposes, e.g., in blackmail calls or
terrorist videos. Conventionally, forensic voice biometrics comprises
manual, semi automated, and fully2 automated methods, whereas
linguistic and acoustic phonetic methodologies are the most widely
1 Applications for speech transcription are freely available to the layman
(e.g., see: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.audio.
hearing.visualization.accessibility.scribe, accessed 2019-04-25). The discus-
sion on speech technology and privacy in daily use, however, needs to be addressed
outside of this dissertation. First steps towards a common understanding of speech
technology and legal communities are outlined in a collaborative work with Cather-
ine Jasserand, Els Kindt, Massimiliano Todisco, Isabel Trancoso, and Nicholas Evans
[18]. Existing technology safeguards are surveyed in a collaborative work with Bhik-
sha Raj, Thomas Schneider, and Christoph Busch (among others) [19].
2 Fully automated methods are rarer. They possibly occur in surveillance scenarios.
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spread form of evidence reporting. In linguistics, grammatical and
stylistic patterns are examined for biometric characteristics in or-
der to infer the biometric identity of a probe that is compared to a
(closed-set) list of suspect identities3 (also to short-list), where pho-
neticians examine behavioral speech patterns and sound units, caus-
ing case dependent feature selection, comparison, and creation of a
forensic report. Law enforcement speaker recognition software, such
as BATVOX4, Voice Biometrics GOV5, VoiceGrid6, and VOCALISE7 is
inspired from commercial applications as well as phonetic method-
ology, for which the selection and analysis of datasets is crucial to
objective evidence reporting.
In practice [20], forensic science is based on four inferences: identi-
fication, individualization, association, and reconstruction. These in-
ferences are structured in three levels: source level (origin of a trace),
activity level (activity leading to the trace), and offense level (activity
is constitutive of an offense). Currently, biometric systems computing
scores are employed in three types of inferences at the source level:
identification and identity verification, individualization, and asso-
ciation. The depending forensic biometric applications are: forensic
identification, e.g., of disaster victims; forensic investigation, e.g., au-
tomated fingerprint identification systems; forensic intelligence, e.g.,
associating traces from different cases; and forensic evaluation, e.g.,
evaluation of biometric evidence in court by employing a biomet-
ric system of some sort. Forensic terminology differentiates between
specimens as probes if captured in controlled conditions, e.g., existing
in forensic identification; and as trace in uncontrolled (forensic) con-
ditions. Research in forensic evaluation and investigation employing
speaker recognition concerns limited data in training and testing. Ap-
plications may include large-scale suspect tracking.8 Additionally, lan-
guage and environmental domain shifts cause decreasing biometric
recognition performances that need to be compensated. Finally, fun-
damental principles on the quantification of the weight of evidence
are under paradigm shift, i.e., a philosophical debate on Bayesian and
non-Bayesian paradigms.
1.2 scope and motivation of this dissertation
The scope of this dissertation is to put biometric verification in ap-
plications according with the Bayesian decision framework (BDF). As
exemplarily depicted, application fields are found in the commercial
3 Even if the operation is an open-set classification most of the time.
4 AGNITIO, Madrid, Spain, part of Nuance Communications, Burlington, MA, USA.
5 Phonexia, Brno, Czech Republic.
6 Speech Technology Center Ltd., St. Petersburg, Russia.
7 Oxford Wave Research Ltd., Oxford, UK.
8 See EU project: Speaker Identification Integrated Project (SIIP) — Privacy Enhanced
Speaker Identification at Global Reach, [Online] http://siip.eu, accessed 2017-10-05.
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as well as in the governmental sector. Therefore, the BDF is examined
regarding the setup of an operating point (decision threshold based
on beliefs), e.g., for communication between commercial entities and
the communication between forensic experts and triers of fact. This
dissertation distinguishes between commercial entities as biometric
service providers, offering an authentication application to end-users;
commercial entities as biometric system operators, hosting and imple-
menting a biometric service for a provider; and commercial entities as
biometrics (sub-) system vendors. The motivation of this dissertation
is driven by the following observations from state-of-the-art speaker
recognition, grouped by:
• different perspectives on what performance is;
• impact of changing environmental conditions;
• quality estimates from acoustic features;
• security, privacy, and data protection.
Different perspectives on what performance is. Performance eval-
uation constraints different figures of merit in speaker recognition [21,
22], forensics [23, 24], and biometrics standardization [25] research
communities. In speaker recognition, application-depending operat-
ing points (thresholds) are parameterized by beliefs in the prior prob-
ability ratio of expected non-mated to mated comparison trials, and
in the ratio of costs associated to falsely declaring a reference – probe
pair "match" or "non-match". By weighting these beliefs by the empiri-
cal misclassification error rates of a system, the decision cost function
(DCF) optimization criterion represents the expected cost of decision
making within the BDF when employing a system. In the BDF, er-
ror rates are measured at an operating point, the Bayes threshold,
resembling from prior and cost beliefs. By calibrating system score
outputs to log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores, DCFs are minimized (for
the magnitude of belief ratios). Consequently, the empirical decision
risk is reduced. Therefore, discrimination of recognition classes and
calibration to produce scores that are LLRs resemble performance.
By contrast, concurrent biometric standardization solely refers to
examining error rates, i.e., discrimination performance. The optimiza-
tion of a recognition system to meet a prior and cost based decision
policy is segregated (and unconcerned). Therefore, when employing
a recognition system, discrimination is optimized without consider-
ation of the impact of poor decision making. However, when solely
developing and evaluating recognition systems for one operational
scenario, both perspectives correspond to another (to an extent).
In forensics, evidence is reported objectively, and the provinces of
the forensic practitioner and the court are separated.9 Automated
9 By segregating provinces of evidence reporting and jurisdiction, forensic practition-
ers and courts preserve their integrity within legal systems.
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forensic systems report the weight of evidence (in this dissertation:
LLRs), putting the magnitude of similarity and dissimilarity of the ref-
erence – probe pair into relation, i.e., prosecution and defense propo-
sitions. However, cost beliefs remain unparameterized in forensics,
and the parameterization of the prior belief is in the province of
court. Automated forensic systems are thus calibrated to provide in-
formation discriminative and well-calibrated enough to making good
decisions on average, without knowing the prior beliefs set during
an investigation. From speaker recognition and forensics, the figure
of merit Cllr [26] emerged, application-independently summarizing
discrimination and calibration as well as information performance.
Among others, related work is contributed by the dissertations of
Daniel Ramos [27], Niko Brümmer [28], and Rudolf Haraksim [29].
In order to optimize speaker recognition systems technology-in-
dependent of their use, a taxonomy on performance perspectives is
required. Eventually, an interrelation of these perspectives provides
guidance to the discourse of harmonization between the fields.
Impact of changing environmental conditions. Conventionally
[21, 30, 31], speaker recognition systems are trained under idealistic
conditions but are employed in the real world under different envi-
ronmental influences, e.g., forensic in contrast to commercial scenar-
ios, and operate under different decision policies. As voice reference
samples are captured in controlled environments of rather ideal con-
ditions, biometric voice probes are captured in real world situations.10
Thereby, the duration of voice samples is an indicator of the phonetic
variety comprised, i.e., longer durations provide more sufficient bio-
metric features as more speech is present (sample completeness).11
On varying levels of interfering noise and different noise types,
this dissertation concerns changing environmental constraints of two
voice samples being compared, i.e., overlapping sounds stemming
from heating and ventilation systems represent non-biometric (ambi-
ent) noise, and interfering voices of third speakers account for bio-
metric noise, such that the biometric recognition task also needs to
address third individuals recorded, e.g., from radios or TV sets run-
ning in the background or nearby persons chatting (in a recorded
telephone call). Both noise types are present in commercial and foren-
sic application scenarios.
10 By contrast, access border control is operating under supervision, thus high-quality
of biometric probes is assured as well. This application scenario is controlled as
lower-quality data is rejected and probe samples are recaptured at the gate.
11 Short durations cannot allow for a vast variety of phonetic content within a voice
sample. In text-dependent application scenarios, i.e., repetition of passphrases, the
phonetic content remains rather fixed, such that subjects are recognized based on
their characteristic utterance of those phrases. However, in text-independent appli-
cation scenarios, i.e., natural speech, short duration samples can consist of vastly
diverging phonetic contents. By contrast, the distribution of phonetic sound units
converges for longer sample durations [32].
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In this dissertation, the main focus is placed on duration and noise
(from air conditioning and third speakers). Both tasks are repeatedly
posed to the speaker recognition community by the speaker recogni-
tion evaluation (SRE) series of the US National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [33–36]. Over the last decades, the NIST SREs
have provided thousands of hours of speech data for the training
of biometric voice comparators. However, this extensive availability
of labeled data is not always given, e.g., small medium enterprises
developing applications for mobile devices might not have the re-
sources for mobile device speech data, and the characteristics of foren-
sic speech data differ case-by-case. The MOBIO SRE 2013 [37] poses
a limited training dataset for mobile environments, serving as an exem-
plary study in this dissertation on readjusting model assumptions for
the purpose of increasing discrimination performance.
Quality estimates from acoustic features. The calibration of scores
for various environmental conditions is proposed in [38, 39]. Both
rebias12 score adaptively to an audio characteristic or a measure of
quality, where the additive calibration term summarizes a quality
comparison of reference and probe samples. Both studies use NIST
SRE data. The first uses the PRISM13 subset [40] of the 2008 and 2010
NIST SREs, the latter uses the I4U14 subset [41] of the 2012 NIST SRE
[35].
In [38], unified audio characterization (UAC) is proposed, estimat-
ing the posterior probability of seven conditions on (English) speech
data, characterizing general audio properties, namely (1) solely tele-
phone speech; (2) telephone and microphone speech; (3) interview
and microphone speech; (4) vocal effort speech, summarizing nor-
mal, low, and high effort; (5) language, summarizing English, Chi-
nese, Russian, Arabic, and Thai; (6) noisy microphone speech with
different signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) levels, summarizing 0dB, 15dB,
and 20dB SNR levels; and (7) reverberant microphone speech data,
summarizing 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7 reverberation time. As speaker recogni-
tion systems extract acoustic features first and then project them to
the biometric subspace, UACs are estimated based on acoustic fea-
tures, which are also applicable to non-biometric recognition tasks,
such as speech, language, and emotion recognition. UACs reflect au-
dio characteristics from the perspective of the recognition system.
In the dissertation of Miranti Indar Mandasari [39], quality is mod-
eled for score calibration by quality measure functions (QMFs) of the
12 Let’s assume scores are well-calibrated in ideal conditions, then the quality degrades,
and scores differ in expectation as well as true value (bias). By re-biasing scores
adaptively to quality, well-calibrated scores might be achieved (research of this dis-
sertation).
13 The subset comprises challenging speech data, promoting robustness for speaker model-
ing (PRISM).
14 For the 2012 NIST SRE, the I4U consortium consisted of nine university and industry
sites from four continents, hence the acronym.
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duration and the SNR level. Thereby, duration serves as a proxy mea-
sure to the phonetic variability; the known SNR level is used instead
of an SNR estimate. On the one hand, studies on the known SNR
level provide a fair benchmark in this setup, however, operative sys-
tems need to estimate the SNR level as the noise-free speech signal re-
mains unknown. Duration and SNR degraded speech data is derived
by truncation of long duration and high SNR (clean) voice samples
and synthetically added noise by using the Filtering and Noise Adding
Tool (FaNT).15 Thereby, speech data is segmented by voice activity into
speech and non-speech sequences; segmentation labels of clean data are
used for synthetic noise data. Quality conditions comprise five dura-
tions (5, 10, 20, 40 seconds, and more) and 25 SNR conditions (0, 5,
10, 15, and 20dB), where air conditioning and biometric noise types
are derived seperately but summarized per SNR level. Symmetric pat-
terns appear for reference and probe sample quality.
In order to normalize and calibrate scores of speaker recognition
systems well when targeting unconstrained environments, different
aspects need to be considered. There is an immense variety of quality
aspects in speech data, e.g., reverberation, noise, language, emotions,
and duration. The scope of this dissertation is limited on duration
and noise, particularly on speech data derived from the I4U dataset.
Rather than summarizing non-biometric and biometric noise types,
i.e., ambient noise from air conditioning and noise from other speak-
ers, this dissertation investigates on the impact of each noise type.
References are assumed to be captured in high quality, as the refer-
ence sample capturing is usually supervised (in one form or another).
As for the biometric recognition task, the biometric noise is expected
to cause more severe impacts. By using measures such as SNR to
model quality, measurement errors mislead the following signal pro-
cessing. By estimating quality from the signal processing perspective,
e.g., by UACs, the impact of changing signal quality is modeled more
naturally from and for a system’s signal processing.
Security, privacy, and data protection. Biometric systems operat-
ing in end-user authentication and forensics are in constant danger
of being attacked. Weak points are found in different stages of the
biometric signal processing [42–44], e.g., presentation attacks at the
capture of a sample, intrusion of the database storing biometric refer-
ences, and exploitation of the biometric comparator. These examples
outline the scope of this dissertation on security, privacy, and data
protection.
In the speaker recognition community, presentation attack detec-
tion (PAD) has been a regular object of research since 2013 [45] in
special sessions of Interspeech and Odyssey conferences, elaborating
on the automatic speaker verification (ASV) spoofing and countermeasures
challenge (ASVspoof) editions in 2015, 2017, and 2019 [46–48], among
15 [Online] http://dnt.kr.hsnr.de/download/fant.tar.gz, accessed: 2018-12-30.
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others. The focus of ASVspoof 2015 [49] is placed on speech syn-
thesis, voice conversion (morphing), and short-term replay attacks.
The origins of five attacks are known for the development of PAD
modules but those of another five attacks remain unknown. As the
known presentation attacks targeted frequency amplitudes of speech
signals but not frequency phase shifts, four presentation attacks of
the evaluation set sharing this approximation are well detected by
the systems submitted to the challenge. However, the short-term re-
play attack, the unit-selection attack, preserved phase information, and
is thus the difficult task of ASVspoof 2015. In ASVspoof 2017 [50],
audio replay attacks are emphasized: speech is captured in different
environments with multiple sensors and replayed in environments of
the same and of different properties by varying playback devices and
sensors. The conditions of development and evaluation data subsets
differ in the way presentation attacks are performed. Replay attacks
can, in principle, be implemented by any layman. ASVspoof 2019 [51]
extends the aforementioned challenges. Presentation attacks are, inter
alia, based on the outcomes of voice conversion challenges, another
research field in speech communication. In contrast to the 2015 and
2017 editions, where error rates served as the primary figure of merit,
the 2019 edition evaluates submissions based on the tandem expected
cost of decision errors (t-DCF) [52] derived from speaker recognition
and PAD performance. In this dissertation, the scope of security is
limited to the detection of unit-selection attacks.
Preserving privacy in speaker and speech characterization is an
interdisciplinary topic, bringing together technology experts, legal re-
searchers, and cryptographers [19]. In speech communication, exist-
ing cryptographic approaches are based on, e.g., secure two-party
computation, searchable symmetric encryption, functional encryp-
tion, hardware-assisted security, differential privacy, and homomor-
phic encryption (HE). The vast majority of cryptographic methods
rely on integer modulo operations, whereas biometric voice compar-
isons are based on floating point operations, computing LLR scores.
In contrast to conventional biometric comparators, such as Hamming,
Euclidean, and cosine distances, where the amount of cryptographic
operations scales linearly with the feature dimension, the computa-
tional complexity increases for estimating LLRs. State-of-the-art voice
reference – probe comparators rely on matrix multiplication. Matrix
inversions and determinant computations are also involved when
propagating the uncertainty of the feature extraction. The propaga-
tion of uncertainty throughout comparisons [53, 54] addresses uncon-
strained environments by changing the outline of the comparison sub-
system. The latter is assumed fixed in this dissertation to a standard
state-of-the-art comparator.
In this dissertation, the computation of LLRs as scores is
paramount, allowing no information losses. The scope on privacy and
1.3 motivated research questions of this dissertation 9
data protection is limited to HE for state-of-the-art voice comparators,
particularly the two covariance model (2Cov) computing LLR scores
by a subspace model, a special case of the probabilistic linear dis-
criminant analysis (PLDA) family. Privacy is preserved by the HE of
aggregated biometric data. Data protection is provided to biometric
system vendors of PLDA/2Cov comparators by the HE of the sub-
space model.
1.3 motivated research questions of this dissertation
The following research question is posed in this dissertation:
Can quality mismatches be estimated at pre-comparison
stages and aid the Bayesian identity inference in discrimi-
nation and calibration performance?
In the context of motivation, further research questions arise from
the main question:
To which extent can the Bayesian paradigm on perfor-
mance be interrelated with conventional error rate trade-
off diagrams, and how can established performance visu-
alizations be classified in the BDF?
Can the impact of environmental conditions in terms of
biometric distinctiveness—as voice references aggregate—
and the robustness of voice sample segmentation deci-
sions be quantified before the comparison subsystem?
As security systems are subject to attacks, can text-inde-
pendent audio replay attacks which are based on unit-se-
lections of previously captured and rearranged speech se-
quences be detected?
Can data privacy and data protection be preserved while
sustaining performance? On privacy and data protection:
• Within the framework of the 2016 (EU) General Data
Privacy Regulation [55], considering biometric data as
sensitive, is privacy preservable for biometric capture
subjects while sustaining performance?
• Can the data of comparison subsystem vendors be
protected, meaning parameters of generative compar-
ison models, that are trained on vast data amounts,
while preserving privacy of capture subjects and sus-
taining performance?
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Annex A addresses robust classification on limited training data:
Not all vendors of comparison subsystems are able to de-
velop systems on datasets providing thousands of hours
of speech. Can PLDA classifiers thus be de-noised on lim-
ited mobile device speech training data?
1.4 the thesis statement of this dissertation
The proposed methodology utilizes novel measures, examining fea-
ture space properties regarding environmental quality aspects, esti-
mating the likelihood of a voice sample belonging to quality con-
ditions. These quality estimates are employed in order to increase
the biometric discrimination during score normalization and to cali-
brate system scores, facing unconstrained environmental conditions.
By the proposed score calibration, LLRs result, i.e., perturbed scores
are transformed into LLRs in a quality informed fashion. Effectively,
scores represent the one-dimensional aggregated information of the
biometric comparison, in which quality estimates are employed to
aggregate the information about arising uncertainty of the feature ex-
traction due to diverging environmental conditions. LLR scores have
a coherent interpretation within the BDF, such that error-depending
risks as well as occurrence probabilities can be adapted to changes in
environmental quality conditions.
The thesis statement developed during this research period is the
following:
The aggregated information for voice biometric identity inference
can be enhanced using qualitative feature space information and
re-biasing decision thresholds adaptively to biometric compar-
isons.
1.5 outline of this dissertation
This dissertation is conventionally structured in fundamentals depict-
ing background theory and generally related work, the experimental
framework introducing theoretical and practical methods as well as
a proposed extension to the theoretical canon, and research studies
with experimental validation. The dependency among chapters is il-
lustrated in Fig. 1.2.
This dissertation is structured as follows:
• Chapter 1 introduces the topic of automatic speaker recognition
for commercial and forensic purposes. It constitutes the moti-
vation of this dissertation and defines its scope, outline, and
contributions.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
Chapter 2:
Fundamentals
Chapter 4:
Elaborating on the
Paradigm Shift
in Performance
Assessment
Chapter 3:
Experimental
Framework
Chapter 5:
Duration and Noise
Impact on the Front-End
Chapter 6:
Enhancing Decision Information
in Unconstrained Environments
Chapter 7:
Presentation Attack Security and Data Privacy
Chapter 8:
Conclusion
Reporting experimental results
Required
Recommended
Figure 1.2: Dependence among dissertation chapters.
• Chapter 2 summarizes related works in biometrics, standardiza-
tion, BDF, and conventional signal processing as well as pattern
recognition concepts in speaker recognition.
• Chapter 3 describes the evaluation methodology, performance
criteria, and evaluation databases.
• Chapter 4 elaborates on the paradigm shift from Frequentist to
Bayesian performance assessment, contributing visualizations.
• Chapter 5 introduces a measure for the decision robustness of
voice segmentation in the presence of noise and analyzes the
biometric distinctiveness regarding variable speech durations.
• Chapter 6 presents contributions regarding unconstrained envi-
ronments, proposing quality adaptive score normalization and
calibration methods, enhancing the biometric identity inference.
• Chapter 7 addresses the security of speaker recognition systems
in terms of detecting short-term replay attacks as well as privacy
and data security aspects, proposing architectures for biometric
cryptosystems, protecting privacy and data security demands
alongside sustaining score calibration properties.
• Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation, summarizing the main
results and outlining perspectives for future research.
12 introduction
Chapters 2 to 6 are introduced by a preamble and concluded by
a summary. For the purpose of seeking harmonization with the bio-
metrics standardization community, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37, this disser-
tation is written in compliance with the SC 37 terminology, but the
language written is kept in American English (standards are written
in British English). Equation readability is accommodated by indent-
ing punctuation in the end of equations with a half space (to precau-
tion misreadings, e.g., of commas after fractions with primes accent-
ing denominator terms). Some methods developed in this dissertation
are strongly based on popular approaches in speaker recognition [30,
31], Bayesian inference using probabilistic models [56–60], and BDF
depending performance assessment methods [24, 26, 61, 62]. Meth-
ods developed in this dissertation are motivated by signal processing
[63] and information theory [64]. This information is especially useful
when dealing with Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
1.6 contributions of this dissertation
This dissertation is contributing the following:
To the Theoretical Framework
• definition of a visualization model consequently following the
BDF interrelating error rates with depending decision log-odds,
such that distances within the proposed binary decision error
trade-off (BET) plot visually correspond to changes in BDF
thresholds, representing belief changes in prior probabilities
and decision costs [65];
• introduction of verbal scales of least-favorable decisions reflecting
magnitudes of LLRs in error trade-off diagrams, making LLRs
rather digestible from a Frequentist’s perspective and increasing
the transparency of performance reporting in cross-application
scenarios [66, 67];
• methodology on denoting thresholds (step-by-step) by refining
priors and costs (exact value but also ranges) for commercial
and jurisprudential communication, utilizing the BDF [66, 67];
• taxonomy on performance visualization for LLRs, distinguish-
ing between i) the target audience (analysis or reporting), ii)
criteria types (errors or information), and iii) criteria levels (dis-
crimination or calibration), also proposing the normalized ECE
(NECE) plot alongside. The taxonomy is self-contained;
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To Novel Measures
• introduction of decision robustness of voice segmentation algo-
rithms [68];
• outline of biometric voice distinctiveness: estimation of feature
space entropy [69];
• definition of quality vectors (q-vectors) that linearly sample en-
vironmental condition parameters for quality informed score
normalization [70], motivated by UACs [38] and QMFs [39];
To Novel Methods
• score normalization employing a quality-adaptive pre-selection
of cohort data based on q-vectors for robust estimation of nor-
malization parameters [70];
• score calibration for multi-condition environments, proposing
function of quality estimates (FQEs) based on q-vectors [71];
• quality-informed score normalization, utilizing deep learning
examining multi-condition environments [72];
• PAD of replay attacks as short-term audio collages in cross-lan-
guage training and testing [73];
• HE for voice references of biometric system end-users and com-
parator models of biometric system vendors [74] (Odyssey 2018
best paper award);
• greedy learning of biometric information recovery during com-
parator estimation of feature subspaces [75], cf. annex A, when
limited mobile device speech training data is solely available.

2
F U N D A M E N TA L S
This chapter introduces the narrative of this dissertation on
paradigms on decision making, followed by fundamentals of biomet-
ric systems, an outline of the Bayesian decision framework (BDF),
and conventional approaches in automated speaker verification. Bio-
metric systems are presented regarding general system design and
definitions from ISO/IEC standardization within the JTC 1/SC 37
committee, such as harmonized vocabulary, performance assessment
assuming zero-effort impostors, and a framework regarding the detec-
tion of presentation attacks. As the SC 37 perspective on performance
solely considers a Frequentist’s point of view while the speaker recog-
nition community puts emphasis on fully Bayesian systems, i.e., fol-
lowing the BDF throughout, gaps between standardization and state-
of-the-art speaker recognition communities are briefly depicted.
For the purpose of understanding the recognition metrics em-
ployed in this dissertation, relevant aspects of the BDF are explained,
i.e., the total probability theorem, conditional probabilities, Bayesian
inference, and the concept of decoupling comparison and decision
layers, yielding a separation of objective score computation and subjec-
tive decision policies. Alongside, implications resulting from consider-
ing a Bayesian perspective are explained in order to provide a holistic
overview on log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores, highlighting benefits
to machine learning for decision making. Notably, the decoupling of
comparison and decision layers is encouraged by the forensic science
community but is further applicable to commercial scenarios as well
as to biometric standardization. By formalizing decision making, one
can explicitly outline performance requirements (the values of score
threshold) that systems need to meet (on low decision risks).
Finally, automated speaker recognition is introduced, particularly
on the extraction of biometric features from acoustic data, the biomet-
ric comparison, and the adaptive normalization of comparison scores.
The outlined baseline system depicts the 2012 to 2016 state-of-the-art
feature extraction and comparison in speaker recognition, which is
currently employed in products for commercial and forensic applica-
tions. Its acoustic signal processing extracts fixed-length intermediate-
sized vector (i-vector) features from mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients (MFCCs), which are a time-variable speech representation
(since longer speech durations imply more MFCCs). By transform-
ing acoustic features suitable to a variety of speech recognition prob-
lems (e.g., speech, language, and emotion recognition) into biometric
features that are solely suitable to the biometric recognition task, com-
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parisons are carried out in the latent biometric subspace. Probabilistic
linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) comparators are state-of-the-art,
carrying out comparisons in the latent biometric subspace, whereby
the likelihoods of similarity and dissimilarity between reference and
probe features are estimated as LLR scores. The family of PLDA com-
parators is suitable for 1 : 1, 1 : n and m : n recognition tasks.
Systems based on the i-vector/PLDA framework are referred to as
fully Bayesian systems; systems in consistency with the BDF. Eventu-
ally, score normalization and calibration techniques are employed in
order to achieve higher biometric discrimination performance (low
error rates) and to sustain well-calibrated scores (low decision risks).
Such methods are relevant, as systems are trained on a distinct (ideal)
domain but need to operate well in unconstrained environments.
2.1 the narrative : on paradigms in decision making
Decision making16 with classification systems aims at performing
the best possible action. Classification systems predict the class of
observed input data, whereas prediction thresholds depend on the
trade-off between wrong decisions.17 This is known to be best formal-
ized by BDF [59], where an action must be taken towards a given
class. In binary decision systems, two complementary propositions or
classes exist.18 Commercial biometric applications might state:
• proposition A: The biometric identity claim is true; versus
• proposition B: The biometric identity claim is false;19
whereas forensic applications might state (e.g., for fingerprints [76]):
• proposition A: same-source proposition: The fingermark and the fin-
gerprint originate from the same finger of the same donor; versus
• proposition B: different-source proposition: The fingermark origi-
nates from a random finger of another donor of the relevant population,
unrelated to the donor of the fingerprint.20
16 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Daniel Ramos and Didier
Meuwly [65].
17 In commercial applications, thresholds are defined by formal or informal require-
ments. In forensic applications, thresholds are denoted outside the scope of the
forensic practitioner: decisions lie within the province of court. To assess the benefit
of employing biometric systems within forensic evidence reports, decision making
needs to be formalized in forensic evaluation, such that an information theoretic per-
formance assessment can be conducted. The scope of this dissertation is to address
commercial and forensic communities, leveraging formalized decision making.
18 The terms proposition and class will be used synonymously. In contrast to the term
hypothesis, propositions are not implying randomness of the outcome.
19 In some other problems, both propositions can be non-exhaustive, yielding a multi-
class problem. This discussion, however, exceeds the scope of this dissertation.
20 Proposition B needs to be defined as not A, but both propositions might not reflect
the entire reality. That is, the relevant population reduces the decision making problem
to a tractable model for taking action on A over B or vice versa.
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Decisions in commercial and governmental applications are made
by following either a rule based (informal) or a risk/an informa-
tion based (formal) paradigm. In both, erroneous decisions lead to
Type I and Type II error rates. For the former paradigm, decision
policies constrain absolute error rate trade-offs (e.g., 1% Type I error
on Type II error rates below 5%). As such, a threshold (an applica-
tion’s operating point) is derived by examining the class score dis-
tributions of a system’s evaluation output. In other words, operating
points are derived after performance assessment based on informal
specified requirements (error rate trade-offs). For the latter paradigm,
decision policies are specified in a formal way, such that operating
points are specified before performance assessment based on well-de-
fined risk/information parameters: the probability of class A, namely
Pr (A) complementary to Pr (B) = 1 − Pr (A), and the cost of each
erroneous decision cA, cB (e.g., in a smart home application for light-
ing control, one could define cB = e0.20 for the power consumption
cost caused by a neighbor activating light, whereas one could set
cA = e0.40 for the inconvenience cost of not being recognized as one-
self by the system). The emphasis of this dissertation is placed on the
latter paradigm, the BDF.
In the BDF, the prior probability of class A is updated by the ob-
servation of some findings E (e.g., biometric features and compari-
son scores). Ideally, the strength of the evidence for proposition A
versus B is described by a so-called likelihood ratio (LR), namely
Pr(E |A)
Pr(E |B) , the likelihood of the evidence E under the model that as-
sumes proposition A (in ratio) to the likelihood of the evidence E
under the model that assumes proposition B. By updating the prior
belief (Pr (A) , Pr (B)) with the LR, the posterior probabilities Pr (A |E)
and Pr (B |E) of both classes are obtained.21 The posterior probability
Pr (A |E) is the likelihood of proposition A to be true given the evi-
dence E, and the posterior probability Pr (B |E) is the likelihood of
proposition B to be true given the evidence E. Actions on A are taken
if the posterior ratio Pr(A|E)Pr(B|E) is equal to or exceeds the cost ratio that
puts the cost of falsely accepting proposition B in proportion to the
cost of falsely rejecting proposition A: cBcA 6
Pr(A|E)
Pr(B|E) .
Considering the observation of some (biometric) features as the
evidence E: information about the classes, the prior belief, is updated
by the LR to the posterior belief. After obtaining posteriors, decisions
are made following a well-known optimal decision rule, considering
the costs cA, cB. In other words, LRs (computed by the system) are
compared with the Bayes threshold cBcA
Pr(B)
Pr(A) ; the joint ratio of prior
probabilities and costs (external to the system).
21 As the propositions A,B are mutually exclusive (B is notA), the posterior probability
Pr(A |E) for the belief in proposition A is derivable via the relationship Pr(A|E)Pr(B|E) =
Pr(A|E)
1−Pr(A|E) . Notably, this relationship implies A,B being exhaustive, which holds for
the relevant population within the decision model.
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2.1.1 The Bayesian Decision Framework: Examples
Following the BDF paradigm, different perspectives on decision mak-
ing are available, allowing to decouple system validation (develop-
ment) and evaluation (operational) stages, as the gap in-between is
bridged by sustaining well-calibrated scores (LRs). In the following
examples, the effective ratios of costs and priors are summarized by
the parameters c,pi. Under the typical assumption of positive costs,
the pair of (c,pi) with the cost ratio c1−c =
cA
cB
and the prior ratio
pi
1−pi =
Pr(A)
Pr(B) will define the whole range of possible applications of
the system.22 As such, the cost parameter c is determinable by ex-
plicit costs (with monetary units). However, c remains without any
unit, as one parameter value c summarizes various cost ratios, and pi
summarizes various prior ratios in a single value. The BDF decouples
the subjective domain (formal requirements to decision making) from
objective domain (a system’s output as weight of evidence), such that
one system is employable to various applications (c,pi) and in dif-
ferent application fields. Depending on the (c,pi) parameterization,
different Type I and Type II error rates result. Type I errors are the
class B reference – probe comparisons whose corresponding LR ex-
ceeds the (c,pi) decision requirement, leading to a false action (erro-
neous acceptance of proposition B). Type II errors are the class A ref-
erence – probe comparisons whose corresponding LR fails to meet the
the (c,pi) decision requirement, leading to a false action (erroneous re-
jection of proposition A). Ideally, LRs encode the overall proportion
of erroneous decisions made at their depending Bayes threshold.
Example: Access Border Control (ABC) Gates
For face biometrics in ABC systems, FRONTEX requires a Type I er-
ror rate of 0.1%; the Type II error rate shall not to exceed 5% [77]. In
[65], a collaboration contributing to the dissertation at hand, this is
demonstrated so as to relate to explicit cost and prior values when
following the BDF: assuming no prior intel (pi = 50%, known as
maximum prior entropy), a cost value of c > 1919+999 =
1
1018 ≈ 154
is required in order to meet the stated requirements—the 999 re-
flects the 0.1% Type I error rate requirement and the 19 the 5%
Type II error rate requirement. Given a rather friendly environ-
ment (e.g., pi = 95% = 1920 of the biometric identity claims are
true), a more security-demanding cost value is required instead:
c > 1919+999×19 =
1
1000 . The error rate constraint remained fixed,
but one aspect of the mutual belief in priors and costs changed,
causing the 999 term to be multiplied with a 19 (in ratios, the de-
nominator value 20 cancels out): in the light of a much more gen-
22 Linguistically, applications are defined in terms of ratios of proposition A to propo-
sition B, especially as proposition B emerges from the terminology not A. In other
words, expressions of the form A : B are consistent within the BDF to expressions of
the form B : A. Nonetheless, translating one to the other is trivial.
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uine environment, the convenience centered yet secure cost con-
straint (c → 1, here ≈ 154 ) becomes much more security centered
one (c → 0, here: 11000 ). As the prior pi in ABC gates can be fixed
to some value, the criterion to which one biometric system is to fa-
vor another corresponds to the optimization of a security decision
risk (lower c values are to meet). In this example, the mutual opti-
mization of multiple (c,pi) parameterizations remains out-of-scope.
From the scope of a single biometric system operator with a single
application, the BDF provides the same insights into which of two
competing systems is preferable. Finding the best system under a
fixed error rate constraint optimizes convenience levels at a fixed
security level.
The rule based decision framework, however, solely provides an in-
dicator of the impact of erroneous decisions. The benefit of the BDF
unfolds in the assessment of cross-application performance. A par-
ticular application represents a possible scenario in which a system
using LRs will be operating. An application’s operating point is de-
termined by its decision policy that is formalized by a particular pair
(c,pi). Thus, a particular LR threshold value corresponds to one appli-
cation scenario and many LR thresholds resemble many applications
in a formalized manner. These values change across different applica-
tion domains, for all of which LR scores satisfy the optimal decision
rule, i.e., the Bayes risk: Pr(B |E) cB 6 Pr(A |E) cA.
Example: Research and Development (of Payment Services)
Biometric system vendors distributing the same biometric system
to multiple biometric system operators need to meet different ap-
plication domain requirements. For instance, sensitive bank appli-
cations with few impostors and many clients will require low c
(penalizing false acceptances; cA values become more negligible
the larger cB values become, effectively causing higher LR thresh-
olds) and high pi (lower probability of impostors). In contrast, a non-
critical access control scenario with many impostors might require
higher c (non-critical) and lower pi (many impostors). Likewise,
payment services concerning a broad range of transaction volumes
will face different threat vectors, associating multiple (c,pi) operat-
ing points depending on the decision risk. Thereby, varying secu-
rity countermeasures (e.g., contactless payment, PIN, and signature
verification) relate to specific (c,pi) requirements and thus to the fol-
lowing thresholds: low LRs on contactless payment and high LRs
on PIN or signature verification. In other words, depending on the
LR value contributed by a biometric system, subsequent payment
verification mechanisms can be chosen in the transaction authen-
tication process. As application domains remain unknown during
research and system development, vendors benefit from creating
systems outputting LRs. The BDF allows to validate single binary
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decision systems over all operating points (c,pi) in a formal way:
the parameterization of (c,pi) outlines the Bayes threshold at which
the empirical decision risk is measured, i.e., a (c,pi)-weighted sum
of Type I and Type II error rates. The Bayes risk defines perfor-
mance requirements, i.e., an optimal decision risk. Targeting appli-
cations supporting multiple (c,pi) parameterizations, e.g., varying
cost levels depending on payment transaction volumes, a system’s
output needs to yield low Bayes risks independent of the applica-
tion. These system output scores are known as LRs. Consequently,
research on binary classification systems following the BDF can
reach out to a broader audience as performance reporting is fully
transparent within the formal decision making based on well-cal-
ibrated scores. Notably, scores of any (binary) classifier are trans-
formable into (ideal) LRs [78] by score calibration [28, 79].
If scores are well-calibrated (LRs), they can be optimally used for
all (c,pi) parameterizations [26, 80]. However, if the scores are badly
calibrated and the application (c,pi) changes, new thresholds can-
not be set without making new development experiments with new
databases in order to empirically set optimal thresholds. Unfortu-
nately, this cannot be done easily in many scenarios and in some
it is simply impossible. For instance, in setups of varying security
conditions, recalculating thresholds with a database each time a new
security condition is established seems not feasible.
Example: Evaluation of Forensic Biometrics
Forensic experts and the courts address propositions on different
levels: source and activity level for the experts and offense level
for the court. Here, evidence reporting is decoupled from decision
making. The goal of the forensic expert is to report the evidence
for ideal decision making. The evidence reporting is thereby car-
ried out on a different level than the decision making in court. The
duty of the court is to provide the prior probability ratio and to
make decisions based on the posterior probability ratio [20, 81].
The province of the forensic expert is restricted to the weight of
evidence (the LR). In order to evaluate decision making, by em-
ploying one biometric system or another, the forensic expert can
solely report on the information gain by employing a biometric
system across all prior configurations. A solution to this problem
consists in forcing systems to generate well-calibrated scores: LRs.
LR scores can either result from the feature domain (fully Bayesian
systems compute LRs by models assessing the biometric evidence)
or from the score domain (calibration functions are trained that
transform any score into their depending LR value). Systems that
sustain LR scores meet the optimal Bayes risk at any Bayes thresh-
old. By employing fully Bayesian systems, changing the threshold
does not require the use of a development database but simply the
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definition of priors pi and costs c. As for commercial applications,
this simplifies the change of applications (thresholds) enormously
and makes technology application-independent (it adequately sus-
tains decision making across all thresholds possible) [61, 80]. For
forensic evaluation, (a) computing LRs and (b) formally denoting
thresholds are distinguished, accounting for the decoupled levels
of the different provinces of the forensic expert (source and activa-
tion level) and of the court (offense level). In contrast to commer-
cial scenarios, where priors are usually high (convenience), forensic
scenarios consider rather low priors (e.g., pi = 1% for one culprit
among 100 suspects with prior odds 1 : 99) as one culprit is within
a group of suspects. In commercials, this corresponds to security
scenarios. Again, at the source and activation level, there is solely
the estimation of the LR as the weight of evidence, whereas the
prior parameterization and decision making is solely at the offense
level. These decoupled provinces correspond in commercials to the
biometric system computing LRs (for source and activation levels)
and the operative decision policy (for the offense level).
Notably, the employment of the BDF leverages the paradigm
shift towards the Bayesian perspective: the LR score computation
(province of the expert witness) is explicitly decoupled from decision
making (province of the court). Ideally, the court would parameter-
ize priors and costs, but this exceeds the scope of this dissertation.
The automation of the jurisprudential process is explicitly not tar-
geted: by providing well-calibrated scores (LRs), the weight of ev-
idence reported by the expert witness is objective and suitable for
all operating points. In this sense, (c,pi) values are solely parame-
terized theoretically, whereas commercial applications specify par-
ticular values, such that explicit thresholds are derived. In foren-
sic evaluation, however, discussion about priors and costs is not
applicable for the only focus is the strength of evidence. For the
purpose of evaluating automated forensic biometric systems, LRs
are reported symmetrically, favoring prosecution and defense propo-
sitions, i.e., seeking an unbiased evaluation. One might link the
example of forensic biometrics to the research and development
phase of (binary decision) systems.
In this dissertation, the BDF is addressed under varying envi-
ronmental conditions for speaker recognition systems. A system is
trained on voice data stemming from ideal environmental conditions,
a non-noisy environment with more than 40 s of captured speech.
Yet, its operational environment varies as subjects are interacting
with voice biometric systems in different settings, e.g., in offices with
(heavy) ventilation/air conditioning (ambient noise) or at home with
(voices from) television or the radio running in the background (bio-
metric noise). Even in an unconstrained environment, ideal decision
making is anticipated by end-users having expectations on the per-
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formance of the system and by service providers sustaining low deci-
sion risks. The BDF formalizes optimal decision making (cf. Fig. 2.1).
Thus, it is fundamental to address speaker recognition in unconstrained
environments.
Prior
odds
Posterior
oddsInference
Likelihood Ratio
(Biometric System)
10 1 2
1
odds: 10 : 1
Pr(A) ≈ 91%
LR = 120
weight of evidence E
odds: 1 : 2
Pr(A|E) = 33%
Costs
cA,cB
required: 1 : 2
required: 990 : 1
Decision
A or B?
⇒ proposition A
⇒ proposition B
Figure 2.1: Bayesian decision framework, cf. [82], red: subjective operating
point, blue: objective likelihood ratio reporting, green: chain of
identity inference, orange: decision layer. Notably, in forensics,
the judge adjudicates on the guilt, not on the identity of a sub-
ject. Similarly, in commercials, decisions are not made about an
identity—although identity inference is used—; the granting of
access is decided on.
Example: Smart Home, low Signal-Quality or false Claim?
The following example considers an application in an environment
with few subversive interaction attempts, e.g., speaker recognition
in smart home applications with high prior odds 10 : 1 (pi = 1011 );
true biometric identity claims are ten times more likely to occur
on average than false identity claims. Compared to a non-mated
probe, a biometric system output in terms of evidence should re-
sult in low LRs, i.e., supporting to favor proposition B over propo-
sition A. In this example, a system compares a biometric reference
with a biometric probe and weights the biometric evidence with
a LR of 120 : Pr (E | B) is twenty times higher than Pr (E | A). A bio-
metric system computes both probabilities and reports their ratio,
such that a LR of 120 resembles intermediate output ratios, such
as 1%20% ,
2%
40% ,
4.75%
95% . Decisions are made considering the cost value
of erroneous decisions c, which depends on the application policy.
Smart home applications for lighting control (operated by speech)
are non-critical, e.g., with a decision cost trade-off between 20 cents
and 40 cents in power consumption versus inconvenience (c = 23 ).
A posterior ratio of at least 1−cc =
1
2 is required (posterior odds
1 : 2), resembling a posterior belief in proposition A given the ev-
idence of Pr(A |E) >
1
2
1+ 12
= 13 ≈ 33.3%. While access to home
security system administration is rather critical, e.g., with a deci-
sion cost trade-off in liabilities versus inconvenience of 99 000 e to
100 e (c = 1991 ), a posterior ratio of at least
990
1 is required (odds
990 : 1 at Pr(A |E) > 990991 ≈ 99.9%)
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The identity inference process following the BDF is illustrated
in Fig. 2.1: the belief in the prior ratio of pi = 1011 (odds 10 : 1
at Pr(A) = 1011 ≈ 91.0%) is updated by an LR of 120 to the be-
lief in the posterior ratio of pi1−pi
1
20 =
10
1
1
20 =
1
2 (odds 1 : 2 at
Pr(A |E) = 13 ≈ 33.3%). Thus, the convenient smart home appli-
cation decides on proposition A, whereas the security application
decides on proposition B.
However, the amount of captured voice signals (audio duration)
varies among interaction instances, causing the biometric voice
comparison to operate on mismatching sample completeness con-
ditions. Also, facing increasing noise levels, e.g., originating from
ventilation systems and television sets running in the background
during a biometric capture process (ambient and biometric noise),
the biometric system operates on mismatching noise conditions. Ei-
ther way, the estimation precision of LRs declines, effectively result-
ing in the miscalibration of the biometric system output: a score of
1
20 will lead to misconducted decision making if not accounting
for changes in, e.g., sample completeness and signal quality. Let’s
assume the biometric probe is mated, high well-calibrated scores
are expected, such as an LR of 991 , but an LR of
1
20 is observed.
For a prior pi = 1011 , a posterior ratio of
pi
1−pi
99
1 =
990
1 resembles
(at the posterior probability Pr(A |E) = 990991 ≈ 99.9%), meeting the
requirements of either exemplary smart home application in order
to decide for proposition A. For the purpose of making good deci-
sions on average, formal decision making requirements (c,pi) need
to be refined for a speaker recognition system in unconstrained en-
vironments, such that low quality is capable of justifying to decide
for a true identity claim and against a false claim.
In this dissertation, LR values are re-biased by an offset, which de-
pends on the sample quality. By employing a fully Bayesian system as
baseline, well-calibrated scores (LRs) are sustained from the feature
domain by employing appropriate signal processing and modeling.
Facing unconstrained environments, scores (corresponding to ideal
LRs on idealistic controlled conditions) become uncalibrated and are
unsuitable to ideal decision making across all thresholds if the biomet-
ric voice sample quality degrades. This dissertation investigates on
sustaining biometric discrimination (low error rates) and calibration
(low Bayes risk across all thresholds) in unconstrained environments.
Therefore, score normalization and calibration schemes are examined
(based on estimates of biometric quality), producing discriminative
scores and well-calibrated system outputs: LR scores.
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2.1.2 Likelihood Ratios: Well-Calibrated System Outputs
Classification systems are well-calibrated if the yielded LRs are rep-
resentative of the feature distribution [26, 80, 83]. Thus, calibration
is a property of scores: well-calibrated scores are LRs. Following the
Bayesian rule, decisions are made based on LRs: optimal decisions
are performed if a classifier yields scores comparable to the Bayes
threshold [26, 80]. However, if the LRs of the classifier are not well-
calibrated, then the Bayes threshold will not be optimal either. Uncal-
ibrated LRs will be referred to as simply scores and well-calibrated
scores as log(LR) of LLRs.23 The calibration property is important for
applications requiring a transparent relation between the strength of
evidence and the decision risk as systems are used in any kind of
application ranging from high-security (e.g., access to bank accounts)
to high-convenience (e.g., access to personalized publicity). For the
former, systems must be restrictive with impostors. For the latter,
systems must facilitate the user access. Since both cannot happen at
once, the application scenario then moves between two extremes: the
highest-security (very few Type I errors) and the highest-convenience
(very few Type II errors). Changing decision policies towards secu-
rity, associated thresholds move from the extreme-convenience to the
extreme-security and vice versa.
In order to map scores as system outputs of different recognition
systems into the same calibrated score space, obtaining optimal cal-
ibration is the important step. Afterwards, relations between cali-
brated thresholds, i.e., formalized decision policies, are addressable.
Thereby, relationships between decision policies become mathemati-
cally expressible and requirement assessment becomes automatically
provable. As an LLR threshold η is logarithmic, an equally impor-
tant movement of the threshold to higher security applications and
to higher convenience applications will have the same absolute value
(although it will have opposite signs). For instance, multiplying the
cost-ratio cBcA from 10 to 100, i.e., times 10 towards higher-security
applications, will mean an increase in η of log(10) = 2.3; and an
equivalent multiplication of cBcA from 100 to 10, i.e., times 10 towards
high-convenient applications, will add −2.3 to η. The same applies to
the multiplication of the ratio of prior probabilities. Thus, a calibrated
domain is desirable in order to measure how equivalent changes in
the application (changes in η) affect the system. In a calibrated score
scale, moving the Bayes logarithmic threshold η a given quantity (e.g.,
by ±2.3) implies the same for all score distributions since the scores
are well-calibrated, i.e., interpretable, as the meaning of each LLR
value is directly linked to the meaning of their corresponding LLR
threshold η. If both values are the same, the score reports on the ev-
23 Scores are treated as LLRs and not LRs due to mathematical convenience and in
order to assess log-odds.
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idence in the trade-off between class proportions and the threshold
informs on the least required trade-off between prior and cost odds
associated with the same classes.
In the following segment, the error rate centered perspective of
the biometrics standardization community is introduced. Gaps are
pointed out regarding the BDF, employed within the speaker recog-
nition community, and the difference in implications of both per-
spectives are pointed out by two examples. Afterwards, the BDF is
explained in detail and depending perspectives on performance as-
sessment are outlined. An overview on automated speaker recogni-
tion systems employing the BDF is provided thereafter, depicting the
state-of-the-art speaker recognition system that constitutes this disser-
tation’s baseline system.
2.2 biometric systems in iso/iec standardization
When employing biometric systems, harmonization between biomet-
ric system vendors (developing biometric systems) is crucial in order
to sustain high performance, low error rates as well as low decision
risks, good sample quality and security to biometric system owners,
operators, users (of a biometric system), and biometric system end-
users of biometric systems. The ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 biometrics24
committee develops standards with relevance to, e.g., passports, bor-
der control, and biometrics in banking and payments.25 SC 37 devel-
ops standards within different working groups26 (WGs):
• WG 1: harmonized biometric vocabulary
• WG 2: biometric technical interfaces
• WG 3: biometric data interchange formats
• WG 4: technical implementation of biometric systems
• WG 5: biometric testing and reporting
• WG 6: cross-jurisdictional and societal aspects of biometrics
Some terminology of the speaker recognition community is em-
ployed.27 However, as the scope of the harmonized biometric vocabulary
24 ISO/IEC JTC 1 is the joint technical committee (JTC) on information technology be-
tween the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). JTC 1 is organized in subcommittees (SCs).
25 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Christoph Busch [84].
26 See https://www.iso.org/committee/313770.html, accessed: 2017-10-12.
27 The term speaker recognition is the example par excellence for conflicting terminol-
ogy definitions. The community refers to itself as speaker recognition, whereas the
SC 37 compliant term would be voice biometrics instead. In the SC 37 harmonized
vocabulary, recognition is the umbrella term for verification and identification tasks.
However, in the speaker recognition community, speaker recognition can also refer to
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[1] is placed regarding black (and gray) box testing,28 this dissertation
partially differs in some terms. Exemplarily, the term sample quality
is specified within biometric standardization as its use within stan-
dardization diverges from its use in natural language. Otherwise, the
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED) [86] is sufficient for defining
terminology. In biometric standardization, the quality of a sample is
explicitly linked to degrading biometric recognition performance. In
the COED, one of its definitions is specific to voice data: distinguish-
ing characteristic or characteristics of a speech sound [86]. The purpose of
this research is to sustain good performance levels regardless of the
quality. This is only possible if quality is linked to signal properties
instead of performance (as is the case in biometric standardization).
The COED definition of quality as the degree of excellence of something
leaves ambiguity to the interpretation of excellence. For standardiz-
ing the evaluation of biometric systems for a fixed dataset, linking
excellence with performance is sufficient. For researching on how to
improve performance on non-fixed datasets, however, this link is in-
sufficient. This dissertation’s approach of quantifying excellence aims
at examining changes within signal processing of a recognition sys-
tem; quality changes of a voice sample are linked to changes in its
representation during speech signal processing.
This section depicts relevant aspects of WGs 1 and 5.
2.2.1 Generalized System Design
The design of biometric systems is standardized29 in terms of a gen-
eral subsystem composition [25, 87]. Fig. 2.2 (as of [87]) illustrates the
subsystem composition. The subsystems are:
• Data capture. Biometric capture subjects present their biological
or behavioral characteristics, which are captured by biometric
sensors (potentially assembled in a capture device), e.g., micro-
phones, resulting in a biometric sample, e.g., a digital audio file.
voice verification as the identification task is usually researched in terms of language
recognition (technology-pushing labs working on speaker recognition mostly work
on language recognition simultaneously). The BDF provides fairly enough freedom
to generalize from one task to another. This choice is made for the purpose of the
visibility of this dissertation in its major research field, the speaker recognition com-
munity.
28 The main purpose of ISO/IEC 2382-37 [1] is the harmonization of documents de-
veloped within the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 biometrics committee [85], in particular
towards the ISO/IEC 19795-1 project [25]. As [25] standardizes the performance and
testing reporting of biometric systems, the communication between vendors, opera-
tors, and owners is targeted. For the sake of tractability and in order to reach consen-
sus on performance measures and visualizations, abstract perspectives on biometric
systems are solely considered, particularly black (and gray) box testing.
29 See standing document (SD) 11 of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 [87], http://isotc.iso.
org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=9626779&objAction=Open, accessed: 2017-
10-12.
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• Signal processing. Samples are segmented into relevant and
non-relevant regions of interest, comprising speech and non-
speech, such that biometric features can be extracted. Qual-
ity control assures high system performance by rejecting low-
quality samples, assuming that new samples can be recap-
tured.30 High-quality features representing enrolment samples
are utilized for the creation of biometric references. Probe sam-
ples that are assured to be of high-quality as well are utilized in
the comparison subsystem.
• Data storage. Databases comprise enrolled biometric references.
For recognition comparisons, stored references are requested
and loaded from the database. During verification, a single
biometric identity is claimed and the depending reference is
loaded. During identification, multiple references are loaded.
• Comparison. Biometric reference and probe features are com-
pared, reporting their similarity or dissimilarity as scores,
whereby verifications are 1 : 1 reference – probe comparisons,
and identifications compare a set of references against a probe,
i.e., 1 : n comparisons.
• Decision. In a two-stage process, verification or identification
outcomes are determined. First, scores are compared to thresh-
olds, resulting in preliminary decisions or candidate lists. Sec-
ond, decision policies are employed on these preliminaries from
which the final recognition outcome results.
For the purpose of putting this dissertation into the context of bio-
metrics standardization, that is to generalized biometric systems, the
focus is solely31 placed on verification as a recognition task, particu-
larly in similarity scores resulting from the comparison module.
Example: Generalized Biometric Systems in this Dissertation
In this dissertation, data capture, data storage, signal processing,
and comparison subsystems are assumed to be fixed, whereby the
data flow is readable. Moreover, the decision subsystem (likewise
the jurisprudential decision maker) is segregated, such that the
score output of the comparison subsystem needs to be well-cali-
brateda in order to satisfy different decision policies that are un-
30 Recaptures can be sustained in active capture scenarios, such as border control or
mobile payments. In forensic biometrics, however, crime scene specimen cannot be
recaptured, leading forensic experts to assessing the benefit of examining a speci-
men’s sample quality in order to continue with analytic evidence reporting or refus-
ing the specimen.
31 Notably, the employed comparator modules are also capable to 1 : 1, 1 : n and
m : n recognition tasks, such that measures and methods proposed in this thesis
are expected to be generalizable. For the purpose of keeping the narrative rather
digestible, speaker recognition is addressed in terms of verification.
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Figure 2.2: General design of a biometric system; source and shape seman-
tics: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 SD 11 [87].
known at the time of system development or when operational
conditions change in unconstrained environments.
Regarding forensic practitioners, the evidence of biometric voice
data cannot be (re-) captured as in controlled environments and
hence needs to be examined asis or be rejected for case work. Thus,
sample quality is addressed in this dissertation as a quantification in
terms of an estimate about a condition’s characteristic for the pur-
pose of adaptively normalizing and calibrating comparison scores
to improve decision making for decision policies unknown to sys-
tem development. In contrast to the quality control process that
could issue a recapture of biometric samples, as depicted in Fig. 2.2,
quality information estimated during feature extraction could aid
in recalibrating log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores (or thresholds).
In order to analyze the impact of varying environmental condi-
tions that are directly comparable, the signal processing subsystem
is investigated distinctively in terms of acoustic and biometric feature
extraction. Intermediate features situated in between are analyzed
in order to estimate quality impacts on the non-biometric signal
processing. As an extension to the generalized design, this disserta-
tion proposes to exploit the quality control module under simulated
operational condition changes, such that the behavior of system
decisions is adaptively calibrated using quality estimates. Preserv-
ing scores as the weight of evidence (LLRs) sustains good decision
making in forensic and commercial application use cases.
a Notably, published SC 37 standards (as of 2019) do not consider score calibration.
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2.2.2 Performance and Testing Reporting Framework
In order to fairly compare biometric systems, ISO/IEC 19795-1 [25]
defines a framework for performance testing and reporting. The
framework differentiates fundamental performance metrics on error
rates at different stages of a biometric system, in particular:
• Enrolment and acquisition. The proportion of uncaptured bio-
metric characteristic presentations is the failure-to-acquire rate
(FTA), whereas the proportion of captured enrolment samples
but of insufficient biometric sample quality is the failure-to-enrol
rate (FTE).
• Comparison. As algorithm performance, the Type I error rate is
the false match rate (FMR) and the Type II error rate is the false
non-match rate (FNMR).
• Transaction. Combining the FTA and both algorithm error rates
in technology evaluations, the Type I error rate is the false ac-
cept rate (FAR) and the Type II error rate is the false reject rate
(FRR).
• Technology, scenario, and operational evaluation. Combining
the FTE and the transaction error rates, the Type I error rate
is the generalized false accept rate (GFAR) and the Type II er-
ror rate is the generalized false reject rate (GFRR) in scenario
or operational evaluation. Thereby, the scenario evaluation con-
cerns end-to-end prototypes, and the operational evaluation is
conducted for one specific population and application combina-
tion.
In this dissertation, the FMR and the FNMR metrics are solely utilized
as the conducted research subdues technology evaluations. The FMR
is the proportion of completed non-mated comparison trials in which the
non-mated probe and reference are falsely declared “match” [25, 2019 CD1
revision]. The FNMR is the proportion of completed mated comparison
trials in which mated probe and reference are falsely declared “non-match”
[25, 2019 CD1 revision].
FMR and FNMR trade-offs are visualized by so-called detection
error trade-off (DET) plots [88], cf. Fig. 2.3. For the sake of easier
tractability, scores stemming from mated or non-mated comparison
trials are referred to as class A and class B scores. DETs are originally
motivated by observations of the speaker recognition community that
many (adaptive) score normalization techniques tend to Gaussianize
the score distributions [89]. The motivation of DETs is to scale the
Type I and Type II error rate axes in such a way that error trade-
offs rather resemble straight lines than curves to aid the visualiza-
tion for an easier separability of systems’ performance. Therefore, the
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quantile function of the N(0, 1) distribution is used, i.e., the inverse cu-
mulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Thus,
DETs are quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plots of error rates. For the purpose
of illustrating capabilities and limitations of DET plots, Figs. 2.3a to
2.3c depict synthetic score distributions. Arbitrary system outputs are
simulated over different score ranges. (These distributions serve as ex-
emplary system outputs and are not intended to model some error
rate properties.) Depending score sets S2.3a,S2.3b,S2.3c are sampled
from normal (N), Beta (Beta), chi-square (χ2) and uniform (U) dis-
tributions: if score distributions follow Gaussian distributions, their
trade-off resembles a straight line in this Q-Q plot. However, if a
straight line resembles, the underlying score distributions are not
necessarily Gaussians as seen for the score set S2.3b, sampled from
χ2 and Beta distributions. Straight lines occur for other score distri-
butions than the normal distribution as well in the DET space.
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Figure 2.3: Examples of DETs for synthetic score distributions: histograms
(105 class B versus 5× 104 A score sets) (a),(b),(c) with class B
scores (red), class A scores (green); (d) DETs of (a) (solid), (b)
(dashed), and (b) (dash-dotted) with rule of 30 indications for
FMR (red) and FNMR (green).
In contrast to receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) [90], DET
plots can depict neither 0% nor 100% due to their underlying quantile
function, which considers a (−∞,+∞) space. Therefore, the major
advantage of DET plots as described in [88] is that they are visually
easier distinguishable by the human eye when score distributions are
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Gaussians. The quantile function of N(0, 1) is also known as the probit
function, defined by the inverse error function erf−1 as:
probit(x) ≡
√
2 erf−1(2 x− 1) . (2.1)
For the purpose of denoting upper and lower bounds to ob-
served error rates, the standardized performance testing and report-
ing framework [25] depicts Frequentist uncertainty estimates in terms
of confidence intervals, particularly two rules of thumb: the rule of
3 [91] and the rule of 30 [92]. Furthermore, zero-effort impostors are
considered, whereas attacks targeting a specific biometric reference
are not. Attackers might produce elaborated presentation attack in-
struments (PAIs) to yield higher similarity scores against the biomet-
ric reference of a specific target subject in a comparison trial.
2.2.3 Presentation Attack Detection: Testing and Reporting
Presentation attacks comprise artificial, human or other natural PAIs
[43], which are presented at sensor level to the biometric system but
may also consider modified biometric samples in research evaluations
[93]. Artificial PAIs are comprised presentation artefacts, such as in
audio replay attacks, speech synthesis or voice conversion. Fig. 2.4
illustrates attack points to a biometric system and depicts the scope
of presentation attacks according to ISO/IEC 30107-1 [43].
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Figure 2.4: Overview on attack points in biometric systems with depicted
scope of ISO/IEC 30107-1; source and shape semantics: [43].
For detecting presentation attacks, presentation attack detection
(PAD) is considered an additional subsystem to the biometric system
[43], see Fig. 2.5: the PAD subsystem might influence the signal pro-
cessing or the comparison subsystems. However, [43] is not restricting
the system design as such. In [45, 94], system designs consider either
score fusion of comparison scores with PAD subsystem scores or a
unified classifier jointly conducting biometric comparison and PAD
recognition tasks.
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For operational evaluations, ISO/IEC 30107-3 [93] proposes the per-
formance assessment utilizing error rates for the PAD subsystem, in-
spired by ISO/IEC 19795-1 [25]. For scenario and technology testing,
the biometric standard family on PAD proposes to employ synthetic
PAIs for offline testing. Independent of whether presentation attacks
are conducted by impostors (subverting a system to be recognized as
another identity, by Type I errors) or by identity concealers (subvert-
ing a system to remain unrecognized, by Type II errors), Type I and
Type II error rates are represented by the attack presentation classifica-
tion error rate (APCER) and the bona fide presentation classification
error rate (BPCER). The APCER is the proportion of attack presentations
using the same PAIS incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations in a
specific scenario [93]. The BPCER is the proportion of bona fide presenta-
tions incorrectly classified as presentation attacks in a specific scenario [93].
For the purpose of targeting operating points enforcing security at a
defined level, [93] recommends (but does not require) to report the
BPCER at a 5% APCER (BPCER20). Moreover, figures of merit based
on weighted error rates are explicitly deprecated in this standard—a
result from discussions on the half total error rate. Information the-
ory motivated measures were not considered as the depreciation was
agreed upon. The APCER and BPCER metrics are relevant to this
dissertation’s emphasis on PAD. Other PAD related metrics consider
non-responses, duration efficiency, the data capture subsystem, and
full system evaluation.
The performance and testing reporting framework as such, how-
ever, solely depicts a Frequentist’s perspective on performance as-
sessment, whereas this dissertation aims at the benefit of a system’s
contribution to decision making, such as decision risk assessment em-
ploying the BDF. In contrast to the biometric standardization commu-
nity, the ongoing PAD research challenge of the speaker recognition
community, the ASVspoof challenge, employs a tandem decision risk
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[52] as a figure of merit in its 2019 edition [48], i.e., a weighted er-
ror rate motivated from information theory resembling the expected
risk of employing a speaker recognition system as well as a PAD sub-
system. Both communities disconnect: in ISO/IEC 30107-3 [93], any
form of weighted error rates are deprecated, such as the ASVspoof 2019
primary figure of merit. This discrepancy illustrates that more har-
monization work is necessary to bring both (currently rather disjoint)
wings of the larger biometric community closer together.
2.3 gap analysis iso/iec 19795-1 :2006
The ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 [25] standard is one of the most relevant32
projects of the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 committee as it is focussed on
the principles and framework of biometric performance testing and
reporting.33 Its major benefit is a unified reporting of biometric recog-
nition performance as is, agreed under international consensus from
industrial, governmental, and academic sites. However, the 2006 ver-
sion of this standardization project remains unchanged (confirmed
in 2011 and in 2016), such that more recent methodologies in perfor-
mance assessment have been unconsidered for over a decade.
In brief, the gap of ISO/IEC 19795-1 [25] to the state-of-the-art per-
formance evaluation (in speaker recognition) is due to the fact that
the standard has not been changed for over 15 years (when it was
initially drafted). The standard solely considers evaluation results in
terms of error rates as is rather than their predictive power. Thereby, em-
pirical uncertainty is just addressed in terms of the trust in repetitions
(confidence in a sampling comprising true values) but not in terms
of the trustworthiness of forecasts (credibility in the inference among
multiple uncertain decisions). Considering the Bayes theorem not only
in system development (machine learning) but also in system evalua-
tion, the following gaps of the ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 standard [25] to
the speaker recognition community are identified:
32 Historically (from the start of the SC 37 committee onwards), the early 19795-1
project aimed at the evaluation performance harmonization of multiple vendor al-
gorithms. Beside other projects from the 19795 family (required to implement their
part 1 framework), the standardization of biometric application interfaces (province
of WG 2, not required to implement 19795-1) builds upon the design of a generalized
biometric system (province of WG 5), cf. Fig. 2.2. For the harmonized communication
between standardization projects being discussed in different WGs, two standing
documents (SDs) were established: SD 2 on the harmonized biometric vocabulary [95],
regularly updating the ISO/IEC standard 2382-37 [1]; and SD 11 [87] on the gen-
eral biometric system, summarizing the outline of the 19795-1 standard [25]. Based on
the interface specifications (province of WG 2), technical implementations are stan-
dardized (province of WG 4), independent of data interchange format specifications
(province of WG 3). In order to pursue a harmonized terminology, SD 2 is an ongoing
project (province of WG 1) to which all other WGs contribute (also WG 6 on cross-
jurisprudential and societal aspects). In other words, the outline and assumptions of
the 19795-1 project [25] are fundamental to many SC 37 projects.
33 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Christoph Busch [84].
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• Proper scoring rules. The applicability of a biometric system to
decision making processes is not addressed. As testing reports
are likely to be employed for performance prediction of future
decision making, the prediction accuracy assessment of such
reports is of utmost relevance to avoid misleading decisions that
could be made when performance reports solely report error
rates as is regardless of their impact to decision making.
• Identity inference for decision making. Bayesian (identity) in-
ference is crucial for the purpose of making good decisions
on average and, consequently, in order to assess the depend-
ing Bayes (decision) risk as a performance metric. The stan-
dard addresses a traditional Frequentist perspective by limiting
its scope to the exclusive reporting of error proportions, spar-
ing any Bayesian perspective on performance assessment. Con-
sequently, Bayesian perspectives on performance evaluation ap-
pear not to comply with the standard (as non-conformant) as
depending methods remain unmentioned.
The current standard addresses confidence intervals of error rates
rather than credible intervals: confidence intervals concern a large
number of repetitions, e.g., 95% of (entire) experiment sam-
plings (repetitions) confirm an error rate interval and 5% of the
samplings oppose this error rate interval, such as 5 out of 100
conducted experiments. By contrast, credible intervals concern
the uncertainty of an error rate estimate. For a fixed 95% credibil-
ity, the true error rate is believed to be in a narrower interval
around the observation when larger data amounts are used. In
that case, the error rate estimation is believed to be more pre-
cise. When using smaller data amounts, the true error rate is
believed to be in a wider interval around the observation. The
error rate estimation is then believed to be more uncertain/less
precise. Even if the debate on Frequentist versus Bayesian is a
rather philosophical one, it is possible to state that, in an experi-
mental observation, the Frequentist’s perspective on the current
standard can only provide answers to where a true error rate
is indirectly, whereas a Bayesian perspective provides answers
directly.
• Information theory. This standard focuses on particular appli-
cation requirements for systems under test, with error rates
serving as a proxy for an information theoretic perspective on
performance. However, under unknown requirements prior to
the employment of a system, such as during research and de-
velopment of multi-application systems or for forensic scenar-
ios, an abstraction of performance is necessary, especially when
decision cost matrices remain unspecified (e.g., in a forensic wit-
ness report). Therefore, threshold values need to be addressed
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in a more formalized way. By associating their value correspond-
ing to the proportion of competing classes within the feature
space, the divergence between score distributions of each class
is addressable in a formal manner. The formalization of decision
making allows to examine the information gain from employing
a system for an (identity) inference process under different de-
cision requirement assumptions.
These gaps represent two fundamentally different approaches on
denoting decision thresholds: the standard assesses proportions of er-
rors initially in order to derive the corresponding operating point, a
threshold value. Under the Bayesian paradigm, in contrast, threshold
values are denoted before performance evaluation. However, for the
premise of testing solely one application scenario with one report, i.e.,
no cross-application testing, the 19795-1 standard [25] is well appli-
cable, such as in research and development solely dedicated to auto-
mated border control (between two specific airports). The outlined
gaps need to be considered for research and development of cross-
application systems, e.g., for smart home, online banking, or forensic
applications. In the following, the gaps are addressed in more detail.
The following sections briefly discuss proper scoring rules, Frequen-
tist versus Bayesian philosophies and their implications towards the
rule of 3 and rule of 30, parts of the informative (non-normative) an-
nex of ISO/IEC 19795-1 [25]. Afterwards, identity inference for deci-
sion making is addressed in more detail, illustrating perspectives on
performance measures emerging (inter alia) from the speaker recog-
nition community. Finally, the state-of-the-art in speaker recognition
and the baseline system used in this dissertation are outlined.
2.3.1 Proper Scoring Rules: in Brief
In decision theory, the accuracy of (probabilistic) predictions is ad-
dressed by proper scoring rules [78, 96–98], with Brier [96] being the
most prominent paper. In this paper, the goodness of weather fore-
casts is addressed, proposing to relate the forecast probability with the
relative occurrence probability (error proportions). It states that arbitrary
scores may not be the most useful forecast. The metric Brier score is the
mean square error between prediction probability and the actual out-
come (favoring a proposition), i.e., between a system’s (probabilistic)
score and the probability of that proposition to occur. In the literature,
various other scoring rules are proposed. The goodness of automatic
pattern recognizers is evaluated by their application-independent Bayes
risk: scores are recognition system outputs that need to reflect the
class distribution within the feature space (in a formalized manner).
In other words, scores need to encode Type I and Type II error propor-
tions when making binary decisions, independent of the classes’ prior
probabilities that are conveyed within an evaluation dataset. That is,
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to produce log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores, where the depending ex-
pected Bayes risk is referred to as the cost of LLRs, namely Cllr [26, 28].
In the feature space, LLR scores reflect the class distribution regard-
ing the competing propositions. In the decision space, LLR thresholds
reflect the ratio of erroneous decisions made regarding these proposi-
tions (considering the prior probabilities of classes in a dataset). LLR
scores are the most useful scores for binary decision making. Moti-
vated by proper scoring rules, the preservation of LLR score proper-
ties is essential to sustain better decision making on average.
Proper scoring rules may be defined in two equivalent ways [99]:
• Let P and Q be probability distributions predicting a class u ∈
U. Proper scoring rules are real-valued functions S(Q,u), where
the expected value34 w.r.t. P is minimized at P = Q:
〈S(P,u)〉u∼P 6 〈S(Q,u)〉u∼P . (2.2)
If the minimum is unique, the rule is referred to as a strictly
proper scoring rule.
• Let Q be a probability distribution to predict a class u ∈ U. Let
d ∈ D be a decision based on Q, while u is (still) unknown. Let
C(d,u) be a real-valued cost function, quantifying the goodness
of decision d, after the class of u becomes known. Let d∗Q ∈ D
be a minimum-expected-cost decision with:
〈C(d∗Q,u)〉u∼Q 6 〈C(d,u)〉u∼Q ∀d ∈ D , (2.3)
then S(Q,u) = C(d∗Q,u) is a proper scoring rule.
Both definitions imply another definition; let D = U: decisions d can
be interpreted as predictions for u [99].
2.3.2 Frequentist and Bayesian: in a Nutshell
Philosophically [100], Frequentist and Bayesian approaches elaborate
on concepts of uncertainty. Frequentists describe uncertainty due to
randomness (aleatory uncertainty) but cannot describe the uncertainty
due to lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty) using probabilities. In
contrast, Bayesians utilize probabilities to quantify any kind of un-
certainty: a Bayesian proposition’s probability represents a degree of
belief in the truth of that proposition (randomness in a Frequentist’s
perspective).35 In other words, a Bayesian credible interval addresses
the chance of a proposition being true, while the Frequentist confidence
interval addresses the relative amount of experiments, which will con-
tain the true value, denoted as p-value like, e.g., p = 0.95. The heart
34 The expectation operator is denoted by 〈·〉.
35 Again, the term proposition is preferred over the terms event or hypothesis, which
imply randomness of the outcome.
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of the debate is on whether something is unknown or unknowable, whether
its uncertainty is due to fundamentally unpredictable randomness or to po-
tentially resolvable lack of knowledge [100].
By consequence, this debate addresses the inference of parameter
values of a recognition mode: Frequentist approaches can exclusively
infer statements about parameters indirectly, whereas Bayesian ap-
proaches can make direct statements that are unambiguous towards
the parameters to be learned. Thereby, from a Frequentist perspective,
error rates represent the discrimination power of a learned model,
whereas in a Bayesian perspective, performance is quantified directly
regarding both the discrimination power and the prediction power.
The performance evaluation of biometric recognition needs to be ad-
dressed regarding proper scoring rules in order to inform commercial
and forensic system biometric system owners about the usefulness of
employing a system for their decision making requirements. Regard-
ing biometric recognition, this dissertation solely emphasizes the ver-
ification task, i.e., LLRs in 1 : 1 comparisons with the Cllr proper
scoring rule ([28] provides a multi-class generalization of Cllr).
From a Frequentist perspective, thresholds are indirectly defined
by error rates: an error rate constraint is defined before evaluation,
a system’s threshold value achieving this constraint is derived after
all comparison scores are computed. Thereby, the decision policy is
not necessarily considered right away. For instance, this is the case
in biometric standardization [25, 101], where a match/non-match de-
cision is made utilizing an error rate based threshold. The verifica-
tion outcome, however, may employ further decision policies, see sec-
tion 2.2, leading to a formal way of denoting operating points (Bayes
thresholds). In the following section, implications of either beformen-
tioned philosophies on performance assessment are discussed and
compared by means of two examples. Both examples briefly address
how error rates are principally dealt with. Implications and benefits
of the Bayesian perspective are directly compared to well-established
tools based on a Frequentist perspective. After these examples, the
Bayesian perspective is introduced in depth.
2.3.3 Thresholds According to Error Rates (Frequentist)
An error occurs by comparing a score S to a threshold t:
t
accept
6
reject
S . (2.4)
A Type I error occurs if a class B score is greater or equal to t; and a
Type II error occurs if a class A is lower than t. Looking at one error
type at a time, each comparison is a trial of binary outcome, whereby
a series of binary-outcome trials is known as a Bernoulli experiment.
Conventionally, Bernoulli experiments are outlined for coin tosses.
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This setup describes the toss of an unfair coin with the depending
error rate resembling the fairness of that coin. When examining a
score set instead of coin tosses, an error rate e is drawn as a Binomial
experiment with the underlying Binomial distribution Bin (n,p) with
n i.i.d. (comparison) scores and the true error probability p and k
being the number of errors:
Pr (k;n,p) =
(
n
k
)
pk (1− p)n−k . (2.5)
Thereby, the observed error rate e is a sampling of Bin (n,p); the ob-
servation e is not necessarily equal to the truth p.
As the observed error rate is not the true error rate—after all, we are
sampling—precise statements about recognition performance are of
interest. Two rules of thumb, namely the rule of 3 [25, 91] and the rule
of 30 [25, 92] are motivated from the Frequentist perspective but find
their counterparts in the Bayesian perspective as well. Both denote
bounds to the estimation of the true error probability p based on the
observed error rate e. The rule of 30 addresses how much the true
error rate is off from the estimate derived from the sampling and how
many observed errors would be necessary to limit the uncertainty of
error rate estimates. The rule of 3, however, addresses the observation
of zero errors. In the case of observing perfect class discrimination,
the lowest error rate that can be reported under a given confidence is
estimated.
Example: Frequentist Implication I / II, the Rule of 3
When observing zero errors, a Frequentist questions the random-
ness of a sampling, an experimental setup in this case, as other
i.i.d. samplings might result in higher observed error rates. The bi-
nomial distribution of Eq. (2.5) is parameterized with k = 0 (zero
errors) and compared to a confidence interval c:
Pr (0;n,p) > 1− c ,(
n
0
)
p0 (1− p)n−0 > 1− c ,
(1− p)n > 1− c ,
n log(1− p) > log(1− c) . (2.6)
The term log(1 − p) depends on the true error rate p, which is
expanded by the Taylor/Maclaurin series (as |p| < 1):
log(1− p) = −
∞∑
k=1
pk
k
= −p−
p2
2
−
p3
3
− · · · . (2.7)
For very small p values, the higher moments become negligible,
such that: log(1− p) ≈ −p. The least upper bound to p is approxi-
mated by:
−np ≈ log(1− c) , ≈ − log(1− c)
n
. (2.8)
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The true error is estimated depending on the number of i.i.d. scores.
The rule of 3 states for a c = 95% confidence:
p ≈ 3
n
; (2.9)
the quantile value for c = 0.95 is approximated as log(0.05) ≈ −3.
The rule of 3 is a rule of thumb depending on the number of scores,
presenting the lowest error rate for a 95% confidence level. When re-
sampling an experimental setup, the prediction of p is the lowest true
error rate in 95 of 100 cases but not in 5 of 100 cases, on average.
Example: Frequentist Implication II / II, the Rule of 30
When observing errors, a Frequentist questions the randomness of
a sampling, as in other i.i.d. samplings the true error rate might be
completely off from the observed error rate. In [25, 92], a relative
band is hypothesized around the observed error rate e in terms of
a scaling term a (the relative band is (1± a) e), wherein the true
error rate could lie (or not). The difference between observation
and truth |e− p| compared with a relative band of the observation
a e by a scaling factor a is expressed probabilistically: Pr(|e− p| >
a e). In order to simplify comparisons to a confidence interval c,
this probability term can be expressed without the absolute value
operator | · | as:
Pr(|e− p| > a e) = Pr
(
e > p
1− a
)
+ Pr
(
e 6 p
1+ a
)
6 1− c .
(2.10)
Akin to the rule of 3, a binomial distribution is assumed. By as-
suming n is large, the binomial distribution is approximated by a
normal distribution which is known as the Wald test: Bin (n,p) ≈
N (np,np (1− p)). Thereby, the probability terms Pr
(
e > p1−a
)
and Pr
(
e 6 p1+a
)
are assumed to follow a normal distribution, for
which p is standardized in the form of pˆ ∼ N
[
p, p (1−p)n
]
. For the
probability Pr
(
e > p1−a
)
, this standardization is carried out as:
e > p
1− a
⇔ e− p > p
1− a
− p =
p− p+ ap
1− a
=
ap
1− a
⇔ (e− p)
√
n√
p
√
1− p
> ap
1− a
√
n√
p
√
1− p
⇔ e− p√
p (1−p)
n
> a
1− a
√
p
√
p
√
n√
p
√
1− p
⇔ X > a
1− a
Y . (2.11)
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The two random variables X, Y are introduced for the sake of easier
tractability:
X =
e− p√
p (1−p)
n
∼ N[0, 1] , and Y =
√
np
1− p
. (2.12)
Indeed, e is centered by the mean value p and normalized
by the standard deviation
√
p (1−p)
n . Similarly, the probability
Pr
(
e 6 p1+a
)
is standardized:
e 6 p
1+ a
⇔ e− p 6 p− p− ap
1+ a
⇔ X 6 −a
1+ a
Y , (2.13)
such that Eq. (2.10) is expressed by:
Pr(|e− p| > a e) ≈ Pr
(
X > a
1− a
Y
)
+ Pr
(
X 6 −a
1+ a
Y
)
6 1− c .
(2.14)
Numerically, values for Y result by using the closed-form solu-
tion of the standard normal cumulative density function. The sub-
stituted Eq. 2.10 is solved to zero for the normally distributed ran-
dom variable X:
0 = Pr
(
X > a
1− a
Y
)
+ Pr
(
X 6 −a
1+ a
Y
)
− (1− c) . (2.15)
The solution will result as a term depending on Y, which encodes
the terms p,n as: Y2 = n p1−p . The ratio
p
1−p is expressed by the
Taylor series at the center 0 (assuming very small error rates):
p
1− p
=
∞∑
k=1
pk = p+ p2 + p3 + · · · , (2.16)
where for very small p values, higher moments become negligible
( p1−p ≈ p), such that: Y2 ≈ np ; Y2 approximates the number of
true errors np. Parameterizing a = 30%, c = 90% [25, 92] (30%
relative band to the observation with a two-sided test; each side is
tested with a 5% confidence interval), the number of errors approx-
imates Y2 ≈ 30.
The rule of 30 addresses the minimum amount of errors necessary,
such that the true error rate p lies within a relative band of ±a to
the observed error rate e at a confidence interval c. In other words,
for the shown parameterization, on average, at least 30 errors need
to be observed, such that in 90 out of 100 cases, the true error rate
p lies within a ±30% band of the observed error rate e; but not in 10
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out of 100 cases. In 5 out of 100 cases, the true error rate is below 0.7 e,
and in another 5 out of 100 cases, the true error rate is above 1.3 e
(values are limited to the [0, 1] interval for probabilities). Eventually,
the rule of 30 assumes large datasets, such that the binomial distribu-
tion is approximated by a Gaussian distribution; and very low error
rates, such that Y2 approximates the number of true errors. On high
error rates, the term np1−p (number of true errors by the true success
rate) remains rather intractable. Thus, the rule of 30 is inapplicable
to datasets of limited data and to observed error rates that are higher
than very low.
2.3.4 Thresholds before Evaluation (Bayesian)
This section illustrates how the outlines of the rule of 3 and the rule
of 30 change when moving from a Frequentist to a Bayesian perspec-
tive. The uncertainty of the observed error rates is modeled by so-
called uninformative priors, i.e., priors of maximum entropy. As a scalar,
the value of the uninformative prior is 0.5 (a half or 50%). As a ran-
dom variable (a prior distribution), different distributional assump-
tions can be made [64]. From a Bayesian perspective, a prior belief is
modeled either by a scalar probability or by a probability distribution.
The prior belief is updated by an observation to the posterior belief. If
the distribution of posterior and prior belief is of the same probability
distribution family, both distributions are called conjugate. Conjugate
priors give a closed-form solution for the posterior (numerical conve-
nience).
Example: Bayesian Implication I / II, the Rule of 3
The Bayesian rule of 3a is described in [91]. The true error rate p
given an observation Y is stated in terms of Bayes’ theorem as [102]:
Pr(p |Y) = Pr(Y |p)
Pr(p)
Pr(Y)
, (2.17)
where the posterior follows a Bernoulli distribution for error rates.
The conjugate prior of the Bernulli distribution is the Beta distribu-
tion. Parameters of the prior distribution are assumed as Beta(1,b)
with the variable b, where the parameter 1 is chosen in order to pro-
vide the prior with a local maximum away from zero that, without addi-
tional information, cannot be justified [91]. Thereby, the corresponding
Bayesian extension of Eq. (2.8) is approximated by a Taylor expan-
sion with the least upper bound regarding the number of scores n
[91]:
p ≈ − log(1− c)
n+ b
≈ 3
n+ b
. (2.18)
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The uninformative uniform prior is addressed by denoting b = 1
[91], yielding for a c = 95% credible interval:
p ≈ 3
n+ 1
. (2.19)
a Notably, the ISO/IEC standard 19795-1 [25] depicts the Frequentist rule of 3 as of
[91], while the Bayesian counterpart is spared.
A slight modification of the Frequentist rule of 3 results. With a
credibility of 95%, the lowest error rate to be predicted is 3n+1 when
observing zero errors on n scores.
Revisiting the rule of 30, which is rather suitable for large scale
tests, the inherent assumptions of large n values might not hold true
for small datasets. A Bayesian alternative for limited data scenarios
is encouraged regarding the Type I and Type II error trade-off assess-
ment. Error rates p might not be assumed small, either, if they are, for
example, in the equal error rate (EER) region. On targeting challeng-
ing data, however, EERs might be fairly large as well. This raises the
following question: given an observed error rate e and the number of
i.i.d. scores n, which lower and upper bounds for the true error rate p
to be in this relative band can be denoted on a 90% credible interval?
Example: Bayesian Implication II / II, the Rule of 30
Targeting an objective prior, an uninformative prior distribution
can be used for a parametric space γ, such as Jeffrey’s prior p(γ)
[103], which is related to the Fisher information matrix I(γ) as:
p(γ) ∝
√
det (I(γ)) . (2.20)
Regarding Bernoulli trials, Jeffrey’s prior results in the Beta dis-
tribution: Beta(α = 0.5,β = 0.5), where α,β represent successes
and failures. Given a score set of n scores, the observed error rate
e is defined by the number of observed errors x with e = xn , such
that the posterior distribution for p is derived as:
p ∼ Beta (x+ 0.5,n− x+ 0.5) . (2.21)
Inspired by the rule of 30, a two-sided 90% credible interval is
examined, depicting the 5th-quantilea of Eq. (2.21) as an estimate
for the lower bound, and depicting the 95th-quantile of Eq. (2.21) as
an estimate for the upper bound.b
a Example on n = 90, x = 3, e ≈ 3.3% providing pBayeslower ≈ 1.2%, see:
https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=5%25+quantile+betadistribution%
5Bx%2B.5,+n-x%2B.5%5D+with+n+%3D+90+and+x+%3D+3
b Example on n = 90, x = 3, e ≈ 3.3% providing pBayesupper ≈ 7.6%, see:
https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=95%25+quantile+betadistribution%
5Bx%2B.5,+n-x%2B.5%5D+with+n+%3D+90+and+x+%3D+3
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Tab. 2.1 provides a comparison among different database sizes on
a fixed observed error rate between the Frequentist’s rule of 30 to its
Bayesian alternative: as the database size increases, the performance
estimate becomes more certain, and the upper and lower bounds con-
verge to the single point performance estimate. While the Frequentist
confidence interval remains fixed, the Bayesian credible interval is ca-
pable of accounting for the amount of data. Its major benefit lies in the
evaluations of low data amounts, e.g., in the prototype development
of mobile biometrics and presentation attack detection (PAD) evalua-
tions, where comparatively limited data amounts can be collected. In
order to narrow the rule of 30 bounds (despite lowering confidence
or credible percentiles), the Frequentist approach requires lower error
rates, whereas the Bayesian approach requires more data.
Table 2.1: Examples of Bayesian rule of 30 credible interval
[
p
Bayes
lower ,p
Bayes
upper
]
of
error rates for e ≈ 3.33% on different database sizes n, compared
with the Frequentist rule of 30 confidence interval
[
p
Freq.
lower,p
Freq.
upper
]
with pFreq.lower = (1− 30%) e and p
Freq.
upper = (1+ 30%) e, remaining fixed
regardless of n.
n 9× 101 9× 102 9× 103 9× 104 9× 105 9× 106
x 3 3× 101 3× 102 3× 103 3× 104 3× 105
p
Freq.
upper 4.33% 4.33% 4.33% 4.33% 4.33% 4.33%
e 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33%
p
Freq.
lower 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33%
p
Bayes
upper 7.62% 4.43% 3.66% 3.43% 3.36% 3.34%
e 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33%
p
Bayes
lower 1.21% 2.46% 3.03% 3.24% 3.30% 3.32%
The examples of the rule of 3 and of the rule of 30 illustrate im-
plications when moving from a Frequentist to a Bayesian perspective.
Taking a Frequentist perspective, recognition performance evaluation
concerns the repeatability of observations. After that, decisions are
made in an informal manner: requirements are denoted on error rates
(not on threshold values), such that threshold values are parameter-
ized after an evaluation is carried out. By contrast, Bayesians formal-
ize all types of uncertainty, including prior probabilities and decision
costs, such that threshold values are parameterized before any evalua-
tion is carried out. Then, the scope of recognition performance eval-
uations is extended to address the goodness of a recognition system’s
predictions. The following section illustrates how the observed gaps
of the ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 standard can be bridged when moving
from informal to formal decision making on the biometric identity in-
ference, i.e., from a Frequentist to a Bayesian perspective.
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2.4 bayesian decision framework
The Bayesian decision framework (BDF) combines Bayesian inference
and decision theory [56, 57], see Fig. 2.1. In this dissertation, the
BDF formalizes the interaction of the biometric comparison subsys-
tem and the decision subsystem. Motivated by Bayes’ theorem, prior
beliefs of competing propositions (class A : true identity claim, class
B: false identity claim) are updated by observing evidence in terms
of likelihood ratio (LR) comparison scores outputted by the biomet-
ric system, resulting in a posterior belief towards each proposition.
In other words, the biometric system contributes information to bio-
metric comparison as evidence to a Bayesian inference. In Bayesian
inference, a probabilistic prediction of each proposition results.36 By
comparing the probabilistic predictions, the posterior belief, to a deci-
sion cost matrix that reflects the operational policy, decision making
is formalized. The decision outcome favors the proposition yielding
the highest incentive, i.e., the lowest decision risk cost.
In this dissertation, (biometric) recognition systems, cf. Fig. 2.2, ide-
ally estimate log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores (log-LRs), and LLR
thresholds are formulated based on the prior and cost beliefs. The
posterior belief, as an intermediate result of the decision inference
chain, is substituted with the cost belief, resembling the formal re-
quirements of a decision cost matrix. LLR thresholds are parameter-
ized by additive impacts of the prior belief and the decision cost
matrix [28]. Eventually, an LLR threshold value is the prior belief
(additively) biased by the cost belief but also vice versa; its parame-
terization can as well be seen as the cost belief biased by the prior
belief. Either parameterization of the prior belief or the cost belief
can remain unknown, e.g., some smart home applications might run
in single households or in shared flats without further specification
(the prior belief is of full uncertainty). Whereas in the current foren-
sic practice, decision cost matrices are undefined since decisions are
made in the province of court (on the offense level), forensic practition-
ers report on evidence at the source and activity levels [20]. At these
levels, no intel exists on the cost belief—the cost belief is of full uncer-
tainty. If the prior belief remains unknown (at maximum prior entropy),
the decision cost matrix fully parameterizes the LLR threshold, and
the impact of the prior belief contributes a zero bias. If the cost be-
lief remains unknown (at maximum cost entropy), the prior belief fully
parameterizes the LLR threshold, and the impact of the cost belief
contributes a zero bias.
Effectively, decision and comparison subsystems are decoupled
[24]: subjective thresholds are formed by the prior belief and the de-
36 Due to their probabilistic nature, probabilistic extreme values (zero or one) are theo-
retically not possible throughout the BDF, whereas empirical measures, given insuf-
ficient data, can result in such.
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cision cost policy (effectively, operating points) which are compared
to objective evidence estimates (LLR scores). The formal decoupling
of subjective and objective domains accommodates for fully automated
decision making systems (with formalized requirements, parameter-
izing thresholds) as well as for the optimization of objective evidence
reporting independently of thresholds, e.g., by optimizing the good-
ness of LLR scores (Cllr as figure of merit) yielded by a recognition
system. The first is suitable for commercial application scenarios,
whereas the latter is suitable for forensic application scenarios: fol-
lowing the LLR estimation by the forensic practitioner (on the source
and activity levels), the trier of fact assigns priors based on other ele-
ments of the case in order to make a decision (on the offense level).
The following section introduces the underlying concepts of the
BDF, namely the total probability theorem, Bayesian inference, strictly
proper scoring rules, and effective operating points. Furthermore,
BDF related performance visualizations are introduced, reporting on
decision risk and the information supplied to decision making by a
system.
2.4.1 Total Probability Theorem and Identity Inference
The total probability theorem states the calculus, which is necessary to
outline and distinguish between propositions (prediction classes) [63,
64]. By denoting probabilities to the prior probability of each propo-
sition, a subjective degree of belief is formalized in each proposition to
be true. This prior belief is updated by a system’s objective assessment
of the evidence, resulting in the subjective posterior belief in the truth
of each proposition. Based on the posterior probabilities, biometric
identities are inferred, and informed decisions are made. The basis
of the BDF is the total probability theorem: let U partition the set U by
n mutually exclusive37 and exhaustive38 subsets A1, · · · ,An, such that
their union equals U [63, 64]:
U = [A1, · · · ,An] . (2.22)
In terms of biometric recognition, these partitions represent either
verification outcomes or (closed-set) identification outcomes. Open-
set identification outcomes can be targeted as well, when modeling
the prior belief in unknown propositions (such as by uninformative
priors). In this dissertation, LLRs inform on a binary decision (on A or
B), such that relevant populations [104] need to be defined, employed
for modeling the nominator Pr (E | A), and the denominator Pr (E | B)
likelihood estimates that form an LLR log Pr(E |A)Pr(E |B) . All existing data
that is relevant to the decision inference model is reflected by the set
37 Mutually exclusive: {} =
⋂
{Ai |Ai ∈ U}.
38 Exhaustive: U =
⋃
{Ai |Ai ∈ U}.
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U; the relevant population for class A and the relevant population for
class B (and of other classes) result from a partition U of U.
The BDF requires the relevant class populations to be mutually exclu-
sive and to be exhaustive in order to answer a simple question within
a decision inference chain (e.g., forensic case work might link more evi-
dence than biometric). Notably, the BDF is a model to decision mak-
ing, and an aspect of the real world is modeled in consequence (not
the entirety of the real world). This particular detail is crucial in two
ways: one might argue that the relevant population was capable of help-
ing to answer a stated simple question, which would be ideal if the de-
pending argumentation remained feasible. Another, however, might
argue that the simple question was answerable by the chosen relevant
population, which would be practicable if the depending argumenta-
tion followed best practices. For the first argument, the stated simple
question needs to be addressable, e.g., by the forensic practitioner em-
ploying a biometric system; for the latter, the chosen relevant popula-
tion needs to be reflective of the current case, e.g., to be justifiable to
a trier of fact. Therefore, the choice of how and which U partitions U
is crucial.
A1 A2 A3
AnA4 · · ·
(a) Partition Ui: n subsets
A1 A2 A3
AnA4 · · ·
B1
B2
B3
(b) Partitions Uii: 3 subsets
Figure 2.6: Total probability theorem example with subset partitions Ui =
[A1, · · · ,An] (black) and Uii = [B1,B2,B3] (green, blue, red).
Fig. 2.6 illustrates two partition examples Ui,Uii of U:
• The partition Ui depicts an arbitrary large number of n subsets
with, e.g., relevant populations as A1 for modeling class A and
A2, . . . ,An for modeling class B as not class A in U, where the
subsets are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in terms of the set
U. However, this partition is prone to run in intractable require-
ments: the stated simple question would require to reflect the
entire world, which is deemed to be unaddressable (indepen-
dently of whether or not one employs a sophisticated decision
framework). This partition approach, however, might appeal to
commercial application scenarios, when seeking further model-
ing generalizations.
• The partition Uii comprises 3 subsets as B1 = {A1,A4},B2 =
{A2,A3},B3 = {{Ai | i ∈ N, 4 < i < n},An} with, e.g., relevant
populations as B1 for modeling class A, B2 for modeling class
B, and B3 for modeling other populations, also being mutually
exclusive and exhaustive subsets in terms of the set U. However,
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this partition limits the range of simple questions asked by the
trier of fact, e.g., the subset A1 and A4 could reflect the voice
of close relatives of the same gender39 and the subsets A2 and
A3 could reflect the voices of two other suspects than the one
represented by A1. As a benefit, these simple questions are ad-
dressable by, e.g., a forensic practitioner. Notably, one needs to
bear in mind that the weight of evidence will solely report on
B1 and B2, summarized by the LLR, and B3 will remain with-
out likelihood estimation (unless modeled by prior beliefs in
the remaining classes and data availability to represent their
relevant population). In other words, the trier of fact needs to
examine the set U, where forensic practitioners would report on
the weight of evidence between the subsets B1 and B2 on the
source and activation levels, leaving B3 either to another evidence
report within a case (e.g., the LLR of B3 compared to the union
of B1 and B2), or to further considerations carried out on the
offense level.
Utilizing U, the total probability Pr (E) of an evidence observation E
(the new information) is partitioned by the subsets of U [63, 64]:
Pr (E) = Pr (E |A1) Pr (A1) + · · ·+ Pr (E |An) Pr (An) , (2.23)
where E is arbitrary but fixed.40
Considering binary decisions, i.e., decisions of binary outcome, e.g.,
({yes, no}, {true, false}, {accept, reject}), the proposition set U = [A,B]
comprises two subsets (likewise two partitions) A,B, which can be
part of a more complex U ⊆ U. For a simple question asked, however,
the model of U is sufficient, e.g., for A versus B; A1 versus A2; or B1
versus B2. Fig. 2.7a exemplarily depicts41 a two subset partitioning
of Pr (E) in geometrical terms: the total probability Pr (E) is the com-
bined area of the rectangles whose dimensions are the probability of
each subset partitioned in U (the prior beliefs: Pr(A), Pr(B)) and the
39 The so-called brother effect is not only well-known to forensic practitioners. It de-
scribes that the voices of closely related male speakers sound similar on the tele-
phone.
40 In [63], the new information is referred to as event rather than evidence. In the termi-
nology of Bayesian inference, the term evidence is preferred. In contrast to specimens,
i.e., a sample of a class, evidence is data presented in proof of the facts and generalizes
to any data derived from or as the specimen itself. Conventionally, the total probabil-
ity of an evidence Pr (E) reflects its emission probability. In other words, the same
(fixed) observed evidence E can be emitted by any subset A1, . . . ,An ∈ U, but with
varying emission probabilities Pr (E |A1) , . . . , Pr (E |An), depending on the particu-
lar subset. The law of total probability considers the prior probability of each subset
Pr (A1) , . . . , Pr (An), such that the union of all pairwise disjoint subset-depending
evidence emission probabilities resembles the total probability of the evidence. This
holds true for any measurable evidence observation (arbitrary).
41 The figure is inspired by educational videos of the YouTube 3Blue1Brown
channel by Grant Sanderson, see: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCYO_jab_
esuFRV4b17AJtAw.
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depending probability of E assuming that solely one of the subsets is
true (the conditional probabilities of the LR: Pr(E | A), Pr(E | B)). As all
subsets are mutually exclusive (each subset representing one among
mutually exclusive propositions), solely one of the propositions of the
subsets can be actually true.
Pr (A)
Pr (B)
Pr (E |A) Pr (not E |A)
Pr (E |B) Pr (not E |B)
Pr (E)
100%
100%
Pr (A,E)
Pr (B,E)
(a) Partitioning of Pr (E)
Pr (A|E) =
Pr(E |A) Pr(A)
Pr(E)
Pr (B|E) =
Pr(E |B) Pr(B)
Pr(E)
1
(b) Conditional probabilities
Figure 2.7: Partitioning of the total probability depending on beliefs, leading
to conditional probabilities of the Bayes rule.
Fig. 2.7b shows how the posterior belief is derived as the condi-
tional probability Pr (Ai |E) for a subset Ai given the evidence E [63,
64]:
Pr (Ai |E) =
Pr (Ai,E)
Pr (E)
= Pr (E |Ai)
Pr (Ai)
Pr (E)
, (2.24)
with the joint probability Pr (Ai,E), i.e., of Ai and E being true:
Pr (Ai,E) = Pr (Ai |E) Pr (E) = Pr (E |Ai) Pr (Ai) . (2.25)
The Bayes’ theorem follows [63, 64]:
Pr (Ai |E) =
Pr (E |Ai) Pr (Ai)
Pr (E |A1) Pr (A1) + · · ·+ Pr (E |An) Pr (An) . (2.26)
Example: Poker (Texas Hold’em), Straight versus Flush
Let’s imagine you are playing poker, and there is one opponent
left in the game.a Flush and turn are drawn: two low cards (one
of hearts), ten of spades, queen, and ace of hearts. You are holding
jack and king of spades, a straight with the cards on the table. Only
a flush can beat you, a flush of hearts.
What is the probability of your opponent holding two cards of
hearts, making it five cards of hearts with the three on the table, a
flush? There are 10 hearts of 45 cards remaining, your opponent is
holding two cards. For your opponent holding a flush (proposition
A), the prior probability is Pr(A) = (
10
2 )
(452 )
= 45990 ≈ 4.5%; for your
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opponent not holding a flush (proposition B), the prior probability
is Pr(B) = 1− Pr(A) = 945990 ≈ 95.5%. Something is happening!
Your opponent places a bet—a high bet—a bluff? How does it
change your belief in her cards? Let’s examine the evidence E.
In the light of her having a flush (A is true), a high bet is rea-
sonable, let Pr(E | A) = 97% be the model output in this example.
If she is not holding a flush (B is true), she is bluffing by placing
a high bet. For this example, let the model of her play style in the
particular game situation return Pr(E | B) = 30%. The joint proba-
bilities are Pr(A,E) = 972200 , Pr(B,E) =
630
2200 , and the total proba-
bility of the evidence is Pr(E) = Pr(A,E) + Pr(B,E) = 7272200 ≈ 33%.
Your prior beliefs are updated by the new information to the pos-
terior beliefs: Pr(E | A) = 97727 ≈ 13.3%, Pr(E | B) = 1− Pr(E | A) =
630
727 ≈ 86.7%. The high bet increased the plausibility of her holding
a flush from 4.5% to 13.3% by a factor of about 3. Let’s now return
to speaker recognition in unconstrained environments.
a This example is adapted from Grant Sanderson’s video preview Bayes’ rule! on
patreon.com, 2017-06-15.
As the emphasis of this dissertation is placed on binary decisions,
i.e., biometric verification, U is effectively partitioned into two subsets
representing the competing propositions of a biometric claim:
A : same subject (true biometric identity claim); versus
B : not A⇔ different subjects (false biometric identity claim).
In the BDF [56, 57], conditional probabilities are employed, such
that by taking the ratio of the Bayes rules for either posterior prob-
abilities, the Pr(E) term cancels out, and the posterior ratio Pr(A|E)Pr(B|E)
depicts the decision boundary solely regarding the LR Pr(E |A)Pr(E |B) and
the prior ratio Pr(A)Pr(B) :
Pr (A |E)
Pr (B |E)
=
Pr (E | A) Pr(A)Pr(E)
Pr (E | B) Pr(B)Pr(E)
=
Pr (E | A)
Pr (E | B)
Pr (A)
Pr (B)
. (2.27)
For the purpose of simplification, the value42 of the prior probabil-
ity ratio Pr(A)Pr(B) is summarized by a scalar pi that reflects the effective
prior probability of class A and is thus referred to as the target prior
(targeting class A over class B). Eq. (2.27) is simplified regarding the
target prior pi and the target posterior Pr (A |E) [28, 79]:
Pr (A)
Pr (B)
=
pi
1− pi
⇔ pi = Pr (A)
Pr (A) + Pr (B)
,
42 Prior probability values of a class (e.g., class A) can be assigned in terms of, e.g.,
(a) the expected occurrence proportion of that class within the dataset, (b) maximum
entropy (with the value 0.5 for two classes), and (c) prior distributions that can be
informative (e.g., conjugate prior distributions) or uninformative (e.g., Jeffrey’s prior).
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Pr (A |E)
Pr (B |E)
=
Pr (A |E)
1− Pr (A |E)
=
Pr (E | A)
Pr (E | B)
pi
1− pi
. (2.28)
By summarizing the prior probability impact in terms of pi, one
can easily infer exhaustiveness within the model (from pi1−pi ): the prior
belief is updated regarding the targeted class (class A) and its op-
posing class (class B). The decision model answers a simple question,
i.e., between the two classes A and B. As a parameterization of pi for
any parameterizations of Pr(A)andPr(B) will always exist, the BDF
operates in an exhaustive set.
Notably, the BDF infers identities by the subjective posterior proba-
bilities, where a decision maker formalizes requirements on the pos-
terior probability ratio Pr(A|E)
1−Pr(A|E) . By separating the subjective prior
and posterior from the objective LR, Eq.(2.28) is reformulated as:
Pr (A |E)
1− Pr (A |E)
1− pi
pi
=
Pr (E | A)
Pr (E | B)
, (2.29)
such that the decision layer (left side) is decoupled from the system
output (right side). The following section elaborates on the formal
definition of the decoupled decision layer.
2.4.2 Decoupled Decision Layer
Decisions are made by examining the posterior ratio Pr(A|E)
1−Pr(A|E) re-
garding a decision policy. Propositions and decision outcome depend-
ing costs are employed, conceptually regarding a required impact of
Pr (A |E). A cost matrix associates two costs to each proposition: a
success cost and an error cost. When targeting binary decisions and as-
signing costs zero to successes, solely Type I and Type II error costs
cI, cII need to be considered:
cI : cost for falsely accepting proposition B;
cII : cost for falsely rejecting proposition A.
Costs are incentives and define the required impact of posterior odds
to decision making. In this dissertation, costs are treated in a formal-
ized but applicable manner, such that different perspectives on costs
are denoted as43:
• cA, cB: the costs of erroneous decisions against the propositions
A, B, which can be associated with common factors and com-
prise units (e.g., expressed in e or $). Eventually, solely the cost
ratio is of interest, units and common factors cancel out;
43 In the speaker recognition community, priors and costs are addressed in terms of
pi, cI, cII, p˜i. The definitions of cA, cB, c are employed here for the purpose of easier
tractability for readers with another background, such as image based biometrics,
machine learning or banking. The outline and definition of the parameter c might
be seen as a contribution of this dissertation (bridging gaps).
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• cI, cII: Type I and Type II error costs (without units);
• c: a scalar summary of the cost ratio (its probabilistic form);
where these three concepts relate as:
c =
cII
cII + cI
=
cA
cA + cB
. (2.30)
Example: Decision Costs in Smart Home Applications I / III
Voice activated smart home applications, e.g., lighting control or
home security access, range from non-critical to critical/sensitive:
• Addressing the costs of erroneous decisions in lighting con-
trol, one might aim at energy consumption versus inconve-
nience costs and define cB = 20 cents for a Type I error and
cA = 40 cents for a Type II error. As such, cI = 1, cII = 2, and
c = 23 .
• Regarding the costs of erroneous decisions in home security
access, one might target liability versus inconvenience costs
and define cB = 99 000 e for a Type I error and cA = 100 e
for a Type II error. As such, cI = 990, cII = 1, and c = 1991 .
The definition of costs is a subjective belief, so is any decision pol-
icy. Different biometric system operators might require different
cost constraints from a system biometric system vendor for similar
application scenarios.
Given an evidence E, binary Bayes decisions are made by minimiz-
ing the Bayes risk, i.e., regarding the cost notations and posteriors
[28]:
Pr (B |E) cB 6 Pr (A |E) cA , Pr (B |E) cI 6 Pr (A |E) cII ,
(1− Pr (A |E)) (1− c) 6 Pr (A |E) c ,
cB
cA
6 Pr (A |E)
1− Pr (A |E)
,
cI
cII
6 Pr (A |E)
1− Pr (A |E)
,
1− c
c
6 Pr (A |E)
1− Pr (A |E)
.
(2.31)
Combining Eqs. (2.29) and (2.31), comparison (the LR Pr(E |A)Pr(E |B) ) and
decision layers (the LR threshold τ) are decoupled as the posterior
ratio is substituted with the cost ratio:
τ =
1− c
c
1− pi
pi
6 Pr (E | A)
Pr (E | B)
. (2.32)
For simplification and mathematical convenience, the prior, poste-
rior, and cost ratios are expressed in terms of their log-odds form,
an alternative way of expressing probabilities. Thereby, logarithmic
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Bayes thresholds η are denoted as log-likelihood ratio (LLR) operat-
ing points (LLR thresholds), such that the log-odds of the target prior
are re-biased by the log-odds of the decision costs (and vice versa):
η = log τ = log
1− c
c
1− pi
pi
= logit(1− c) + logit(1− pi)
6 log Pr(E | A)
Pr(E | B)
, (2.33)
where the logit transformation (to log-odds) is defined as44:
logit (x) ≡ log x
1− x
, (2.34)
being its inverse function, the sigmoid function:
σ(x) ≡ (1+ e−x)−1 . (2.35)
Notably, the sigmoid function is a particular case of the logistic func-
tion F(x), specified by location and scale parameters µ, s:
F(x) =
(
1+ e−
x−µ
s
)−1
. (2.36)
The logit function represents the log-odds associated with probabil-
ity x ∈ (0, 1). Notably, log-odds are fundamental to logistic regression
(to the logit model). By employing log-odds, the identity inference
and decision making processes are simplified.
Example: Decision Costs in Smart Home Applications II / III
Voice activated smart home applications, e.g., lighting control or
home security access, operate in an environment with few subver-
sive interaction attempts, see section 2.1.1. Here, the exemplary oc-
currence of a true biometric identity claim is ten times more likely
than a false biometric identity claim. The target prior is pi = 1011 ,
i.e., pi1−pi = 10 in odds notation. The depending log-odds are
logit(pi) = logit
(
10
11
)
= log pi1−pi = log(10).
Depending Bayes thresholds η are derived as the log of the ratio
between cost and prior odds, which in terms of log-odds is formal-
ized by the (symmetric) sum: η = logit(1 − c) + logit(1 − pi), see
Eq. (2.33). In these smart home application examples, the threshold
is partially defined by the prior log-odds: η = logit(1− c)− log(10),
where the cost log-odds (logit(1− c)) depend on the decision costs
of an application:
• For lighting control with c = 23 , the cost log-odds are logit(1−
c) = − log(2), such that the Bayes threshold is η = − log(2) −
log(10) = − log(20) ≈ −3.0, i.e., −3.0 is the smallest value of
LLR scores resulting in the favor of proposition A.
44 Notably, − logit(x) = log 1−xx = logit(1− x) and η = logit(1− c) + logit(1− pi).
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• Regarding home security access with c = 1991 , the cost log-
odds are logit(1− c) = log(990), such that the Bayes threshold
is η = log(990) − log(10) = log(99) ≈ 4.6.
Notably, zero valued LLRs represent equality in the support of ei-
ther propositions A,B (e.g., 0 = log 1 = log 0.50.5 = log
50%
50% ). Thus,
depending zero valued LLR thresholds require at least as much
support of proposition A as of proposition B but reflect operat-
ing points of maximum entropy regarding costs and priors.a Re-
garding the lighting control scenario, LLRs greater than or equal
to η = −3.0 are required. This accommodates not only for LLRs
supporting security decisions (LLRs greater than zero), but also in-
cludes LLR thresholds η ∈ [−3.0, 0.0], relating to LLRs supporting
proposition B over A. In other words, the depicted lighting control
application naturally accommodates for LLRs favoring convenience
and security decisions but not for extremely high convenience de-
cisions (e.g., represented by LLR thresholds η  −5.0). Vice versa,
in the home security access scenario, LLR thresholds η > 4.6 are
required, excluding LLRs favoring lower security decisions (corre-
sponding to LLR thresholds 0 < η < 4.6). The depicted home secu-
rity access application naturally accommodates for LLRs favoring
higher security decisions only.
a The cost requirement and the prior probability at maximum entropy are 0.5, and
the depending impact on the LLR threshold resembles logit(0.5) = 0 log-odds.
As seen in Eq. (2.33), the ratio CBCA → ∞ if c → 0, and CBCA →
0 if c → 1 is analogous to the (reciprocal) prior ratio Pr(B)Pr(A) and pi.
Thus, under the typical assumption of positive costs, the pair of (c,pi)
will define the whole range of possible applications of the system. A
particular application represents a possible scenario, where a system
using LLRs will be operating, determined by a particular pair (c,pi)
and thus a particular value of η by Eq. (2.33). Seeking further scalar
summaries of the operative decision policies (c,pi), an effective prior p˜i
(likewise, an effective cost or effective policy) is denoted as [28, 79]:
p˜i =
pi c
pi c+ (1− pi) (1− c)
,
η = logit(1− p˜i) with decision making by:
η 6 log Pr (E | A)
Pr (E | B)
. (2.37)
Example: Decision Costs in Smart Home Applications III / III
Effective priors bridge the gap between target priors pi and decision
costs c, as formal application values (c,pi) are mappable to a specific
p˜i value and thus between one another. For example, costs remain
unspecified in forensic scenarios, assuming unit costs, i.e., maxi-
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mum cost entropy: c = 12 . By utilizing effective priors, commercial
and forensic applications (c,pi) are interrelated:
• For the lighting control application
(
2
3 ,
10
11
)
with η = − log(20), the effective prior resem-
bles p˜i = 2021 , also resembling applications like(
1
2 ,
20
21
)
,
(
20
21 ,
1
2
)
,
(
1
100 ,
1980
1981
)
,
(
1980
1981 ,
1
100
)
.
• For the home security access application
(
1
991 ,
10
11
)
with η =
log(99), the effective prior resembles p˜i = 1100 , also resembling
applications like
(
1
2 ,
1
100
)
,
(
1
100 ,
1
2
)
,
(
20
21 ,
1
1980
)
,
(
1
1980 ,
20
21
)
.
Notably, the effective prior p˜i = 0.01 has been employed as one
application configuration in the biannual speaker recognition eval-
uation (SRE) series of the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) since 2010, the major research challenge of the
speaker recognition community.
For the purpose of training recognition systems for multiple ap-
plications, i.e., application-independently, logistic regression models,
among others, optimize the effective prior p˜i as a scalar representation
instead of more complex operating point representations in order to
yield well-calibrated system outputs (LLR scores) over the range of
all possible applications {(c,pi) | c ∈ (0, 1),pi ∈ (0, 1)}.45
2.4.3 Decision Risk Performance
The performance of systems in specific applications is examined by
the Bayes risk [59]. Given a set of binary decision scores S, the empir-
ical Bayes risk R is the expected cost value, a weighted sum of the
Type I and Type II error rates (e.g., false match rate (FMR), false
non-match rate (FNMR)). Weights resemble the depending decisions
costs (e.g., cA, cB; cI, cII; or c) and the depending prior probabilities
(e.g., Pr(A), Pr(B); or pi). One might define the Bayes risk as either
R (S | Pr(A), Pr(B), cA, cB) or in terms of the target prior and unit-
free costs as R (S |pi, cI, cII) or in terms of the summarized priors and
costs as R (S |pi, c):
R (S | Pr(A), Pr(B), cA, cB) = Pr(A)cA FNMR (η) + Pr(B)cB FMR (η) ,
R (S |pi, cI, cII) = pi cII FNMR (η) + (1− pi) cI FMR (η) ,
R (S |pi, c) = pi c FNMR (η) + (1− pi) (1− c) FMR (η) , (2.38)
assigning zero costs to successful decisions. Notably, the definition of
an application’s operating point, i.e., (cA, cB, Pr(A), Pr(B)); (cI, cII,pi);
(c,pi); or (p˜i) also parameterizes the Bayes threshold η. In the Bayesian
45 For c = 0, c = 1,pi = 0,pi = 1, LLR scores remain without impact, i.e., decisions are
already made without any employment of a recognition system, as always one of
the propositions A or B is favored per default in decision policies with η = ±∞.
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decision framework (BDF), the distribution of LLR scores ideally cor-
responds to the class proportion at the depending Bayes threshold
values over the entire range of possible applications. As such, the
Bayes risk is the expected (average) posterior decision cost: Type I and
Type II error rates resemble the expected proportion of erroneous de-
cisions, occurring with a prior probability and causing a cost impact
of making an erroneous decision. The sum of the class-dependent ex-
pected risks resembles the expected risk value over all classes (due
to the linearity of the expectation operator). For an arbitrary but fixed
parametrization, the Bayes risk is referred to as decision cost function
(DCF).46
The parameterization of the empirical Bayes risk is simplified by
employing the effective prior p˜i, such that the evaluation criterion is
(merely) scaled to the empirical Bayes error rate E (as a DCF) [28, 79]:
E (S | p˜i) = R (S | p˜i, 1, 1) =
R (S |pi, cI, cII)
pi cII + (1− pi) cI
= p˜i FNMR (η) + (1− p˜i) FMR (η) . (2.39)
Figs. 2.8a to 2.8b visualize empirical Bayes error rates for the ex-
emplary systems in Figs. 2.3a to 2.3c among effective priors p˜i, which
are referred to as applied probability of error (APE) plots47, cf. [28,
61]. APE plots assess DCFs over all possible application parameteriza-
tions, depicting the actual decision risk compared to the default decision
risk (if all LLR scores are equal to zero) and to the discrimination power
a system is potentially capable of supporting if scores of the system
were ideally calibrated, i.e., being LLRs.
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Figure 2.8: Examples of APE plots for synthetic score distributions: for score
sets of Figs. 2.3a – 2.3c with class B scores (red), class A scores
(green); APE plots (a), (b), (c) with E (S | p˜i) (green), Emin (S | p˜i)
(dashed), and the default performance E (S0 | p˜i) (black).
However, even when based on Bayesian statistics, systems might
yield badly calibrated scores, e.g., in the light of insufficient data
46 DCFs are employed as the primary evaluation criterion within the NIST SREs.
47 APE plots depict performance depending on the effective prior, i.e., the negative
Bayes threshold −η = logit p˜i. For harmonization purposes, one may choose to
present the x-axis regarding η, such that (LLR) score histograms are co-aligned.
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amounts or poor data quality, such that one would be interested to re-
calibrate these scores to LLRs. In single application scenarios, the cali-
bration to accommodate all possible LLR thresholds is not required as
long as the lowest decision risk results at the depending Bayes thresh-
old, as this is the only LLR value where an idealistic actual decision
risk is necessary (for a single application).
To reveal the discrimination power, the DCF metric is exploited. By
interpreting the DCF performance as a threshold-independent func-
tion and by sweeping over all threshold values while the effective
prior weight remains fixed, the optimal DCF performance is revealed
for each operating point p˜i. The optimal DCF performance, minimum
DCF (minDCF), is referred to as Emin, representing the performance
of a well-calibrated system48 [79]:
minDCF (S | p˜i) = min
−∞6η6∞ p˜i FNMR (η) + (1− p˜i) FMR (η) . (2.40)
In the following, actual performance will refer to empirical measure-
ments with minimum referring to the performance on the assumption
of well-calibrated system outputs (LLRs). The minimum resembles the
discrimination power, whereas the actual performance reflects the oper-
ational power, i.e., the combination of the discrimination power and the
calibration loss.
For the purpose of better visual comparability in which a similar
visual distance conveys the same relative DCF impact in the tails as in
the center of APE plots (sacrificing equal absolute DCF differences),
[79] proposes a normalization of the empirical Bayes error rate utiliz-
ing a default system, emitting the score set S0. An S0 default system
yields the reference performance:
E (S0 | p˜i) = min (p˜i, 1− p˜i) , (2.41)
where all LLRs equal zero; a system contributing as much informa-
tion to decision making as a coin toss. The visualization gap of APE
plots manifests in the DCF of the default system: distances to the de-
fault performance visually collapse in the tails of the APE plot, i.e.,
for applications of high convenience or of high security (e.g., η = −5
and η = +5). Fig. 2.9 illustrates the normalized Bayes error rate
(NBER) plots, normalizing Fig. 2.8. Thereby, the contribution of FMR
and FNMR error rates to the minimum and actual performance are de-
picted depending on the Bayes threshold η, cf. [79]. Conventionally,
APE and NBER plots refer to logit(p˜i) = −η on x-axes, placing empha-
sis on the effective target prior due to forensic perspectives. In this dis-
sertation, however, η is directly depicted on the x-axes, which might
be more intuitive to layman examiners, seeking coherence within the
performance assessment of similarity scores.
48 In this sense, systems are numerically calibrated by exploiting all possible configu-
rations under the preservation of monotonicity.
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Figure 2.9: Examples of NBER plots with actual (green), minimum (dashed),
and default (black) performance; rule of 30 bounds are depicted
dependent on effective priors p˜i regarding 30 false matches (green
triangle) and 30 false non-matches (red triangle); the contribution
depending on error rates is exemplarily depicted in (d), (e) in
terms of p˜i-weighted FMR (dashed), FNMR (solid) contributions
to the minimum (magenta) and to the actual DCF (red).
NBER plots application-dependently interrelate DCFs and error
rates across different applications (c,pi), which are summarized in
terms of the effective prior p˜i. The exemplary NBER plots serve to il-
lustrate that Bayes risk values depend on the formalized application’s
operating point: targeting cross-application use cases, performance
assessment solely based on error rates will mislead decision making
and increase operational costs, depending on the impact of erroneous
decisions made. Thereby, score calibration is crucial so as to yield an
operational performance close to the discrimination performance.
The goal of this dissertation is to assure low discrimination but also
low calibration losses, targeting an application-independent system
output, i.e., scores that can serve as LLRs for all operating points (e.g.,
for effective decision policies p˜i outlining Bayes thresholds η). In the
following sections, the conventional error rate based performance as-
sessment as well as score calibration are addressed. In forensic scenar-
ios, score calibration and depending performance measures are moti-
vated from information theory since priors and costs remain unknown
or at maximum uncertainty during evidence reporting. Notably, these
different perspectives on recognition performance are summarized by
the same performance measure which emerges from either perspec-
tive and will serve as the primary evaluation metric here, namely Cllr
58 fundamentals
and Cminllr . Interrelations between the different perspectives exist, par-
ticularly between the Bayes risk, score calibration, and information gains.
Thereby, the Bayes risk is based on error rates (on conventional er-
ror rate performance) but outlines ideal score calibration: the decision
risk is minimal when the score values are LLRs. Consequently, the
conventional error rate trade-off assessment is interrelated with ideal
score calibration. The following section depicts the Bayes risk from the
perspective of conventional error rate trade-off assessment.
2.4.4 Error Rate Performance Visualization and Ideal Score Calibration
This section addresses the visual and numerical interrelation between:
i) detection error trade-offs (DETs), ii) minDCFs, and iii) well-cali-
brated scores (LLRs). In terms of errors, binary decision performance
is typically visualized by depicting Type II against Type I error rates,
such as in DET plots [88]. DET plots are receiver operating character-
istic (ROC) plots [90], ROCs plot class A success rates against class
B error rates49, with inverted y-axis, i.e., depicting the Type II error
rate rather than the true positive rate. Furthermore, DETs warp both
axes by the probit function, i.e., they interrelate probabilistic odds. By
depicting empirical error rates in DETs, i.e., discrete and not continu-
ous data, a steppy curve is obtained, representing the error trade-offs
across all thresholds. As a complement to the steppy DET, calibrated
scores can also be depicted in terms of a continuous interpolation
over the underlying ROC. This interpolation is the ROC’s convex hull
(ROCCH). It visualizes minDCF values in the canvas of the y-axis
inverted ROC. ROCCH and minDCF are closely related due to the
pool adjacent violators (PAV)-LLR algorithm [28, 79, 105, 106]. Figu-
ratively speaking, the ROCCH can be thought of as a rubber band put
around the steppy ROC which yields a convex interpolation of con-
tinuous error trade-offs from the observed, empirical, discrete trade-
offs in the ROC space. The ROCCH visualizes ideal score calibration
(the PAV-LLR algorithm’s output in the error rate trade-off domain)
and relates to the minDCF as follows. As the minDCF continuously
minimizes over thresholds, the ROCCH is a two-dimensional discrete
minimization between ROC points in the x,y ∈ <2 space (in the y-
axis inverted ROC space) [79]:
[x,y] =
n∑
i=0
αi [FMR(i), FNMR(i)] with αi > 0,
n∑
i=0
αi = 1 , (2.42)
such that the minDCF (minimizing weighted error rates over thresh-
olds) is interpreted as a discrete minimization over the vertices of
the ROCCH. Notably, all minDCF p˜i weighting parameterizations re-
semble tangents to the ROCCH with a p˜i-depending slope where the
49 ROCs were developed in the field of radar detection in the 1940s, gaining popularity
in the 1960s.
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value of a minDCF parameterization resembles the distance of a tan-
gent to the plot’s origin (geometric proofs are outlined in [66, 107]).
An equivalence proof between the ROCCH algorithm and the PAV
algorithm is shown in [108].
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Figure 2.10: Example regarding DETs: steppy (green), ROCCH (orange),
with (a) corresponding y-axis inverted ROC space: minDCF tan-
gents (dotted) and lines (blue) with line lengths corresponding
to minDCF values and (b) ROC and ROCCH in the DET space.
Fig. 2.10 illustrates a DET plot [88] with an exemplary steppy curve
and its depending ROCCH curve. Notably, by swiping over all appli-
cation parameterizations, i.e., over all Bayes thresholds, the maximum
of all resembling minDCF values (across all p˜i weighting parameteri-
zations) corresponds to the equal error rate (EER) of the ROCCH [28,
61, 79], which is referred to here as the EER. Fig. 2.11 exemplarily
depicts the relationship between minDCF and the EER. Alternatively
to the ROCCH, isotonic regression can be used to minimize the mean
square error between raw scores and the fit to probabilistic class la-
bels between 0, 1, i.e., the PAV-LLR algorithm [28]. For the sake of
easy tractability, the PAV-LLR algorithm is referred to as PAV.
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Figure 2.11: EER as maximum minDCF, cf. Fig. 2.8a, with minDCF (dashed),
FMR (red), FNMR (green).
The PAV algorithm is elaborately examined50 in [28] with motiva-
tion for speaker and language recognition systems. It can be easily
expanded further to any binary or multi-class decision system. As
depicted in [79], PAV calibrated scores resemble the ROCCH when
50 Implementations to system evaluation, calibration, and fusion are found in [79].
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visualizing Type II against Type I error rates. In other words, when
depicting the discrimination performance of binary decision scores,
the post-evaluation calibration of uncalibrated scores to LLRs is in-
herent to the nature of binary decision systems51, such that the per-
formance visualization employing the ROCCH is the natural choice.
The ROCCH is the expected ROC segment of (all) optimistic and pes-
simistic interpolations [90], where the Bayesian decision framework
(BDF) furthermore employs the ROCCH in order to depict ideal deci-
sion making, i.e., after PAV calibration.
The PAV algorithm [28, 78] performs isotonic regression for two-class
problems: PAV maps the entire range of score values to a unified score
scale of posterior probabilities that are optimally calibrated. Fig. 2.12
shows the output of the PAV algorithm: a PAV value for each score
is in the [0, 1] domain, namely SPAV, an optimally-calibrated posterior
probability. The value is a posterior probability because PAV intrin-
sically considers the so-called empirical prior-ratio ˙˘pi to compute its
transformation, which is the proportion of class A scores w.r.t. the
total in a data set (a given52 value of pi). A more detailed example is
provided in annex B. Thus, SPAV values should directly correspond
to the log-odds of costs to make Bayes decisions, but decisions could
only be made for ˙˘pi. Removing the log-odds influence of ˙˘pi, scores S
are indeed LLR values [28, 79]:
S = logit(SPAV) − logit
(
˙˘pi
)
. (2.43)
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Figure 2.12: Example of PAV isotonic regression with scores of propositions
A (blue circles), B (red crosses), and the resulting PAV func-
tion (orange). (a) Algorithm initialization (all scores to calibrate
with 0 value of y-axis); (b) the predictive PAV function, pre-
serving monotonicity: the y-axis increases with an increasing
proportion of scores from class A; proportions as odds (gray).
As Eq. (2.40) provides a numerical solution to score calibration (the
score-to-LLR transform), solely optimizing for one operating point,
PAV rather poses an analytical solution to score calibration, providing
51 On the assumption of the total probability theorem, i.e., that the propositions to
which the binary decision system is examining evidence are mutually exclusive but
not necessarily exhaustive.
52 Notably, for evaluation purposes, an evaluator may choose a pi suitable to the tar-
geted application [28], not necessarily equaling ˙˘pi.
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ideal LLRs for all operating points. Fig. 2.13 exemplarily illustrates
the ideal LLRs corresponding to the synthetic scores of Figs. 2.3a
to 2.3c. Notably, the PAV transform preserves error rate trade-offs.
However, the depending histograms dramatically change as scores
are transformed into their related ideal LLR representation. As such,
the relation of thresholds and error rates changes, also changes. The
experimental setup denotes bounds to empirical LLRs and thus to
the possible shapes of error rate proportions. In this sense, propor-
tions of (empirical) error rates are nothing but histograms of score
distributions.
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Figure 2.13: PAV-LLR example: (a) – (c) score histograms, (d) – (f) their ideal
LLR representation: the latent subspace of decision making.
2.4.5 On Performance Visualizations in Forensic Evaluation
In forensic evaluative scenarios, the province of court53 (decision mak-
ing) is separated from the province of the forensic practitioner (re-
porting the weight of the evidence in terms of a score), such that the
reports of a forensic witness are neither without bias towards prose-
cution nor towards defendant propositions, and the decision making
is solely conducted by judges and jurors. As the forensic practitioner
cannot know the operating point employed, the reported weight of evi-
dence (the score) ideally provides accurate probabilistic predictions to-
wards either proposition A,B for each operating point, which is eval-
uated by proper scoring rules regarding the goodness of scores to rep-
resent LLRs, cf. sections 2.3.1. In the 2015 methodological guidelines
of the European network of forensic science institutes (ENFSI) [62],
53 In investigatory scenarios, prosecutors or law enforcement make decisions. The point
is that decisions are not made by the forensic practitioner.
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the prediction accuracy is addressed in terms of the probabilities of mis-
leading evidence. Effectively, these probabilities are FMR and 1−FNMR
values, which are ideally equal at the LLR threshold η = 0 (the de-
pending system is well-calibrated at η = 0), where neither proposition
is favored over the other. From the proportions of FMR and 1−FNMR
values, depending LLR values resemble across all thresholds, and the
corresponding LLR thresholds express the required extend of which
either proposition needs to be favored over another.
In forensics, the assessment perspective of recognition performance
requires to shift from the impact of decisions made by employing a biomet-
ric system to the benefit a decision maker has by employing a biometric sys-
tem, regardless of any decision policy. The former, while suitable in com-
mercials, implies that the forensic practitioner makes decisions, which
is in another province. The latter implies that the forensic practitioner
reports the evidence (without any bias) in some way, ideally provid-
ing information to the province of court (the decision makers). For
commercials, the forensic perspective can be interpreted as the anal-
ysis of recognition performance during research and system develop-
ment. Therefore, the distribution of scores is examined in three differ-
ent ways: (i) as the proportion of cases depending on LLR values—in
commercials, error rates regarding PAV-LLR histograms (in the latent
decision subspace)—; (ii) the separability of class instances (score dis-
tributions of subjects); and (iii) the expected separability resulting
from all observed class instance—the information gain a system pro-
vides to decision making, particularly in comparison to employing
no system reporting on the evidence.
Tippett plots [109] visualize the correspondence of LLR values to
FMR and 1−FNMR values. Limit Tippett plots [110] further depict
lowest to highest error rates possible after score calibration (universal
bounds), when considering the empirical prior ˙˘pi regarding either class
A,B. Thereby, a pseudo PAV score calibration is conducted by assum-
ing Gaussian distributions. Fig. 2.14 illustrates Limit Tippett plots: at
η = 0, the vast gap between both probabilities of misleading evidence sug-
gest badly calibrated scores. Compared to DET plots, Limit Tippett
plots interrelate discrimination and calibration performance. Com-
pared to NBER plots, the universal bounds depict the limitations of the
experimental setup (the ratio of class A,B scores). Notably, in a foren-
sic practitioner’s methodological validation, probabilistic predictions
rather address proportions of cases than error rates due to the following
perspective that has been brought up by forensic experts in various
one-on-one conversations: justice cannot make erroneous decisions (as it
is just). Limit Tippett plots provide insights into calibration and dis-
crimination performance without addressing decision costs. As such,
the information gain to decision making is indirectly addressed.
For the purpose of examining information performance in greater
detail, zoo plots have been introduced in the forensic biometrics com-
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Figure 2.14: Limit Tippett plot example of Fig. 2.3a with universal bounds
(black), error rates (red, green), FMR (dashed), and 1− FNMR
(solid).
munity [111–113]. Motivated by Doddington’s zoo [114], statistic test
visualizations are proposed to classify subjects into four categories
based on quantiles in two regards: hardness to detect and easiness to
impersonate. Zoo plots simplify the statistic analysis to quantiles of
class A scores and class B scores per subject. Fig. 2.15 presents54 a
zoo plot based on [111, 112]: the zoo distinguishes between so-called
phantoms, doves, worms, and chameleons, examining the 25% quantiles
of class A and class B score distributions, which might consider out-
liers relevant to further algorithmic analyses. Ellipses around the av-
erage coordinates per subject illustrate the depending variance esti-
mate assuming Gaussian score distributions. Limit Tippett and zoo
plots, however, solely report indirectly on discrimination and calibra-
tion performance, in contrast to decision risk and information based
measures.
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Figure 2.15: Zoo plot example of Fig. 2.3a based on further synthetic refer-
ence and probe labels, the zoo addresses phantoms (orange),
doves (purple), worms (green), and chameleons (blue), right
and on top are the y- and x-axes depending score distributions.
54 See: https://github.com/josbouten/bioplot.
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2.4.6 Information Performance: System Contribution to Decision Making
Motivated by the Shannon entropy, [27, 115] proposed to estimate the
information gain which is yielded by employing a recognition system
to decision making instead of reporting error rates. The information
gain is reported as the cross-entropy between empirical score distri-
butions and the depending ground-of-truth label distribution. The
uncertainty about a set (or partition) U, see section 2.4.1, is denoted
as H(U), i.e., the entropy of the partitioning [63, 64]:
H(U) = −
∑
u∈U
Pr(u) log2 Pr(u) , (2.44)
where in the case of binary partitions with the prior pi of one partition:
H(U) = −pi log2 pi− (1− pi) log2(1− pi) , (2.45)
which is known as the prior entropy [27, 115]. The posterior entropy
H(U = {A,B} |S) is of concern for measuring the uncertainty of de-
cision making by employing a particular system, informing about
evidence by its scores s ∈ S:
H(U = {A,B} |S) = −
∑
u∈U
Pr(u)
∞∫
−∞
Pr(s |u) log2 Pr(u | s)ds . (2.46)
Usually, the computation of Eq. (2.46) is impractical, requiring
knowledge of the likelihoods Pr(s | A) and Pr(s | B). Systems might
be designed to directly provide the ratio of these likelihoods (the
LLR), or the likelihoods are unknown, especially when employing
discriminative comparators (e.g., Euclidean distance). In [27, 115], the
posterior probabilities of a system (denoted by P) are compared with
a reference probability distribution (the ground-of-truth labels, de-
noted by Q). Then, dependencies of the posterior and the likelihood
inside the integral are eliminated, and the cross-entropy HQ||P be-
tween reference probabilities55 Q and system posterior probabilities
P is examined:
HQ||P ({A,B} |S) = HQ ({A,B} |S) +DQ||P ({A,B} |S) , (2.47)
where HQ ({A,B} |S) is the posterior entropy of the reference and
DQ||P ({A,B} |S) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [27, 115]:
DQ||P ({A,B} |S) =
∑
u∈{A,B}
Q(u)
∞∫
−∞
q(s |u) log2
Q(u | s)
P(u | s)
ds , (2.48)
with q denoting the probability density function of Q. The cross-en-
tropy comprises the complementary effects of HQ ({A,B} |S), the un-
certainty about the propositions if posteriors are computed from the
55 The reference (the ground-of-truth) is posterior as is.
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reference andDQ||P ({A,B} |S), the divergence of the system posterior
P from the reference posterior Q.
By choosing the ground-of-truth labels as reference, i.e., Q(A |S) =
1 if A is true and Q(B |S) = 0 if B is true, the entropy of the
reference posterior Q is zero: HQ ({A,B} |S) = 0, such that the
cross-entropy becomes the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Supposing
the law of large numbers holds, Eq. (2.47) (on continuous data) is ap-
proximated by the empirical cross-entropy (ECE) (on discrete data):
HQ||P ({A,B} |S) ' ECE. As the information gain of employing a sys-
tem within the Bayesian decision framework (BDF) is of interest, the
depending performance across different prior Q(u) |u ∈ U = {A,B}
parameterizations needs to be reported. For binary decision systems,
the ECE is computed from class A scores SA and class B scores SB
[27, 115]:
ECE = −
Q(A)
|SA|
∑
a∈SA
log2 Pr(A |a) −
Q(B)
|SB|
∑
b∈SB
log2 Pr(B |b) , (2.49)
with the posteriors Pr(A |a) and Pr(B |b). Reformulating Eq. (2.28),
the posteriors are expressed by the LLRs a ∈ SA and b ∈ SB:
Pr(A |a) =
ea pi1−pi
1+ ea pi1−pi
=
(
1+
1
ea pi1−pi
)−1
,
Pr(B |b) = 1− Pr(A |b) =
1
1+ eb pi1−pi
=
(
1+ eb
pi
1− pi
)−1
, (2.50)
such that Eq. (2.49) is expressed regarding the LLRs a,b:
ECE =
Q(A)
|SA|
∑
a∈SA
log2
(
1+
1
ea pi1−pi
)
+
1−Q(B)
|SB|
∑
i∈SB
log2
(
1+ eb
pi
1− pi
)
(2.51)
and by employing the expectation operator 〈·〉, the logit function
logit(x) (see Eq. (2.34)), and the sigmoid function σ(x) (see Eq. (2.35)):
ECE =
pi
log(2)
〈− logσ(a+ logit(pi))〉a∈SA
+
1− pi
log(2)
〈− logσ(−b− logit(pi))〉b∈SB . (2.52)
The ECE can be interpreted as the average information needed to
make a decision (between propositions A and B) [27, 115]. Thereby,
the uncertainty about the propositions is considered (e.g., priors or
other knowledge involved in a case).
In (forensic) evaluation, the target prior pi is left unspecified by the
system designer (e.g., biometric system vendors or forensic practition-
ers), such that systems are compared across all possible pi parameter-
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izations. Fig. 2.16 illustrates ECE plots56 for the systems depicted in
Fig. 2.13 depending on the log-odds of the target prior pi. Thereby, the
minimum ECE (minECE) is derived by performing PAV calibration
[27, 115], providing the optimal LLR scores. The difference between
ECE and minECE measures the information loss due to imperfect
score calibration [27, 115]. 1
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Figure 2.16: Examples of ECE plots with the actual ECE (red), the minECE
(blue), and the default performance (black).
In other words, for binary decision systems, PAV resembles the
reference (oracle) probability distribution. As the PAV is basis to
minECE and also resembles the ROC’s convex hull (ROCCH) likewise
minimum DCF (minDCF) [28, 79], a common performance criterion
to information and Bayes error rate analyses is foreshadowed.
2.4.7 Goodness of LLR Scores
The goodness of LLRs57 is referred to as Cllr, i.e., the cost of LLRs, which
can be derived in different ways by [26–28, 79, 115]:
• integrating over all Bayes risk operating points, likewise the ap-
plication-independent slope of DCFs:
Cllr (S) =
1∫
0
DCF (S | p˜i)dp˜i . (2.53)
• measuring the accuracy of probabilistic prediction based on
strictly proper scoring rules58, such that proposition-depending
56 In [27, 115], the x-axis is referred to regarding logit10 odds. However, the natural
logarithm is preferred here.
57 In the context of the BDF, goodness rather reflects the accuracy of scores to fulfill
LLR properties, rather than the term robustness, usually addressing generalization
properties of machine learning. In the context of this dissertation, goodness reflects
a system’s actual contribution to decision making, whereas robustness is a subordi-
nated term, which in [24] is referred to as a secondary performance characteristic
measured by Cllr, EER, and the range of LLR values.
58 The underlying Cllr scoring rule is known as logistic regression and is a special case
of the canonical form of binary proper scoring rules, parameterized by the Beta
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costs are reflected regarding the true set of probabilities (associ-
ated with the decision ground-of-truth):
Cllr (S) =
1
2 log(2)
∑
a∈SA
log(1+ e−a)
|SA|
+
∑
b∈SB
log(1+ eb)
|SB|

=
〈− logσ(a)〉a∈SA + 〈− logσ(−b)〉b∈SB
2 log(2)
. (2.54)
• generalizing the ECE at the prior of full uncertainty, i.e., pi = 0.5:
Cllr = ECE |pi=0.5 . (2.55)
To sum up, an evaluation setup determines expected LLR values
(for its empirical comparisons to be conducted), and Cllr examines
how good the empirical LLR scores align59 yielding (operational) cal-
ibration performance, whereas Cminllr assumes well-calibrated scores,
i.e., depicting discrimination performance. An intuition to Cllr values
is established in the speaker recognition community as [28]:
• Systems with Cllr > 1 are poorly calibrated, and decisions are
better made by omitting these systems or by examining more
data in order to reduce the uncertainty of a system provided to
decision making.
• Systems with Cllr = 1 are as good as a coin toss (on average),
i.e., computational effort without gain to decision making.
• Systems with Cllr < 1 are well-calibrated and aid decision mak-
ing, regardless of calibration losses are still present or not.
In this dissertation, Cllr is the primary evaluation metric summariz-
ing operational performance application-independently, alongside with
Cminllr resembling the application-independent discrimination power.
Notably, the LLR of the LLR is the LLR, a premise well-known to
forensic statisticians, as an argument put forward by Niko Brümmer
with a published derivation by Miranti Indar Mandasari [39, p. 79]:
1. Theorem: scores S are well-calibrated LLRs if the posterior score
distribution Pr (A |S) is the same as the posterior evidence dis-
tribution from the reference – probe comparison Pr(A |E).
distribution Beta (α,β) whose parameters α,β (for Cllr: α = β = 1) can be fine-
tuned in order to target specific ranges of operating points, such as high-security
applications by placing emphasis rather on the left tail of score distributions, e.g.,
with α = 2, providing wider and lower cost minima on higher LLR thresholds [116].
59 Thereby, Cllr takes the form of the canonical logistic regression loss. Other Bayesian
objective functions place emphasis on certain score distribution tails, a practical
recipe can be found in [116]. Since Cllr also resembles a generalization of these
proper scoring rules, this dissertation will refer to Cllr as a primary performance
characteristic, summarizing all operating points naturally equally.
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2. Corollary: in other words, the LLRs (left side) encode all compar-
ison information (right side), i.e., the evidence E:
Pr(A |S) = Pr(A |E) . (2.56)
3. Corollary: applying the logit transform (log-odds instead of prob-
abilities) and the Bayes’ rule to either side:
logit(Pr(A |S)) = logit(Pr(A |E)) ,
log
Pr(A |S)
1− Pr(A |S)
= log
Pr(A |E)
1− Pr(A |E)
,
log
Pr(A |S)
Pr(B |S)
= log
Pr(A |E)
Pr(B |E)
,
log
Pr(S | A)Pr(A)Pr(S)
Pr(S | B)Pr(B)Pr(S)
= log
Pr(E | A)Pr(A)Pr(E)
Pr(E | B)Pr(B)Pr(E)
,
log
Pr(S | A)
Pr(S | B)
= log
Pr(E | A)
Pr(E | B)
. (2.57)
4. Proof: log Pr(S |A)Pr(S |B) is the LLR of the LLR; log
Pr(E |A)
Pr(E |B) is the LLR.
Thus, LLRs are the desired system output and Cllr is their measure.
2.5 automatic speaker recognition
Speaker recognition systems60 for biometric verification and identifi-
cation tasks are of similar design: acoustic features are extracted as a
voice sample representation in the latent acoustic subspace, whereas
biometric comparators use projections of these features into the latent
biometric subspace for the purpose of identity inference. Furthermore,
score post processing schemes are employed in order to enhance dis-
crimination and calibration performance. Computationally, state-of-
the-art comparators and score post processing schemes are capable
of comparing multiple voice references and probe features at once.
State-of-the-art technology is suitable for either biometric recognition
task.61 The scope of this dissertation lies on binary decisions, i.e.,
60 Parts of this section are based on different collaborative works. The overview of
the PLDA comparator family is based on the work with Daniel Ramos and Alicia
Lozano-Diez [117]. The overview that aims at non-experts in speaker recognition to
proficient readers is derived from the work with Amos Treiber, Jascha Kolberg and
Nicholas Evans (among others) [19, 118], a 23 co-author collaboration survey on data
privacy in speaker and speech characterization and a follow-up.
61 Biometric recognition covers two machine learning tasks (verification and identifi-
cation), other characterization tasks involve, e.g., speaker diarization (the annotation
of the speech sequence with speaker labels that indicate who spoke when), searching
for speakers, and clustering of voice data. When seeking compliance to the 2017
ISO/IEC standard on harmonized biometric vocabulary [1], the term biometric char-
acterization would be a new entry, accounting for a broader sense of recognition tasks.
This ambiguity is attributable to the different concepts of what recognition means.
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the verification of biometric identity claims with a binary outcome
∈ {true, false}. Research findings of this dissertation, however, might be
easily transferable from verification to identification and other tasks,
as symmetric and generative comparators are employed following a
fully Bayesian paradigm.
The following sections start with a brief overview of speaker recog-
nition technology and how the research field has evolved over time.
Then, conventional signal processing methods fundamental to this
dissertation are depicted in terms of extracting acoustic and biometric
features, comparing voice representations and post processing scores.
2.5.1 Brief Overview of Speaker Recognition Technology
The presentation of this brief overview is aimed at the non-expert
reader and so the terminology used below is adapted to that used in
other fields of biometrics [1] and computer science. It also covers the
full processing pipeline illustrated in Figs. 2.17 and 2.18, which cov-
ers both feature extraction and biometric comparison. While the treat-
ment focuses specifically on automatic speaker recognition, many of
the techniques described in this section are also applicable to diariza-
tion and other speaker characterization applications. Readers profi-
cient in speech signal processing and speaker recognition could con-
tinue at section 2.5.3.
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Figure 2.17: Overview of speaker recognition with the typical processing
toolchain (solid), groups of comparators (dotted), and timeline.
Fig. 2.17 shows the most dominant speaker recognition technolo-
gies. They are all based on the deconvolution of speech signals. This
pre-processing step is necessary to separate so-called source and filter
components. This is achieved by a process known as homomorphic
analysis [119], which is typically applied to short-term intervals of
the speech signal. The source component comprises pitch and glottal
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pulse information, whereas the filter component represents vocal tract
information. Traditionally, acoustic features used for speaker recog-
nition encompass only the latter. In contrast to other fields of bio-
metrics, acoustic features used for speaker recognition are an inferred
representation of the vocal tract rather than being a directly observed
biometric characteristic. With speech being a dynamic signal, feature
vectors are extracted periodically, e.g., from sliding windows, typically
representing in the order of 25ms of consecutive speech and with
a 10ms window offset [120, 121]. While there are a host of alterna-
tives, the most popular acoustic features are mel-frequency cepstral
coefficients (MFCCs) [122–124].
Approaches to biometric comparison, also shown in Fig. 2.17 by
groups of comparators, encompass probabilistic identity inference by
subspace identity models and deep neural network (DNN) based fea-
ture extraction. Group (1) of Fig. 2.17 corresponds to comparisons
using probabilistic cluster responses between an acoustic cluster, i.e.,
a universal background model (UBM) and a reference model, e.g.,
hidden Markov models (HMMs) [125] or Gaussian mixture models
(GMMs) [126]. In this case, the biometric information is the reference-
specific cluster centroids (the mean values of the probabilistic clus-
ters). The concatenation of these mean values is referred to as a super-
vector [30]. Groups (2,3) in Fig. 2.17 correspond to techniques that de-
compose supervectors into factors that represent both biometric and
non-biometric subspaces. These factors are referred to as probabilistic
embeddings, namely latent (inferred rather than observable) represen-
tations that lie in a lower dimensional subspace that is more immune
to nuisance variation. In group (2), joint factor analysis (JFA) [127–
129] explicitly yields biometric and non-biometric embeddings. JFA
scores the likelihood of non-biometric factors given biometric factors
as reference. By contrast, group (3) yields a total variability subspace, re-
ferring to factors as intermediate-sized vectors (i-vectors) [130], being
probabilistic embeddings. Pairs of reference – probe i-vector embeddings
are compared by, e.g., cosine distance similarity and probabilistic lin-
ear discriminant analysis (PLDA) [60, 131–133]. Groups (4,5) encom-
pass discriminative embeddings that are derived using DNNs (referred
to as x-vectors) [134–136] and are also compared to PLDA. In the case
of speaker recognition, biometric information in the form of templates
is generally point estimates (usually of high quality), e.g., supervec-
tors, JFA factors, or embeddings (without uncertainty propagation).
However, when facing variable quality conditions, uncertainty needs
to be propagated in a principled manner, e.g., i-vector embeddings
estimated alongside their uncertainty are a model rather than a tem-
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plate.62 Group (5) relates to the extraction of meta-embeddings [54, 99],
which are capable of principled uncertainty propagation.
In groups (1-5), biometric information is represented by models. Algo-
rithmically, templates are expected values of some form (averages of
high precision), whereas models center data (remove averages of low
precision) to propagate uncertainties on the biometric similarity ver-
sus on the biometric dissimilarity. Algebraically, groups (1-4) rely on
logsums and inner products (dot products), whereas group (5) and end-
to-end uncertainty propagation also rely on matrix inversions and log-
determinants. As such, computations are carried out on floating point
representations as opposed to integer values.
comparison
score
score
normalization
score
calibration
score
fusion
decision
A vs. B
additional
cohort data
calibration
model
multiple LLRs
objective evidence
subjective
threshold η
Figure 2.18: Overview on score processing for the purpose of making good
informed decisions on average.
Whatever the approach to speaker recognition, some form of nor-
malisation [30] is usually applied to compensate for nuisance varia-
tion, e.g., cepstral mean and variance normalization that marginalizes
microphone and other channel effects via normally distributed data.
Other reasons to normalize scores are to improve system calibration
and fusion. A general approach to score post-processing is illustrated
in Fig. 2.18. A large, auxiliary set of cohort data is often used in con-
junction with references and probes to normalize the scores produced
by some of the systems described above. Score calibration is often ap-
plied to transform scores into log-likelihood ratios (LLRs), whereas
score fusion techniques can be applied to improve reliability by com-
bining the scores produced by different speaker recognition systems,
e.g., so that they produce LLRs that reflect the weight of evidence
for a given probe in a given reference – probe comparison. The use
of LLRs rather than raw scores has distinct advantages, e.g., (a) the
Bayes decision risk is minimized, and (b) decision making is solely in-
ferred from biometric information, namely to the proportion of mated
and non-mated reference – probe pairs (ideally, encoded by a score in
its value: the LLR).
This dissertation relates to the state-of-the-art as follows. The i-
vector/PLDA paradigm (group 3) is the baseline. The benefit of
this paradigm over deep learning systems is the inherent data inter-
pretability throughout each processing step; data interpretability is di-
62 The vast majority of literature assumes high precision after embedding extraction
(for the sake of computational effort), such that embeddings are treated as templates
(approximated from models) and the uncertainty of the feature estimate is not con-
sidered further. By contrast, [137] propagates the uncertainty of i-vector embeddings
(as models) in a principled manner throughout the PLDA comparison.
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luted during (current) DNN processing, DNNs are thus inapplicable
to scenarios which demand understanding of each step in evidence re-
porting. In this dissertation, quality vectors (q-vectors) are proposed—
quality estimates derived from acoustic i-vectors—and employed in
score normalization and calibration to sustain good decision making
in unconstrained environments. In other words, the data flow of a
speaker recognition system is exploited during processing—data rep-
resentations of each step have a well-defined interpretation—but the
baseline system itself remains unchanged. This benefits biometric sys-
tem operators who use and understand state-of-the-art technology
but are not developing speaker recognition systems end-to-end. Us-
ing the methods proposed in this dissertation, operators are capable
of not only employing state-of-the-art technology but moreover of
gaining the ability to utilize licensed systems in unconstrained envi-
ronments. Based on the Bayesian decision framework (BDF) score nor-
malization/calibration is nothing but threshold normalization/cali-
bration throughout—an adaptation of the belief in a decision policy
facing new information (e.g., about quality) is formalized in the same
way as an update of the strength of evidence (LLR scores) in the light
of the same new information.
In the following, the extraction of acoustic features is briefly out-
lined. Early biometric comparators in speaker recognition are directly
employed on these acoustic features (as well as the latest end-to-end
DNNs). The ideas and concepts of conventional comparators are pre-
sented for two purposes. For one, their chronological evolution is
fundamental to the extraction of biometric from acoustic features. For
another, to provide a brief outline of involved concepts for computer
scientists (being non-experts in this field) that might find struggle
with (although well-written) tutorial overviews on speaker recogni-
tion (e.g., [30, 31]).
2.5.2 Acoustic Feature Extraction in Brief
The survey [30] distinguishes between the following acoustic features:
• High-level. Features represent behavioral characteristics, such
as accent, idiolect, or phones, typically examined by linguists
and phoneticians in a semi- or non-automated fashion.
• Prosodic and spectro-temporal. Features comprise behavioral
and physiological information, e.g., rhythm, pitch, or harmon-
ics, which are also influenced by the properties of a biometric
subject’s vocal tract, where research contributions are coming
from signal processing and acoustic phonetics.
• Short-term spectral and voice source. Features rather put em-
phasis on physiological characteristics, such as length and di-
mension of the vocal tract, which are indirectly examined uti-
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lizing spectral and other easily extractable low-level signal fea-
tures, enabling automated real time recognition.
Short-term spectoral and voice source features are the most cho-
sen features for automatic speech processing. In speaker recognition,
acoustic features are extracted from voice samples in order to assess
the biometric evidence [31]. Typically employed acoustic features are,
e.g., MFCCs, summarizing a perceptual scale of pitches [123, 124]; lin-
ear predictive coding coefficients (LPCCs), a filter-source model of speech
resonances [138, 139]; and relative spectral transform and perceptual lin-
ear predictions (RASTA-PLPs), smoothed spectra warping robust to lin-
ear spectral distortions [140–142]. Among others, the speaker recog-
nition community has introduced: Perseus features, more noise ro-
bust variation of MFCCs with responses from Gammatone filter bank
[143], and constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs), geometrically dis-
tributed octaves while preserving linearly spaced frequency filters
[144]. Effectively, these features share one property, exemplarily pre-
sented in the following: acoustic features are extracted from a homo-
morphic transform of speech for the purpose of speech deconvolution
[119].
Example: Deconvolution of Speech, a Homomorphic Analysis
Canonically, a time t dependent signal u(t) is deconvoluted by a
linear filter system into its (e.g., two) components u1(t),u2(t). Let
⊗ denote the convolution of speech in the observation space, ⊕ de-
note the convolution in the homomorphic space (preserving alge-
braic structures of speech), and φ the homomorphic transform of
the linear filter system, such that the structure of speech convolu-
tion is preserved in the homomorphic space—the homomorphic
transform of a convoluted signal equals the homomorphic convo-
lution of its transformed components:
φ(u(t)) = φ(u1(t)⊗ u2(t)) = φ(u1(t))⊕φ(u2(t)) . (2.58)
Thereof, speech components are easier to deconvolute in the homo-
morphic space.
According to [119] (published in 1968; concurrent nevertheless),
there are many equivalent representations of such filter systems
in speech processing, where the most straightforward and most
generally applicable are based on the complex Fourier transform.
The excitation u(t) and the response uˆ(t) of the system are related
by their associated complex Fourier transforms U(jω), Uˆ(jω) as:
Uˆ(jω) = logU(jω) = log |U(jω)|+ jΦ(jω) , (2.59)
with the complex phase Φ(jω) associated with U(jω); denot-
ing complex numbers in terms of radians of the angle ω with
−pi < ω < pi, imposing j2 = −1. By applying the inverse Fourier
transform, the transform of the linear filter system is realized, and
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acoustic features are extracted. As the Fourier transform is trans-
forming orthogonally, it results in decorrelated Fourier coefficients.
By equivalently substituting the Fourier transform with the Z-
transform, the system is evaluated on the unit circle. The Z-trans-
form of the time-discrete signal u(n) (with integer indices n ∈ Z)
is the formal power series U(z) with the complex number z:
U(z) =
∞∑
n=−∞u(n) z
−n . (2.60)
The input sequence (the filter input) and the complex cepstrum (the
filter response; an anagram of the processed spectrum U(z)) are rep-
resented as u(n), uˆ(n) with the associated Z-transforms U(z), Uˆ(z),
such that Uˆ(z) = logU(z). The inverse Z-transform reveals the com-
plex cepstrum uˆ(n) in terms of its additive components:
uˆ(n) =
1
2 pi j
∮
logU(z) zn−1 dz . (2.61)
Speech is considered to be a convolution of pitch p(n), glot-
tal pulse g(n), and vocal tract v(n) sequence representations [119],
where the speech waveform is viewed through a window w(n),
such that:
u(n) = [p(n)⊗ g(n)⊗ v(n)] w(n) . (2.62)
The complex cepstrum is the basis of speech signal processing.
The convolved speech components are transformed into additive
components in the complex cepstrum, making them separable in an
orthogonal acoustic space—ideally, cepstral representations are decor-
related. Depending on the chosen feature type, amplitude and/or
phase, information is used (e.g., MFCCs ignore the complex phase
and just use amplitude information). Furthermore [30], voice activity
detection (VAD) (removal of non-speech), speech enhancement (signal
denoising), and feature normalization methods can be applied (to fulfill
the requirements of following signal processing, such as zero mean
and unit variance).
In this dissertation, solely short-term spectral acoustic features are
used, namely MFCCs. To explicitly define the used acoustic features
[31]: MFCCs are obtained after a short-term Fourier transform of
25ms voice segments63, which are sampled by sliding windows [120,
121] at a rate of 100Hz, resulting in the amplitude and phase contribu-
tion of the examined frequency bands.64 Then, the power spectrum
is computed, filtered by the logarithmic mel filterbank, and cepstral
coefficients are obtained by a discrete cosine transform of the logarith-
63 In the automatic speech recognition (ASR) and speaker recognition communities
usually referred to as frames [120, 121].
64 Considering telephone speech (8 kHz denotes the upper frequency bound of the
communication channel) usually, e.g., 200Hz to 3.8 kHz frequencies are examined.
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mic values of each filterbank energies. Signal phase information is
thereby omitted, solely considering amplitude information. A speech
segment representation of compressed energy information results.
In general, acoustic features can be augmented and/or normalized
[30, 31] by, e.g., cepstral mean and variance normalization, applying
feature warping [145] or RASTA filtering [142]. Typically, static cepstral
coefficients are augmented by first and second order derivatives [120,
121], i.e., the velocity and acceleration of cepstral coefficients, which
are stacked onto the static features, forming the representation of a
short-term voice segment.65 In this dissertation, 60 acoustic features
are extracted from 20 static MFCCs.
MFCCs are the basis for conventional signal processing, the estima-
tion of latent biometric subspaces, and end-to-end DNN approaches.
In the following, conventional signal processing and comparison
methods are outlined, forming the theoretical basis of the state-of-
the-art technology employed in this work.
2.5.3 Conventional Signal Processing and Comparison
Conventional signal processing methods in speaker recognition rely
on so-called universal background models (UBMs), cf. groups (1-3)
of Fig. 2.17. In terms of Fig. 2.17, the response of an acoustic clus-
ter (referred to as the UBM) with voice sample representations as
input describes these samples in a known acoustic scenario. UBMs
are statistic clusters (e.g., HMMs and GMMs), modeling the space of
observable acoustic features. Depending on the employed compari-
son algorithm, UBMs serve different purposes: in HMM-UBM, GMM-
UBM, and supervector comparisons, group (1) of Fig. 2.17, speaker-
dependent models are adapted from a UBM modeling proposition
A, whereas the UBM serves as the model to proposition B during
LLR computation. However, for the purpose of extracting latent fac-
tors, group (2), or probabilistic embeddings, group (3), the UBM is basis
to the estimation of a latent voice sample representation, i.e., to the
sample representation embedded in a probabilistic subspace of the
UBM. The latter is crucial for the extraction of i-vector features.
UBMs as (state-transitioning) HMMs [125] model temporal speech
patterns by transitioning between latent states capable of emitting
feature vectors (text-dependent models). UBMs as (state-less) GMMs
[126] cluster speech patterns probabilistically (text-independent mod-
els). GMMs can be seen as single-state HMMs that are also being ca-
pable of emitting feature vectors. GMMs λ = {wc,µc,Σc | c ∈ C} are
probabilistic clusters and compute log-likelihoods by a weighted log-
sum over their clusters c ∈ C (referred to as mixture components) with
65 Conventionally, 13 or 20 static MFCCs are used (replacing the zeroth MFCC with
a frame’s energy). When employing first and second order derivatives, 39 or 60
features are yielded per voice segment.
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weights wc, component-wise normal distributions N(ψt |µc,Σc) hav-
ing distribution mean and covariance parameters µc,Σc [31]:
log Pr(ψt |λ) = log
∑
c∈C
wcN(ψt |µc,Σc) . (2.63)
Thereby, the mean values represent cluster centroids, and covariance
terms represent the precision of a component (precision Σ−1c being
the inverse of uncertainty Σc): small covariances indicate high pre-
cision, such that solely features close to a centroid yield high likeli-
hoods and vice versa—high covariances indicate poor precision. LLRs
are computed by comparing the likelihoods of a speaker GMM to
a UBM. Log-likelihoods logN(ψt |µc,Σc) are estimated per GMM
component λc. Notably, probability density functions (pdfs) fX(x |λ)
of the exponential family, such as the multivariate normal distribu-
tion λ = {µ,Σ} with mean and covariance expectation parameters µ,Σ,
can be expressed by their natural parameters η(λ), outlining the dis-
tribution, and by sufficient statistics T(x), describing the data for that
distribution [59]:
fX(x |λ) = exp
(
η(λ)T T(x)+A(λ) +B(x)
)
(2.64)
with distribution and data-dependent normalization termsA(λ),B(x).
For a data series X = {x1, . . . , xN} with N data samples, the pdf
fX(X |λ) is denotable as:
fX(X |λ) = exp
(
η(λ)T
∑
n∈N
T(xn)+NA(λ) +
∑
n∈N
B(xn)
)
. (2.65)
These normalization terms sustain a fundamental probability prop-
erty: the area under the pdf equals one (
∫
fX(x |λ)dx = 1). In other
words, log-likelihoods log fX(x |λ) are computable by linear algebra.
For this dissertation, the main benefit of this pdf formulation is not to
investigate different members of the exponential distribution family
but rather to outline the necessary computations in which distribu-
tion pre-calculations are separated from data depending calculations,
e.g., occurring during a verification attempt. Consequently, computa-
tions are carried out efficiently and for privacy centered communica-
tion, and multi-party LLR computation protocols are definable at the
precise instances of model parameter and biometric depending data
calculations.
For multivariate Gaussian distributions with feature dimension F,
the well-known pdf is expressed in terms of the inner product (the
dot-product) between the natural parameters η(λc) for a GMM compo-
nent λc and the sufficient statistics T(ψt) of acoustic features ψt. For
one feature ψt and for a feature sequence ψ1, . . . ,ψT , the observa-
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tion log-likelihoods logN(ψt |µc,Σc), logN(ψ1, . . . ,ψT |µc,Σc) are
(with summarized normalization terms) [59]:
logN(ψt |µc,Σc) =
(
η(λc)
T T(ψt)
)
−
(
1
2
µTcΣ
−1
c µc +
1
2
|Σc|+
F
2
log(2pi)
)
,
logN(ψ1, . . . ,ψT |µc,Σc) =
(
η(λc)
T
∑
t∈T
T(ψt)
)
− T
(
1
2
µTcΣ
−1
c µc +
1
2
|Σc|+
F
2
log(2pi)
)
with η(λc) =
[
Σ−1c µc
−12Σ
−1
c
]
and T(ψt) =
[
ψt
ψtψ
T
t
]
. (2.66)
In Eq. (2.66), T denotes the transposition operator, t ∈ T time of
the feature vectors and T(ψt) the sufficient statistics (disambigua-
tion by font style). Notably, for an entire voice sample representation
Ψ = {ψ1, . . . ,ψT }, the sufficient statistics are the sole data dependent
term and are accumulated before computing the inner product. Terms
depending on F,µc,Σc are pre-computable constants. Effectively, log-
likelihoods of a Gaussian distribution are computed by addition and
multiplication, where non-linear terms (such as log(2 pi)) are precom-
putable constants.
UBMs are trained by the iterative expectation-maximization algo-
rithm (EM) [59], optimizing the model fit of the training data: during
expectation steps, the expected sufficient statistics are computed. Afer-
wards, during maximization steps, the log-likelihoods of the entire
training data set are optimized w.r.t. the model parameters, see [59,
120, 121] for details. In speaker recognition (e.g., [146]), UBM training
is hierarchical. Therein, the first EM iterations optimize the fit of a sin-
gle cluster (UBM component), which is then split into two depending
on the principal axis of variance [146, source code]. Then, the fit of two
clusters is optimized during consecutive EM iterations, thereafter of
four clusters and so on, until the final number of clusters, i.e., the final
number of UBM components is—usually—a power of two.66 During
enrolment, the UBM is seen as the prior distribution and the enrol-
ment data as new information, such that the model is adapted to the
maximum a-poserior (MAP) model, see [59, 120, 121].
In the following examples, the concepts of the group (1) compara-
tors in Fig. 2.17 are briefly outlined, providing a background on the
history of research in the speaker recognition community. Chronolog-
ically by appearance in the literature, the HMM – UBM comparator is
depicted first, followed by the GMM – UBM comparator. Afterwards,
66 Clusters of too low or high precision might be omitted to neglect acoustic artifacts
of the training data or components of poor fit. When omitting components, the re-
maining UBM weights need to be rescaled, such that their sum is one.
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supervector comparison by SVMs is described for one of the many
variants proposed in the literature pool.
h1Start
v1,1
h2
v1,2
v2,1
v2,2
h3
v2,3
v3,2
v1,3
v3,1
v3,3
ψ1
Pr(ψ1 |λh1)
Pr(ψ1 |λh2)
Pr(ψ1 |λh3)
ψ2
Pr(ψ2 |λh1)
Pr(ψ2 |λh2)
Pr(ψ2 |λh3)
(a) Observing two feature vectors ψ1,ψ2, each state
with its conditional likelihood of the form Pr(ψ |λ)
and transition probabilities of the form v.
h1Start
h2
h3
h2 h2 h2
h3 h3
ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 ψ4 ψ5 ψ6
(b) Observing six feature vectors ψ1, . . . ,ψ6 and an (exemplarily)
most likely path; opaque states indicate each state’s location
in the transition graph.
Figure 2.19: HMM example: finite state machine with three states h1,h2,h3
(blue circles) with h1,h3 as start and final states, observing fea-
ture vectors (orange boxes); transition probabilities (solid) and
emission probabilities (dotted).
Example: Acoustic Features, the HMM – UBM Comparator
HMMs [125] are finite state machines with underlying statistical
models. They describe a sequence of possible (latent) states by prob-
abilities based on the previously attained sequence of states. The
transition likelihood between two states is modeled by transition
probabilities V =
{
vi,j ∈ R | 1 6 i, j 6 k, 0 6 vi,j 6 1,
∑
i vi,j = 1
}
with k HMM states, and the sum of transition probabilities of exit-
ing a state equals one. Fig. 2.19 illustrates an exemplary HMM as a
graphical model when observing data.
Each stateH = {h1, . . . ,hk} is capable of estimating likelihoods to
data observations, as each state resembles a latent variable outlined
by a mixture λ of C (e.g., Gaussian) distribution components. The
probability Pr(ψt |λh) of an HMM state h observing data ψt with
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time-dependent frame index t ∈ T and T feature vectors from a
mixture of multivariate Gaussian distributions N is:
Pr(ψt |λh) =
∑
c∈C
wcN(ψt |µc,Σc) , (2.67)
where wc,µc,Σc denote component weights, mean vectors and
covariance matrices (per state). Notably, as acoustic features are
assumed to be decorrelated (the feature vector elements are inde-
pendent), covariances matrices are diagonal. States are capable of
either associating a likelihood to any observed data (data discrim-
ination) and to emit any observable data for a given likelihood
(data generation). The most likely latent state transition path is de-
termined via forward-backward algorithms, e.g., by the Viterbi algo-
rithm or by the Baum-Welch algorithm [125]. Considering state tran-
sition and observation/emission probabilities, HMMs are capable
of discriminating any observed data sequence, with likelihoods de-
pending on the assumed sequence of latent states and generating
(emitting) any data sequence for given state sequences and emis-
sion likelihoods.
The outline of HMMs is determined by their number of states, state
transitions and each state’s distributions, e.g., when modeling each
phoneme (each sound unit) by another HMM, each HMM requires
less states to sufficiently represent the data, fewer state transitions
and fewer mixture components per state. Usually, speaker-dependent
HMMs are adapted from the UBM based on few enrolment voice sam-
ples. In consequence, of the limited availability of enrolment data67,
not all UBM parameters are adapted towards a speaker’s subspace,
such that transition, weight, and covariance parameters of the UBM
are assumed to be equal among all subjects. Conventionally, HMMs
model passphrases, words, or phonemes, making them suitable for
text-dependent application scenarios. For text-independent systems,
however, GMMs are more suitable.
Example: Acoustic Features, the GMM – UBM Comparator
GMMs [126] are an HMM special case with one state (without state
transitions, thus effectively state-less), where likelihoods are com-
puted from a mixture of Gaussian distributions, see Eq. (2.63). Sim-
ilarly to the HMM – UBM approach, a UBM (a universal GMM)
serves in the GMM – UBM comparison as the proposition B model,
whereas a speaker-dependent GMM is adapted from the UBM dur-
ing enrolment by using the enrolment data of a subject, serving as
the proposition A model.
Usually, only GMM’s mean values µc are updated, assuming
equal weights wc and covariances Σc among all subjects for com-
67 Hours of uttered speech would aid the sufficiency of training models. To utter these
speech amounts, however, could be inconvenient to end-users.
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ponents c ∈ C (due to limited enrolment data). As HMMs usually
employ C = {8, 16, 32} components per state, speaker recognition
GMMs often comprise C = {512, 1024, 2048, 4096} components, lead-
ing for 60-dimensional acoustic features to up to 14 995 456 free pa-
rameters to estimate in terms of weights, means, and covariances
(495 616 free parameters for diagonal covariance approximations
with 245 760 speaker-depending mean values).
In contrast to HMMs, GMMs cannot model state transitions but are,
in turn, better suited to efficient computations in text-independent
application scenarios. However, as the GMM mean values of reference
models solely represent a speaker’s identity as a biometric subject,
the research focus of the speaker recognition community moved to
the so-called supervectors.
Example: Acoustic Features, Supervector/SVM Comparator
The concatenation of mean values across mixture components is
referred to as supervector mT =
[
µT1, . . . ,µ
T
C
]
[30]. The UBM param-
eters wc,Σc remain speaker-independent as non-biometric infor-
mation. Adapted reference and probe supervectors are compared
by SVMs in terms of the divergence between both clusters repre-
sented [147]. Supervectors are high-dimensional representations of
voice samples, employable to biometric and non-biometric recogni-
tion tasks (the UBM models the acoustic subspace, not the biomet-
ric subspace). Thereof, supervectors are considered as sparse data,
since reference and probe samples usually convey a few seconds
up to some minutes of speech—the linguistic variability modeled
by text-independent UBMs is not representative within single voice
samples.
Speaker recognition based on supervectors is carried out by em-
ploying discriminative models (e.g., SVMs) or generative models
(e.g., probabilistic embeddings). In contrast to conventional SVM
kernels, the GMM supervector kernel [147] computes a bound to the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between two GMM distributions, one rep-
resented by the reference supervector mr, another by the probe
supervector mp. By assuming diagonal covariances, a closed-form
solution is represented by its corresponding inner product, i.e., the
kernel function K(mr,mp):
K(mr,mp) =
∑
c∈C
(√
wcΣ
−12
c mc,r
)T (√
wcΣ
−12
c mc,p
)
, (2.68)
wheremc,r,mc,p represent component-depending terms of the ref-
erence and probe supervector. A two-class SVM is constructed from
sums of the kernel function with L support vectors (denoted by
ms), i.e., supervectors outlining the SVM’s decision bound that are
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determined by a training process. Discriminative scores SSVM are
computed by speaker-depending SVMs as:
SSVM(mp) =
∑
l∈L
αl θl K(ms,l,mp) + b , (2.69)
where θl are the ideal outputs associated with the support vectors
(0, 1 class labels for class B and class A), consisting of non/-/mated
and mated supervectors from the reference and the background,
and positive weights αl sustain the condition:
∑
l∈L αl θl = 1.
The outline of SVMs regarding supervectors is a straight-forward
consequence from the assumptions on GMM – UBM comparisons, i.e.,
equal covariance terms and equal component weights across all sub-
jects (due to insufficient data in enrolment and recognition). As solely
supervectors represent a sample of a speaker in the GMM – UBM ap-
proach, comparators such as SVMs that assess these voice represen-
tations are designed. Regarding biometric information in the form of
templates and models, SVMs are designed to treat features as tem-
plates.
Elaborating on noise robustness for SVMs in speaker recognition,
[147] proposes nuisance attribute projection, removing the sample but
not subject depending subspace from supervectors by projection. In
[148], within class covariance normalization (WCCN) is proposed, a su-
pervised whitening transform: the feature space is projected into a
more discriminant subspace, where feature elements are decorrelated
(covariances of feature elements are zero), and each feature element’s
variance is one. The transformation matrix is estimated by the ex-
pected within-covariance class over all classes [148]. For GMM supervec-
tor SVMs, an SVM is required per speaker, distinguishing between
the subject’s identity and others.
By contrast, other comparators allow to simultaneously compute
comparison scores for multiple subjects. Depending on the kernel
design, however, comparison can accommodate for features as mod-
els. Nevertheless, in the context of this work, templates cannot be
used to predict other sample representations of a subject, whereas
models can.68 This is relevant when comparators trained on idealistic
68 Here, the central aspect of models are the formulation of the posterior marginal and
the posterior predictive. For details see [59]. The likelihood Pr(D |η) of a data set D
depends on the natural parameters η. By modeling priors of the natural parame-
ters η and of the data Pr(η), Pr(D), likelihoods are used to compute the posterior
of the natural parameters given the data Pr(η | D) = Pr(D |η) Pr(η)Pr(D) . Let the natural
parameters exemplarily be based on two terms like the data mean µ and covari-
ance Σ, then the posterior of the natural parameters equals the posterior of these
terms Pr(η | D) = Pr(µ,Σ | D) since η is a function of (µ,Σ). By using marginaliza-
tion, the prior belief in these parameters is updated: the posterior marginal of the
covariance is Pr(Σ | D) =
∫
Pr(µ,Σ | D)dµ and the posterior marginal of the mean is
Pr(µ | D) =
∫
Pr(µ,Σ | D)dΣ. The posterior predictive Pr(x | D) uses the updated belief
in a distribution’s parameters to predict data x given a data set D in a meaningful
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conditions are facing environments of unconstrained quality. There-
fore, embeddings are extracted and compared by models generalizing
across subjects.
2.5.4 Embeddings: Feature Extraction
In this dissertation, embeddings are subspace representations w.r.t. a
recognition task in which the terms latent (or hidden) refer to these
embeddings as variables living in this subspace. Embeddings are esti-
mated probabilistically (e.g., as biometric factors [127] and as i-vectors
[130]) or by DNNs (e.g., as x-vectors [134, 135]). In speaker recogni-
tion, comparisons of reference and probe embeddings are carried out
either in terms of correlation (e.g., by the cosine distance similarity)
or in terms of subspace identity models (e.g., by PLDA [60]). Mo-
tivated by stochastical variational Bayes, so-called meta-embeddings [54,
99] propose an identity inference scheme, combining the advantages
of probabilistic and discriminative embeddings.
2.5.4.1 Probabilistic Embeddings
Groups (2,3) of Fig. 2.17 examine the biometric subspace of a voice
sample within an acoustic cluster: emphasis is put on factors repre-
senting the biometric voice by decomposing supervectors m into bio-
metric and non-biometric components. In JFA, group (2), sparse su-
pervectors (with dimensions between 20k and 250k) are decomposed
into lower-dimensional non-sparse factors (e.g., with 50 to 250 dimen-
sions) representing biometric y, non-biometric x, and residual z latent
variables [127, 128].
Example: Latent Biometric Factors, JFA Comparison
JFA hyperparameters V,U,D are pre-trained, mapping supervec-
tor components into latent factors y, x, z (or probabilistic embeddings).
The JFA model is defined regarding the UBM supervector mUBM
(as a data offset) and is expressible in different ways:
manner—the likelihood of the predicted data is based on the knowledge of a data
set. In terms of a ratio of marginal likelihoods, the posterior predictive can be easily
evaluated as Pr(x | D) = Pr(x,D)Pr(D) =
∫ ∫
Pr(x |µ,Σ)dµdΣ [59].
On the one hand, the posterior predictive is usable to estimate (train) likelihood
models, e.g., speaker dependent HMMs and GMMs (to enrol reference models). On
the other hand, by formulating latent variables rather than distribution parameters,
latent class subspaces can be estimated. For example, they can be used to recognize,
e.g., a language, an emotion, and a biometric subject. In this dissertation, these con-
cepts are used to estimate latent variables (probabilistic embeddings) to represent
speaker identities based on a formal inference from acoustic voice data. Note: de-
spite the appearance of Bayesian statistics, most computations involved are nothing
but addition and multiplication (the most used distributions have elegant closed-form
solutions).
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m =mUBM +V y+Ux+Dz
⇔ V y = (m−mUBM) − (Ux+Dz)
⇔ V y+Dz =m− (mUBM +Ux)
⇔ Ux = (m−mUBM) − (V y+Dz) . (2.70)
The braces foreshadow the concept of how JFA is used: (i) the JFA
model decomposes supervectors; (ii) having multiple enrolment
samples, biometric supervector components V y are estimated
from all centered supervectors of reference samples m −mUBM,
thereafter, sample-depending non-biometric supervector compo-
nents are estimated with the residuals Ux + Dz. Therein, the
speaker-depending biometric and residual factors (y, z) form the
reference model (iii) of a biometric subject. The depending term
in the supervector space (V y +Dz) is derived by jointly center-
ing the supervector mean by the UBM supervector and the sample
dependent non-biometric component termUx. During recognition
(iv), non-biometric supervector components Ux of the voice probe
are decomposed by the centered supervector term m−mUBM that
is re-biased by the joint biometric and residual term V y+Dz (the
enrolled reference).
Conceptually, supervectors m are obtained from iteratively
adapting the UBM, where the adaptation depends on the UBM’s
cluster response regarding acoustic features ψ1, . . . ,ψT . Notably,
the UBM adaptation is deterministic, such that its response (of the
first adaptation iteration) outlines the estimation of supervector
decomposition. Thus, the JFA hyperparameters are trained to fit
the decomposition model accordingly. Therefore, a UBM’s acoustic
feature response is represented by each UBM component’s statis-
tics on emitting a feature vector ψt (of the t-th speech segment),
namely the Gaussian posterior γt(c); the zero order statistics Nc,
accumulating component posteriors; and the first order statistics
Fc, a component’s expected valuea:
γt(c) =
N(ψt |µc,Σc)∑
c∈C
N(ψt |µc,Σc)
, Nc =
∑
t∈T
γt(c) , Fc =
∑
t∈T
γt(c)ψt .
(2.71)
Then, from the perspective of the enrolled reference term V y+
Dz, supervectors are centered by the UBM’s supervector mUBM
and the non-biometric supervector terms Ux—the origin of the su-
pervector space is moved to mUBM +Ux. As such, supervectors
and first order statistics are centered as well; the centered super-
vector m and the centered first order moment F of a sample are
denoted by (sparing the component-wise notation for the sake of
easier tractability):
m =m− (mUBM +Ux) , F = F−N (mUBM +Ux) . (2.72)
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For LLR computations, the JFA idea is to marginalize the obser-
vation in order to infer a latent subspace, where acoustic feature
representations correspond to the biometric recognition task, i.e.,
the latent biometric subspace, which for JFA is jointly estimated with
non-biometric factors. Therefore, the posterior distribution of the
latent factors is estimated, such that the likelihood of a sample X
is computed by integrating over the posterior distribution of the
sample (but not subject) depending term x [129]:
log Pr(X |m) =
∫
Pr(X |m, x)N(x | 0, I)dx , (2.73)
where 0 represents the zero vector, and I the identity matrix. Latent
non-biometric factors are assumed to be Gaussian distributed (as
well as the biometric and residual factors).
LLRs SJFA(m, x,mUBM, xUBM) are estimated by the likelihood of
a sample given a centered reference supervector m and a probe’s
non-biometric factors x and by the likelihood of this sample given
the UBM’s centered supervectormUBM and the UBM’s non-biomet-
ric factors xUBM:
SJFA(m, x,mUBM, xUBM) = log
Pr(X |m, x)
Pr(X |mUBM, xUBM)
. (2.74)
As: mUBM = 0, the LLR computation simplifies where the log-
likelihood terms are further approximated by the first order Tay-
lor series; a linearly computable LLRs results [129]. Biometric
and residual factors (yr, zr) are extracted from reference samples,
whereas non-biometric factors, zero and first order statistics xp,
Np, Fp are extracted from probes. In JFA (for details, see [127–
129]), the LLR SJFA(yr, zr, xp,Np, Fp) is approximated by employ-
ingb the UBM’s covariance ΣUBM [129]:
SJFA(yr, zr, xp,Np, Fp) ≈
(V yr +Dzr)
TΣ−1UBM (Fp −Np (mUBM +Uxp)) . (2.75)
a Second order statistics, accumulating ψtψ
T
t terms, cancel out during LLR com-
putation and are thus spared in this brief overview [129].
b Think of it as: (V yr +Dzr)T Σ
−1
UBM (V yp +Dzp) with probe biometric and
residual probe factors yp, zp.
In JFA, voice samples are represented by a compound probabilistic
embedding, comprising biometric, non-biometric, and residual em-
beddings. JFA is employed in text-dependent scenarios, where non-
biometric factors resemble, e.g., different (known) passphrases ut-
tered by a speaker or different capture sensors (microphones) used by
a subject. The non-biometric JFA factors x, however, were observed
to convey speaker-discriminant information, such that the i-vector
paradigm [130] emerged, see group (3) of Fig. 2.17.
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Example: Probabilistic Embeddings, Acoustic i-vectors
In [130], a total variability subspace is proposed as a JFA special case.
GMM supervectors m are decomposed into the UBM supervector
mUBM and the lower-dimensional representation—a latent variable
referred to as i-vector i:
m =mUBM + T i , (2.76)
where T denotes the total variability matrix (a rectangular matrix of
low rank), containing the eigenvectors with the largest eigenvalues
of the total variability covariance matrix [130]. The total variability
matrix can be thought of as a dictionary, mapping supervector el-
ements to i-vector elements for each GMM component—the total
variability matrix T is constructed from component-wise entries Tc
with c ∈ (1, . . . ,C), giving a point estimate i (an expectation) of the
supervector m by: 〈m〉 = T 〈i〉.
The total variability matrix is trained by the EM algorithm, in
which i-vectors are modeled as latent Gaussian variables, more pre-
cisely, as Gaussian posteriors. The i-vector prior distribution Π(i)
with mean vector µ and precision matrix P is conventionally de-
fined as [149] (note, precision is the inverted covariance):
Π(i) ∼ N
(
µ,P−1
)
. (2.77)
The i-vector posterior distribution of Π(i) with the i-vector
point estimate 〈i〉 and its uncertainty 〈i i′〉 are given in terms of
the component-wise pre-whiteninga zero and first order statistics
Nc, Fc by [149]:
Cov(i, i) =
(
P+
∑
c∈C
Nc T
T
c Tc
)−1
,
〈i〉 = Cov(i, i)
(
Pµ+
∑
c∈C
TTc Fc
)
,
〈i iT〉 = Cov(i, i) + 〈i〉 〈i〉T . (2.78)
Conventionally, Π(i) is assumed to be standard normal (µ = 0
and P = I), simplifying the i-vector extraction to:
〈i〉 =
(
I+
∑
c∈C
Nc T
T
c Tc
)−1 (∑
c∈C
TTc Fc
)
. (2.79)
a After pre-whitening, the precision matrix associated with each mixture component can
be taken to be the identity matrix and the mean vector to be zero [149].
Notably, i-vectors are point estimates associated with their depend-
ing extraction uncertainty (〈i iT〉), which is employable in feature
86 fundamentals
space analyses and in comparison algorithms (for the latter, see [53,
137]). Acoustic i-vectors are also employable to other tasks outside of
speaker recognition, such as speech, language, and emotion recogni-
tion. For the purpose of this dissertation, acoustic i-vectors are used
in order to derive q-vectors, which are proposed to inform score cali-
bration about changing environmental conditions. For speaker recog-
nition, however, decisions are carried out in the biometric (not the
acoustic) subspace, thus acoustic i-vectors are projected into the bio-
metric subspace.
Example: From Acoustic to Biometric i-vectors
State-of-the-art i-vector systems, such as in [150], conduct a variety
of i-vector post processing in order to enhance the biometric dis-
crimination performance. Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) trans-
forms a feature space by maximizing the ratio of the class between
variance to the class within variance, targeting better linear class
separability. i-vectors are already in the biometric subspace hereof.
However, further feature normalizations lead to better recognition
performance.
Whitening (or its supervised variation WCCN) decorrelates and
denoises i-vector elements, such that its subspace resembles a Eu-
clidean space. Thus, conventional distance measures are employ-
able, e.g., the Euclidean distance and the cosine distance. After these
transform, the covariance matrix of the data is the identity matrix.
In [132], the length of i-vectors is observed to be proportional
to the speech duration; more speech segments correspond to more
sufficient statistics accumulated during i-vector extraction and thus
to more sufficiently estimated i-vector distributions. For the pur-
pose of better comparability of i-vectors from variable voice sam-
ple durations, [132] proposes to employ radial Gaussianization,
particularly its Taylor series approximation length-normalization. Ef-
fectively, i-vectors are put to unit length and are thus projected
onto a unit sphere around the feature space’s origin—length-
normalization in the Euclidean space is referred to as l2-norm.
If desireda, i-vector posterior distributions can be projected
throughout LDA, WCCN, and l2-norm [151].
a The vast majority of i-vector systems is not propagating uncertainty to the com-
parator, saving computational efforts.
2.5.4.2 DNN Embeddings
Different deep learning schemes are studied within the speaker recog-
nition community, whereof the x-vector embedding [134, 135] yielded
the greatest (recent) breakthrough. In this dissertation, discriminative
embeddings are briefly outlined as part of the literature survey on
speaker recognition, however, they are not investigated thereafter as
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the data interpretability is diluted during DNN processing. Among
others, the preservation of interpretability is relevant to forensic sce-
narios.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
Statistics Pooling
. . .
. . .
. . .
ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψT
Pr(υ ∈ Υ |ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψT )
Embedding
(x-vector)
512×Υ softmax layer
512× 512 layer
3000× 512 layer
1500T × 3000, concatenatation of
µ,σ values (pooled over T frames)
512× 1500 NIN layer, total context:
15 frames ({t})
512× 512 NIN layer, total context:
15 frames ({t})
1536× 512 NIN layer, total context:
15 frames ({t− 3, t, t+ 3})
1536× 512 NIN layer, total context:
9 frames ({t− 2, t, t+ 2})
120× 512 NIN layer, total context:
5 frames ({t− 2, t− 1, t, t+ 1, t+ 2})
Figure 2.20: Architecture of end-to-end DNN extracting x-vector embed-
dings at the sixth layer before the nonlinearity, see [136]: lay-
ers operate on T acoustic features in a feed-forward DNN; a
statistics pooling layer aggregates over the frame-level represen-
tations with additional layers before a softmax over Υ training
data subjects. During x-vector extraction, the last two layers are
omitted, yielding 4.4 billion parameter estimations.
Example: DNN Embeddings, x-vectors
End-to-end DNNs extract embeddings (referred to as x-vectors)
[134–136] derived from acoustic features, namely 20 static MFCCs
without derivatives. In [136], 24 filterbank responses—mean-nor-
malized with sliding windows up to 3 s [145]—are derived from
speech segments (after VAD). Fig. 2.20 illustrates the x-vector DNN
architecture.
In each layer, DNNs employ linear functions with input/output
vectors x,y, projection matrix A, and bias b:
y = Ax+b . (2.80)
Network layers are normalized by activation functions (e.g., the
ReLU activation function), typically introducing a nonlinearity to
the network. Parameters A,b are trained by solving Lagrangians,
optimizing an objective function of the recognition task. Ideally,
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outputs of higher layers (before nonlinearities) convey more dis-
criminant features for the recognition task at hand, such as x-vector
embeddings for speaker recognition.
The DNN employs five layers with a network-in-network nonlinear-
ity (NIN), see [152]. Effectively, where conventional DNNs would
have a rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation function, NINs pro-
pose three ReLUs with two so-called micro neural network blocks in
between. Thereby, NIN layers assess different temporal contexts:
the first NIN layer uses two frames before and after a current frame
(a context of five frames with 120 inputs, yielding 512 outputs), the
second NIN layer uses three outputs of the first layer (nine frames
context with 1 536 inputs, yielding 512 outputs), and the third layer
uses three outputs of the second layer (fifteen frames context with
1 536 inputs, yielding 512 outputs). After the fourth and fifth NIN
layer, mean and standard deviation statistics µ,σ are aggregated
over all frames, where the statistics pooling layer can, e.g., assign
equal weights to frames or employ a self-attention mechanism [136,
153, 154]. Embeddings are extracted in the layer after the statistics
pooling layer before its nonlinearity.
During training, additionally, a feed-forward layer and a softmax
layer are employed. For each subject υ ∈ Υ present in the train-
ing data
{
ψ1,l, . . . ,ψTl,l
}
l∈L with L voice samples, the softmax es-
timates the posterior probabilities, e.g., for the training identities
Υ = {X,Y,Z} : Pr(X |ψ1, . . . ,ψT ) =
exp(xTwX)∑
j∈{X,Y,Z} exp(xTwj)
with identity
depending weights wX,wY,wZ. The training objective (the loss
function) is the multiclass cross-entropy E:
E = −
∑
l∈L
∑
υ∈Υ
θl,υ log Pr(υ |ψ1,l, . . . ,ψTl,l) , (2.81)
where θl,υ represents the ground-of-truth class label (1 if the sub-
ject of the sample l is υ, and 0 otherwise) with a subject’s posterior
probability Pr(υ |ψ1,l, . . . ,ψTl,l) given the evidence (the speech seg-
ments) {ψ1,l, . . . ,ψTl,l} having Tl speech segments. As there are
many DNN designs and training objectives (e.g., see [155]), the x-
vector recipe serves as a state-of-the-art prototype DNN.
2.5.5 Comparators for i-vector and x-vector Embeddings
In speaker recognition, the most prominent embedding comparators
are the cosine distance similarity and subspace identity models, i.e.,
PLDA. Meta-embeddings [54, 99] are motivated by PLDA and x-
vector embeddings, providing LLR comparisons to DNNs. For the
sake of easier tractability, reference and probe embeddings are de-
noted by xr, xp throughout this section.
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Example: Cosine Comparison
In order to discriminatively compare i-vectors and x-vectors, the
cosine between reference and probe features reveals their correla-
tion.a The cosine similarity score Scos(xr, xp) is computed as:
Scos(xr, xp) =
xr
T xp
||xr||2 ||xp||2
, (2.82)
which for length-normalized embeddings simplifies to the inner
product: xrT xp, relating to the Euclidean distance SEuc(xr, xp) as:
SEuc(xr, xp) = 2 (1− xrT xp).
a For training a discriminative embedding extractor, the cosine distance similarity
between training samples is used. If its variation, the angular margin softmax loss
[155, 156], is used instead, the DNN is trained in an elegant way to obtain well
regularized loss function by forcing learned features to be discriminative on a hypersphere
manifold [155] (further performance gains are promising).
The cosine comparator, however, neither examines the latent iden-
tity subspace, assuming extracted features are already discriminative
for the recognition task at-hand, nor does it provide well-calibrated
scores. These theoretical disadvantages manifest in higher decision
costs, see decision cost functions (DCFs). Whereas one might cali-
brate cosine scores to yield LLRs, another might just compute LLRs
directly.
State-of-the-art speaker recognition comparators belong to the
probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) family [132, 157,
158]. PLDA conducts an LLR scoring, comparing the probabilities
of the propositions (a) reference and probe embeddings xr, xp stem-
ming from the same source or (b) stemming from different sources,
see A,B in section 2.4.
Subject identities are modeled as latent variables in a linear sub-
space, assuming Gaussian distributions69 for subject identities and
noise [60]. In [60, chapter 18], the PLDA family is depicted. In this
overview, emphasis is put on:
• the identity subspace model [60]
• the originally proposed PLDA [60]
• the simplified Gaussian PLDA [132, 158, 160] adapted for
speaker recognition purposes
• the depending full subspace variant, i.e., the two covariance
model (2Cov) [158, 160, 161].
69 In [159], heavy-tailed priors (t-distributions) are proposed, accounting for pooled
telephone and microphone speech.
90 fundamentals
(a) Latent identity
variable
1D
 Su
bsp
ace
(b) Latent variable in
feature space
(c) Subspace of a la-
tent identity vari-
able
(d) Gaussian dis-
tributed identity
variables
(e) Latent variables in
feature space
(f) Identity subspace
model
Figure 2.21: Identity subspace model, cf. [60].
Example: Identity Subspace Model Comparisons
The identity subspace model [60] extends canonical factor analysis
by addressing within-subject variabilities. The generative model is
depicted regarding xij for I subjects with Ji samples per subject:
xij = µ+Φhi + ij ,
Pr(xij |hi) = N (µ+Φhi,Σ) ,
hi ∼ N (0 , I) ,
ij ∼ N (0,Σ) with diag[Σ] ,
xij ∼ N
(
µ,ΦΦT +Σ
)
, (2.83)
where ΦΦT corresponds to the between-subject variance, Σ to the
within-subject variance, 0 is the zero vector, and I denotes the iden-
tity matrix. The model parameters Φ,Σ are iteratively trained by
the EM algorithm.
Fig. 2.21 illustrates the identity subspace model for a 2D feature
space: different identities are assumed to be standard Gaussian dis-
tributed, (a) and (d), which spans an 1D subspace in the 2D feature
space. In the 1D subspace, different identities are distributed de-
pending on the between-subject variance, (b) and (e). Thereby, the
samples of one identity vary depending on the within-subject vari-
ance, which may also resemble a residual term to the model, (c)
and (f). Assuming the same between and within class variances for
all subjects, i.e., a model generalizing over all identities, the latent
2.5 automatic speaker recognition 91
1D identity subspace is expanded to the observed 2D feature space,
yielding the identity subspace model.
The identity posterior distributions are estimated, similarly to
the i-vector model, regarding the precision of the identity sub-
space estimation Li, providing first and second order moments
〈hi〉, 〈hi hTi 〉 [60]:
Li = I+ JiΦ
TΣ−1Φ ,
〈hi〉 = L−1ΦTΣ−1
Ji∑
j=1
(xij − µ) ,
Pr(hi | xi;1,...,Ji) = N
(
〈hi〉,L−1
)
,
〈hi hTi 〉 = L−1 + 〈hi〉 〈hi〉T . (2.84)
LLR scores SSIM(xr, xp) are computed in the feature domain by
examining the distribution of identity variables in the latent sub-
space with: Σtot =ΦΦT +Σ [157, 158]:
SSIM(xr, xp) = logN
([
xr
xp
] ∣∣∣∣∣
[
µ
µ
]
,
[
Σtot
ΦΦT
ΦΦT
Σtot
])
− logN
([
xr
xp
] ∣∣∣∣∣
[
µ
µ
]
,
[
Σtot
0
0
Σtot
])
. (2.85)
Accounting for further style variations (channel variability in
speaker recognition), the original PLDA [60, 131] models these vari-
ations by additive Gaussian random variables. For PLDA with Gaus-
sian assumptions, the simplifications are proposed in [132, 133].
Example: Original and Simplified PLDA Comparisons
The original PLDA assumes additional style (channel) influences,
which are interpreted as additive Gaussian random variables sij
that (smoothly) result in an additive manner to the generative
model:
xij = µ+Φhi +Ψsij + ij ,
Pr(xij |hi, sij) = N
(
µ+Φhi +Ψsij,Σ
)
,
hi ∼ N (0, I) ,
sij ∼ N (0, I) ,
ij ∼ N (0,Σ) with diag[Σ] ,
xij ∼ N
(
µ,ΦΦ ′ +Σ
)
. (2.86)
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A compound generative model is established for LLR scoring,
where reference and probe embeddings are simply stacked (com-
pound embedding) [60]:
[
xr
xp
]
=
[
µ
µ
]
+
[
Φ Ψ 0
Φ 0 Ψ
]hr,psr
sp
+
[
r
p
]
. (2.87)
A simplified variant is employed in speaker recognition [132,
159]: the generative model is defined in terms of a subject-specific
component Bi = µ +Φhi and a sample-depending component
Wij = Ψsij + ij, where all latent variables h, s, are assumed to
be statistically independent. The generative model of the original
PLDA can be re-formulated w.r.t. Bi,Wij:
xij = Bi +Wij ,
Bi ∼ N
(
µ,ΦΦT
)
, Wij ∼ N
(
0,ΨΨT +Σ
)
with full[ΨΨT] and diag[Σ] , (2.88)
such that the model is simplified to [132]:
xij = µ+Φhi + ij ,
hi ∼ N (0, I) ,
ij ∼ N
(
0, Σ˜
)
with full[Σ˜] ,
Σ˜ = ΨΨT +Σ . (2.89)
LLR scores SPLDA are computed alike to Eq. (2.87) in the feature
domain by examining the distribution of identity variables in the
latent subspace (with the identity covariance Σwithin = ΦΦT and
the total covariance Σtotal =ΦΦT + Σ˜) [132]:
SPLDA(xr, xp) = logN
([
xr
xp
] ∣∣∣∣∣
[
µ
µ
]
,
[
Σtotal Σwithin
Σwithin Σtotal
])
− logN
([
xr
xp
] ∣∣∣∣∣
[
µ
µ
]
,
[
Σtotal 0
0 Σtotal
]
,
)
(2.90)
and by assuming µ = 0:
SPLDA(xr, xp) = xTrQxr + x
T
pQxp + 2 x
T
r Pxp + const
with Q = Σ−1total −
(
Σtotal −ΣwithinΣ
−1
totalΣwithin
)−1
,
P = Σ−1totalΣwithin
(
Σtotal −ΣwithinΣ
−1
totalΣwithin
)−1
.
(2.91)
By centering the embeddings, a zero mean can be assumed, i.e.,
µ = 0. The closed-form solution is derived via Eq. (2.66) in terms
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of the inner product of the natural parameters of each distribution
and the sufficient statistics of the compound embeddings. Therein,
the constant term summarizes the probability density functions’
normalization terms depending on Σwithin,Σtotal.
For the purpose of faster score computations, a further simplifi-
cation of PLDA is proposed and related to other generative pair-
wise models in speaker recognition, as depicted in [53, 133, 137, 158],
namely the two covariance model (2Cov), which can be represented
in terms of a pairwise SVM, avoiding the major weakness of one-versus-
all SVM training [158]. Using 2Cov pairwise SVM, multiple compar-
isons can be conducted at once across subjects, whereas one-versus-
all SVMs need to be trained per subject.
Example: Two-Covariance (2Cov) Comparisons
The 2Cov model represents the full-subspace PLDA [161], a simple
linear Gaussian generative model is adopted with between- and
within-subject covariance matrices B,W which have the same di-
mensionality as the feature vector xij [160]:
xij = µ+hi + t ,
hi ∼ N (hi |µ,B) with full[B] ,
xij |hi = N
(
xij |hi,W
)
with full[W] ,
B =
I∑
i=1
Ji
N
(hi − µ) (hi − µ)
T ,
W =
1
N
I∑
i=1
Ji∑
j=1
(
xij −hi
) (
xij −hi
)T (2.92)
with the total number of samples N =
∑I
i=1 Ji.
The closed-form solution to the 2Cov score S2Cov (xr, xp) com-
putation is denoted w.r.t. within and between precision W =
W−1,B = B−1 with mean µ [133]:
S2Cov (xr, xp) = xTrΛxp + x
T
pΛxr + x
T
r Γ xr + x
T
p Γ xp
+ cT (xr + xp) + k
with Λ =
1
2
WT Λ˜W , Γ =
1
2
WT
(
Λ˜− Γ˜
)
W ,
Λ˜ = (B+ 2W)−1 , Γ˜ = (B+W)−1 ,
c =WT
(
Λ˜− Γ˜
)
Bµ , k = k˜+
1
2
(
(Bµ)T
(
Λ˜− 2 Γ˜
)
Bµ
)
,
k˜ = 2 log |Γ˜|− log |Λ˜|− log |B|+ µTBµ . (2.93)
By using the Frobenius inner producta [133], Eq. (2.93) is stated as:
S2Cov (xr, xp) = 〈Λ, xr xTp + xp xTr〉+ 〈Γ, xr xTr + xp xTp〉
+ cT (xr + xp) + k
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= wTΛϕΛ(xr, xp) +w
T
Γ ϕΓ(xr, xp)
+wTcϕc(xr, xp) +w
T
kϕk(xr, xp)
= wTϕ(xr, xp)
with ϕ(xr, xp) =

vec(xr xTp + xp xTr)
vec(xr xTr + xp xTp)
xr + xp
1
 =

ϕΛ(xr, xp)
ϕΓ(xr, xp)
ϕc(xr, xp)
ϕk(xr, xp)
 ,
w =

vec(Λ)
vec(Γ)
c
k
 =

wΛ
wΓ
wc
wk
 , (2.94)
where the S2Cov (xr, xp) = wTϕ(xr, xp) formulation can serve to
outline a pairwise SVM.
a The inner Frobenius product denotes xTrAxp = 〈A, xr xTp〉 = vec(A)T vec(xr xTp),
where vec(·) is the operator stacking matrices into a vector, and 〈A,B〉 is the dot
product between matrices, see [133].
Motivated by PLDA, meta-embeddings [54, 99] are proposed for LLR
computations using DNNs, see group (5) of Fig. 2.17. Thereby, un-
certainty is propagated in a principled manner, accounting for the
embeddings extraction uncertainty.
Example: Meta-Embeddings
By propagating uncertainty, recognizers operating in changing
quality settings are informed on the precision of the estimated
feature. In meta-embeddings, the latent identity variable z is em-
ployed to estimate LLRs in the latent subspace (not in the observa-
tion domain but similarly to PLDA). However, the purpose of meta-
embeddings f(z) is to describe a latent embedding z, not to define
it [99]: the latent variable z is not definable by meta-embeddings,
but geometric and algebraic structures are rather employed for the
purpose of estimating LLRs, such that parameters outlining meta-
embeddings are stored in vector form.
Gaussian meta-embeddings (GMEs) fGME(z) are represented by the
sufficient statistics T(z), the D,D2-dimensional parameters a,B,
and their natural parameters η(fGME(z)):
η(fGME(z)) =
[
a = (I+B)µ
−12B
]
, T(z) =
[
z
zT z
]
with a ∈ RD , B ∈ RD2 , µ = (I+B)−1 a , s.t.:
fGME(z) = exp
(
η(fGME(z))
T T(z)
)
= exp
(
aT z−
1
2
zTBz
)
,
(2.95)
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where B is the positive, semi-definite precision matrix. The terms
a,B are derived by a DNN (similarly to x-vectors). GMEs are practi-
cal for Bayesian inference, relying on (standard normal) priors pi(z),
such that the log-expectation of a meta-embedding logE(a,B) is
derived by integrating out z (with 〈·〉 denoting the expectation op-
erator) [99] :
pi(z) = N(z | 0, I) =
exp
(
−12z
T z
)√
(2 pi)D
,
logE(a,B) = log〈fGME〉pi
= log
∫
Rd
fGME(z)pi(z)dz
=
1
2
aT (I+B)−1 a−
1
2
log |I+B| . (2.96)
LLR scores SGME(ar,Br,ap,Bp) with reference GME {ar,Br}
and probe GME {ap,Bp} are computed using the pooled reference –
probe GMEa (apooled = ar +ap,Bpooled = Br +Bp) [54, 99]:
SGME(ar,Br,ap,Bp) = log
E(ar +ap,Br +Bp)
E(ar,Br)E(ap,Bp)
. (2.97)
a When propagating uncertainty in a principled manner, LLR computations also
include matrix inversions and determinants (of the GMEs’ covariance terms).
2.5.6 Score Normalization and Calibration: Improving Decision Making
In speaker recognition, score normalization aims not at yielding
scores in numerical intervals but at (a) adaptively augmenting the bio-
metric information conveyed in a score by using additional data, and
at (b) sustaining LLR score properties for single-algorithm and multi-
algorithmic systems (for one comparison subsystem or when fusing
multiple comparison subsystems). Theoretically, PLDA provides well-
calibrated scores in terms of LLRs. Score normalization techniques,
however, were shown to increase discrimination performance [126,
162, 163].
Example: Cohort based Score Normalization Methods
By comparing the reference – probe comparison score S to the
scores of additional comparisons carried out on so-called cohort
data—additional data to the reference and the probe—normalized
z-scores S ′ are estimated based on the cohort scores’ average µ and
on the cohort scores’ standard deviation σ [162, 163]:
S ′ =
S− µ
σ
. (2.98)
Effectively, cohort scores describe an empirical score distribution,
depending on the reference and the probe under comparison. The
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score normalization puts different reference – probe comparisons
on the standard normal scale. In large-scale systems, cohort sets
comprise multiple thousands of samples. Depending on the em-
ployed comparator, Eq. (2.98) might solely consider references,
probes, or both (in a symmetric variation).
The speaker recognition community refers to z-norm when the
normalization scheme of Eq. (2.98) is applied to reference samples,
yielding µr,σr normalization terms. The community refers to t-
norm (test normalization) when this scheme is applied to probe sam-
ples, yielding µp,σp normalization terms. Notably, z-norm and t-
norm tend to Gaussianize score distributions [89]. Usually, z-norm
and t-norm are combined, either one on top of the other [162], e.g.,
referred to as z/t-norm, or in parallel [163], referred to as symmetric
normalization (s-norm), when assigning equal weights to the z-score
and t-score. Adaptive variations are considered to be more robust:
distribution tails are omitted, enforcing cohort score distributions
to be rather Gaussian [162, 163], e.g., by selecting the top-250 co-
hort scores. The as-norm (adaptive s-norm) score SAS is computed
by [163]:
SAS =
1
2
(
S− µr
σr
+
S− µp
σp
)
. (2.99)
First and second moment statistics µr,σr,µp,σp are derived based
on the top-nR,P scores from each of the two resulting score sets R
representing reference – cohort and P representing cohort – probe
scores. Thereby, the most competitive cohort scores are selected
with adaptation towards reference and probe features, i.e., µr,σr
are ideally estimated on probe-alike cohort data, whereas µp,σp
are ideally estimated on reference-alike cohort data.
Depending on the comparator, different normalization tech-
niques were shown to be useful when targeting low false match
rate (FMR) regions: either normalization schemes are employed in
series, e.g., z/t-norm for GMM – UBM systems [162] and as-norm
for PLDA systems [130, 163, 164].
Usually, cohort normalized scores are not LLRs, which is why score
calibration sustains LLR properties [24, 28, 115]. Notably, score cali-
bration is also useful for cosine or other non-LLR comparison ap-
proaches. Among others, score calibration methods are parametric
(here, logistic regression) or non-parametric (here, isotonic regression)
[165].
Example: Score Calibration by Logistic Regression
Logistic regression (or linear calibration) employs bias and scaling
terms w0,w1, estimated to provide a robust (but non-ideal) cali-
bration of a score S. An activation as the linear combination of
weights and score(s) is optimized regarding the best fit to a pre-
dictive value representing the class labels [58, 60], particularly for
2.5 automatic speaker recognition 97
binary decisions, a value between 0 and 1 representing B,A class
propositions. Utilizing the logistic sigmoid function σ(x), activations
and predictions are linked by the calibration function a(S):
a(S) = w0 +w1 S ,
σ(a(S)) =
1
1+ e−a(S)
, (2.100)
which, after the optimization of w0,w1 in terms of maximum likeli-
hood learning [58, 60], corresponds to the posterior probability (at
maximum prior uncertainty, i.e., pi = 0.5):
Pr(A |S) = σ(a(S)) . (2.101)
Therefrom, LLR calibrated scores S ′ are approximately obtained
using the logit functiona:
S ′ ≈ logit(σ(a(S))) = a(S) = w0 +w1 S . (2.102)
a The logistic sigmoid function is the inverse of the logit function, transforming
log-odds to probabilities. Notably, neural networks designed with regard to a
probabilistic generalization of embeddings [99] can be assumed well-calibrated.
By contrast, logistic calibration [79, 165] resembles a single perceptron network.
As presented in [79] and further advanced in [32, 38, 166, 167],
additional terms can be added in order to adaptively characterize
a comparison and to increase discrimination and calibration perfor-
mance. Regarding this dissertation, the extension of logistic regres-
sion directly motivates the research objective [71, 72]. As score calibra-
tion employing logistic regression sustains a parsimonious degree-of-
freedom, robustness can be assumed over a limited range of effective
priors. However, on rather low or high LLRs, approximation errors
tend to increase. Eventually, the degree of freedom is a trade-off be-
tween reaching ideal calibration and sustaining robustness.
Example: Score Calibration by Isotonic Regression (PAV-LLR)
In score calibration, comparison scoresa are transformed to LLRs.
The pool adjacent violators (PAV)-LLR algorithm is a special case of
isotonic regression, see section 2.4.4. PAV establishes score groups
representing alike class A,B proportions based on the empirical
observation of system score outputs. The PAV calibration function
is defined by the score group bounds and by the group depending
LLR values. For empirical scores (e.g., outside of technology and
laboratory testing) situated between score groups, PAV-calibrated
LLR values are estimated by linear interpolation. Score calibration
is isomorph w.r.t. discrimination performance but improves calibra-
tion performance as LLR score properties are sustained.
a Binary decision LLR scores can be alike to similarity or dissimilarity scores, de-
pending on the definition of the propositions A,B. Conventionally, and in this
dissertation, similarity scores are computed.
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The PAV algorithm [28] provides optimal calibration for a given
dataset by conducting an isotonic regression, see Fig. 2.12. The cal-
ibration, however, is based on score group mappings and interpola-
tions which might be prone to nuisance artifacts. In contrast to linear
calibrations—solely achieving good calibration on a limited range
of operating points—, PAV is capable of calibrating well over wide
ranges of operating points due to its nonlinearity [165], cf. Fig. B.1j.
Thus, PAV-LLR calibration is referred to as oracle/ideal score calibration
[24, 115].
2.6 summary and conclusion
This chapter introduced different fundamentals relevant to this disser-
tation’s discourse, particularly: the narrative on paradigms in decision
making; biometric systems in standardization; a gap analysis between bio-
metric standardization and speaker recognition communities; the Bayesian
decision framework (BDF) (basis to speaker recognition system design
and evaluation); and the state-of-the-art in speaker recognition. These top-
ics interrelate with this dissertation as follows:
The Narrative on Paradigms in Decision Making. The scope of
where and how a system is employed outlines its performance mea-
sures. For the purpose of promoting one amongst many recognition
systems to be employed in one application operating in fixed environ-
mental conditions of high quality, error rate based figures of merit can
serve as a proxy criterion to information theoretic performance mea-
sures. From an information theoretic perspective, recognition system
outputs as comparison scores aid the prediction of classes. A prior be-
lief in the class observation probabilities and cost belief in the impact
of erroneously made decisions outline application-dependent figures
of merit. For defined prior and cost beliefs, comparison scores ideally
predict class proportions that equal prior and cost proportions. Hav-
ing the uncertainty in prior beliefs fixed, however, the trade-offs in
error rates—error rates resemble proportions of comparison scores—
correspond to trade-offs in cost beliefs. When researching and de-
veloping recognition systems for multiple application purposes, e.g.,
access border control, banking and payment solutions, and forensics,
application-independent figures of merit assess the benefit of employ-
ing the same recognition system for each purpose. (Alternatively to
optimizing one system across decision trade-off requirements, recog-
nition system vendors might recalibrate system outputs for each ser-
vice provider; however, this practice is believed to be too intractable
within this dissertation.) Thereby, in contrast to commercial scenar-
ios but by using the same application-independent figures of merit
in forensic scenarios, systems can be optimized to better contribute
for informed decision making; in forensics, levels of evidence report-
ing (source and activation levels)—the score outputs of an automated
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recognition system—are separated from the level of decision making
(the offense level), although cost beliefs remain unspecified. To serve
all these different demands, scores need to be log-likelihood ratios
(LLRs). In this dissertation, the scores of speaker recognition systems
operating in unconstrained environments are recalibration to sustain
LLR scores.
Biometric Systems in Standardization. The general design of a bio-
metric system distinguishes between subsystems: data capture, sig-
nal processing, data storage, comparison, decision, and presentation
attack detection (PAD). This dissertation contributes to all but the
data capture subsystem—in speech technology, the variability of cap-
ture devices (microphones) is well-studied to be diminished by the
normalization of acoustic features, such as cesptral mean and variance
normalization of mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs). On the
comparison subsystem, a greedy learning architecture is proposed in
annex A to retrieve biometric information when only limited train-
ing data of mobile device speech is available. On the PAD subsystem,
a countermeasure on unit-selection attacks is proposed in section 7.1.
On the data storage subsystem, a biometric information protection
scheme is proposed in section 7.2 based on which the architecture
of distributed biometric systems depends and computations in signal
processing, comparison, and decision subsystems are reformulated.
On the signal processing subsystem, quality vectors (q-vectors) are
proposed and investigated in chapter 6 to inform comparison and
decision subsystems on changing environmental conditions—in par-
ticular, on the impact of environmental changes to a specific signal
processing. By this design choice, the standardized quality control
module is substituted: in standardization, solely biometric samples
of high quality are considered for comparison, assuming (i) charac-
teristics could be recaptured, i.e., subjects are present during verifi-
cation, e.g., in access border control, and (ii) the performance of bio-
metric comparators is sustained, when lower quality features are not
processed. For (i), however, recapturing might not always be possi-
ble, such as in forensic scenarios, where subjects are solely available
during enrolment; at crime scenes, the biometric probe is a foren-
sic trace. For (ii), this is true when extracting biometric features as
templates; in speaker recognition, however, biometric features are ex-
tracted as models—the uncertainty associated with the feature extrac-
tion is propagated throughout signal processing and can be used
in comparison subsystems. As for templates, uncertainty cannot be
propagated in a principled manner, quality control is necessary. When
propagating uncertainty to the decision subsystem, however, good
decision making can be sustained despite degrading signal quality;
the capability of using q-vectors for this purpose is investigated in
this dissertation. During this dissertation’s research on q-vectors, the
2014 state-of-the-art in speaker recognition is employed as the base-
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line system and the acoustic and biometric feature extraction is fixed.
Therefore, the impact of unconstrained environments to the acoustic fea-
ture extraction is investigated in chapter 5.
On the decision subsystem, the perspective of requirement specifi-
cation, communication and validation based on prior and cost beliefs
is communicated to the biometric standardization (and other machine
learning communities) in chapter 4. A proposed taxonomy on perfor-
mance visualizations interrelates targeted audiences, perspectives on
performance and depending criteria types. The binary decision error
trade-off (BET) plot is proposed: changes in magnitude of prior and
cost beliefs linearly resemble on this error rate trade-off’s canvas. Con-
sequently, changes in LLR thresholds are revealed; the BET plot visu-
alizes requirement trade-offs in the latent decision subspace—betting
log-odds are revealed.
Gap Analysis. Gaps of the biometric standardization to the speaker
recognition community are depicted, particularly on performance
evaluation. Benefits are outlined of employing strictly proper scor-
ing rules, the BDF, and evaluation methodology motivated from in-
formation theory. Effectively, these gaps correspond to moving from
a Frequentist to a Bayesian perspective on performance assessment.
Exemplarily, impacts to the Frequentist rule of 3 and rule of 30 are
shown, when moving to a Bayesian perspective. As the BDF is the
formalized way of denoting thresholds, these examples correspond
to specifying threshold values before an evaluation, error rate trade-
offs lead to associated thresholds; and after an evaluation, prior and
cost requirements directly yield a threshold’s value. Both perspectives
consider score discrimination performance, the latter also includes
score calibration performance: well-calibrated systems lead to a de-
cision risk that approximates the discrimination performance well.
By employing worse calibrated systems, higher decision risks are the
consequence.
The Bayesian Decision Framework (BDF). This gap is bridged by
the BDF. Thus, the BDF is explained in-depth from basis in total prob-
ability theorem and identity inference; over the derivation of decision
risk performance, i.e., application-dependent figures of merit; rela-
tions between the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot, the
ROC’s convex hull (ROCCH) and ideal score calibration; performance
visualizations in forensic evaluation and motivated from informa-
tion theory; to the application-independent figures of merit Cllr and
Cminllr . Thereby, C
min
llr reports on discrimination performance, stating
the lower bound to Cllr, which also reports performance losses from
(insufficient) calibration. Cllr and Cminllr are the primary performance
measures used in this dissertation, as both summarize different per-
spectives on performance, particularly, generalized cross-entropy and
decision risks, independently of threshold assumptions.
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State-of-the-Art Speaker Recognition. A brief overview on break-
throughs, i.e., conventional methods, and on the state-of-the-art is
outlined. The technological development of the speaker recognition
community is summarized from the 1980s to 2019. The state-of-the-
art technology used as baseline in this dissertation is explained in
more detail, particularly, on the i-vector feature extraction and com-
parison by probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA). From
the speaker recognition perspective, biometric templates are point es-
timates of high precision, whereas biometric models accommodate data
uncertainty in the manner of varying signal contents and qualities—
models analytically characterize the rather uncertain information (not
on observed but) on inferred data. After reference – probe compar-
isons, speaker recognition systems normalize scores by employing ad-
ditional cohort data (samples of known other speakers). Cohort sam-
ples are compared to either, references and probes, resulting in two
score distributions, which are used to put the one score of reference –
probe comparisons into context; cohort score normalization is adap-
tively to a comparison. If scores are not LLR scores (e.g., PLDA scores
are LLRs but not anymore after cohort score normalization), score cal-
ibration is employed to transform (continuous) scores to LLRs, such
that the BDF is persistently employable.

3
E X P E R I M E N TA L F R A M E W O R K
This chapter introduces the experimental framework in terms of the
evaluation methodology and the utilized datasets.70 The datasets
used encompass major datasets of the speaker recognition commu-
nity, i.e., speaker recognition evaluation (SRE) datasets distributed
by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
This dissertation puts emphasis on a derived dataset from the 2012
NIST SRE, targeting different acoustic environments. The studies con-
ducted for this dissertation on acoustic effects on voice segmentation
as well as on limited mobile training data utilize the 2013 MOBIO
SRE dataset originating from a European project, placing emphasis
on speech in mobile environments. In this dissertation, protocols on
privacy preservation for state-of-the-art voice comparators based on
homomorphic encryption are proposed. For the purpose of providing
an empirical validation of the implementation to the theoretical valid-
ity, the 2013 – 2014 NIST SRE database is used for the corresponding
proof-of-concept study. The German speech data corpus (GSDC) of
the Technische Universität Darmstadt and the S10 attack subset of
the ASVspoof 2015 corpus are employed for investigating on presen-
tation attack detection (PAD) countermeasures to the unit-selection
attack.
3.1 evaluation methodology
Experimental validations are carried out on relevant and well-estab-
lished datasets. Evaluations employ well-established figures of merit
of the speaker recognition and the biometrics standardization com-
munities. The primary metrics on discrimination and calibration are
Cminllr and Cllr, see section 2.4.7. As secondary metrics, error rate based
metrics on discrimination are used, particularly the equal error rate
(EER) and the FNMR at a 1% FMR (FMR100), see section 2.4.4. In the
following sections, the organization of data is introduced for system
training and experimental validation, then performance criteria are
depicted.
70 Parts of the following dataset descriptions are derived from publications contribut-
ing to this dissertation [68–72, 75].
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3.1.1 Organization of Data
For the purpose of preserving fair benchmarks, i.e., in order to avoid
data snooping71 of the results presented (but also of future work build-
ing upon them), the data is organized in separated sets for different
purposes:
• The studies on segmentation and on limited mobile training
data utilize the MOBIO corpus [37, 168]. Thereby, the segmen-
tation study synthetically adds noise in order to examine seg-
mentation decision robustness in unconstrained environments.
By contrast, the limited training data study assumes ideal con-
ditions throughout but investigates on comparator training as-
sumptions in the light of limited data availability during system
development.
• The examined state-of-the-art speaker recognition system stems
from the I4U consortium72 as of the 2012 NIST SRE [41, 169].
For training, it uses the universal background model (UBM),
the intermediate-sized vector (i-vector) extractor, and the prob-
abilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) comparator. The
I4U filelist on system development is used, whereas i-vectors
are provided by I4U collaborators.73
• Experiments on score normalization and calibration are carried
out on the I4U file lists on development and calibration valida-
tion (not the 2012 NIST SRE evaluation dataset).
• The PAD study employs the ASVspoof 2015 corpus [49] and the
GSDC provided by the TU Darmstadt [172].
• The proof-of-concept experiment on data privacy is conducted
on the 2013 – 2014 i-vector NIST SRE [36], a remake of the 2012
NIST SRE with i-vectors extracted from a conventional system
by the MIT Lincoln Labs and distributed by the NIST.
71 Data snooping refers to the discrepancy between pre-planned inference and infer-
ence after looking at data. In data driven research communities, new data needs to
be regularly inserted into these communities, such that statistical errors are avoided.
When running multiple analyses (within a research community), the one significant
result of many other results could also be due to an observation sampling. This
dissertation explicitly targets forms of development datasets for providing insights,
such that research following this dissertation is not prone to data snooping.
72 The I4U consortium is a collaboration of institutes across four continents consisting
of university and company labs. In 2012, nine institutes worked on a NIST SRE
submission [169]. The file lists are prepared for sites participating in the 2012 NIST
SRE as part of the I4U consortium. For the 2016 NIST SRE, the consortium comprised
sixteen institutes [170]. For the 2018 NIST SRE, the consortium comprised eleven
institutes [171].
73 At this point, the author would like to give Rahim Saeidi a special thanks for his
support.
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A fixed acoustic signal processing is considered, i.e., i-vectors rep-
resent the acoustic (not yet the latent biometric) feature space. Experi-
mental validations are carried out on I4U i-vector file lists. Transform
functions to the latent biometric subspace are trained in accordance
with the literature pool [32, 166, 167, 173].
3.1.2 Performance Criteria
The primary figures of merit concern the goodness of log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) scores: Cllr for discrimination and calibration; and Cminllr
for discrimination. Calibration loss as the gap from Cminllr to Cllr
is referred to as the miscalibration cost of LLR scores Cmcllr [166]:
Cmcllr = Cllr −C
min
llr . As an application-independent discrimination met-
ric, Cminllr represents the generalized empirical cross-entropy of class A
and class B LLRs w.r.t. Bayesian thresholds η ∈ (−∞,∞) on the as-
sumption of well-calibrated systems [26, 115]. However, when sys-
tems are not well-calibrated, Cmcllr increases
74, such that Cllr reports on
the combined discrimination and calibration loss of a binary decision
system.
The secondary figures of merit concern the biometric performance
in terms of error rates and in accordance to the ISO/IEC 19795-1 [25]
standard on biometric testing and reporting, namely the EER and the
FMR100 criteria.
3.2 datasets and protocols
In the following sections, employed databases, protocols and the re-
lated baseline performance are introduced. Systems are based on the
conventional i-vector/PLDA paradigm, which is grounded on gener-
ative Bayesian models throughout the acoustic and biometric signal
processing.75
74 Systems of low Cminllr costs are discriminative regarding the Bayesian decision frame-
work (BDF) and systems of low Cmcllr costs are also well-calibrated: Cllr approximates
Cminllr . These systems may not need additional information in order to yield better
Cllr performance. Conventionally, Cmcllr occurs on lacking reference, probe, or model
training data, e.g., when targeting environmental domains considered neither dur-
ing the training of acoustic or biometric feature extraction nor during the training of
comparators and score normalizations.
75 In contrast to discriminative models, being solely optimized on a classification task at-
hand, generative models are also capable of emitting the modeled data. Likelihoods
depend on the model fit in the light of data being presented to this model. As such,
generative models provide an estimate on their expectation when observing the data
and are capable of maximizing this expectation by updating their parameters.
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3.2.1 Protocol of the 2013 MOBIO SRE
Aiming at mobile environments, experiments are carried out on the
publicly available 2013 MOBIO SRE [37, 168], which provides a chal-
lenging and realistic testbed for current state-of-the-art speaker verification
[37]. The speaker recognition subset of the MOBIO database [37, 168]
is recorded on mobile phones and laptops, whereas in the 2013 MO-
BIO SRE [37] only data from mobile phones is used. A standard acous-
tic feature extraction in speaker recognition is used based on the RAS-
TAMAT [174] and the jfacookbook [175] toolkits: 60-dimensional acous-
tic features which are based on 19 mel-frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs) with log-Energy as well as first and second order derivative
coefficients on a standard hamming window. Feature warping [145]
is applied using a 3 s sliding window. Acoustic i-vectors are extracted
with 400 dimensions based on a 512-component UBM. Due to the
limited data in the 2013 MOBIO SRE, gender-independent systems
are trained utilizing a PLDA comparator [132]: i-vectors are projected
into a 49-dimensional latent biometric subspace by linear discrimi-
nant analysis (LDA), then mean values are subtracted, followed by
within class covariance normalization (WCCN) [148] projection and
length normalization [132]. Reference and probe i-vectors are com-
pared by a full-subspace PLDA [60, 132, 158], known as the two co-
variance model (2Cov) comparator [133].
Table 3.1: Partitioning of the MOBIO database, cf. [37]
Set Female Male
Subjects Samples Subjects Samples
Background 13 2496 37 7104
Development set (references) 18 90 24 120
Development set (probes) 18 1890 24 2520
Tab. 3.1 depicts the amount of subjects and samples for the training
and development sets containing 50 and 42 subjects in total. Experi-
ments are solely conducted on the development set in order to pre-
vent data snooping effects for other research on the MOBIO database,
targeting the MOBIO evaluation set. The MOBIO dataset is solely uti-
lized for analyzing the performance of voice sample segmentation
by voice activity detection (VAD) algorithms regarding noise simula-
tions on different signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) levels. Due to a rather
small proportion of female speakers in the PLDA training data, re-
sults are solely reported w.r.t. data of male speakers. The baseline
system yields a 0.407 Cminllr , a 11.9% EER, and a 46.7% FMR100 on the
development set. The baseline EER performance is in line with other
reported single-comparator system performances of 9.6% and 11.3%
that solely use the MOBIO background dataset for system training,
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including VAD. More elaborate multi-algorithmic system fusions em-
ploy larger datasets for training and achieve EERs up to 5.0%.
On the MOBIO evaluation set, the primary metric is referred to
as the half total error rate (HTER) of the false match rate (FMR) and
false non-match rate (FNMR) measured at the development dataset’s
EER threshold [37, 168]. HTER as a figure of merit is a mix between
the perspectives of biometrics standardization and the BDF, thus the
interpretation of HTER is conflicting either way.76 For the sake of con-
sistency to related work on the MOBIO SRE, experimental evaluations
tertiary report on the HTER, too.
3.2.2 I4U Protocol of the 2012 NIST SRE
Experiments using the I4U file lists [41] as of the 2012 NIST SRE are
employed in studies on duration-only77 impacts (sample completeness)
as well as on mutual duration and SNR score normalization and cali-
bration. Tab. 3.2 provides an overview on the NIST SREs from 1996 to
2012 regarding the employed datasets, targeted languages, the num-
ber of subjects, and the duration of probe samples. In the vast major-
ity of reference samples, the duration is at least one minute. Over the
past decades, the SREs targeted different challenges, to which new
datasets are provided in each evaluation.
Early datasets encompass different phases of the Switchboard col-
lection78 [177]: Switchboard 1 (sw1), Switchboard 2 phases 1 to 3
(sw2p1, sw2p2, sw2p3), Switchboard 3 phases 1 and 2 (sw3p1,
sw3p2), targeting different English dialects in the U.S. and cellular
data in Switchboard 3. The Ahumada corpus [178] targets Spanish
speech, whereas the FBI database [179] puts emphasis on different
microphones used in police interviews. The MIXER corpora [180–
76 In the BDF, the EER threshold is where the maximum minimum DCF (minDCF)
is observed. The depending decision cost function (DCF) parameterizes weights of
Type I and Type II error rates. When examining the performance on another dataset,
the DCF has the same parameterization and the same LLR threshold. By contrast,
HTER applies an equal weight of both error rates and as the threshold remains fixed
with no inherent or consistent LLR interpretation. In biometric standardization, the
concept of weighting error rates is deprecated in [93]. Moreover, the current revision
process of ISO/IEC 19795-1 [25] aims at deprecating the EER as well, since the EER
might be the easiest to understand but remains the least informative figure of merit,
among alternatives.
77 Before investigating on mutual duration and noise effects, this dissertation investi-
gates on duration impacts. The term duration-only indicates that unnoisy but trun-
cated speech data is used.
78 As of 2019, the Switchboard corpora still remain among the most employed evalua-
tion corpora for various recognition tasks for telephone speech data as they comprise
about 2 400 dialog conversations with phonetic transcriptions. From the speech pro-
cessing perspective, the vast data amount of natural speech data transmitted over
limited telephone bandwidth is rather relevant (compared to data captured by the
latest microphones), such that these corpora are still included as training data in
NIST SREs, among others.
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Table 3.2: Overview on NIST SRE datasets, cf. [21, 27, 33, 34, 176]. Languages
are encoded as English (E), Spanish (S), Arabic (A), Chinese (C),
Russian (R).
NIST SRE Databases Languages. No subjects Probe duration
1996 – 1999 sw2p3 E 233 3 – 60 s
2000 sw2p1,
sw2p2,
Ahumada
E, S 804 5 – 60 s
2001 sw1,
sw3p1,
Ahumada
E, S 174 5 – 60 s
2002 sw2p2,
sw2p3,
sw3p2, FBI
E 330 5 – 60 s
2003 sw2p2,
sw2p3,
sw3p2
E 356 5 – 60 s
2004 MIXER E, S, A, C, R 310 10 s, 30 s
2005 MIXER E, S, A, C, R 526 10 s, 5min
2006 MIXER E, S, A, C, R 1 011 10 s, 5min
2008 MIXER E, S, A, C, R 1 328 10 s, 5min, 8min
2010 MIXER,
Greybeard
E, S, A, C, R 5 460 10 s, 2min, 5min, 8min
2012 MIXER,
Remix
E, S, A, C, R 2 250 30 s, 100 s, 5min
184] put emphasis on multi-lingual speaker recognition (including
non-natives), on transmission channels (landline, cellular and micro-
phone) as well as on various noise conditions. The latter being espe-
cially targeted in the 2012 NIST SRE, where subjects spoke in noisy
booths. Other parts of distributed speech data contain synthetically
added noise (after post-processing) [35]. The Greybeard collection
[185] puts emphasis on aging by recapturing subjects of prior collec-
tions (Switchboard 1, Switchboard 2, Mixer 1, Mixer 3) at later time
periods. In the Remix corpus [186], sample donors participating in
earlier Mixer datasets are encouraged to make telephone calls from
noisy environments, e.g., with street noise, music or television broad-
casting speech in the background.
The I4U file lists for the 2012 NIST SRE are derived for the acoustic
and for the biometric subspace modeling as:
• For the purpose of training the acoustic feature extraction with
a 2048-component UBM, from which 400-dimensional i-vector
are extracted, a variety of speech corpora are used (by I4U and
other consortia participating in NIST SREs): Switchboard cellu-
lar phase 1 and 2 [177], Fisher English [187] of the NIST SREs
2001 to 2003 as well as the MIXER data [180, 181] of the NIST
SREs in 2004 to 2006 [188–190].
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• MIXER data [182–184] of the NIST SREs 2006 to 2010 [33, 34,
190] are employed for training the latent biometric subspace
transform and the PLDA comparator with dimension reduction
by LDA to 200, WCCN and length-normalization, and for full-
subspace comparison by 2Cov. Different subsets are assembled
for training and validating score normalization and calibration.
Table 3.3: Overview on the I4U calibration development (dev) and valida-
tion (val) sets regarding the references and probes subsets (ref,
prb), cf. [41].
No subjects No samples
dev val dev val
ref prb ref prb ref prb ref prb
Male 680 868 763 804 16 941 19 866 29 961 21 837
Female 1 039 1 243 1 115 1 102 24 693 25 980 43 119 28 548
Tab. 3.3 provides an overview on the I4U development and valida-
tion sets to the anticipated calibration task. The 2012 NIST SRE evalu-
ation plan encourages the use of other reference samples for recog-
nition purposes. This, however, is in conflict with ISO/IEC 19795-
1:2006 [191] (reconfirmed in 2016 [25]), prohibiting to employ data
of other subjects of the evaluation test crew as well as data of other
evaluation probes when conducting comparisons on the evaluation
set. Results are solely reported on the I4U validation set.
3.2.2.1 Duration Study
In the duration-only study of this dissertation, the evaluation protocol
is inspired by previous studies on the effect of voice sample duration
effects in [32, 173] based on the I4U file list [41]. The system architec-
ture and settings of the i-vector extractor used are reported in [169].
The used database subset contains 551 female and 425 male subjects
with each subject having at least 10 samples. The focus on subjects
with at least 10 samples is distinct to this dissertation’s study. Sub-
ject-disjunct development and validation subsets are separated into
female and male reference and probe datasets. While both reference
sets only contain full i-vectors, the probe sets contain truncated i-
vectors of the duration groups 5 s, 10 s, 20 s, 40 s, and full (> 40 s) of
each full sample after duration truncation.79 The duration groups are
depicted in Tab. 3.5a. Baseline performances are depicted alongside
the mutual duration and noise study in Fig. 3.1.
79 In the I4U file lists with duration truncation, some samples with less than 60 s but
more than 40 s of speech were truncated into 5 s, 10 s, and 20 s durations. The original
segment was put into the full condition group, leaving no 40 s representation of
that sample. In existing literature [32, 173] and studies on duration indicate little
difference between 40 s and full condition groups. Thus, this database property is
assumed to cause negligible changes in the results of this dissertation.
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3.2.2.2 Mutual Duration and Noise Study
In the mutual duration and noise studies, experiments are conducted
for five duration and five SNR conditions. SNR conditions stem
from two noise sources: air conditioning (AC) and crowd80 (CROWD)
noise. By degenerating voice samples from the 2012 I4U file list [41],
mutual quality and completeness degradation effects are examined
on 55 conditions on a state-of-the-art system comprising i-vector fea-
tures [36, 130] and PLDA comparison [60, 132, 158]. Thereby, duration
is considered to represent sample completeness, as the estimation of
sufficient statistics, see section 2.5, becomes more precise (less un-
certain) with the observation of more (speech) data. While in many
scenarios, reference samples can be captured under very good con-
ditions, probe samples are affected by signal degradation, hence em-
phasis is put on condition-variable probe samples, while references
are assumed to be ideal.
Table 3.4: Label scheme for mutual duration and noise conditions.
Condition 1 2 3 4 5
Duration 5 s 10 s 20 s 40 s full
Noise clean
(a) Duration only conditions
Condition 6 7 8 9 10 11 . . . 15 16 . . . 30 31 . . . 55
Duration 5 s 10 s 20 s . . . full 5 s . . . full
Noise AC CROWD
SNR 0dB 5dB 10dB 15dB 20dB 0 . . . 20dB 0dB . . . 20dB 0dB . . . 20dB
(b) Mutual duration and noise conditions
Condition dependent voice sample versions are created from long
duration and clean samples of the I4U file list [41] by truncation into
the aforementioned duration groups as in [32, 173] and by applying
AC and CROWD noise using the Filter And Noise Adding Tool (FaNT),
such that noise groups of 0dB, 5dB, 10dB, 15dB, 20dB, and clean
(original SNR) are established. In total, 55 conditions are examined,
see Tab. 3.4.
The baseline speaker recognition system is set up as follows: stabi-
lized weighted linear prediction [192] is employed for robust spectrum
estimation after enhancing the voice sample data using maximum-
likelihood short-time spectral amplitude [193]. The rest of the acoustic sig-
nal processing is similar to previous work in [32, 169]. Raw i-vectors
are drawn from samples after VAD. The VAD labels from clean con-
ditions are then applied to corresponding noise versions. For depend-
80 Likewise babble noise.
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Figure 3.1: Baseline performance on I4U evaluation set affected by mutual
signal degradation (without score normalization or calibration).
ing experiments, perfect VAD is assumed in order to exclude undesir-
able effects rising from VAD shortcomings in low-SNR levels which
exceeds the scope of this dissertation. Full/clean probe samples of the
I4U development and evaluation sets of all male subjects are synthet-
ically modified condition-dependently. The conducted experiments
assume similar performance effects to occur for female subjects as for
male subjects.
All samples of the training set are modified condition-dependently,
such that the latent biometric subspace feature processing produces
well-calibrated scores over all conditions (but likely not for every
single condition). The following processing is trained for acoustic
i-vectors to yield discriminative feature representation in the latent
biometric space: LDA reduces dimensions from 400 to 200, WCCN
decorrelates feature elements and enforces unit variances. By length
normalization [132], radial Gaussianization is approximated, project-
ing voice representation onto a unit sphere of i-vectors. For the sake of
analyses tractability, experiments are solely reported regarding male
speaker data. Biometric i-vectors are compared by PLDA with 200
speaker factors (full subspace; 2Cov comparator). PLDA is trained in
a multi-condition pooled fashion as in [194].
Fig. 3.1 shows the performance of a state-of-the-art i-vector/PLDA
baseline system with neither score normalization nor calibration. In
general, CROWD noise causes higher performance deterioration than
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AC noise. Longer duration and higher SNR levels lead to better per-
formances, and in the vast majority of conditions, the clean/full con-
dition outperforms other conditions in terms with 0.019 Cminllr and
0.4% EER (as expected). Cminllr performance vastly worsens due to high
signal degradation on 0dB SNR AC noise as well as on 0dB and 5dB
SNR CROWD noise. By contrast, the performance of 20dB SNR and
clean conditions is rather similar on AC across duration conditions.
By shifting the focus on duration effects, Cminllr and EER performance
linearly depend on the log-duration (as observed by [32]) and mu-
tual effects appear as a linear combination of log-duration and SNR
impacts (SNR already is in log-compressed form).
3.2.3 2013 – 2014 NIST i-vector SRE Protocol
This dissertation’s proof-of-concept study on data privacy system ar-
chitectures is carried out on the 2013 – 2014 NIST i-vector machine
learning challenge [36, 195] phase III database (with labeled devel-
opment data), where 600 dimensional i-vectors are supplied. The
challenge dataset comprises a development subset of 36 572 i-vectors,
1 306 reference subjects with each having five enrolment i-vectors
(references are average i-vectors), and 9 634 probe i-vectors. In total,
12 582 004 comparisons are carried out, jointly serving for two subsets
on the progress of participants during the time of the challenge and
the final evaluation performance. The challenge’s protocol [36, 195]
resembles the 2012 SRE protocol [35], in which extracted acoustic i-
vector features are distributed instead of audio data. The goal of the
2014 NIST SRE was to make research on speaker recognition available
to a larger research community with diverse backgrounds in, e.g., ma-
chine learning, computer vision or other biometric modalities.
3.2.4 GSDC and ASVspoof 2015 Datasets
For the purpose of examining PAD of unit-selection attacks, the Ger-
man Speech Data Corpus (GSDC) and ASVspoof 2015 datasets are
employed. The ASVspoof 2015 corpus [49] only contains unit-selec-
tion presentation attacks in the evaluation set (as the S10 attack); thus,
a contrastive database is employed for development and optimization
of countermeasures, namely the GSDC. As such, the ASVspoof data
remains unseen, data snooping is prevented, and comparability with
other countermeasures proposed at the spoofing challenge 2015 is
preserved in the sense that the evaluation data is not exploited. How-
ever, by contrast, this dissertation’s study employs additional data
to the data provided by the challenge; the ASVspoof 2015’s protocol
would be violated for the sake of investigating on capabilities of de-
tecting unit-selections if these presentation attack instruments (PAIs)
were known. The training database on learning artefacts of unit-selec-
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tion attacks is derived from the GSDC provided by the TU Darmstadt
[172]. Tab. 3.5 depicts the dataset protocol.
Table 3.5: Database partitioning on GSDC (self partitioned) and ASVspoof
2015 (S10 eval-set).
Subset Bona fide Attack
GSDC development set 10343 10461
GSDC calibration set 3745 4484
GSDC validation set 400 100
ASVspoof S10 subset 9404 18398
3.3 summary
The used datasets are well-established within the speaker recognition
community. For the purpose of examining effects to VAD and limited
training data, the voice dataset of the 2013 MOBIO SRE is employed.
In most studies of this dissertation, experiments are carried out
on a noise robust acoustic feature extraction originally based on file
lists of the I4U consortium for the 2012 NIST SRE—data well-known
to the speaker recognition community. Thereby, the employed acous-
tic and biometric feature extraction as well as the comparator are
based on generative models which depict the conventional Bayesian
paradigm in state-of-the-art speaker recognition throughout this dis-
sertation. The parameterization of the baseline systems is in line with
configurations reported in the research community and yields com-
parable performance.
Regarding evaluation criteria, results are primarily reported regard-
ing discrimination power in terms of Cminllr and calibration power in
terms of Cllr and Cmcllr . Secondarily, results are reported regarding Fre-
quentist discrimination power in terms of EER and FMR100.
For research on PAD security, the performance of unit-selection at-
tack countermeasures is assessed utilizing metrics proposed by the
ISO/IEC standard 30107-3 [93], i.e., the attack presentation classifica-
tion error rate (APCER) and the bona fide presentation classification
error rate (BPCER). For research on privacy and data protection, i-
vectors of the 2013 – 2014 NIST SRE are used that correspond to an
i-vector re-distribution of the 2012 NIST SRE. This data is used for a
proof-of-concept study on protocols proposed for preserving privacy.

4
E L A B O R AT I N G O N T H E PA R A D I G M S H I F T I N
P E R F O R M A N C E A S S E S S M E N T
This chapter addresses the paradigm shift in performance assessment
from a Frequentist to a Bayesian perspective, see sections 2.3 and 2.4.
The aim is to interrelate fundamental principles of the Bayesian de-
cision framework (BDF) with a Frequentist’s perspective on perfor-
mance assessment. The following research question is targeted:
To which extent can the Bayesian paradigm on perfor-
mance be interrelated with conventional error rate trade-
off diagrams, and how can established performance visu-
alizations be classified in the BDF?
The context of this chapter is outlined by well-established concepts
within the speaker recognition, forensic sciences, and biometric stan-
dardization communities. For yielding contributions, interrelations
are drawn to bridge gaps between these communities. Consequently,
rather adequate methods in one research field might become less ap-
propriate after the transfer to another field.81 As such, the contribu-
tions of this chapter on the BDF are more towards the general the-
ory in machine learning than to a distinct applied research field (e.g.,
speaker recognition, forensics, and biometrics).
In order to make log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) digestible to the lay-
man, especially in terms of visual performance assessment, error rate
trade-off plots are examined regarding formal relationships towards
decision cost functions (DCFs), empirical cross-entropy (ECE), and
Cllr metrics, see section 2.4. This chapter addresses the BDF and its im-
plications to conventional performance visualization. Contributions
to the theoretical framework are:
• The formal notation and definition of an angular operating
point. It is well-known that LLR operating points resemble line
segments in the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) space,
the ROC’s convex hull (ROCCH). As each segment is of con-
stant slope, the turnover in LLR thresholds occurs in the angle
between two ROCCH segments. From a Frequentist perspec-
tive, sampling error trade-offs correspond to moving thresholds;
81 Exemplarily, concepts from forensic science are motivated to make likelihood ratios
(LRs) digestible to the layman in commercials, but in commercials, LRs are applicable
in fully automated systems from evidence reporting to decision making. This is
not the case in forensic evaluation, where the (semi-) automated evidence reporting
(on source and activation level) is segregated from non-automated decision making
(offense level). In contrast to commercials, the concept of LR thresholds is (at the
moment) non-existent in forensic science.
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from a Bayesian perspective, changing trade-off requirements
corresponds to moving thresholds.
• The visualization of verbal LLR scales in error rate trade-off
plots. Verbal scales for LLRs are introduced in the forensic sci-
ence community in tabular form. To enhance evaluative trans-
parency, these verbal scales are proposed to be visualized on the
ROCCH.
• The verbal scale of least-favorable decisions. In forensic sci-
ence, LLRs are communicated by scales of strength of evidence; pri-
ors cannot be assumed by forensic practitioners. There is a need
to differentiate between the strength of evidence and the deci-
sion. In commercials, LLRs reflect not only the strength of evi-
dence but LLR thresholds represent the least-favorable decision
that can be made. To make LLRs as thresholds easier to digest in
performance visualization, color-encoded bands of LLR thresh-
old values are proposed in detection error trade-off (DET) plots.
A host of infinite cross-application operating points is summa-
rized into a few scales, which are easier to digest when deciding
which system to favor, such that error trade-offs and Bayesian
threshold values are interrelated. To forensic science, however,
this visualization method corresponds to making LLRs easier
to digest as scales of strength of evidence: since LLR scores and
LLR thresholds are equal (at the least-favorable decision), either
perspective holds. As verbal scales of strength of evidence already
exist in tabular form proposed in the forensic science commu-
nity, its visualization is a minor contribution. The visualization
and contribution of verbal scales of least-favorable decisions is a
more general task.82
• The introduction of a guideline on how to set and fine-tune
decision policies formalized by (c,pi) and thus LLR thresh-
olds. To make the BDF more applicable for practitioners, a com-
munication scheme of formalized decision requirements is out-
lined. In brief, first a verbal band is selected, then an initial op-
erating point is fine-tuned by relative adjustments of depending
prior and cost beliefs.
• The binary decision error trade-off (BET) plot. The purpose
of the BET plot is to visually interrelate changes in the magni-
82 In forensic science, the need to report on the strength of evidence results from the un-
definability of priors and costs by forensic practitioners. Priors might be simulated,
but for costs, only maximum uncertainty can be assumed. Nevertheless, in the BDF,
LLR thresholds are outlined by prior and cost beliefs—even if one can use maximum
uncertainty (value: 0.5, for binary decisions) to leave a belief unspecified—, and LLR
scores need to be of equal value at least. The strength of evidence is summarized,
mathematically, in the same manner in the ENFSI scale and the scale of conclusion as
in the scales of least-favorable decisions. In theory, either represent the same aspect
of the BDF. In practice, they differ in the way the BDF is applied.
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tude of prior and cost beliefs with error rate trade-offs. There-
fore, the axes of the y-axis inverted ROC plot are scaled by
the logit transform; error rates are represented by their corre-
sponding log-odds values instead of their conventional proba-
bilistic representation. As such, error rate trade-offs are visually
interrelated with LLR threshold trade-offs, which in turn corre-
spond to the formal specification of application-depending deci-
sion policy parameterizations (c,pi), effectively revealing betting
odds—and moreover, symmetry in trade-offs is preserved due
to the treatment of their log-odds representation form.
• The normalized ECE (NECE) plot. ECE plots are normalized
by visually accounting for the prior-depending default per-
formance, such that visualized calibration losses are more di-
rectly comparable across different priors. To forensic evaluation,
NECE plots visually remove prior dependencies. To commer-
cial evaluation, NECE plots enable the simulation of informa-
tion performance across priors independently of cost beliefs.
For NECE plots, cost log-odds are effectively zeroed and thus
neglected (only prior odds are considered) since nothing but
the information gain is of interest, i.e., the information gain
from employing a recognition system and its dependency on
the (prior) proportion of the classes is to be recognized.
• A self-contained (holistic) taxonomy on established and pro-
posed BDF performance visualizations. An overview is pro-
vided on the relationships and aspects of performance visual-
izations, particularly, for the performance reporting type (dis-
crimination or discrimination and calibration), the performance
reporting scope (error rates or information gains), and the tar-
geted audience (analysis or reporting).
In the following, the ROCCH is favored over steppy ROC since it
is consistent within the BDF, see section 2.4.4.
4.1 contribution : angular bayes operating points
To visualize decision impacts, DCFs are revisited83, see section 2.4. In
this context, the parameterized Bayes risk as a DCF is computed for
an empirical set of scores S given a specific operating point p˜i likewise
η w.r.t. Type I and Type II error rates p1(η),p2(η) as [28]:
DCF(S | p˜i) = p˜i p2(η) + (1− p˜i)p1(η) . (4.1)
Regarding DETs, the two addend terms can also be visually resem-
bled in a two-dimensional Euclidean space, where each axis depicts
an error rate, cf. [107].
83 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Daniel Ramos, Didier
Meuwly, Jonas Lindh and Christoph Busch [66, 67].
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Figure 4.1: Operating points as linear combination in y-inverted ROC space:
deriving DCF values by dropping perpendiculars onto the ϕ-
depending line. Values of minDCF and DCF are derived by the
distance to the origin of two lines having the slope − cot(ϕ)
on an exemplary system. The first dotted line to the origin is
the ROCCH tangent; the second dotted line intersects the ϕ-
corresponding LLR threshold. The calibration loss resembles the
distance between minDCF and DCF, cf. [107].
In other words, the Bayes operating point is a linear combination
of the Type I and Type II error rates, and the ROCCH visualizes its
minimum DCF (minDCF) for all p˜i associated operating points. Thus,
before computing similarity scores, an operating point is denoted in
the y-inverted ROC space by a line with p˜i depending slope. This
dissertation proposes to denote the angular operating point ϕ by:
tanϕ =
c
1− c
pi
1− pi
=
p˜i
1− p˜i
=
sinϕ
cosϕ
= e−η ,
DCF(S |ϕ) = sin(ϕ)p2(η) + cos(ϕ)p1(η) ,
note: ϕ = cot−1(p˜i−1 − 1), p˜i = (1+ cot(ϕ))−1 . (4.2)
Therefore, DCF slopes are depicted in terms of tanϕ and − cotϕ.
Regarding the tanϕ slope, the DCF depicts a conventional linear func-
tion intersecting the origin, while the optimization task is subject to a
minimal distance of its perpendicular towards the origin. The perpen-
dicular is defined by the value of − cotϕ and an y-axis offset. These
− cotϕ lines are tangents of the ROCCH for well-calibrated systems.
Consequently, by sweeping over all ϕ values, the ROCCH resembles
[79]. The notation of the angular operating point is implicitly depicted
in [107]. Here it is explicitly denoted and defined.
Fig. 4.1 provides the outline of a geometric proof84, cf. [107], a proof
via ROCCH and minDCF relations is in [28]. Smaller ϕ values reflect
more secure requirements, putting emphasis on ROCCH points of
84 The proof directly follows from: ODc = cos(α − ϕ) = sinϕ sinα + cosϕ cosα,
p1(η) = c cosα, and p2(η) = c sinα.
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high Type II errors due to the − cotϕ property and the convexity85 of
the ROCCH. On poorly calibrated systems, actual thresholds diverge
from the threshold of minimum risk, i.e., the calibration loss as the
difference between DCF and minDCF values is represented by the
distance between the − cotϕ lines of the actual threshold and of the
ROCCH tangent.
Consequently, application-dependent operating points represent
formalized decision policies and are specifiable in terms of the follow-
ing notations (among further mixtures in between these notations, cf.
section 2.4):
• unnormalized cost and prior parameters: (cA, cB, Pr(A), Pr(B)),
• normalized cost and prior parameters: (cI, cII,pi),
• summarized cost and prior parameters: (c,pi),
• effective priors (likewise, effective costs/policies): (p˜i),
• angular operating points: (ϕ),
• LR thresholds: (τ),
• LLR thresholds: (η).
All these expressions share the same meaning: an operating point
formalized from a decision policy.
Considering the relationship between the ROCCH and PAV score
calibration, angular operating points ϕ sample the PAV mapping
function from the y-axis’ perspective onto the 2D error rate trade-off
diagram. The ROCCH results and in turn represents all Bayes risks by
their discrimination power (all minDCF values, thus Cminllr ). Since the
relationship between the ROCCH, minDCF, and Cminllr is well-known,
but the visual relationship to Cllr is spared so far in the literature,
Fig. 4.2 exemplarily contributes the visualization of Cminllr and Cllr in
the y-axis inverted ROC space. By sampling all points of the DCF on
the related minDCF lines, the area visualizing Cllr is shaped.
4.2 verbal-scaled detection error tradeoffs
This section86 addresses the interrelation of performance visualiza-
tion in terms of error rate trade-offs and LLRs. DET plots depict er-
ror rates independently of associated thresholds in quantile-quantile
85 Pulling on one point of the ROCCH impacts all its segments as they monotonically
preserve convexity, e.g., pulling on the equal error rate (EER) point would eventually
result in a two-segment ROCCH—two straight lines to the left and right of the EER
point. Other segments which would be in the concave set after pulling on a point of
the ROCCH are removed and replaced by lines of the new convex set.
86 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Daniel Ramos, Didier
Meuwly, Jonas Lindh and Christoph Busch [65–67].
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Figure 4.2: Contribution: visualizing Cllr in the y-axis inverted ROC space
with (a) minDCF line and ROCCH tangent samplings, (b) visual-
izing Cllr areas in the y-axis inverted ROC space.
(Q-Q) plots, scaling y-axis inverted ROC plots. In contrast to the Fre-
quentist approach of solely comparing error rates, the BDF further
considers the impact of (wrong) decisions and the prior probabili-
ties of each class, which form a BDF operating point (c,pi). In the
forensic science community, magnitudes of LLRs are summarized by
utilizing so-called verbal scales [23, 103, 196–200]. Verbal scales are in-
troduced to differentiate between strength of evidence obtained from
a holistic approach (verbal) and strength of evidence obtained from
an empirical approach (numerical). LLR values quantify the strength
of evidence, summarized in verbal scales by LLR magnitudes.
4.2.1 Making Likelihood Ratios Digestible: Verbal Scales
In forensic evaluative praxis, verbal scales are employed when LRs
and LLRs cannot be computed but one still needs to be able to pro-
vide a common scale for case work operating on (semi-) automated
and fully manual examination and reporting of the weight of evi-
dence. Notably, the consistency of human interpretation of LR values
is shown to vary among (layman) examiners as well [201, 202], despite
different effort levels in the training of (layman) examiners. As such,
verbal scales aid a rather digestible and concise interpretation of LR
values as verbal tags are defined in association to specific LR values,
i.e., defining a LR range interpretation (by tags and values) for the
purpose of human communication. In other words, verbal scales aid
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the communication of system requirements and the issue to which
extent a system’s output supports either proposition.
Verbal LR scales map bands of LR values to verbal interpretation
in terms of support for either prosecution or defendant propositions.
Early verbal scales put emphasis on LRs < 102 [103, 200], until the
forensic field considered LRs for DNA examination. In 2015, the
European network of forensic science institutes (ENFSI) [23] recom-
mended the verbal scale suggested by the association of forensic ser-
vice providers (AFSP) [198] based on a ten digit system introduced
by Turing. By contrast, Nordgaard et al. [199] proposed the scale of
conclusion, which interpolates verbal bands concerning two fix points,
namely LR = 102 and LR = 106. Thereby, the increase in the base 10
logarithm of two consecutive interval bands of the verbal bands is
proportional. For the sake of easier tractability, these bands are ab-
stractly labeled in terms of nine scales as −4, . . . ,±0, . . . ,+4. In other
words, the interpolation is conducted from the LLR perspective (in
the log-domain, base e). This is more suitable than an interpolation
within the LR-domain due to its linear symmetry regarding the de-
pending scales of conclusion, where base 10 is considered for human
emphasized assessment.
Table 4.1: Verbal scales for communicating LR values, cf. [200], scales de-
picted for LRs > 1. For LRs < 1, bounds are symmetric as 1LR .
LR > 1 verbal
6 3.16 barely worth
6 10 substantial
6 31.6 strong
6 102 very strong
> 102 decisive
(a) Jeffreys’61 [103]
LR > 1 verbal
6 33 weak
6 100 fair
6 330 good
6 103 strong
> 103 very strong
(b) Evett’91 [196]
LR > 1 verbal
6 101 limited
6 102 moderate
6 103 moderately strong
6 104 strong
> 104 very strong
(c) Evett’00 [197]
LR > 1 verbal
6 101 weak/limited
6 102 moderate
6 103 moderately strong
6 104 strong
6 106 very strong
> 106 extremely strong
(d) ENFSI guideline [23, 198]
LR > 1 verbal
6 5.625 (±0) neither/nor
6 100 (+1) some extent
6 5625 (+2) support
6 106 (+3) strong
> 106 (+4) extremely strong
(e) Scale of conclusion [199] with
non-approximated LR values
Tab. 4.1 compares verbal scales on LRs> 1, which favor the proposi-
tion A (prosecution). Verbal scales for LRs favoring the proposition B
(defense) with values < 1 are symmetric regarding 1LR . For the scope
of this dissertation, the ENFSI scale is preferred for communication
in forensic evaluative scenarios and the scale of conclusion for com-
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munication in commercial scenarios. Either verbal scale is also illus-
trated in Fig. 4.3. The choice of a verbal scale depends on one’s in-
terest. Forensic reporting might prefer the ENFSI scale as the log10
scale is easier to explain to laymen and provides more LR bands.
By contrast, commercial reporting might favor the Nordgaard scale
as the loge scale rather accounts for natural relations, and applica-
tions are denoted in a rather limited amount of bands that consider
wider ranges of applications (which does not exclude its use to foren-
sic science). For designing verbal scales, one might consider Weber’s
law87—the more LR scores diverge from a (c,pi) associated LR thresh-
old, the wider LR bands might be; and the narrower if LRs are closer
to the operating point (depending on the design and intention of
involved decision policies). Notably, this dissertation solely outlines
the applicability of verbal scales without explicitly intending to pro-
mote any particular scale design. Summarizing for the LLR domain,
a verbal equivalent is used instead of an LLR, using a table for re-
placement. Thus, LLR values may be understood much more easily
by end-users88, conveying a degree of support rather than just a rel-
ative degree of similarity. This reporting scheme can favor end-users
as biometric system vendors, providers, operators, and owners.
4.2.2 Contribution: Verbal Scales of Least-Favorable Decisions
Moving the perspective of verbal LLR scales to the domain of LLR
thresholds (from forensic to commercial evaluation), this dissertation
contributes to the verbal scale of least-favorable decisions, concerning an
easier to understand summary of different decision policies. Fig. 4.4a
shows a color code of the verbal scale [23] of LLR values, which is
proposed to be used in error trade-off plots in order to interrelate
LLR values at a given threshold in verbal bands. In forensic science
(solely considering LLR values, not thresholds), such a figure could
be used to show if a method is more suitable for investigation/intel-
ligence or for evaluation. Associating verbal scales of LLR values to
LLR thresholds, cf. Eq. (2.33), verbal scales are also put in context to
BDF operating points (c,pi). LLR values that are greater than or equal
to an LLR threshold η lead to the favoring of proposition A at the
minimal cost advantage.
87 Effectively, the ratio of the just noticeable difference (JND) ∆x perceived by a stim-
uli to its amount x is (roughly) constant, i.e., ∆xx ≈ const., inducing logarithmic
JND effects regarding the stimuli amount. Exemplarily, let a difference in jail sen-
tences be 3 months: from 3 to 6 months (feeling longer) compared to 20 years to
20 years and 3 months (feeling not that much more). The logarithmic stimuli might
cause judges to speak less granular sentence terms and more round sentence terms
(example also provided by YouTubers Prof. Hannah Fry and Doctor of Letters Brady
Haran, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHG8io5qIU8). When designing ver-
bal scales for decision making, one might account for Weber’s law when verbally
tagging LR ranges (either on the base 10 or the natural logarithm).
88 Even if it may be an illusion as words are less transparent than numbers.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of verbal LR scales for base 10 and natural loga-
rithm: verbal tags (above), associated log-value ranges (below).
4.2.3 Contribution: Verbal Scales in DET Plots
The bounds of verbal bands—of the strength of evidence and of least-
favorable decisions—are depicted by using Eq. (4.2) in terms of the
depending LR bounds89 LR−4,...,±0,...,+4:
tanϕ = (LR−4,...,±0,...,+4)
−1 . (4.3)
In order to visualize the cross-application discrimination perfor-
mance in DET plots, verbal scales are utilized, e.g., the ENFSI scale
and the scale of conclusion. Fig. 4.5 illustrates the verbal scales de-
pending DCF slopes in the y-inverted ROC space, the y-inverted and
log-compressed ROC space, and in the DET space. Since one minDCF
point can lie on the ϕ depending line at most due to the ROCCH’s
convexity, levels of security and convenience are monotonically color-
encoded on the ROCCH. Levels of decision policy requirements when
aggregating applications by verbal scales are depicted.
The presented approach provides an assessment recipe towards
cross-application decision risk for biometric researchers, hence DET
plots are emphasized. This work proposes to depict aggregated levels
of decision risk on ROCCHs w.r.t. verbal scales, assuming optimal cal-
ibration. Fig. 4.6 shows the verbal scale DET plot for three synthetic
systems. The proposed visualization informs on both, the strength
of evidence and the least-favorable decision—LLR scales are revealed
89 This example refers to the scale of conclusion introduced in [199] since bounds are
denoted from the LLR-domain, and the amount of bands is more limited to fewer
categories, such that commercial decisions become easier to make.
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Figure 4.4: Contribution: verbal scale of least-favorable decisions: (a) transla-
tion of required log10(LR) values (annotated as the required pos-
terior to prior odds ratio) into verbal support, based on [23], (b)
translation of required loge values, based on [199]. Depending on
the direction, LLRs will support decisions favoring A or B with
a verbal strength indicated in the scale (alternating gray scales).
1
0
−
1
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
10−1
20
40
60
80
Type I error rate (in %)
Ty
pe
II
er
ro
r
ra
te
(i
n
%
)
(a) y-inv. ROC space
1
0
−
8
1
0
−
5
1
0
−
3
1
0
−
1
10−8
10−5
10−3
10−1
Type I error rate (in %)
(b) y-inv., log-compr. ROC space
1
1
0
−
5 1
2
0
6
5
9
5
10−5
1
20
65
95
Type I error rate (in %)
(c) DET space
Figure 4.5: DCF slopes as tanϕ lines in DET plots with ϕ operating points
(exemplary on the scale of conclusion): solid lines indicate se-
curity levels (+1,+2,+3,+4), dashed lines indicate convenience
levels (−1,−2,−3,−4). Blue, red, green and black lines indicate
±4,±3,±2,±1 levels, respectively. The dotted line resembles as
the center of the ±0 level (DCF weights error rates equally).
in the latent decision subspace, where the values of LLR scores and
LLR thresholds are the same. The nature of information, however, dif-
fers depending on an evaluation’s purpose. In forensic evaluation, the
strength of evidence provided by a system is of interest. In commer-
cial evaluation, it is the validation of decision requirements.
Using the relationship between PAV and ROCCH, the proposed
augmentation to DET plots increases transparency. Furthermore, the
reflection of resulting PAV groups is motivated: ranges of supported
verbal scales should be sustained, e.g., when binning within system
processing or obfuscating scores. This is to be pursued to (a) yield
ROCCHs and not make them collapse into a few supporting points
and thus to (b) support a wider range of application requirements.
Since the PAV conducts score binning, any pre-binning limits the
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Figure 4.6: Contribution: verbal scales encoded DET plot with exemplary
systems of Fig. 2.3a (solid), 2.3b (dashed), 2.3c (dash-dotted), and
scales of least-favorable decisions based on (a) the ENFSI scale,
(b) the scale of conclusion.
potential application range broadness of a system. The concept of
depicting minDCF or DCF values in the DET space is not new, cf.
application-independent evaluation methods [61], to which a novel
scheme for depicting ranges of minDCFs is contributed here. They
are aggregated by similarity in terms of verbal scales, suitable for
comparing a few systems of interest. As a result of this work, error
trade-offs are categorized into levels of effective security and conve-
nience in terms of the decision domain. For forensic evaluation, the
ENFSI verbal scale might be used instead of the scale of conclusion.90
A publicly available reference implementation is provided.91
4.2.4 Contribution: Communicating Threshold Requirements
This section’s emphasis is placed on making the verbal scale en-
coded DET practical for commercial and forensic communication to-
wards denoting BDF thresholds. Conceptually, communication par-
ties might seek guidance as follows:
1. An application’s scale is denoted, such that a representative op-
erating point can be assembled.
Example. A security application of the verbal scale +2 is targeted. A
lookup table, see Tab. 4.2, provides an initially associated thresh-
old to each verbal band. For the scale +2, this thresholds is
η+2 = 8.03.
90 This debate does not lie within the scope of this dissertation, the ENFSI scale pro-
vides a higher variety of conclusion levels, whereas the scale of conclusion is easier
to handle and visualizes a more natural summary of LLR magnitudes.
91 See: https://codeocean.com/algorithm/154591c8-9d3f-47eb-b656-
3aff245fd5c1/metadata.
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Table 4.2: Centers of Cratiollr (η) gravity on the [199] scale of conclusion.
Verbal scale -3 -2 -1 ±0 +1 +2 +3
Application convenience security
ηmin -13.82 -8.63 -4.61 -1.73 1.73 4.61 8.63
ηcenter -13.18 -8.03 -4.07 0 4.07 8.03 13.18
ηmax -8.63 -4.61 -1.73 1.73 4.61 8.63 13.82
2. A target prior92 pi—one may think of it as an attack prior (1−pi),
i.e., the target prior for class B—is denoted. Therefrom, the cost
ratio cIcII is revealed by reformulating Eq. (2.33):
cI
cII
= eη+logitpi.
Example. A friendly scenario has 99% a-priori target claims, such
that pi = 0.99. Therefrom, the cost ratio results as cIcII ≈ 3× 105.
Note: when assuming cII = 1 of a fixed but arbitrary cost unit,
cI is directly set by the same cost unit.
3. If the beliefs in pi, cI, cII need adjustment, one can define muta-
bility ranges of operative BDF thresholds η,η ′ in terms of an
offset δ, which can be expressed as the logarithm of the odds
ratio between the associated effective priors p˜i, p˜i ′:
δ = η ′ − η = logit p˜i− logit p˜i ′
= log
c ′I
c ′II
− logitpi ′ −
(
log
cI
cII
− logitpi
)
= log
c ′I
cI
cII
c ′II
+ logitpi+ log
(
1
pi
−
pi ′
pi
)
− log
pi ′
pi
. (4.4)
The ratios c
′
I
cI
,
(
cII
c ′II
)−1
, pi
′
pi can be defined as upper and lower
bands on the relative mutability of the initial values. Thereby,
one must sustain two properties: 0 < cI, cII and 0 < pi,pi ′ < 1.
Example. The cost ratio appears to be high. Assuming the denomina-
tor cost term as cII = 1, the other cost term is adjusted to cI = 275 000.
Then, a ±15% mutability band might be presumed, accounting for un-
certainty in the definition of the cost ratio. In contrast, the definition
of the prior ratio is more certain, however, a ±5% mutability band is
set for pi (just in case): upper and lower bounds to the threshold result
as 5.78 6 η ′+2 6 8.07 representing 3.08× 10−3 < p˜i < 3.13× 10−4.
In other words, a scenario of 1% attacks became an effective sce-
nario of 99.69% to 99.97% attacks—the value of p˜i is a mapping
of prior and cost beliefs and for revealing the effective prior in
the outlined scenario, the cost ratio is simply set to unity cIcII = 1.
Thus, one may want to start from an operating point representing
a verbal band and proceed with a fine-tuning of the decision policy
parameters (cI, cII,pi). In this context of employing mutability ranges,
92 The prior is the biggest difficulty in the forensic evaluative scenario.
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Figure 4.7: Contribution: representative operating points per verbal band,
exemplary on the scale of conclusion’s +1 band with equal areas
left and right to the center of gravity threshold ηctr.
initial thresholds can be denoted, such that calibration performance
to either end of a verbal scale band is sustained symmetrically. There-
fore, seeking the center of gravity (of costs) is proposed depending
on a verbal band. Since DCFs are dependent on p˜i and different DCF
setups are compared, an application-independent cost measure is nec-
essary. Thus, Cllr is used, see section 2.4 and Eq. (2.54). Cllr terms are
examined depending on the ratio of the class A and class B score sets
SA,SB. Emphasis on security and convenience scenarios, therein, is
symmetrically from an operating point central within a verbal band,
i.e., the integral of Cratiollr :
Cratiollr (η) =
log(1+ eaη)
log(1+ e−aη)
with a = sign(η) . (4.5)
Fig. 4.7 illustrates the determination of such a representative point for
the scale of conclusion’s +1 band.
Thereby, the EER line is resembled for η = 0 on well-calibrated sys-
tems, cf. Fig. 4.5. At η = 0, prior and cost beliefs are in equal ratio
(cI = cII = 1,pi = 0.5) but can also be under full uncertainty—the
first notion is a throughout parameterization of BDF parameters; the
second notion is derived from information theory (the BDF accom-
modates for both perspectives). By reaching towards higher levels of
security or convenience, the centers collapse towards the outer limits
of the depending verbal band due to the increasing exponential cost
penalty, cf. Tab. 4.2, exemplarily depicting centers of gravity for the
scale of conclusion.
To derive operating points verbally, biometric system vendors, op-
erators, providers, and owners can first discuss the application type,
e.g., in terms of −3, . . . ,+3 verbal bands. Second, they can agree
on a range of considerable priors93, then derive dependent costs, cf.
Eq. (2.37). Third, they adjust the threshold depending on the repre-
sentative operating point by utilizing Eq. (4.4), e.g., the cost ratio pro-
posed by the representative operating point of a scale may vary in
a (−10%,+15%) band or else needs to be downscaled to a distinct
cost ratio. By adjusting thresholds, other verbal bands can be effec-
tively reached, e.g., a threshold of scale +2 might increase to scale +3
(which is just fine as the beliefs in a decision policy are updated).
93 One may interpret 1− pi as the prior ’attack probability’ to a system.
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4.3 contribution : binary-decision error trade-off
(bet) plots
In this section94, an error rate trade-off is proposed exactly account-
ing for the BDF paramount to decision making. Common ways of
measuring the trade-off between error types are ROC and DET [88]
plots, where systems are tested for any possible threshold (applica-
tion). The Type I and Type II errors of a system are plotted as linked
pairs, the so-called operating points. DET plots are a variant of ROC
plots, which plot Gaussian-warped axes.95 This variant has two ad-
vantages: (i) Gaussian-distributed scores generate straight lines in
DET plots; (ii) the low-error region of the graph is magnified, helping
to visualize differences in low-error systems. Although theoretically
appealing, the Gaussian warping of the axes is mainly motivated be-
cause many score normalization techniques tend to Gaussianize the
scores [89]. However, this does not take score calibration into account,
and therefore systems presenting good DET plots might lead to bad
decisions under BDF.
Here, the binary decision error trade-off (BET) plot is proposed,
an alternative warping of the ROC axes to support the visualization
of distances between pairs of Type I and Type II errors, cf. Fig. 4.8,
involving three main processes:
1. The first stage involves warping the axes of the ROC plot ac-
cording to the log-odds transformation, i.e., the logit function,
instead of the probit function of the DET. Thus, an equivalent
increase or decrease of the application Bayes threshold towards
any of the extreme application scenarios will be visualized as
an equivalent increase or decrease in the axes of a BET curve.
2. The second stage is a necessary optimal score calibration. The
previous property is manifested only if the scores are optimally-
calibrated, which is achieved by using the pool adjacent viola-
tors algorithm (PAV) [78, 90]. Therefore, the previous visualiza-
tion property in BET plots is possible.
3. The third stage encodes system curves with scales of decision
policies. This is a consequence of the second stage: the ROCCH
corresponds to the PAV output [78, 90]. LLR thresholds are en-
coded on the ROCCH in scales of least-favorable decision poli-
cies.96 This way, a more pessimistic evaluation of performance in
the empirical set is sought, which is extrapolated as a prediction
of future operational performance.
94 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Daniel Ramos and Didier
Meuwly [65].
95 Axes are warped by the probit function, whose inverse is the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of the standard normal distribution.
96 When A is chosen over B as an LLR equals the threshold of a policy.
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Figure 4.8: Performance visualizations on synthetic score sets (red versus
green) sampled from 2.3a N(0, 1) versus N(3, 2) (solid), 2.3b χ2(3)
versus 25 Beta(2, 12 ) (dashed), 2.3c U(−4,
1
10 ) versus Beta(
9
10 ,
1
2 )
(dash-dotted), and ROCs with different scales in (a) to (d).
In contrast to other members of the ROC plot family, which solely
aim to visualize score distributions in one or another way, the BET
plot builds upon an implication of the BDF that is well-known among
forensic statisticians: the LLR of the LLR is the LLR [39, p. 79]. In other
words, applying the LLR principle on scores as well as on features
leads to the same value. LLRs encode the class proportion within
both spaces in their values. Thus, the meaning of LLRs is invariant
to whether the score space or the feature space is discussed: LLRs
are ideal for formal assessment of decision performance with binary
outcome which is informed by a machine learning system, such as
biometric verification. In the logarithmic domain, decision trade-offs
resemble a tug of war between two opposing propositions: an equal
change in favoring either proposition means the same; LLRs are the
natural choice for binary decision scores. Even if a recognition system
is not capable of yielding LLRs as scores, the second stage of the
BET plot will empirically exploit depending ideal (oracle) LLR values
by carrying out an oracle score calibration. Thus, the latent decision
subspace is revealed, the only domain where formal decision models
can be applied in a meaningful manner by means of the BDF. Fig. 4.9
shows the BET stages at a glance.
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Figure 4.9: Big picture: the BET plot, interrelating Bayes threshold distances,
and the empirical support of decision scales.
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4.3.1 Score Calibration: Properties and Implications
Score calibration is a necessity for decision making which is informed
by machine learning, when class discrimination and the preservation
of an ideal decision boundary are intended. In decision theory, the
accuracy of (probabilistic) predictions is addressed by proper scoring
rules [78, 96–98], with Brier [96] contributing the most prominent pa-
per. For binary classifiers, however, Cllr [26] is the de facto standard,
a proper scoring rule for LLRs, which emerged in the speaker recog-
nition community. Its basis is rooted in decision theory for pattern
recognition [56]: optimal decisions minimize the expected posterior
risk (cost) R(P |E) of favoring proposition P in the light of some ev-
idence E and a true proposition Ti with i as proposition index for
N = 2 propositions:
R(P |E) =
∑
i
CP,Ti Pr(Ti |E) (4.6)
with the non-negative costs CP,Ti of deciding for proposition P in the
light of the true proposition Ti. For binary decisions, only the propo-
sitions A,B are possible for P and Ti. Here, decisions are made based
on the extent to which proposition A is favored over proposition B.
The tie-breaking rule to minimize R(A |E) [56] is (here written down
as a least-favorable decision; 6 instead of < as in [56]):
R(A |E) 6 R(B |E) , CA,B −CB,B
CB,A −CA,A
6 Pr(A |E)
Pr(B |E)
,
log
CA,B −CB,B
CB,A −CA,A
Pr(B)
Pr(A)
6 log Pr(E | A)
Pr(E | B)
. (4.7)
The last line makes use of Bayes’ theorem, putting priors and costs
on the left-hand side, applying the logarithm to both sides (prior
and cost terms must be positive, otherwise a recognition task would
be superfluous), leaving the LLR to remain on the right-hand side.
This very step foreshadows the main difference to the perception of
performance visualization established in machine learning, e.g. [203,
204], which operates on posteriors (comparing them to costs): only
when a classifier informs on the strength-of-evidence by means of
LLRs, evidence is reported comparable to the required trade-off for-
malized by quantified prior and cost beliefs; the subjective decision
layer is formally (and entirely) decoupled from objective evidence re-
porting layer, as required in forensic evidence assessment [23, 24]. For
the sake of easier tractability, zero costs in making correct decisions
CA,A = 0 = CB,B are assumed. Furthermore, the notation of costs on
making an erroneous decision is simplified as: CA = CB,A if A is true
but the decision is B; and CB = CA,B if B is true but the decision is
A. For well-calibrated scores, the Bayes threshold η is, cf. Eq. (2.33):
η = log
CB Pr(B)
CA Pr(A)
= logit(1− c) + logit(1− pi) . (4.8)
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Decision policies are formally denoted by quantifying the belief in
priors and costs; score calibration means to meet these trade-off require-
ments with the output of the machine learning systems (not only to
improve on discrimination but also to sustain interpretation in terms of
the left-hand side), which informs the decision layer, e.g. a biometric
verification system (regardless of the biometric modality being voice,
iris, handwriting, fingerprint, face, or another; and regardless of the
shape of any empirical score distribution).
4.3.2 Modeling Bayesian Decision Policies (not Scores)
The proposed BET plot is motivated by the visual suggestion of ROC
and DET plots: trade-offs in decision policy parameterizations (c,pi)
are visualized in terms of their error rates, namely Type I error rate
in the x-axis and Type II error rate in the y-axis for a given value of
threshold η. In BET plots, the axis warping is defined by a quantile
function intrinsically given by η. Thus, same distances in the axes re-
veal equivalent variations in the application policies. Moreover, each
point of a BET plot will reveal a pair of Type I and Type II errors that
are optimal for the given Bayes threshold. Thereby, the threshold is
meaningfully moved across the BET characteristic, considering that
a move that supposes an equal distance interrelates to an equivalent
increase or decrease in the parameterized decision policy (c,pi).
The threshold η and decision policy parameters (c,pi) relate with
the logit function, which is here proposed as the ROC axes warping.
Adopting the logistic distribution97, whose cdf is the logistic function,
cf. Eq. (2.34), and whose quantile function is the generalized logit func-
tion, the integrals of Type I and Type II error rates p1,p2 are sampled
by its cdf, and corresponding thresholds η1,η2 are modeled by its
quantile function:
η1 ∼ µ1 + s1 logitp1 , η2 ∼ µ2 + s2 logitp2 (4.9)
with location and scale parameters for the Type I error rate µ1, s1 and
the Type II error rate µ2, s2.
Theorem. By exploiting the latent decision subspace, LLRs (having an
angular interpretation in the ROC canvas) are co-assigned with the verti-
cal/horizontal linear interpretation (which the human eye is used to judge
on in error rate trade-off plots).
Due to its underlying decision model, the BET plot is the first error
rate trade-off plot to fully interrelate error rate and Bayesian perfor-
mance assessment paradigms precisely. In the following, proofs are
outlined, implications are stated, and examples are provided.
97 As Gaussian-distributed scores resemble straight lines in the DET space, logistically
distributed scores will resemble straight lines in the BET space, but first and fore-
most, the BDF is targeted, i.e., the decision formalism.
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4.3.3 Tractable Decision Model Parameters
By definition of calibration, calibrated probabilities are equal to error
rates (on average). The logistic quantile distribution of the thresh-
old η thus naturally appears as the logistic function. The relation-
ship between LLRs and posterior probabilities may be viewed as a
generalized sigmoid. Thereby, coordinates after PAV (p1,p2) are ex-
amined, i.e., points of the ROCCH that are interpreted as perfectly-
calibrated posteriors. Employing s1, s2 scalings, competing log-odds
are weighted. For the sake of easier tractability, let s1 = s2 = 1, such
that solely µ1,µ2 terms are discussed in the following.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of logit (blue) and probit (orange) scales, reflecting
probabilities as compressed odds. The log transform (dotted)
is solely capable of compression: log-scaled error rates cannot
warp to positive values, whereas compressed odds are symmet-
ric in (−∞,+∞) towards 50%.
Fig. 4.10 compares the log, probit (DET), and logit (proposed BET)
axes transform functions. By employing the logit axes scaling, dis-
tances in the BET space account for distances between LLR thresh-
olds. In other words, the BET plot provides an exact visualization
of trade-offs in decision making, as competing (betting) odds are re-
flected in a symmetric fashion (in terms of log-odds). In contrast, DET
plots reflect probabilistic odds, i.e., putting decision making in con-
text of hypotheses testing, whereas the BET plots put decision mak-
ing in context of favoring propositions based on the strength of evi-
dence. Also, log-scaled axes are undesirable: by solely reflecting the
odds of one proposition, the odds of the competing proposition are
missed out on. In other words, the approximation of the logit with
the log axes scaling introduces the non-linear approximation error:
logit(x) − log(x) = − log(1 − x), such that visual distances between
error trade-offs cannot be exactly interrelated with LLR threshold dis-
tances. When consequently following the BDF, the logit scale is prefer-
able over the probit scale, i.e., the BET plot over the DET plot, as log-
odds are visually interrelated for decision making.
Fig. 4.11a depicts an exemplary BET plot, cf. Fig. 4.8d, with a col-
ored verbal scale (e.g., of the ENFSI scale or the scale of least-favorable
decisions), cf. Fig. 4.4a. Evaluation transparency is enhanced as thresh-
old values and distances are interrelated.
134 on the performance paradigm shift
0.
00
1
0.
01 0.
1 1 5 20 50 80 95
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
5
20
50
80
95
ηP −ηQ
P
Q
S
ηS −ηQ
Type I error rate (%)
Ty
pe
II
er
ro
r
ra
te
(%
)
(a)
System 1
System 2
S
Q
R
P
ηQ−ηR
ηP −ηQ
ηS−ηR
ηS−ηQ
(b)
Figure 4.11: (a) BET plot with exemplary systems of Fig. 2.3a (solid), 2.3b
(dashed), 2.3c (dash-dotted) and verbal scales of least-favor-
able decisions, (b) interrelated distances between operating points
S,P,Q,R with the related thresholds ηS,ηP,ηQ, ηR.
4.3.4 Plot Distances Revealing Log-Odd Trade-Offs
The BET plot interrelates log-odd (c,pi) trade-offs among points of
one system’s ROCCH but also among different systems. Thereby, pri-
ors and costs are related in the same way: a variation in priors will
cause the same effect as an alike variation of costs. For this reason
and for the sake of easier tractability in the following discussion, let
pi = 0.5 (logitpi = 0), e.g., one might assume maximum prior entropy (no
information).98 As the scores to be evaluated by the BET plot are PAV-
transformed, the resulting plot represents the ROCCH of the scores
evaluated [90], i.e., the performance of least-favorable decisions. This
convexity assessment of least-favorable decisions leads to thresholds
parameterizations by ratios (that are up to scaling factors), i.e., pes-
simistic thresholds on the ROCCH (continuous thresholds) instead of
on the ROC (discrete thresholds), as follows.
The quantile p2 represents the thresholds η2 = ηA, i.e., computed
over class A similarity. Thus, the quantile function reveals a Type II
cost cII |= c associated to the depending ηA with the competing Type I
cost cI |= (1− c). Inherently, these cIcII ratios are up to scaling factors.
The costs terms cI, cII range from 0 to 1, covering all possible cost-
ratios and are therefore all possible thresholds for the maximum en-
tropy prior.99 By targeting the prediction of decision policy trade-offs,
98 The prior pi = 0.5 is the implicit prior in all forensic evaluative benchmark tests. Al-
though the value 0.5 is almost never met in forensic science evaluation, the value is
motivated by maximum uncertainty from information theory. In contrast to the EER
(Frequentist perspective on equidistant operating points), however, prior and cost be-
liefs of 0.5 resemble at the value of maximum Shannon entropy (Bayesian perspective
on information theory).
99 Following Eq. (2.33), when c moves from 0 to 1, η moves from −∞ to +∞ regardless
of the (arbitrary but fixed) value of pi in (0, 1).
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all notations are intended in the latent decision subspace, sparing the
assignment of distinct policy parameterization values. When solely
interrelating Type II parameters with p2, defining µ2 as (corollary):
µ2 = log cI + logit(1− pi) , s.t.: ηA ∼ µ2 + logitp2 ,
⇒ log cI
cII
+ logit(1− pi) ∼ log cI + logit(1− pi) + logitp2 ,
⇒ logitp2 ∼ log 1
cII
, s.t.: cII ∼
1− p2
p2
. (4.10)
Proof: The Type II error cost cII is modelled only by the odds repre-
sentation of Type II error proportions; any vertical change in the BET
canvas corresponds to a change in cII costs, which in turn reflects an
LLR threshold deviation from its above expectation ηA.
By contrast, the quantile p1 represents the threshold η2 = ηB, i.e.,
the quantile of a right-to-left integral computed over classB similarity,
inverting LLR thresholds ηA: ηB = −ηA. When solely interrelating
Type I costs with p1, let µ1 (corollary):
µ1 = log cII + logitpi , s.t.: ηB = −ηA ∼ µ1 + logitp1 ,
⇒ − log cI
cII
+ logitpi ∼ log cII + logitpi+ logitp1 ,
⇒ logitp1 ∼ log 1
cI
, s.t.: cI ∼
1− p1
p1
. (4.11)
Proof: The Type I error cost cI is modelled only by the odds rep-
resentation of Type I error proportions; any horizontal change in the
BET canvas corresponds to a change in cI costs, which in turn reflects
a LLR threshold deviation from its above expectation ηB.
Similarly to cII, cI increases by moving towards the origin of the
BET plot and decreases when the depending error rate approaches
100%. Thereby, thresholds η (η1 = −η2) increase either when cI in-
creases or cII decreases. Solely traversing on the x- or y-axis from
a threshold η ′ to a threshold more close to the BET origin η ′′—for
p ′′1 < p
′
1 : η
′′ > η ′, whereas for p ′′2 < p
′
2 : η
′′ < η ′—distances resem-
ble (corollary):
x-axis: logitp ′′1 − logitp
′
1 ∼ log c
′
I − log c
′′
I = η
′′ − η ′ ,
y-axis: logitp ′′2 − logitp
′
2 ∼ log c
′
II − log c
′′
II = η
′ − η ′′ . (4.12)
Proof: Changing horizontally from lower to higher Type I error rates
corresponds to (the distance when) changing from more to less secure
thresholds; changing vertically from higher to lower Type II error
rates corresponds to (the distance when) changing from more to less
convenient thresholds (from less to more secure thresholds).
Fig. 4.11b provides a visual intuition on directed distances in the
BET canvas, where points P,Q are on the same ROCCH, S is on a dif-
ferent, and R is an auxiliary point, necessary to interrelate the thresh-
old difference from Q to S.
136 on the performance paradigm shift
4.3.5 Generalization to Priors as well as Priors and Costs
Solely examining priors (logit c = 0), the parameterization of µ1,µ2
reveals latent priors piII |= pi and (1− piI) |= (1− pi) (up to scaling fac-
tors), where expected thresholds for one decision model the expected
parameters of the competing decision (similarly to the above):
µ1 = logpiII + logit(c), s.t.: logitp1 ∼ log
1
piI
,
µ2 = logpiI + logit(1− c), s.t.: logitp2 ∼ log
1
piII
. (4.13)
Corollaries and proofs correspond to the above.
Due to the threshold symmetry regarding cost and prior log-odds,
cf. Eq. (2.33), the above argumentation holds for solely discussing
different prior parameterizations as well as for (c,pi) as (corollary):
logitp1 ∼ − log cI − logpiI + log cII + logpiII − µ1 ,
logitp2 ∼ − log cII − logpiII + log cI + logpiI − µ2 , where if
µ1 = log cII + logpiII ⇒ logitp1 ∼ − log(cI piI) ,
µ2 = log cI + logpiI ⇒ logitp2 ∼ − log(cII piII) . (4.14)
Proof: Type I error rates interrelate with the convolution of depending
latent priors and costs piI, cI; Type II error rates interrelate with the
convolution of depending latent priors and costs piII, cII. Analogous to
what is stated above, vertical and horizontal LLR threshold changes
are impacted accordingly.
The illustrated proofs work out well for the proposed formalized
decision modeling on the BET canvas because of the fact that LLRs are
not only scores of some form to report on the class distribution within
the feature space but also encode in their value the class proportion
within the latent decision subspace: the LLR of the LLR is the LLR.
4.3.6 Implications for Interrelations
The BET model allows to interrelate a formal interpretation of fix er-
ror rate constraints, exemplary the constraints by FRONTEX for face
biometrics in automated border control [77]: if p2 performances are
compared at a fix p1 = 0.1% error rate, the latent cost cI = 1−10
−3
10−3
=
999 is induced. Then, by requiring p2 6 5%, cII > 1−0.050.05 = 19 and
η 6 log 99919 ≈ 3.96 follow.100 In other words, convenience is increased
at a fixed security level, accommodating for lower Bayes thresholds
as well. The BET model allows for shifts between beliefs in the deci-
sion policy while sustaining error rate constraints. For example, the
above assumed maximum prior uncertainty (pi = 0.5) for a cost be-
lief of c > 1919+999 ≈ 0.019. The application environment is shifted to
100 Comparatively, the 2016 NIST speaker recognition evaluation [22] sets its lowest
operating point at ηSRE16a = logit(1− 0.01) ≈ 4.60.
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be more friendly with pi = 95% = 1920 , where cII > 19 is kept along-
side the error rate constraints p1 = 0.1% (logitp1 = − log(999)) and
p2 6 5% (logitp2 6 − log(19)):
logitp2 ∼ − log(cII piII)⇒ − log(19) ∼ − log(19 piII)⇒ piII ∼ 1 ,
piII
piII + piI
|=
pi
pi+ (1− pi)
= pi⇒ piI = 1− pi
pi
=
1
19
,
logitp1 ∼ − log(cI piI)⇒ − log(999) ∼ − log
(
cI
1
19
)
⇒ cI ∼ 999× 19 ,
cII
cII + cI
|=
c
c+ (1− c)
= c⇒ c > 19
19+ 999× 19 =
1
1000
. (4.15)
The mutual prior and cost beliefs of a decision policy (c,pi) can
be interrelated with fixed to error rate constraints. By changing one
of these beliefs (e.g. pi), however, the other belief (e.g. c) is affected.
Thus, in the example, the cost term of an application’s decision policy
changes from a rather convenience centered yet secure (c → 1, here:
19
1018 ≈ 154 ) to a much more security centered one (c→ 0, here: 11000 ).
4.3.7 Examples: Experimental and Use-Case
The proposed BET plots can be applied to any binary decision prob-
lem, as long as the decision is made by the use of of a score as com-
pared to a threshold. In this section, two examples are discussed: i)
advantages of the BET plot on scores stemming from an automated
fingerprint identification system (AFIS)101 in forensic applications
and ii) utility of the BET plot to smart home applications.
Example: AFIS System (Real-World) I / II
AFIS systems use fingerprint papillary line features (e.g., minutiae)
as biometric characteristics for the purpose of biometric recogni-
tion, e.g., verification. Thereby, the number of minutiae examined
by an AFIS system correlates with the discrimination and calibra-
tion performance [76, 205]: performance metrics improve with the
increasing number of minutiae. Fig. 4.12 compares AFIS scoresa,
cf. [76], to their ideal LLR values: as the score distributions, cf.
Figs. 4.12a – 4.12d, solely provide insights into associated error
rates, when compared to a threshold, their ideal LLR representa-
tion, cf. Fig. 4.12e – 4.12h, provides insights into decision making
because it represents the ratio of probabilities of observing scores
given the two competing propositions A,B. In [76], results are vi-
sualized in terms of DET [88] and ECE [115] plots because both
101 Such systems are primarily used for investigative purposes with the aim of mini-
mizing the false reject rate (FRR), not the false accept rate (FAR). The investigative
approach is a selection from larger sets to smaller subsets in which the FRR is mini-
mized. At the evaluation level, however, it is the contrary. Here, the aim is to get the
highest LLR (at the right level of inference) so as to minimize the FAR (even if this
information remains prior dependent).
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Figure 4.12: BET plot example: AFIS performance by number of examined
minutiae with (a) – (d) AFIS scores, (e) – (h) related LLRs.
discrimination and calibration are considered for LLRs. However,
when solely concerning discrimination performance (as for the BET
plot), the examination of calibration performance (by ECE plots) is
beyond the scope of the BET plot, such that calibration is assumed
to be ideal.
a AFIS scores have been used secondarily to compute the strength of evidence in
this forensic evaluation scenario.
Therefore, ROC plots can solely measure discrimination, and the
PAV transformation does not change the ROC. Thus, empirical (AFIS)
scores are transformed into their depending LLR values (after con-
ducting PAV), where (LLR) decision trade-offs resemble the ROCCH,
cf. Fig. 4.13, when continuously increasing decision thresholds.
Example: AFIS System (Real-World) II / II
As the discrimination performance increases, fewer LLR values re-
semble after score calibration, such that the ROCCH is defined
by fewer points. Consequently, steppy ROC plots, solely discretely
sampling thresholds, are not relevant to the BET space. Thresholds
are examined continuously and in the LLR domain (on well-cali-
brated scores) by the use of the ROCCH. Depending on the under-
lying LLR values, different decision scales are supported. When
employing verbal scales of least-favorable decisions, cf. Fig. 4.4a,
depending LLR threshold values are also interrelated. When exam-
ining 10 minutiae, the threshold scale of moderate security decisions
(comparing the green BET segments) is rather narrow compared
to other numbers of minutiae. By comparing the green BET seg-
ments (resembling LLRs ∈ (log(10), log(100)] ≈ (2.3, 4.6]), a par-
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Figure 4.13: BET plot example: AFIS BET plots for 6 minutiae (dashed),
8 minutiae (dotted), 10 minutiae (dash-dotted), and 12 minutiae
(solid); colors depict the verbal scale (ENFSI based of strength of
evidence and of least-favorable decisions).
ticular consequence of the transform from scores as system out-
puts to their corresponding ideal LLR values is revealed: optimal
score calibration maps uncalibrated scores to corresponding LLR
values—these effective LLR groups are not necessarily continuous,
but they are monotonically increasing. Depending on the empirical
set of uncalibrated scores, different gaps between calibrated sys-
tem outputs (as LLRs) can resemble. In PAV calibration, these gaps
are linearly interpolated. On the ROCCH, these gaps are angularly
interpolated, i.e., at the angles between two neighboring ROCCH
segments. Comparing 10 and 12 minutiae LLR score histograms, cf.
Figs. 4.12g and 4.12h, the error rates associated to LLRs span over
a wider range of least-favorable decisions for the 10 minutiae AFIS.
Therefore, the 12 minutiae AFIS yields better error rate trade-off
performance. After optimal calibration, LLR values group by the
empirical ratios of class A,B scores, cf. Fig. 2.12. Depending on
the LLR value of and gaps between these groups, narrower and
wider ranges resemble. BET plots allow to interrelate (LLR) score
histograms of the decision subspace with error rate trade-offs. Fur-
thermore, the changeover between verbal scales is not occurring at
fixed error rates: good decision making needs to discuss the formal-
ized operating point (c,pi) in order to avoid misleading decisions
(on average).
The utility of BET plots is not restricted towards forensic scenar-
ios as the benefit of interrelating betting odds is applicable to many
binary decision problems, such as smart home applications.
Example: Smart Home Applications (Use Case)
Speaker verification could be employed for user authentication, ac-
cessing lighting control or home security systems. In such environ-
ments, one might assume high prior odds 10 : 1 with pi = 1011 (true
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identity claims are ten times more likely than false claims). For non-
critical applications, such as lightning control, one might assume
high convenience cost odds with c = 23 (e.g., inconvenience versus
power consumption costs CA = 20 cents, CB = 40 cents), whereas
for critical applications such as home security systems, one might
assume high security cost odds with c = 1991 (e.g., inconvenience
versus liability costs CA = 100 e, CB = 99 000 e). The first appli-
cation implies the LLR threshold η = logit(1− 2021) = − log(20) ≈
−3.0 in order to favor proposition A—making at least moderate con-
venience decisions, cf. Fig. 4.4a—the latter application requires LLR
threshold η = logit(1− 0.01) = log(99) ≈ 4.6—which provides at
least moderate securitya decisions, cf. Fig. 4.4a. Therefore, the BET
plot allows to choose the most adequate operating point, directly
relating LLR thresholds and errors with prior/cost trade-offs.
a In Fig. 4.4a, an LR of 99 resembles a moderate security decision, whereas an LR of
100 resembles a moderately strong security decision. It is obviously understood that an
LR of 99 is only trivially different in its overall impact from one of 100 [23] (the quote
originally refers to LRs of 999 and a 1001 for two verbal bands overlapping at
exactly a 1000, but the message remains the same).
Decision policies (c,pi) resemble LLR thresholds which correspond
to points of the ROCCH. The proposed BET plot visually interrelates
ROCCH distances to LLR threshold distances, thus to the effective do-
main of decision making—the latent decision subspace—rather than
to the system output (observation) domain. System outputs might be
uncalibrated, and thus would be without any consideration of sever-
ity nor hostility aspects (values of c and pi) to decision making, espe-
cially to erroneously making decisions. Thus, when defining system
operating points solely by error rates, systems might be employed
causing misleading decisions when either of the cost or prior con-
straints change. By formalizing application policies (c,pi), the trans-
parency of empirical evaluations is enhanced for a natural interrela-
tion of error rates and the betting log-odds systems are capable of
supporting (in application scenarios with multiple changing operat-
ing points).
In contrast to empirical ROC plots solely visualizing error rates as
is, DET and BET performance visualizations provide predictive in-
sights into future decision making. Although motivated differently,
DET plots effectively inform on hypotheses testing. By contrast, BET
plots inform on trade-offs between (forensic or commercial) decision
policies—trade-offs in LR magnitudes. Contrary to literature in ma-
chine learning, e.g., [203, 204], BET plots allow to change priors and
costs without assuming that the empirical dataset prior equals the op-
erative application prior ˙˘pi = pi. In [203], cost curves are proposed: the
effective prior p˜i (there as probability cost function) is interrelated with
an average normalised expected cost (applied probability of error (APE)
plots but with predefined cost values and taking the ROC error rates
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as prior probabilities). The work of [204] is in opposition to [206, 207].
The two latter argue that the AUC requires different probability thresh-
old distributions for different classifiers and assumes uniform distribution
over the proportion of correct classifications. The former acknowledges
a plethora of evaluation metrics (e.g., based on strictly proper scoring
rules, including Cllr) but then explicitly considers the simplest option:
uniform distribution. In [204], the Brier score (also known as the mean
square error) is related with the AUC, and the assessment of LLRs
is stated for future work. The calibration of scores and thresholds is
elaborated for a fixed database prior ˙˘pi (used for training systems/de-
scribing evaluation database) to equal the prior pi (used for defining
decision policies). This can be valid when only the cost term of a de-
cision policy changes and the prior term remains fixed and the eval-
uation database is well-chosen to replicate the application-dependent
prior pi requirement. This is not valid in other scenarios, where sys-
tems need to be well-calibrated across different pi values to satisfy the
(not only cost dependent) requirements of policies ranging between
convenience and security decisions, such as in the forensic and bank-
ing scenarios.
Contributing BET plots, the choice of the BDF basis to formal de-
cision making is accounted for. System trade-offs are compared on
the ROCCH, representing optimal score calibration, i.e., for all pos-
sible combinations of prior probabilities and decision costs, optimal
Bayes thresholds are found. Finally, the logit axes transform interre-
lates threshold distances, where the visualization of verbal scales fur-
ther enhances transparency, regardless of the verbal scales being of
strength of evidence or of least-favorable decisions.
Regarding the placement of axes ticks on DET or BET plots, one
might favor to have equidistant ticks. In this dissertation, either trade-
off employs axes ticks as follows:
• The maximum is either 50% or 99%.
• Error rates below 1% are in magnitudes of base 10 order, e.g.,
0.00001%, 0.0001%, 0.001%, 0.01%, 0.1%, 1%.
• Error rates above 1% are limited to five ticks (up to 99%) on
approximately equal distances, such that for the probit scale102
(DET plots) and for the logit scale103. In (BET plots), the ticks are
approximated as: 5%, 20%, 50%, 80%, 95%.
102 See: https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=0.5*(1%2Berf(((probit(0.99)++-
+probit(0.01))+%2F+6+*+%5B1,2,3,4,5%5D+%2B+probit(0.01))%2Fsqrt(2)))
103 See: https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=sigmoid((logit(0.99)++-
+logit(0.01))+%5C%2F+6+*+%5C%5B1,2,3,4,5%5C%5D+%5C%2B+logit(0.01))
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4.4 contribution : normalized empirical cross-entropy
In contrast to error rate performance, this section104 addresses infor-
mation based performance assessment within the BDF. The normal-
ization of APE diagrams, cf. normalized Bayes error rates (NBERs)
plots of Fig. 2.8 in Fig. 2.9, motivates the following property. The vi-
sual comparability of calibration losses from DCF to minDCF values
is preserved across different priors, accounting for changing default
DCF values across operating points—the default performance is the
DCF of a coin tossing system which causes different decision costs
depending on the decision policy (c,pi) parameterization. For ECE
plots [115], the default ECE values solely depend on the prior param-
eterization p˜i, thus NECE plots are proposed here as the ratio to the
default entropy Hdefault:
NECE =
ECE
Hdefault
,
Hdefault = piQ log2
piP
1+ piP
+ (1− piQ) log2 (1+ piP) , (4.16)
where piQ denotes the reference prior and piP denotes a system’s
prior. To simulate information performance over a range of priors,
[115] refers to piQ = piP. The concept of normalizing cross-entropy is
not new, as it is well-known within the automatic speech recognition
(ASR) community [208, 209]. Fig. 4.14 depicts the NECEs correspond-
ing to Fig. 2.16. In contrast to ECE plots, visual distances across dif-
ferent prior log-odds (x-axis depicts logitpi) are comparable, as equal
distances reflect the same normalized discrimination and calibration
performance.
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Figure 4.14: Proposed NECE plots for the systems of Figs. 2.3a to 2.3c, with
persisted Cllr and Cminllr values at logitpi = 0 (dashed), default
cross-entropy (black), normalized ECE (red), and normalized
minECE (dashed, blue).
Notably, the visualization of Cllr and Cminllr values is preserved dur-
ing ECE normalization. In ECE plots, Cllr and Cminllr values are read-
able on the ECE characteristics at logitpi = 0 [115] and the default
104 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Daniel Ramos and Didier
Meuwly [65]. Neither this entire section nor parts of it have been published by the
time of the submission of this dissertation.
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ECE value.105 The values of the ECE characteristic at logitpi = 0 re-
main invariant to the NECE transform as the default entropy equals
1, i.e., fix-points, such that their values are still readable at the vertical
(dotted) line at logitpi = 0. For the alignment of score histograms and
NECE plots, one might intend to flip the x-axis. However, one would
thereby visually suggest pi = p˜i, which solely holds on logit c = 0
(maximum cost entropy).
4.5 contribution : taxonomy to performance
visualizations
This section106 provides a taxonomy as an overview on the perfor-
mance visualization approaches depicted in sections 2.2 and 2.4. The
plots proposed in sections 4.3 and 4.4 are put into the context of exist-
ing work. Performance assessment concepts serve different purposes:
• Solely error rate based analyses are well-established and work
for application scenarios with a fixed operating point. When
examining different operating points, however, e.g., when re-
searchers or developers interpret published results for their op-
erating scenarios, the impact of employing a system to decision
making needs to be considered as well. Two performance report-
ing types are identified: discrimination (class differences) and
discrimination and calibration (the ability to instrumentalize the
knowledge provided by a system to proceed an action).
• Depending on a system’s application scenario, different per-
spectives on performance assessment are applicable, i.e., er-
ror rates are at-hand for decision risk assessment. For appli-
cation-independent reporting, however, a recognition system
is thought of as the weight of evidence that is contributed to
an informed decision making, thus its information gain is as-
sessed. Two performance reporting scopes are identified: error
rates (whose sets occur as comparison scores) and information
gains (the knowledge one learns about score sets to provide as
beneficial intel to others).
• Overall, the targeted audience needs to be addressed well. APE
or ECE plots might report sufficiently enough for analytic pur-
poses in order to develop a system, but NBER and NECE plots
ease the visualization for the sake of deciding on which sys-
105 Regarding the ECE plot, the visualized default value is computed so as to par-
ticularly aid the visual assessment. At logitpi = 0, the default performance eval-
uates to exactly 1, see: https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=-(sigmoid(x)
*log(sigmoid(x))+%2B+(1-sigmoid(x))*log(1-sigmoid(x)))%2Flog(2).
106 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Daniel Ramos and Didier
Meuwly [65]. Neither this entire section nor parts of it have been published by the
time of the submission of this dissertation.
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tem to employ better. As such, steppy ROCs can provide in-
sights into the development of binary decision systems, whereas
the contribution to decision making is better reflected by the
ROCCH. Two targeted audiences are identified: analytics (the
examination of performance elements from observations) and
reporting (to account as a formal statement on observations and
investigations).
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Figure 4.15: Taxonomy on performance visualizations with concepts on:
performance reporting types as discrimination (orange) and
discrimination and calibration (blue); performance reporting
scopes as error rates (red) and information gains (green); and
targeted audience as analytics (dotted boxes) and reporting
(solid boxes). Plots involving PAV calibration to simulate well-
calibrated scores are grouped. Relationships are indicated by ar-
rows (can be derived from), but transitive relations of alike reason
are omitted. Scores (circle) are the root of this taxonomy. Per-
formance visualizations proposed in this dissertation are high-
lighted (thick boxes).
Fig. 4.15 gives an overview on well-established performance vi-
sualizations of the associated communities, namely speaker recog-
nition, forensic evaluation, and biometrics standardization. The de-
picted plots relate as follows:
• Score histograms visualize discrimination and calibration per-
formance of the system output for the analytic interpretation of
score distributions and error rates.
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• PAV-LLR score histograms visualize inferred information from
score histograms on discrimination and calibration perfor-
mance on the analysis of LLR score distributions and the latent
decision subspace.
• Zoo plots visualize error rates as well as inferred information
from score histograms on the analysis of subject-wise contribu-
tions to discrimination and calibration performance. Zoo plots
assume scores to be Gaussian distributed for each subject.
• Limit Tippett plots visualize error rates as well as inferred in-
formation from score histograms on the analysis of the discrimi-
nation and calibration performance of system outputs. Thereby,
error rate trade-offs are visualized for LLR thresholds (after PAV
calibration; thus the transitive dependency to scores is omitted).
Assumptions on error rate limits are drawn from Gaussian as-
sumptions based on the properties posed by the setup of an
empirical evaluation (the numbers of class A,B scores). As such,
Limit Tippett plots are derivable during the creation of PAV-LLR
histograms.
• (Y-axis inverted, steppy) ROC plots visualize error rate trade-
offs for the analysis of discrimination performance. ROCs are
derived from score sets. As ROCs convey error trade-offs, i.e.,
proportions of score sets, they can serve as input to PAV calibra-
tion as well.
• (Y-axis inverted) ROCCH plots visualize (a) the convex hull of
the ROC and (b) the continuous error rate trade-offs that are
sampled after PAV calibration. As such, discrimination perfor-
mance (representing minDCF values, thus Cminllr ) is illustrated
for performance reporting.107
• APE plots visualize discrimination and calibration performance
(DCF and minDCF values) as well as the default decision risk
based on error rates, providing an analysis across all LLR thresh-
olds. The DCF and minDCF integrals equal Cllr and Cminllr . To
depict calibration performance, APE plots are based on PAV
calibration (PAV-LLR histograms).
• NBER plots normalize APE plots for the reporting of error rate
based discrimination and calibration performance. DCF and
minDCF values are normalized by the default decision risk that
depends on the parameterization of the effective prior/cost p˜i.
• ECE plots visualize information performance inferred from
score sets after PAV calibration. By simulating different prior
107 The ROCCH is the set of the expected ROC segments of pessimistic and optimistic
interpolations [90]. According to [210], all points under the convex hull are non-optimal.
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pi values (performance without the consideration of costs, not
to be confused with p˜i), an analysis of minECE and ECE dis-
crimination and calibration performance is illustrated as well
as the default cross-entropy. Cllr and Cminllr values are readable
from the ECE characteristic at logitpi = 0. To depict calibration
performance, ECE plots are based on PAV calibration (PAV-LLR
histograms).
• NECE plots normalize ECE plots for the reporting of infor-
mation based discrimination and calibration performance. ECE
and minECE values are normalized by the default cross-en-
tropy that depends on the parameterization of the prior pi. Cllr
and Cminllr values are readable from the NECE characteristic at
logitpi = 0. (NECE plots are a contribution of this work.)
• DET plots visualize error rate trade-offs for reporting on dis-
crimination performance aiming at hypotheses testing. The axes
of the y-axis inverted ROC plot are transformed using the pro-
bit function. Originally, DET plots were proposed as quantile-
quantile (Q-Q) plots since Gaussian distributed scores tend to
be visualized as straight lines after these axes transform. The
probit function depicts error rates not in the form of probabil-
ities but by their corresponding probabilistic odds. In the same
way, DET plots visualize ROCCHs.
• BET plots visualize error rate trade-offs for reporting on dis-
crimination performance aiming at decision making between
competing propositions. The axes of the y-axis inverted ROC
plot are transformed using the logit function. In this dissertation,
BET plots are proposed as Q-Q plots to interrelate trade-offs in
prior and cost beliefs with trade-offs in error rates. The logit
function depicts error rates not in the form of probabilities but
by their corresponding log-odds. As the BET plot is motivated
by the BDF throughout, ROCs cannot be visualized, whereas
the visualization of ROCCHs accommodates to interrelate LLR
values (scores after PAV calibration). (BET plots are a contribu-
tion of this work.)
• Verbal scales in DET/BET plots visually summarize LLR score
and threshold values (via the ROCCH) for a more transparent
reporting on discrimination performance of error rate trade-offs.
Depending on the evaluation reporting context, these verbal
scales are interpreted and designed towards strength of evidence
or towards least-favorable decisions. (The visualization of verbal
scales on the ROCCH and the proposal of verbal scales of
least-favorable decisions are contributions of this work.)
For the purpose of recommending a few performance visualizations,
commercial scenarios might employ verbal-scaled BET plots in order
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to compare the discrimination performance of multiple systems and
NBER plots per system in order to report on calibration performance.
By contrast, forensic scenarios might employ verbal-scaled BET and
NECE plots, where system-depending NECE plots reveal the infor-
mation gain by employing a system into chains of decision inference.
For scalar metrics, (fast) analytic performance estimates might con-
sider the linearly sampled EER and Cllr, whereas reporting perfor-
mance estimates might consider the ROCCH-EER, the FNMR at a
1% FMR (FMR100) (or alike requirements), the minDCF (e.g., with
p˜i = 0.01 as of the home security system example), the DCF (e.g.,
p˜i = 0.01), Cminllr , and Cllr. To limit the metrics to a few, Cllr and C
min
llr
are the application-independent objective (as an application cannot
be known when measures are specified covering all applications).
4.6 summary
The performance assessment concepts of conventional error rate
trade-off based diagrams are interrelated with the Bayesian paradigm.
The formal notation and definition of angular operating points is funda-
mental to the major difference between two perspectives: while Fre-
quentists change thresholds by moving between error rate trade-offs,
Bayesians change thresholds by moving between LLRs that, in terms
of error rate tradoffs, correspond by changing between segments of
the ROCCH, i.e., between the angles of neighboring segments. Based
on the ROCCH, bands of LLR scores and thresholds are summariz-
able by verbal scales—verbal scales for scores are referred to as strength
of evidence and verbal scales for thresholds as least-favorable decisions.
The practicability of the BDF is promoted by the proposed guideline
on how to set and fine-tune decision policies formalized by prior and
cost beliefs: verbal scales are the basis to finding initial LLR thresh-
olds that are fine-tunable by addressing the mutability of prior and
cost ratios. To further interrelate similarities and outline differences of
both perspectives, two novel performance plots are proposed, namely
BET and NECE plots. BET plots interrelate trade-offs in prior and cost
beliefs with trade-offs in error rates, such that vertical and horizon-
tal changes on the BET plot canvas correspond to changes in LLR
thresholds whilst both axes depict Type I and Type II error rates. For
the conventional error rate based paradigm in performance assess-
ment, BET plots reveal betting odds in the latent decision subspace
that is formalized by the BDF. In contrast to BET plots, solely report-
ing on discrimination performance regarding error rates, NECE plots
report on discrimination and calibration performance regarding infor-
mation gains that result from employing a system to decision making.
As the default information provided by a coin tossing system varies
depending on the prior probability of each class, as does the empir-
ical cross-entropy of a recognition system. NECE plots visualize the
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ratio to default cross-entropy from the empirical information gain in
terms of discrimination and calibration performance. As such, one
can choose the recognition system that provides the most informa-
tion to decision making across ranges of prior class probabilities, i.e.,
across more class A or more class B environments.
For classifying performance visualization (established ones and
proposed in this work), a taxonomy is introduced. This taxonomy
provides an overview on performance visualizations following the
perspective of the BDF paradigm. Performance visualizations that
are well-established within the fields of speaker recognition, foren-
sic evaluation, and biometric standardization are put into context.
Thereby, three performance assessment concepts are identified: the
performance reporting type, which is subdivided into discrimination
and discrimination and calibration; the performance reporting scope,
which is subdivided into error rates and information gains; and the tar-
geted audience, which is subdivided into analytics and reporting.
To the following discourse, the preceding chapter served different
purposes. First, when employing Bayesian methods in machine learn-
ing of recognition systems, the same principles hold for the evalua-
tion of these recognition systems. Second, gaps are bridged between
speaker recognition, forensic evaluation, and biometrics standardiza-
tion communities. To accommodate the perspectives on performance
assessment of these communities, four figures of merit are examined
in the following part of this dissertation, primarily Cllr, Cminllr , secon-
darily EER and FMR100. Third, the contribution of this dissertation
is towards the applicability of LLRs to recognition systems from the
definition of decision requirements; from outline, design, implemen-
tation, research and development of binary decision systems to the
assessment of formalized decision requirements. When facing uncon-
strained environments, it is very helpful to formalize the performance
of speaker recognition systems (to be employed in forensic and com-
mercial application scenarios). As the degrade in the quality of envi-
ronmental conditions causes performance degrades, these degrades
are linkable to specific threshold values (no matter the design of a
recognition system). In this dissertation, quality vectors (q-vectors)
are proposed to inform on the change between environmental con-
ditions to recalibrate LLR scores and thresholds. This chapter elabo-
rated on the impact of the meaning of this recalibration on both: the
strength of evidence and the least-favorable decision being made.
5
O N T H E I N F L U E N C E O F D U R AT I O N A N D N O I S E
This chapter addresses the assessment of pre-comparison measures
for state-of-the-art speaker recognition systems facing unconstrained
acoustic environments. The acoustic feature extraction for a given
system is assumed to be fixed; the baseline system follows the
intermediate-sized vector (i-vector) paradigm with probabilistic lin-
ear discriminant analysis (PLDA) comparison. The following research
question is targeted:
Can the impact of environmental conditions in terms of
biometric distinctiveness—as voice references aggregate—
and the robustness of voice sample segmentation deci-
sions be quantified before the comparison subsystem?
Different duration and noise conditions are examined regarding
their effect to biometric voice samples and to acoustic feature extrac-
tion. Thus, this chapter provides context to the experimental study
described in the following chapter. Firstly, an estimate to pre-com-
parison information is proposed, estimating the biometric distinctive-
ness in terms of entropy. Thereby, the collision probability of sub-
jects is depicted in the i-vector feature space under different sam-
ple durations, i.e., different levels of biometric sample completeness.
Secondly, a novel measure for voice segmentation robustness is pro-
posed based on an analysis of noise impacts towards voice activity
detection (VAD), i.e., the segmentation of voice samples into speech
and non-speech. Eventually, the scope of the following research is re-
stricted towards optimal VAD in order to keep experimental analyses
comparatively fair. In contrast, by including processing artefacts that
result from this early signal processing step (the VAD) in analyses at
later stages, the argumentation of causal complexity is induced, in-
creasing the reporting complexity of the analyses. As current VAD
technology leads to different segmentation decisions by varying qual-
ity conditions (as shown in this chapter), these impacts would delude
the conclusion drawn from analyses concerning the comparison and
decision subsystems. Thus, this chapter concerns the performance de-
grade observable in the signal processing subsystem to put preceding
experiments into context. These experiments solely aim at improving
decision making by the normalization and calibration of scores that
result from a (fixed) comparison subsystem.
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5.1 biometric distinctiveness of voice samples
The security or evidence level of an automated recognition system
can be depicted in terms of the system’s contribution to decision mak-
ing for forensic or commercial applications, see section 2.4. However,
as comparisons differentiate between subjects in the feature space108,
additional information about the underlying feature space can be uti-
lized [211, 212]. Regarding the domain of comparison scores, the work
in [115] focusses on empirical cross-entropy (ECE) analysis across
different recognition systems. In contrast, the biometric information
within a given feature space is reported by measuring the relative
entropy in the feature space as the divergence between the empirical
feature distribution of one subject compared to the generalized fea-
ture space of all other subjects [211]. The benefit of this divergence
analysis is that it estimates the collision probability (when two subjects
share the same features). Exemplarily, the collision probability for
passwords is derived.
Example: Password Entropy & Collision Probability
The entropy of passwords or PINs H(string) can, in comparison, be
computed by the string length L and the number N of different
string characters that can occur [213]:
H(string) = L log2N . (5.1)
Thus, 4-digit PINs have an entropy of 13.3 bits. Compared to more
secure passwords with at least 128 bits, users need to remember
passwords of L = 17 characters (including special characters, as-
suming all printable extended ASCII codes, such that N = 224).
Furthermore, when targeting high-evidence and high-secure sys-
tems, it is valuable to know when collisions will ideally occur. This
information can be derived directly from a feature space’s entropy
H(space) as the probability pcol [42]:
pcol(space) = 2−H(space) , (5.2)
where pcol(PIN) ≈ 1× 10−4,pcol(password) ≈ 3× 10−39 for 4-digit
PINs and secure passwords, respectively.
Compared to passwords, which have no intra-variability as such,
biometric systems need to address within-subject variance as well.
Passwords require to be remembered, whereas in biometrics, features
of the biometric capture subject herself are compared to the known
and deposited reference features representing biologic and behavioral
characteristics [214].
108 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Rahim Saeidi, Christian
Rathgeb and Christoph Busch [69].
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The entropy of voice acoustic features (i-vector features) is investi-
gated. As i-vectors represent the characteristic factors of an acoustic
subspace based on sufficient statistics, the certainty of the subspace
point estimate increases by observing more data, i.e., longer speech
durations. In this section, the following hypotheses are investigated:
• The relative entropy across subjects can predict the performance
estimate in the front-end i-vector feature space, such that a pre-
liminary to the estimation of discrimination performance can be
derived for speaker recognition systems in terms of generalized
discrimination information as Cminllr .
• When examining different degradations of voice sample com-
pleteness, represented by the duration of a voice sample, the
accumulation of biometric probe information cannot only be
resembled in the score domain but also in the feature space do-
main.
• The biometric distinctiveness can be approximated by the cross-
entropy between subjects in the acoustic feature subspace. This
estimate of biometric distinctiveness is independent of the em-
ployed biometric feature extraction and comparison. As such,
insights into the (posterior) collision probability of subjects on
(acoustic) speech data are provided. A figure of merit on the
biometric distinctiveness would depict not only the information
richness of the biometric characteristic but also the difficulty of
a comparison task (when comparing across evaluation datasets
or environments), i.e., it would summarize different perspec-
tives on the expected level of security before any biometric fea-
ture extraction or comparison was conducted.
5.1.1 Feature Space Information
Estimations for biometric information were done, inter alia, by Ratha
et al. [42], Daugman [212], and Adler et al. [211]. Adler et al. also re-
fer to the biometric information as a measurement for the biometric
distinctiveness. The approaches rely on collision estimations by brute
force, estimating the number of independent bits on binarized fea-
ture vectors and the relative entropy between genuine and impostor
subspaces.
Ratha et al. [42] investigated the probability of guessing features
correctly by random feature generation (by brute force). For finger-
prints, they evaluate the total number of possible variations for K
minutiae locations, m minutiae, and d number of minutiae orienta-
tions, thereby formulating the collision probability as 1/
((
K
m
)
dm
)
,
from which entropy can be measured using Eq. (5.2). This approach
addresses the robustness of a feature space on brute force attacks
rather than a feature space’s ability to distinguish between subjects.
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Daugman [212] analyzed binary iris features in which the Ham-
ming distance is used for comparing all subjects of a database to each
other. The author relates the score distribution to a Bernoulli experi-
ment with N = µ(1− µ)/σ2 degrees-of-freedom, where µ is the ob-
served Hamming distance mean value and σ2 is the variance, respec-
tively. A feature space’s entropy is referred to as N, which represents
the amount of coin tosses needed for a feature space collision. This
method describes the unique feature space elements of a binary fea-
ture space. Relating to it, Adler et al. [211] argue that the question to
what extent biometric characteristics are distinctive needs to be addressed
more, since the distinctiveness is provided by features (from an infer-
ence process) and not by the mere number of feature space elements.
Notably, the feature space is bound to the acoustic feature extraction.
As such, the choice of other acoustic features can yield higher or lower
fidelity.109
Adler et al. [211] introduce a measurement for biometric informa-
tion that addresses the inter-subject information of features x. The
latter is measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence D(p||q) of the
intra-subject distribution p(x) and the inter-subject distribution q(x).
It represents the needed extra information (in bit) to represent p(x)
w.r.t. q(x):
D(p||q) =
∫∞
x=−∞ p(x) log2
p(x)
q(x)
dx . (5.3)
The p distribution represents a subject’s feature subspace, while the
q distribution represents the feature space of all other subjects. It is as-
sumed that p and q follow a Gaussian distribution with parameters
p(x) ∼ N(µp,Σp) and q(x) ∼ N(µq,Σq), respectively. By using the
Gaussian model, the Kullback-Leibler divergence represents a lower
bound to the estimated relative entropy and Eq. (5.3) can be formu-
lated as [211]:
D(p||q) = k(λ+ trace((Σp + T )Σ−1q − I))
with k = log2
√
e, λ = log
|Σq|
|Σp|
, T = (µp − µq)
T(µp − µq) . (5.4)
The relative subspace entropy H(p) is computed by the average
relative subject entropy. Fig. 5.1 illustrates how the Gaussian model
acts as a lower bound compared to a more sophisticated model, i.e.,
a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) over q on Gaussian-distributed
exemplary data.
In order to estimate each subject’s relative entropy significantly,
Adler et al. [211] refer to two regularization approaches:
a) Regularization for degenerated features: high-dimensional feature
spaces are usually extracted from samples, e.g., with F = 400 di-
mensions, while the analyzed database may only contain a couple
109 The term fidelity is an expression of how accurately a biometric sample represents its source
biometric characteristic [215].
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Figure 5.1: Estimating the lower bound of relative entropy by using a gener-
alizing Gaussian model compared to a more detailed GMM on
exemplary data. The single-Gaussian model estimates a lower
bound of 47.5 bits, while the GMM’s estimation is calculated by
the mean of each GMM component’s relative entropy, i.e., as the
average distance of the subspaces of subjects q1,q2 to p with
39.5 bits and 73.5 bits, respectively: 56.5 bits.
of samples per subject, e.g., Np = 10. In order to significantly esti-
mate entropy, the feature space is transformed into a G-dimensional
space by principal component analysis (PCA), where G 6 F. The PCA
is performed on the q distribution covariance by singular value de-
composition (SVD) since the q distribution is much more accurately
estimated than the p distribution, such that:
USqV
T = svd(Σq) . (5.5)
The matrices U,Sq,V are truncated to the dimension G. This is
done according to an adaptive impact threshold considering the PCA-
impact of the first element 10−10[Sq]1,1. Elements are truncated at
[Sq]j,j < 10
−10[Sq]1,1. Then, the subject’s PCA feature space covari-
ance Sp is computed by:
Sp = U
TΣpV , (5.6)
and the Kullback-Leibler divergence is restated as:
D(p||q) = k(ν+ trace(U ((Sp +St)S−1q ) − I)V
T)
with ν = log
|Sq|
|Sp|
and St = UT T V . (5.7)
b) Regularization for insufficient data: given Np samples, covariance
estimations on G > Np will lead to singular Σp and will let the en-
tropy diverge to ∞. In order to avoid ill-disposed Σp, non-diagonal
elements [Σp]i,j are set to zero at i, j > Np, e.g., on Np = 10 all non-
diagonal covariances with column or row indexes i, j > 10 are zeroed,
while the diagonal variances remain.
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5.1.2 Contribution: Analysis of Feature Space Information
This regularization scheme needs to be extended since the following
analysis requires the (covariance) matrix to be positive finite (which
covariance matrices naturally are), but the above regularization can
diminish the matrix property. Adler et al. [211] refer to a database on
which 16 samples are distributed for each subject, such that covari-
ance estimations are much more sufficient compared to the case of
varying sample amounts per subject with Np 6 10. Thus, the regular-
ization scheme was extended by:
c) Regularization for ill-conditioned PCA covariances: non-diagonal el-
ements [Σp]i,j are iteratively zeroed until Σp is positive finite.
d) Regularization for insufficient sample amount: mean and covariance
estimations need to be estimated from a proper amount of samples,
which may vary in databases. Given the properties of most databases,
the term proper is denoted in this study, such that only subjects with
at least Np = 10 samples are examined.
For analytic purposes of estimating the biometric information of
state-of-the-art speaker recognition in a duration-sensitive manner,
duration-variable p subspaces were compared with full duration q
spaces simulating the automatic recognition case, in which full refer-
ence i-vectors are compared to probe i-vectors of all duration groups,
see section 3.2.2.1.
Fig. 5.2 and Tab. 5.1 compare the relative entropy among the dura-
tion scenarios (full-versus-5/10/20/40/full) and show correlations to
the biometric and score cross-entropy performance of a correspond-
ing PLDA comparator with 400 speaker factors. The discrimination
performance is reported in terms of the equal error rate (EER), the
FNMR at a 1% FMR (FMR100), and Cminllr .
Table 5.1: Relative entropy and performance comparison of mixed gender
PLDA recognition.
Duration
group
Entropy (in bit) PLDA (400)
µ σ min max EER FMR100 Cminllr
full-5 127.2 24.0 71.5 226.6 17.0% 66.7% 0.529
full-10 124.3 28.1 65.0 254.8 8.7% 31.6% 0.296
full-20 135.5 35.3 63.2 319.0 4.1% 9.8% 0.147
full-40 155.0 43.1 71.1 421.9 2.1% 3.2% 0.078
full-full 182.1 50.0 88.7 471.6 1.7% 2.1% 0.069
In general, biometric information increases by the speech duration
conveyed in the voice sample, which results in better speaker verifi-
cation performances and lower Cminllr . This behavior is expected as i-
vectors gain more significance by duration. The standard deviation of
the subject-wise relative entropy and the maximum entropy increase.
According to the experiments in this work, it is observed that the
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of feature and score domain relative entropy along
with speaker recognition performance among the duration
groups in common recognition scenario (full versus variable du-
ration) using PLDA with 400 speaker factors on mixed gender.
lowest entropy can be estimated to be as low as 63.2 bits for short du-
ration and 88.7 bits for full segments. The exact numbers of entropy
for different system setups could be different, but it is deemed that
the trend would be consistent. For face recognition, particularly for a
feature fusion, Adler et al. [211] refer to an average of 46.9 bits. The
mean of the calculated entropy shows a minimum of 124.3 bits for the
full-10 condition—aside from intra-variability. Short speech samples
can compete with 128 bits-strong passwords in terms of feature space
entropy. The biometric information of full segments yields the highest
mean entropy value of 182.1 bits. In gender-dependent analysis, sim-
ilar results are obtained. The highest relative entropy on the female
and male subsets for full segments exceeded 300 bits and 400 bits, re-
spectively.
In order to provide more detailed information about the actual rel-
ative entropy of respective subjects, Fig. 5.3 visualizes the duration-
based accumulation of relative entropy by each subject. The relative
full-full entropy normalizes the relative entropy of all duration condi-
tions. Aside from a few outliers110 that feature more biometric in-
formation on shorter samples, the vast majority of all relative en-
tropies is within 50% to 100% of the subject-according full-full en-
tropy. Overall, the subject discrimination in terms of a subject’s rel-
110 The more acoustic features are extracted from these outlier subjects, the less dis-
tinctive their representation becomes in the light of all other subjects. As acoustic
i-vectors resemble the expected offset of acoustic features from a universal back-
ground model (UBM), the i-vector representations of these subjects get closer to
the representations of other subjects when more speech data is observed. Effectively,
acoustic i-vectors are a fixed-length audio representation applicable to many recogni-
tion tasks. By projecting acoustic i-vectors to biometric i-vectors, these outlier obser-
vations diminish—the baseline systems of preceding experiments therefore employ
linear discriminant analysis.
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Figure 5.3: Speaker subspace accumulation by duration: relative entropy is
normalized subject-wise by the according full-full entropy, the ac-
cumulation is logarithmically visualized by ratios, i.e., all full seg-
ment ratios are 1, perishing actual entropy value comparisons.
ative entropy accumulates by increasing duration. In comparison to
other duration conditions, however, relative entropy of the full-5 con-
dition is more widely distributed and partly reach full-full level. Fur-
ther, full-10/20/40 relative entropy values accumulate continuously,
while there is a gain from full-40 to full-full among the vast majority
of all subjects.
In contrast to existing literature on entropy in speaker recogni-
tion which merely focuses on the score level, e.g., [36, 115], this
work emphasizes on the feature level. It is demonstrated that cur-
rent speaker recognition feature spaces reach the relative entropy
level of 128 bits-strong passwords already at 20 s of speech, where
the recognition performance is acceptable. The generalized colli-
sion probability of i-vector based speaker recognition can be esti-
mated as pcol(voice127.2 bits) ≈ 5 × 10−39 for short samples and as
pcol(voice182.1 bits) ≈ 2× 10−55 for long samples. As such, automated
speaker recognition is a viable instrument for forensic investigations.
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From an industrial perspective, voice is found to be a suitable biomet-
ric characteristic for user-friendly high-security commercial authenti-
cation mechanisms, such as e-banking. Concerning i-vectors as latent
variables which are estimated alongside their uncertainty, one may, as
an alternative to the covariance regularization, directly use the preci-
sion of the i-vector extraction process. Further gains are expected by
fusing i-vectors stemming from different speech signal features.
5.2 analysis on the segmentation of voice samples
The segmentation of voice samples into frames of speech and non-
speech is referred to as voice activity detection (VAD). Based on VAD-
selected acoustic features, biometric features are extracted and com-
pared. The decision robustness of VAD segmentation is fundamental
to the performance of a speaker recognition system. Stable segmenta-
tion decisions are important to the reliability of biometric systems in
unconstrained environments, such as in mobile banking using voice
recognition or automated forensic speaker recognition.
In this section111, the decision robustness of VAD algorithms is
examined targeting mobile telephone data and concerning different
noise environments, particularly white, pink, car, and babble noise.
White and pink noise represent random channel effects and natu-
ral environment backgrounds, respectively. As the noise level is de-
picted in terms of an signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), i.e., comparatively
reflecting the energy levels of speech and noise, conventional energy-
based VAD algorithms may be prone to unconstrained acoustic envi-
ronments. Thereby, the energy accumulates over all frequencies, gen-
eralizing the information contained in a signal. In this section, the
following hypotheses are investigated:
• Energy based VADs with fixed decision thresholds are prone to
low-SNR levels, especially when assuming high-SNR (speech)
signals, causing instable VAD decisions, where more robust
VAD schemes should benefit from sample adaptive thresholds
of rather detailed frequency analyses.
• Preliminary to the estimation of discrimination performance for
voice biometric systems, e.g., by the EER, FMR100 or Cminllr , a
measure for decision robustness of VAD algorithms can aid the
selection of VAD algorithms when seeking stable voice sample
segmentations and when unconstrained acoustic environments
are targeted.
111 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Reiner Bamberger and
Christoph Busch [68], which emerged from the collaboration with Reiner over his
master’s thesis [216]. The presented analysis motivates to assume perfect VAD recog-
nition for further research studies of this dissertation, such that depending experi-
mental results can be compared fairly.
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5.2.1 Overview: Voice Activity Detection Algorithms
VAD algorithms are introduced in the field of automatic speech recog-
nition (ASR): in order to recognize the verbalized text with less com-
putational effort, speech is segmented into relevant parts, i.e., words
by excluding silence, noise, and non-speech sounds. Therefore, VADs
are conventionally designed, such that speech is not clipped and non-
speech is not falsely segmented as speech.
In this study, emphasis is put on the ITU recommendation P.56
[217]112, the Voicebox VAD (VBX) [218–220], the simple real-time VAD
(SRT) [221], the low-complexity variable framerate VAD (VFR) [222], the
practical, self-adaptive VAD (PSA) [223], and the unsupervised GMM-
based VAD (USG) [224], for which an extension is proposed, and the
most dominant frequency component unsupervised GMM (MUG), incor-
porating features from the simple real-time VAD approach.
5.2.1.1 ITU Recommendation P.56
ITU P.56 [217] contains a VAD for telephone speech transmission
quality in real-time applications. P.56 is a multi-stage VAD. Firstly, a
two-stage exponential averaging on the rectified signal values is per-
formed. Secondly, initial VAD decisions are made by fixed threshold
comparison. Thereby, frames are processed in a geometric progres-
sion scheme with accumulative activity and hangover counters. The
P.56 hangover scheme delays speech to non-speech decisions by 0.2 s,
preserving low-energy speech at the end of utterances. Thirdly, activ-
ity levels of frames are estimated based on activity counters, which
are finally compared to a sample-adaptive threshold derived from the
long-term energy and a 15.9dB margin.
5.2.1.2 Vocebox VAD
The Voicebox VAD [218] is a first-order Markov process modeling
of speech with minimum statistic noise estimation. It extends the
VAD of [219] by conducting a frame-based log-likelihood ratio (LLR)
decision for speech and non-speech propositions examining a-pos-
teriori SNRs estimates based on the power spectrum after discrete
Fourier transform (DFT). The noise spectrum is estimated using min-
imum statistics noise estimation (MSNE) [220] instead of the min-
imum mean-square error (MMSE) estimator. Thereby, spectral min-
ima are tracked in each frequency band without any speech or non-
speech assumptions. The power spectral density (psd) estimation is
smoothed by a conditional mean square error estimator. A-priori and
a-posteriori SNRs are computed for each frequency band w.r.t. the
variance of the smoothed and bias-compensated psd estimation. A
112 P.56 (03/93) is succeeded by P.56 (12/11) with changes in annexes only. This work
refers to the P.56 (03/93) Voicebox implementation [218].
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Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based hangover scheme is conducted,
making decisions for current states also dependent on previous obser-
vations. Speech decisions are conducted on a speech posterior proba-
bility threshold of 70%. Contrary to conventional hangover schemes,
delaying transitions in speech to non-speech decisions, the property
of strong correlations in consecutive occurrences of speech frames is
modeled explicitly by the VBX VAD [219].
5.2.1.3 Simple Real-Time VAD
Targeting a simple, efficient, and robust algorithm, [221] propose an
easy-to-implement and low-complexity VAD for real-time applica-
tions based on short term features, i.e., the short-term energy, the
spectral flatness measurement (SFM, in dB), and the most dominant
frequency component (MDFC), where SFM represents the dB-domain
ratio of the geometric mean to the arithmetic mean of the speech
spectrum and MDFC represents the frequency corresponding to the
maximum spectral value. In [221], thresholds are estimated for each
VAD feature based on the minimum feature values within the first
30 frames, assuming them to partially contain non-speech sequences.
SRT decides on speech if one of the following votes is positive: short-
term energies surpass the minEnergy by an adaptive margin, MDFC
surpasses the minMDFC by 185 frequencies, or SFMs surpass the
minSFM by 5, i.e., the geometric spectral mean is favored over the
arithmetic spectral mean by a factor of
√
10. Energy minima Emin esti-
mates a frame-wise increase by the number of consecutively observed
non-speech frames, such that an adaptive threshold is computed as
Ethres = 40 log(Emin). SRT examines frames of 10ms.
5.2.1.4 Low-Complexity Variable Framerate VAD
In contrast to the conventional frame window and hop size setups
in speech processing (25ms and 10ms) assuming speech signals to
have stationary behavior in short time segments, VFR VAD [222]
assigns higher frame rates to fast changing and lower frame rates
to rather steady events, e.g., consonants versus vowels or silence.
Thereby, frames are examined with a frame shift of 100Hz (1ms
hops), emphasizing on reliable regions in noisy speech. VAD de-
cisions are carried out on a-posteriori SNR estimated distances of
consecutive frames: if accumulated distances of non-speech frames
surpass an frame-adaptive threshold, frame segments are denoted as
speech. VFR preserves sigmoidal turning points between 15dB and
20dB. In the online available source code to [222], the VFR VAD de-
cision is outvoted if the posterior probability of a frame being voiced
is larger than 25% by utilizing the Voicebox pitch tracker [218].
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5.2.1.5 Practical Self-Adaptive VAD
Targeting speaker recognition evaluations (SREs) of the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Kinnunen and Ra-
jan [223] propose an unsupervised, self-adaptive, and practical VAD
based on mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) ψt of frame
t and frame energies. Speech signals are denoised and enhanced
by spectral substractions in magnitude domain, power domain, and
Wiener filtering utilizing MSNE for noise tracking. MFCCs of the
frames associated to 10% of the lowest and highest clean energy
values are utilized in order to train two GMMs representing speech
λspeech and non-speech λnon-speech, respectively, which take the form of
(cf. Eq. (2.63)):
Pr(ψt |λ
speech,non-speech) =
C∑
c=1
wc N (ψt |µc,Σc) (5.8)
with mixture weights wc, component means µc, and covariances Σc,
where λspeech,λnon-speech have the same number of components C for
simplicity. GMMs are trained using k-means in order to retain low
complexity with C = 16 codevectors (components), solely represent-
ing 12 static MFCCs (including the zeroth coefficient) without any
normalizations nor deltas. VAD decisions are conducted within the
Bayesian decision framework (BDF) assuming equal priors and costs,
such that the LLR computation reduces to the nearest-neighbor rule,
i.e., to a vector quantization based approach:
min
c
‖ψt − µspeechc ‖2 6 min
c
‖ψt − µnon-speechc ‖2 , (5.9)
where a simple energy-based VAD decision logE(t) > −75dB needs
to hold as well in order to consider a frame as speech.
5.2.1.6 Unsupervised GMM-based VAD
In [224], an unsupervised GMM based VAD based on a similar de-
sign to the PSA VAD is proposed [223], where VAD decision making
is conducted by LLR and energy decisions and followed by an fi-
nite state machine (FSM) based hangover scheme. Here, rastamat [174]
is used for computing energy values. The energy decisions are con-
ducted after smoothing logE(t) values by a 9-frame sliding window
moving average filter, where the energy threshold ηE is the average
of the values of the 20% and 80% quantiles of sorted logE(t) values.
Similarly, the sample-adaptive LLR threshold ηLLR is derived from a
23-frame smoothing. As in the PSA VAD [223], both speech votes are
required here for considering a frame as speech. Finally, a hangover
scheme is applied in two distinct ways to avoid the loss of speech
segments that might be incorrectly labelled preliminary as acoustic
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noise: transitions from non-speech to speech states are delayed. In or-
der not to move into the speech state due to false alarms, all frames
in the transition phase need to indicate speech, and transitions from
speech to non-speech states are delayed, i.e., if noise is indicated, an-
other transition phase prevents speech misses. Motivated by [225],
this work refers to 3 and 8 frame states for false alarm and missing
VAD transition phases, respectively.
5.2.1.7 MDFC Extension to Unsupervised GMM VAD
GMM-based VADs are motivated by the poor performance of energy-
based VADs in low-SNR scenarios, e.g., speech and noise energies
are equal on 0dB SNR, effectively leading to random VAD deci-
sions. Since USG GMMs are self-adaptive to the current speech sam-
ple, energy-based selection may result in inadequate-representative
training segments, especially in the presence of high-energy noise
impulses, such as closing doors or moving nearby objects.113 Thus,
the use of the lowest and highest MDFC instead of energy values
is proposed here for initializing speech and non-speech GMMs, re-
spectively. MDFC values are smoothed by a 3-frame sliding window
moving average filter before sorting in order to exclude impulsive
short-time noises from speech GMM training. The proposed exten-
sion is referred to as MDFC-based unsupervised GMM (MUG) VAD.
5.2.2 VAD Metrics in Speech and Speaker Recognition
In speech recognition, VAD metrics represent how much verbalized
context is missed in contrast to how many false alarms occur in terms
of non-speech that is forwarded to ASR systems. In the beginning of
an utterance, a number of speech framesNfront-miss could be missed by
VAD. During utterances, a number of speech frames Nmid-miss could
be missed. By contrast, non-speech frames might be mislabeled as
speech frames by VAD, leading to false alarms. The number of false
alarms occurring directly after an utterance is Nover-fa, these are over-
hanging speech labels. The number of false alarms in an utterance
is Nfa. The amounts of correct speech and non-speech decisions are
Nspeech-hits,Nnon-hits. The numbers of ground-of-truth frames compris-
ing speech and non-speech are Ngot-speech, Ngot-non.
Conventional VAD metrics [225–228] employ these numbers. Thus,
they require frame-wise VAD annotated datasets. These VAD metrics
are computed as:
113 Several samples of the MOBIO database [168] comprise short-time noises at the cap-
ture start, which may occur due to, e.g., doors, chairs, or pressing a start recording
button.
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• the front-end clipping (FEC):
FEC =
Nfront-miss
Ngot-speech
, (5.10)
• the middle-speech clipping (MSC):
MSC =
Nmid-miss
Ngot-speech
, (5.11)
• the non-speech over-hang (OVER):
OVER =
Nover-fa
Ngot-non
, (5.12)
• the noise detected as speech (NDS):
NDS =
Nfa
Ngot-non
, (5.13)
• the speech, non-speech, and average hit rates
(SHR, NHR, AHR):
SHR =
Nspeech-hits
Ngot-speech
, (5.14)
NHR =
Nnon-hits
Ngot-non
= 1−NDS , (5.15)
AHR =
1
2
(SHR+NHR) . (5.16)
In speaker recognition, VAD effects are mostly reported regarding
their effect to the biometric and decision performance, e.g., in terms
of the EER, FMR100, decision cost functions (DCFs), or the goodness
of LLRs Cllr [223, 224, 229, 230]. Due to GMM and factor analysis
based architectures in state-of-the-art speaker recognition [126, 127,
130], contextual information is accumulated, i.e., VAD is as little rel-
evant as possible to reject speech segments in order to estimate suf-
ficient statistics without regard to a segment’s context, in which a
segment is falsely omitted (missed) or falsely included (false alarms).
Thus, FEC, MSC, and OVER are less relevant for the biometric VAD
performance assessment. However, these metrics remain useful for
developing VADs, such that, exemplarily, FEC and OVER reflect the
gains from a two-way hangover scheme, and MSC reflects the bene-
fits of smoothing. Furthermore, AHR equally accounts for SHR and
NHR. This is not necessarily optimal from the perspective of retaining
speech segments for discriminative biometric recognition, especially
if SHR and NHR diverge significantly.
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5.2.3 Contribution: Decision Robustness Performance
Targeting VAD performance assessment for unconstrained environ-
ments, VAD decisions shall remain stable under changing conditions
impacting sample quality, such as varying background noises stem-
ming from different sources. Since VAD decisions are binary, i.e.,
speech or non-speech, and environmental effects are conventionally
examined in certain levels or steps, such as 0dB, 5dB, . . . , 20dB and
clean (when distorting the quality of a clean database), effects on VAD
decisions under different environments can be thought of as binary
sequences, which have an arbitrary but fixed length for each voice
sample as depicted in Fig. 5.4. Given optimal-conditions, e.g., clean
and synthetic-distorted samples, each binary VAD decision sequence
stemming from distorted signals can be XOR-compared to the clean
speech signal and reported in terms of the average Hamming dis-
tance d depicting the conditional VAD decision error rate for one
sample. In order to report VAD decision robustness, the database-
average conditional VAD decision error µd¯ (VDE) is proposed. Other
statistic moments, such as variance, skewness, and kurtosis, can aid
an d-distributional summary and VAD development processes but
are not included in further steps for the sake of easier tractability.
Clean 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
20dB 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 d = 116
15dB 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 d = 316
10dB 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 d = 516
5dB 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 d = 816
0dB 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 d = 1616
Condition VAD decision examples on 16 segments
Figure 5.4: VAD decision example under changing environmental condi-
tions with segment-wise VAD votes as speech (1) and non-speech
(0), where clean denotes the original sample of good quality.
Experiments are carried out on the 2013 MOBIO SRE task [37], see
section 3.2.1. Analyses are conducted regarding the VAD decision ro-
bustness in noisy conditions of different SNR levels and the coher-
ence of VAD metrics in terms of sensitivity to the evaluation criteria.
The performance of speaker recognition systems using VADs is com-
pared in Tab. 5.2. Here, discrimination performance is reported in
terms of the EER, the FMR100, and Cminllr . VFR outperforms the other
algorithms in EER and Cminllr , while the proposed MUG VAD yields a
better FMR100 performance. The performance gain of systems to no
VAD segmentation applied is moderate since the MOBIO task com-
prises rather prompted speech instead of phone calls, i.e., samples are
pre-segmented due to the prompted scenario.
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Table 5.2: VAD algorithm performance comparison to no VAD applied by
EER, FMR100, and Cminllr on male speaker subset of the MOBIO
dev-set on clean condition.
VAD P.56 VBX SRT VFR PSA USG MUG no VAD
EER (in %) 11.0 10.9 12.2 10.2 10.9 11.0 10.7 11.9
FMR100 (in %) 42.4 41.1 45.9 40.0 43.7 41.7 39.6 46.7
Cminllr 0.377 0.376 0.376 0.355 0.373 0.377 0.361 0.407
5.2.3.1 VAD Decision Robustness
In order to analyze the impact of noise conditions (source types and
SNR levels) to VAD and biometric recognition performance, pink,
white, babble, and street noise are examined in 0dB, 5dB, . . . , 20dB
SNR levels using the Matlab implementations of [218, 231, 232]. Pink
noise is described to be ubiquitous in many biological and physi-
cal systems [233]. White (Gaussian) noise represents random signals.
Babble noise is conducted utilizing all speakers of the MOBIO back-
ground set with random sample selection. Street noise stems from the
QUT-NOISE-TIMIT corpus [234], which is explicitly designed for the
purpose of evaluating VAD performance.
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Figure 5.5: VAD decision robustness carried out under noisy samples com-
pared to clean samples on dev-set by the proposed VDE met-
ric µd¯.
Fig. 5.5 depicts the robustness of VAD algorithms regarding the
proposed VDE metric, representing the average rate of misconducted
VAD segmentation votes. For the majority of VAD algorithms, speech
decisions on 15dB and 20dB conditions are similarly to the clean
condition. On 0dB and 5dB, SRT yields the most stable decisions on
white, babble, and car noise, and MUG yields the most stable deci-
sions on pink noise. Regarding 10dB to 20dB, VFR outperforms other
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VADs on pink, white, and street noises, while for babble noise, USG
and SRT yield more stable VAD decisions on high-SNRs and 10dB,
respectively. Examining SRE-related VADs, the proposed MUG VAD
outperforms PSA and USG on pink, white, and street noise in 0dB
to 15dB conditions, and on 20dB pink and white noise. In other con-
ditions, USG outperformed PSA. On condition-averaged VDE, MUG
yields 0.120, USG 0.129, and PSA 0.130, whereas VFR and SRT yield
0.113 and 0.157, respectively.
5.2.3.2 Sensitivity Coherence: VAD to Biometric Recognition Metrics
Sensitivity analyses are conducted in order to provide insights into
coherence of the proposed VDE metric to biometric and forensic per-
formance. For tractability purposes, noise conditions are pooled by
SNR level and the SNR of clean samples is assumed to be 25dB.
Fig. 5.6 depicts the SNR sensitivity of the SRT, VFR, USG, and MUG
algorithms. SRT achieves low sensitivity regarding EER and FMR100,
even though SRT yields the highest EER and FMR100 results among
all examined VADs, cf. Tab. 5.2. In terms of the proposed VDE metric
and FMR100, VFR, USG, and MUG VADs perform similarly. Regard-
ing Cminllr and EER, however, USG and MUG result in a more stable
performance than VFR, especially in the low-SNR region with aver-
age EER sensitivity of 0.76% and 0.80% in EER per 1dB SNR.
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Figure 5.6: Sensitivity of VAD performances to different SNR levels of SRT,
VFR, USG, and MUG approaches by (a) VDE, (b) Cminllr , (c) EER,
(d) FMR100.
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VADs are designed for certain applications and target specific envi-
ronmental constraints, such that none of the examined algorithms is
able to outperform other approaches in each analysis. NIST SRE mo-
tivated VADs yield more stable segmentation decisions in high-SNR
conditions than conventional VADs. However, examining low-SNR
conditions, conventional and SRE VADs achieve good performance,
particularly the VFR, PSA, USG, and MUG algorithms. For the VFR
approach, incoherent sensitivity bumps are observed at 5dB. This
can be attributed to its variable frame rate segmentation—under the
presence of noise, ideally shorter frames for plosives might be longer
as intended, considering short frame lengths for high-quality speech
data (an incoherence). Regarding the sensitivity of evaluation criteria,
the USG and MUG algorithms yield the least SNR-sensitive results,
which is coherent to the conducted VAD decision sensitivity analysis.
Moreover, the proposed MUG outperforms other SRE VADs by uti-
lizing beneficial MDFC-features from conventional VADs. The SRT
and VFR algorithms partially achieve gains by employing SFM, a-
posteriori SNR, and pitch features as features—especially in white,
babble, and car noise conditions with low-SNR.
The proposed VDE metric reveals the stability of VAD segmenta-
tion decisions under different noise conditions. In contrast to well-
established metrics in ASR, the proposed metric examines the aver-
age amount of inconsistent VAD decisions on changing environmen-
tal conditions, emphasizing on where speech frames are falsely recog-
nized. By conducting the proposed analyses approach for examining
the decision robustness and evaluation criteria sensitivity of VADs,
coherent decisions can be made regarding the applicability of VAD
segmentation algorithms to speaker recognition tasks. The proposed
metric has limitations regarding the location of false segmentation de-
cisions, which can be examined by conventional VAD metrics. How-
ever, decision robustness is more valuable to state-of-the-art speaker
recognition methods, in which speech frame statistics are accumu-
lated, i.e., the location of VAD errors remain without impact, whereas
unstable VAD decisions lead to different frame samplings forwarded
to acoustic and biometric feature extraction. Contrary to conventional
VAD metrics, frame-wise annotation voice samples are not required
in order to measure VAD performance. Furthermore, the proposed
MUG-extension of the USG approach yields promising gains, which
are expected to be more extended by incorporating SFM, a-posteriori
SNR, and pitch features into the VAD decision process.
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5.3 summary
In this chapter, systems of fixed acoustic feature extraction were exam-
ined in unconstrained environments, exemplarily depicting impacts
of duration or noise to the biometric distinctiveness and the segmen-
tation of voice samples.
Examining the biometric distinctiveness, a pre-comparison perfor-
mance measure was introduced to speaker recognition: the relative
entropy between subjects provided a bound-estimate to the subject
collision probability in the i-vector feature space. Analyzing the bio-
metric information among different voice sample durations, the ac-
cumulation of voice references was visualized regarding the diver-
gence between subjects rather than by the sample completeness it-
self. Insights into the difficulty of the biometric comparison task were
therefore gained before an evaluation of the actual recognition perfor-
mance was conducted. Likewise, different acoustic features could be
compared regarding the provided biometric information as well as
the comparability among features across different biometric modali-
ties and to other authentication features. The correlation between rel-
ative entropy of the feature space and the cross-entropy comparison
performance proofed the soundness of the proposed figure of merit.
Investigating the segmentation of voice samples, the VAD decision
robustness was proposed and another pre-comparison performance
measure to speaker recognition provided. Traditional energy-based
VADs select audio frames randomly on low-SNR, whereas sample
adaptive VADs examining more detailed spectral characteristics pro-
vide higher reliability. In order to sustain rather reliable VADs in
terms of predictability, the analysis of the sensitivity of performance
criteria is proposed—the sensitivity of the proposed decision robust-
ness measure as well as of the sensitivity of, e.g., Cminllr . Even by se-
lecting VAD methods of coherent sensitivity in their performance
changes, their decision robustness degrades to the extent that further
studies in this dissertation assume oracle (perfect prediction) VAD,
leaving research towards robust VADs for future work.

6
E N H A N C I N G D E C I S I O N I N F O R M AT I O N
This chapter depicts the research progress on unconstrained acoustic
environments, targeting the following research question:
Can quality mismatches be estimated at pre-comparison
stages and aid the Bayesian identity inference in discrimi-
nation and calibration performance?
Mutual duration and noise conditions are therefore examined on
the assumption of oracle (perfect) voice activity detection (VAD) seg-
mentation: no matter the signal distortion, speech/non-speech segmen-
tation decisions are ideal. The baseline system used in this chapter
is a state-of-the-art speaker recognition system extracting standard
intermediate-sized vectors (i-vectors) (model representations of the
acoustic and the biometric features), which are compared by proba-
bilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA), see section 2.5. PLDA is
a generative model that is not only capable of discriminating i-vector
pairs regarding their log-likelihood ratio (LLR) strength of evidence,
but also of generating i-vector pairs of desired LLRs—trained to in-
fer biometric identities by decomposing i-vectors into biometric and
non-biometric components. Thereby, within-class and between-class
variability is estimated in the latent subspace: evidence is reported
in the form of LLRs based on the inferred similarity and dissimilar-
ity likelihoods rather than reported as scores directly computed from
observed features.
The system is trained in a condition pooled fashion, see chapter 3.
The duration and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions are thus de-
rived by truncation and synthetic noise degradation.114 The duration
and SNR conditions are sampled in a log-linear fashion, motivated
by performance loss observations in related work [32, 167]. In con-
trast to the systems of [32, 167], the baseline system of this disser-
tation employs a more noise robust extraction of mel-frequency cep-
stral coefficient (MFCC) features by using maximum-likelihood short-
time spectral amplitude [193] (noise suppression filtering) and stabilized
weighted linear prediction [192] (robust spectrum estimation). For the
sake of easier tractability, duration and noise levels are jointly de-
picted as quality aspects. Here, duration resembles a proxy measure
to the completeness of voice samples (the more sufficient statistics are
accumulated, the better the discrimination performance) and noise
114 The Lombard effect (in order to enhance audibility, speakers increase their vocal effort
in the presence of noise) and other speech signal degradation, such as reverberation,
are not assessed as this would require real world data, that is not feasible in the
experimental setup.
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types (AC/CROWD for non-biometric/biometric noise). SNR levels
resemble proxy measures to the signal disturbance.
Resulting scores are well-calibrated (LLRs) if the PLDA model as-
sumptions hold. As PLDA is not trained with formalized prior qual-
ity probabilities, the proportion of conditions during training needs
to predict the condition proportion during evaluation. By narrowing
experimental analyses to single quality conditions, these assumptions
are violated115, but the requirement of speaker recognition systems
to report evidence for good decision making persists. In this disserta-
tion, the biometric system is assumed to be fixed in terms of acous-
tic and biometric feature extraction as well as biometric comparison.
Neither the i-vector nor the PLDA comparator are changeable by a
biometric system owner, operator and provider (solely vendors can
adapt subsystems).
To retain discrimination performance, this chapter proposes a novel
score normalization method, adaptive to quality. To retain calibra-
tion performance, it proposes a novel score calibration method, also
adaptive to quality. For both, this chapter proposes quality vectors
(q-vectors) that are the basis to either approach. Finally, for the pur-
pose of investigating on the gains and limitations of these q-vectors,
analyses are conducted employing deep learning to get insights into
the possible gains and limitations of the proposed q-vectors in score
normalization.
6.1 score normalization : quality adaptive thresholds
Score normalization is an effective tool that accounts for the mismatch
of reference and probe conditions [163, 164, 235]. Targeting uncon-
strained acoustic environments, the performance of speaker recogni-
tion systems degrades under noisier and shorter duration conditions
(Fig. 3.1 and chapter 5), among other signal effects. When dealing
with real-life conditions, where the quality of audio recordings in
test phase does not match enrolment utterance(s) of speakers, a vast
broadness of environmental constraints needs to be covered.
Related work emphasizes transfer learning approaches, such as
inter-dataset compensation [236] and training comparators in a joint
condition (condition pooled) fashion [194, 237]. Acoustic and biomet-
ric feature extractors are trained on rather optimal conditions and
are then put to recognition tasks on out-domain data. Lately, the
robustness of state-of-the-art speaker recognition systems has been
addressed regarding feature extractors [238–241], uncertainty-aware
115 As illustrated in Fig. 3.1 for high quality conditions, discrimination performance is
high and the calibration loss is neglectable (despite appearing relatively large in the
log-log performance plot). For poorer quality conditions, however, discrimination
and calibration losses decrease dramatically: the i-vector representation precision
shrinks due to the insufficient accumulation (information aggregation and estima-
tion) of the underlying sufficient statistics.
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comparators [137, 151] as well as score normalization and calibration
schemes employing quality metrics [38, 70, 166, 242].
In this study116, emphasis is put on the quality adaptive score nor-
malization of systems trained in a condition pooled fashion. Rather
than targeting a limited number of constrained conditions, such as
the unified audio characterization (UAC) approach in [38], this work
targets a host of unconstrained conditions. Motivated by the UAC ap-
proach [38], q-vectors are proposed in this dissertation: quality esti-
mates are predicted by analyzing (non-biometric) changes in acous-
tic i-vector features. These quality estimates inform on the posterior
probability of each condition. As comparators are trained in a condi-
tion pooled fashion, quality estimates are intended to adaptively re-
bias scores (scores that are LLRs in pooled quality conditions but are
uncalibrated in single conditions as the comparator is uninformed
about present conditions) to the right extent to improve the perfor-
mance in particular conditions.
In this dissertation, quality is not interpreted as a measure of biomet-
ric utility but as distinguishing (acoustic) characteristics of speech. For the
former, low quality implies limited biometric information. In this case,
all LLRs should reduce towards zero (evidence). For the latter, dis-
tinguishing characteristics are, e.g., the duration of speech, noise types
afflicting speech, and the SNR level of that noise. Low quality implies
low values of, e.g., duration and SNR.
−4 −3 −2 −1 ±0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Comparison score,
low quality
score: +3
Normalized
score
LLR: −6
Adaptive normalization and/or calibration:
re-biasing the LLR score = +3 by −9
due to insufficient quality
B A
Figure 6.1: Concept: re-biasing thresholds depending on the quality of sam-
ples involved in comparison; the illustration also depicts the ver-
bal scale of conclusion, cf. section 4.2: if a sample’s quality is
insufficient, the related comparison score’s value is adjusted de-
pending on the score normalization model.
Score normalization is placed at the transition from comparison to
decision subsystems (sections 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5). There, the biometric
information on the reference – probe comparison (the evidence) is ag-
gregated to a scalar representation, which is changeable at the end
of the comparison subsystem as well as at the start of the decision
subsystem. As the biometric evidence is summarized by a score, the
comprised biometric information cannot be further enhanced by em-
ploying quality estimates. By using quality estimates, however, the in-
116 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Rahim Saeidi, Christian
Rathgeb and Christoph Busch [70].
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formation divergence between operational and training data is quan-
tifiable, such that scores are jointly normalizable for each condition.
The underlying idea is exemplarily illustrated in Fig. 6.1: a score that
favors proposition A is normalized to a score favoring proposition B
(to an LLR), adjusting the evidence reported by a score. Before cal-
ibration, this score might have been trained as an LLR but is badly
calibrated in the light of condition quality assumptions, diverging be-
tween the assessment of a probe and the training of the signal process-
ing and comparator subsystems. To compensate this gap, the compar-
ison subsystem is adapted based on quality estimates. Alternatively
to this perspective (on augmenting the comparison subsystem), one
might argue that thresholds are adapted at the decision subsystem,
depending on each comparison trial: prior and cost beliefs are ad-
justed between decision policies depending on the quality divergence
underlying these policies.
The investigation outlined in this chapter has two goals: to serve
as an example on how to examine the performance of formalized
decision making of systems operating in the light of unconstrained
environments and as a study on the biometric modality voice. There-
fore, this research focuses solely on duration (sample completeness)
and on two noise types, i.e., noise stemming from air conditioning
systems (AC) mimicking office noise and noise stemming from mul-
tiple speakers in the background, conventionally referred to as bab-
ble or crowd noise (CROWD). As depicted in section 3.2.2.2, noise is
added, which is why the Lombard effect (among other effects) is not
addressed in this work. Additional data utilized in score normaliza-
tion, i.e., the cohort data (section 2.5), is shortened and degraded by
noise as well, resulting in multiple sets of the original cohort data,
(section 3.2.2.2). For each (cohort) i-vector, a q-vector is assigned.
In this section, three hypotheses are investigated: i) motivated by
the UAC approach, q-vectors should be capable of significantly clas-
sifying quality conditions; ii) q-vectors are beneficial for correlating
acoustic features, i.e., i-vectors across different quality conditions; and
iii) the discrimination performance of conventional score normaliza-
tion techniques is expandable by employing information about the
q-vector similarity.
6.1.1 Unified Audio Characterization Motivated Quality Vectors
In order to establish an automated mechanism for estimating reliable
audio quality metrics, a probabilistic scheme based on the UAC ap-
proach [38] is proposed to yield posterior probabilities for each condi-
tion. For the purpose of estimating condition posteriors, single mul-
tivariate Gaussian models Λc ∼ N(µc,Σ), c = 1, . . . , 55 are trained in
acoustic i-vector space. The models have condition-dependent mean
vectors µc and share a full covariance matrix Σ. Class-dependent
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means are estimated using i-vectors from respective quality condi-
tions and Σ is estimated by pooling all the i-vectors. The resulting
vector of condition posterior probabilities117 for an i-vector i is a q-
vector q, and its elements q(c) are the following posteriors:
q(c) = Pr(Λc | i | ) =
Pr(i |Λc)∑55
c=1 Pr(i |Λc)
. (6.1)
All voice sample representations (references, probes, cohorts) are ex-
tended to a pair of an i-vector and a corresponding q-vector.
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Figure 6.2: Condition confusion matrix on q-vectors for two condition
classifiers—likewise condition linkers when taking the perspective
of the opposing recognition task to classification.
Fig. 6.2 depicts two confusion matrices among all conditions.
Tab. 3.4 defines the condition indices. Conditions 31 to 40 comprise
the highest signal degradation in terms of SNR and the CROWD
noise type and the shortest durations with 5 s and 10 s. These con-
ditions are more likely to be confused with other ones as they re-
late from the perspective of the signal processing subsystem. For the
maximum posterior condition classifier, misclassification rates up to
51% are observed. The vast majority of conditions are far more well-
classified, i.e., with misclassification rates less than 20% and correct
classification rates up to 99.6%. On AC and CROWD noises, only 10%
of 40 s/noisy conditions are recognized as their full/noisy condition
equivalents have similar SNR levels. By contrast, a cosine distance
similarity classifier operates symmetrically and provides more cross-
condition similarities, i.e., more condition misclassifications, which is
good for linking conditions with another despite being non-ideal for
condition classification. Using the cosine similarity, q-vectors of dif-
ferent conditions are linkable since the cosine operator is a weaker
condition classifier than the maximum posterior.
117 Equal prior probabilities are assumed. If the likelihoods of each environmental con-
dition to occur are known, one may introduce different priors for each condition.
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6.1.2 Analysis: i-vector Pool Mean Shift
In order to measure i-vector property changes by signal degradation,
i-vector condition mean values are examined, raising the question
whether cross-condition i-vectors share the same mean value or not.
In other words, are i-vectors of different conditions stemming from
the same population, such that they should be treated as samplings
from the same condition cluster, or not? Contrary to previous work
[235], where i-vectors are tested element-wise for shared mean di-
mensions by the Student t-test, this work considers i-vector space
mean values among different conditions. Therefore, the generalized,
multivariate Student t-test is used, namely the Hotelling’s T-squared
statistic [243, 244]. In the according statistical test for population-in-
dependent means, the null hypothesis states that i-vectors share the
same mean value among conditions, whereas the alternative hypothe-
sis states that i-vector mean values differ amongst conditions. Follow-
ing the q-vector modeling, equal covariances are assumed. The test
value of the generalized Student’s t-test t2 uses the averaged scatter
of both populations W and is defined as:
t2 =
nx ny
nx +ny
(x¯− y¯)TW−1 (x¯− y¯)
with W =
∑nx
i=1 (xi − x¯) (xi − x¯)
T +
∑ny
i=1 (yi − y¯) (yi − y¯)
T
nx +ny − 2
,
x¯ =
∑nx
i=1 xi
nx
, y¯ =
∑ny
i=1 yi
ny
, (6.2)
where nx,ny are the number of observations on D-multivariate data
sets x and y, respectively. For examining two conditions, the terms x
and y resemble the acoustic i-vectors extracted from each condition.
In this experimental setup, D equals 200. P-values are estimated by
the cumulative distribution function F of χ2 distributions [243, 244]:
t2 ∼ χ2D , s.t.: p = 1− Fχ2D(t
2) . (6.3)
Fig. 6.3 illustrates observed test values between all 55 conditions;
p-values will result either as exactly one on χ2 scores of zero or as p-
values lower than 10−13 ≈ 0 indicating high significance. Only same-
condition tests result in zero χ2 scores. Hence, all cross-condition
mean shifts are highly significant. Therefore, the q-vector elements
are indicated to be statistically independent. The underlying model
assumes a full, shared, pooled covariance nevertheless. Thus, q-vector
similarities are expressible in terms of probabilistic divergence and
Euclidean distance, e.g., employing the cosine distance similarity.
In other words, the proposed q-vectors are capable of classifying
sample quality conditions.118 However, the utilization of condition
118 As such, q-vectors might be beneficial for the ISO/IEC project family 29794 on bio-
metric sample quality. Particularly, a quality score for voice data could be derived (a
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Figure 6.3: Multi-variate Student’s t-test: i-vector mean value similarity
among conditions.
classification for the purpose of selecting rather suitable subsystems
introduces binning errors [25], which increase the complexity of sys-
tem evaluation but mainly decrease the information capacity pro-
vided by the original evaluation database to a mere subset. The more
conditions are targeted, the lower the average expected information
capacity for each condition, i.e., by binning evaluation data, perfor-
mance estimation is expected to be less accurate. In this study, q-
vectors are utilized as quality estimates for score normalization and
calibration purposes in a holistic fashion.
6.1.3 Contribution: Unconstrained Cohort based Score Normalization
Conventionally, score normalization in speaker recognition examines
the distribution of comparison independent cohort data in order to
project a comparison score into a zero-mean and unit variance do-
main. For the sake of robustness and in order to estimate normal-
ization parameters from a non-skewed Gaussian distribution without
tails, the top-n cohort scores are selected.
Contrary to the conventional AS-norm, cf. section 2.5.6, a quality
based cohort pre-selection is encouraged: sample q-vectors are de-
rived from condition posterior probabilities. Probe-alike cohort rep-
resentations are determined by the minimum (symmetric) Kullback-
Leibler divergence. It is hence possible to approximate condition-
matched cohort sets. Thereby, the theoretical framework on using
quality measures [245] is extended by the score normalization stage.
Condition-matching cohort selection schemes are expected to not
only normalize false matches on references and false non-matches
on probes, but also to encounter condition-depending signal degra-
dation.
While conditions are classifiable by the maximum posterior proba-
bility, the cohort selection requires a similarity metric to find nearby
cohort voice samples in the form of q-vectors. Inspired by [246],
potential part 13 of the 29794 family). More signal aspects than duration and SNR
need to be investigated.
176 enhancing decision information
the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence DsymKL of two q-vectors
qa,qb is proposed here for pre-selecting cohorts:
DsymKL(qa||qb) =
1
2
55∑
c=1
qa(c) log
qa(c)
qb(c)
+qb(c) log
qb(c)
qa(c)
. (6.4)
The closest top-k cohort q-vectors are selected by minDsymKL.
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Figure 6.4: Cminllr and EER comparison of conventional AS-norm to oracle
cohorts and the proposed pre-selection by q-vectors in extreme
conditions.
Aiming at mutual high-degradation conditions, Fig. 6.4 compares
AS-norms by SNR levels on 10 s/CROWD and by duration groups
on CROWD-0dB. The proposed cohort selection significantly out-
performs all other systems in Cminllr and equal error rate (EER), in-
cluding the oracle cohort selection of earlier work [235], proving the
soundness of quality based cohort selection. Taking information of
other comparisons into account, AS-norm can compensate subject
and condition-dependent variances on score domain. Examining Cllr
performance, the unconstrained AS-norm outperforms the baseline
(and the conventional AS-norm) among the vast majority of condi-
tions with relative gains up to 8.2% in Cminllr , 15.9% in EER, and 23.4%
in FNMR at a 1% FMR (FMR100). The cohort size in terms of top-
n selection size, however, has no impact on these metrics, making a
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cohort size of 50 interesting for least-effort concerns. A cohort selec-
tion scheme is examined seeking reference-alike cohorts R and probe-
alike cohorts P. However, no sufficient gains to the conventional AS-
norm are observed, confirming the proposed unconstrained AS-norm
approach.
Fig. 6.5 illustrates which conditions and cohort subjects are consid-
ered in pre-selection: cohorts having similar noise source, duration,
and SNR level are favored, while the vast majority of other conditions
is not considered even in a single cohort speaker. The most cohort rep-
resentations are selected from conditions 36 to 38 (10 s/CROWD-0dB
to 10dB) and from conditions 39 and 40, completing the block of SNR
levels in 10 s/CROWD conditions. Noise source impacts reveal se-
lections representing 10 s/clean and 10 s/AC-0dB, respectively, from
conditions 2 and 11. Duration impacts reveal from selections of con-
ditions 31 to 35, denoting 5 s/CROWD noise conditions. This pattern
is also observed on increasing duration, where much more cohort
speakers are considered among duration and noise similar conditions
by longer probe durations. q-vector based pre-selection of cohort i-
vectors provides a more natural perspective to the relevant cohort
than the oracle condition or a scalar summary.
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Figure 6.5: Pre-selected cohort subjects and conditions on 10 s/CROWD-
0dB (condition 36) by unique selection (black).
Mutual duration and noise effects severely affect speaker recog-
nition in terms of sample completeness and quality. The condition-
informed (unconstrained) AS-norm robustly improves biometric and
forensic performances, but it is clearly not capable of reaching the per-
formance on full/clean samples. However, by quality-based cohort
pre-selection instead of relying on oracle cohort sets, significant gains
in biometric and forensic performance are yielded. Therefore, this ap-
proach seems also promising for similar issues, such as domain shift
compensation.
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6.2 score calibration using quality estimates
Concerning calibration, this section119 solely aims at the calibration of
a conventional i-vector system. As the investigation on direct impacts
of unconstrained environments to calibration is emphasized, the sys-
tems comprising score normalization approaches as well are left for
future work. Targeting commercial and forensic application scenarios,
robust handling of real world data is still a challenging topic: while
commercial applications can focus on known environments and per-
mit sample re-acquisitions from the biometric data subject, the envi-
ronmental setup in forensic scenarios changes case by case and sam-
ple recaptures are not always possible. Furthermore, commercial ap-
plications also need to cope with varying conditions due to the rising
demand for highly mobile applications facing unconstrained environ-
mental conditions regarding sample acquisition processes. Therefore,
a consistent alignment with the Bayesian decision framework (BDF)
is fundamental in order to sustain meaningful thresholds—a score
calibration yielding reliable LLR scores.
Variations in signal quality, i.e., in the probe sample condition, re-
sult in different score distributions per condition [166, 167]. While
systems are usually calibrated for known scenarios and in fixed condi-
tion environments, handling unconstrained conditions imposes well-
calibrated decision thresholds among known and unseen conditions.
Thereby, lower miscalibration costs Cmcllr are sought compared to
conventional calibration, which trains calibration functions on data
stemming from an optimal condition (long duration, noise-free). This
mismatched/conventional calibration scheme is expected to model
low-SNR and short-duration conditions insufficiently and thus to
state the lower performance bound in the robustness analysis of this
work. By contrast, oracle calibration is considered optimal calibration
since calibration parameters are trained depending on each condi-
tion respectively, requiring calibration functions to be trained for each
condition. Hence, the complexity in terms of degrees-of-freedom in-
creases on oracle-condition calibration, when more conditions are
considered and further, unseen conditions cannot be calibrated well.
Therefore, sample quality based calibration promises an adequate
trade-off between model complexity and accurate approximation of
oracle-condition calibration in scenarios facing a wide range of com-
bined noise and duration conditions.
In this section, two hypotheses are investigated: i) score calibra-
tion schemes can be enhanced by employing information about the
similarity of q-vectors as an alternative to quality measures (regard-
ing calibration gains in Cmcllr ); and ii) robustness is pertained by q-
vector based calibration in comparison to existing quality calibration
119 Parts of this section are based on the collaborative work with Rahim Saeidi, Christian
Rathgeb and Christoph Busch [71].
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schemes, especially when tough conditions are unknown to calibra-
tion training.
6.2.1 Quality Measure Functions (QMFs)
In scenarios targeting different conditions, the conventional linear cal-
ibration is observed to be prone to miscalibration when dealing with
recognition scores originating from low-quality probe segments [166,
167]. Training calibration parameters condition-dependently leads to
inconvenient effects, such as higher system complexity in terms of
parameters to train. Quality measure functions (QMFs) [32, 166] are
introduced in order to account for the quality of reference and probe
samples in the score calibration process. In [32, 166], QMFs are formu-
lated as additional components in the linear calibration strategy. In
QMF, an additional quality term Q depends on reference and probe
sample quality measures λreference, λprobe:
S ′Q = w0 +w1 S+Q(λreference, λprobe) . (6.5)
The QMF calibration is interpretable as a linear system fusion of the
biometric comparison with a subsystem quantizing the quality of ref-
erence and probe. Likewise, one might reformulate the equation to
calibrate LLR based thresholds regarding an updated prior belief in
quality. Thereby, the system output S remains unaltered, whereas the
threshold is altered, which could be compared to S ′Q, i.e., the thresh-
old that equals S ′Q for a least-favorable decision
120:
S = w−11
(
S ′Q −w0 −Q(λreference, λprobe)
)
. (6.6)
Previous works [166, 167] introduce the following duration- and
SNR-dependent QMFs, among others:
Qduration := w2 log(dprobe) , (6.7)
QSNR := w2 SNRprobe , (6.8)
Qduration & SNR := w2 log(dprobe) +w3 SNRprobe , (6.9)
where dprobe, SNRprobe denote the duration and SNR of the probe sam-
ple, respectively. Reference samples are assumed to stem from the
clean/full (noise free long utterance) condition.
QMFs sustain a parsimonious degree-of-freedom regarding the
number of calibration parameters that needs to be trained. The as-
sumption of this work is that the more calibration parameters are
needed to train, the less robustness is provided by these calibration
schemes in unknown conditions.
120 Similar thought experiments hold for the presented cohort based score normaliza-
tion. At the transition between comparison and decision subsystems, the last step in
comparison can be reformulated as the first step of decision making.
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6.2.2 Unified Audio Characterizations (UACs)
In [38], the proposed UAC calibration scheme utilizes a symmetric,
bilinear combination matrix W for conducting a quality similarity
score between reference and probe UAC-/q-vectors qreference,qprobe:
QUAC := w2 q
T
referenceWqprobe . (6.10)
The estimation of W induces tremendously high degrees-of-freedom
to the calibration stage, i.e., ‖q‖2 parameters need to be estimated
additionally. When considering all of the 55 examined conditions of
this study, this would correspond to 3 025W parameters (additional
to the one w2 parameter). Low-rank estimates can be obtained by
probabilistic principal component analysis.
In an extension of UAC [242], trial-based calibration is proposed for
examining a set of 14 distinct conditions comprising cross-language,
cross-channel, noisy, and reverberant effects. As such, [242] aims at a
wide range of condition types. In this work, distinct condition types
are examined. The trial-based calibration of [242] causes an immense
high degree-of-freedom on large-scale operations as the most-alike
samples for calibration training are selected for each comparison (ap-
proximately 500).
Following the QMF intention of parsimonious robustness against
unseen conditions during calibration training, QUAC turns unfavor-
able when condition amounts increase. Thus, UAC based score cali-
bration schemes using bilinear combination matrices are not pursued
in this research.
6.2.3 Contribution: Function of Quality Estimates (FQEs)
Motivated by UACs and by QMFs, score calibration schemes are
proposed here for q-vectors, namely function of quality estimates
(FQEs). Based on the q-vector design, the cosine distance similarity
between reference and probe q-vectors qreference,qprobe is suitable as an
FQE Qq-vector, as alike conditions are linkable by cosine similarity (cf.
Fig. 6.2b):
Qq-vector := w2 cos(qreference,qprobe) . (6.11)
Compared to the calibration model proposed for UACs [38], the
proposed FQE requires far fewer calibration parameter estimations,
i.e., one parameter w2. Calibration methods are sought to parsimo-
niously preserve robustness against unseen data. Since measuring cer-
tain quality metrics such as SNR is difficult in low-quality conditions,
alternative calibration schemes relying on FQEs appear promising.
Baseline results of an uncalibrated system are shown in Fig. 6.6:
performance in terms of Cminllr degrades significantly in lower SNR
levels and on shorter observations. All conditions yield respectively
6.2 score calibration using quality estimates 181
high Cmcllr . The gap between Cllr and C
min
llr for SNR levels > 15dB is
very small. Since similar trends on CROWD and AC noise are found,
comparable to section 6.1.3, experimental results are only reported
w.r.t. CROWD noise. The plot depicts log-log axes to emphasize two
aspects: for low quality conditions, degradation impacts are more se-
vere than for high quality conditions; and (more relevantly) for each
condition, the calibration loss is not negligible considering the dis-
crimination performance of each condition, independently of another.
(For these purposes, an easier visual comparability of condition-wise
performance is sacrificed.)
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Figure 6.6: Baseline performance of uncalibrated system on CROWD condi-
tions.
Fig. 6.7 shows the effects of conventional, QMF and FQE calibra-
tions regarding the score distribution of genuine and impostor scores.
Score distribution after QMF and FQE calibration resemble each other
well. The conventional calibration appears to handle the full/clean
condition very well, while suffering in other conditions. Opposed to
conventional calibration, QMF and FQE calibration methods deal well
with noisy and short probe samples. Notably, this behavior could as
well arise due to the amount of training data from each condition
present in the training process of calibration parameters. The training
of conventional calibration is performed using only scores from the
full/clean condition, whereas for training of QMF and FQE calibra-
tions, scores from 55 conditions are utilized.
In the following study, comparisons are drawn between FQEs and
QMFs that are employing the oracle SNR levels and the sample dura-
tion. In order to provide a compact overview, pooled conditions are
examined as well, i.e., the performance of scores pooled from all ex-
amined conditions is evaluated at once instead of condition-wise. On
the robustness of QMF and FQE calibration schemes against unseen
conditions, evaluations are grouped into five analyses on segregated
conditions known during calibration training: i) duration impact on
clean speech, only conditions of 5 s, . . . , full without noise are con-
sidered during calibration training and evaluation; ii) SNR impact on
full duration, only noisy conditions with full duration (including the
full/clean condition) are considered during calibration training and
evaluation; iii) combined duration and SNR effects, all 55 conditions are
182 enhancing decision information
−20 −10 0 10 20
0
5
10
15
Score
R
el
.f
re
q.
(i
n
%
)
(a) Uncalibrated
−20 −10 0 10 20
0
5
10
15
Score
(b) Conventional linear calibra-
tion
−20 −10 0 10 20
0
5
10
15
Score
R
el
.f
re
q.
(i
n
%
)
(c) Calibration based on QMF Qduration
−20 −10 0 10 20
0
5
10
15
Score
(d) Calibration based on FQE
Qq-vector
Figure 6.7: Comparison of class A (green) and class B (red) score distribu-
tions before and after calibration: full lines represent noise free
long probe samples, dashed lines indicate scores from all condi-
tions represented in Tab. 3.4 (excluding full/clean).
considered during calibration training and evaluation; iv) pooled du-
ration and SNR levels, whereas i)-iii) examine each condition one-by-
one and conditions are pooled (under equally prior conditions, i.e.,
at maximum uncertainty); and v) calibration robustness to unseen condi-
tions, conditions that have durations and/or SNR levels of low quality
(duration 6 10 s, SNR 6 5dB) are excluded from training (training
with 12 out of 55 conditions).
6.2.4 Analysis: Duration Impact on Clean Speech
This analysis focuses on noise free (clean) probe samples truncated
into shorter durations. The calibration parameters for QMF and FQE
are trained with recognition scores from noise free probe samples.
Fig. 6.8 compares the three introduced QMFs to the proposed FQE (q-
vectors), where oracle indicates ideal linear score calibration for a sin-
gle condition (condition-wise calibration training, assuming ideal bin-
ning), and conventional indicates mismatched linear score calibration
(solely trained on idealistic data of the full/clean condition). QMFs
and FQE approaches perform better than conventional calibration on
durations 6 40 s in terms of Cmcllr . In terms of Cminllr , no significant
differences are observed between all examined calibration schemes.
When the duration of probe samples is > 40 s, these probe samples
can be considered “full”, and the conventional calibration performs
best.
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Figure 6.8: Cmcllr comparison of duration conditions (clean).
6.2.5 Analysis: SNR Impact on Full Duration
In this experiment, only noisy probe samples are drawn from noise
free long duration (full/clean) samples. When training calibration, pa-
rameters for QMF and FQE are trained on probe samples that are not
truncated. When training QMF calibration, applied SNR-levels are
used instead of measured SNR (eradicating another source of biased
performance results). This selection biases the performance of QMF
calibration in different directions depending on SNR region. In the
low-SNR region (SNR 6 15dB), estimating an SNR level is problem-
atic due to almost equal levels of noise and speech present. Hence,
the applied SNR level is much more accurate for the scope of this
study than measured SNR levels. On the contrary, since voice data
originally distributed for the speaker recognition evaluations (SREs)
by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is
seldom noise free121, the applied SNR level is less accurate compared
to a measured SNR level for SNR > 10dB.
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Figure 6.9: Cmcllr comparison of different SNR conditions (full duration).
Fig. 6.9 depicts the calibration loss, Cmcllr , across variable SNR but
in full duration conditions. In the low-SNR region, QMF outperforms
FQE based calibration in terms of miscalibration cost. This can be ex-
plained by the inclusion of the applied SNR-level as parametric values
of QMFs. The quality estimates aid FQE calibration in handling low-
SNR conditions compared to the conventional calibration. However,
121 The concept of noise free signals can be misleading, as noise is a mere summary term
of undefinable and undesired signal characteristics—every real world signal conveys
noise to some extent.
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quality estimates are not fully accurate, since the applied SNR-level
could be not as accurate itself, which, in turn, also undermines FQE
calibration training. Dealing with SNR > 10dB, FQE presents supe-
rior performance in terms of Cmcllr compared to QMFs. This is in line
with the previous argument on SNR estimation in high-SNR, imply-
ing that quality estimates could be more accurate than the applied
SNR level. In terms of Cminllr , the proposed FQE reveals performance
degrades, with relative losses to other calibration schemes of 23% to
36%, depending on the condition, while other calibration schemes
yield almost similar Cminllr , cf. Fig. 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Cminllr comparison of Qq-vector on SNR conditions to the
min./max. of the other schemes (oracle, Qduration, QSNR,
Qduration & SNR, conventional).
6.2.6 Analysis: Combined Duration and SNR Effects
Figs. 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 depict Cmcllr losses for different quality ranges
for the purpose of visualizing alike patterns in performance changes
when moving across conditions. (Again, the visual comparability of
single performance values is sacrificed for the purpose of visualiz-
ing dynamics in quality impacts; some merely noticeable differences
between different calibration schemes are just too small to empha-
size.) Thereby, for the sake of tractable analyses, the term low quality
is referred to if either the duration 6 10 s or the SNR 6 5dB. Other
conditions are referred to as good quality. In general, no significant dif-
ferences are observed between QMFs and FQE in terms of both Cminllr
and Cmcllr .
In Fig. 6.11, the miscalibration costs in conditions of short dura-
tion and SNR quality are visualized. The changes in miscalibration
cost between 10 s and 5 s (at fixed SNR level) conditions are compar-
atively low compared to the changes between 5dB and 0dB (at fixed
duration). QMFs and the proposed FQE perform similarly per condi-
tion and resemble a far better approximation of the oracle calibration
scheme than the conventional calibration approach.
For the sake of visualizing QMF and FQE behavior in Figs. 6.12
and 6.13, values of Cmcllr > 0.1 are cropped. Fig. 6.12 depicts the mis-
calibration cost in conditions of short duration or low-SNR quality. In
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Figure 6.12: Cmcllr comparison for having either short probe samples (6 10 s)
or low-SNR (6 5dB) present in the probe sample.
terms of approximating the Cmcllr of the matched calibration scheme,
QMFs and the proposed FQE outperform the conventional calibra-
tion scheme. For the 10 s/clean condition, quality based and the con-
ventional calibration approaches yield somewhat similar results com-
pared to the matched calibration scheme. The Cmcllr of the matched
calibration, however, increases with subsiding durations compared
to (the lower) SNR level. By comparison, quality based calibration
schemes are more severely affected by quality degradation in SNR
than in duration. This observation is counter intuitive at first sight,
since duration serves as a proxy measure to sample completeness,
and shorter duration should indicate less information. On shorter du-
rations, the discrimination performance (already) declines, see chap-
ter 5; the miscalibration cost adds to recognition performance as dis-
crimination and calibration. Calibration in conditions of shorter du-
rations (of lacking information) is less (but still) difficult compared
to calibration in conditions of lower SNR levels (of distorted informa-
tion).
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Figure 6.13: Cmcllr comparison of good quality probe conditions (duration >
20 s and SNR > 10dB) to pooled condition.
For good quality conditions, cf. Fig. 6.13, the miscalibration losses
of QMFs and the proposed FQE increase. As the ideal condition of the
conventional calibration scheme is reached, it approximates the oracle
calibration much better than the examined quality based calibration
schemes (in the vast majority of good quality conditions). Looking
at the condition pooled Cmcllr , however, the conventional approach is
clearly outperformed by the QMFs and the proposed FQE, which ap-
proximate the calibration loss of the oracle calibration scheme well.
From the above analysis, one might conclude that quality estimates
can be successfully applied in the calibration stage providing simi-
lar levels of performance as the use of QMF calibration with oracle
(applied) SNR levels and duration.
6.2.7 Analysis: Pooled Duration and SNR Levels
In Tab. 6.1, Cminllr and C
mc
llr , performances of conventional, QMFs, and
the proposed FQE calibration approaches are compared for pooled
conditions w.r.t. variable duration on clean samples, variable SNR on
full duration, and combined duration and SNR effects. On pooling
variable duration conditions (pool D), QMFs and the proposed FQE
yield very similar performances in terms of Cminllr and C
mc
llr . By cali-
brating a pool of scores originated from different SNR levels in probe
samples (pool S), however, the proposed FQE calibration approach
fails to produce a better Cminllr and C
mc
llr performance than the exam-
ined QMFs. The Cminllr provided by the FQE Qq-vector is even worse
than the Cminllr of the conventional calibration. Such behavior could re-
sult from poor q-vector modeling over different SNR levels or could
be partly attributed to the suitability limits of the cosine function in
the FQE calibration scheme. When the whole range of duration and
SNR variation is known during calibration training and evaluation
(pool D+S), the calibration performance provided by Qq-vector is on
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a par with the examined QMFs. It is deemed that supplying scores
from combined duration and SNR variability to the training stage of
calibration results in robust calibration parameter estimation.
Table 6.1: QMF and FQE comparison of pooled conditions: variable du-
ration (D), variable SNR (S) and combined (D+S) conditions (in
Cminllr × 103, Cmcllr × 103). As Cllr = Cminllr +Cmcllr , the comparison of
Cllr values is trivial for these results.
Pool Metric Matched Qduration QSNR Qduration & SNR Qq-vector Conventional
D
Cminllr 59 70 68 68 67 70
Cmcllr 4 4 4 4 4 47
S
Cminllr 43 67 68 67 83 68
Cmcllr 3 3 3 3 5 67
D+S
Cminllr 126 160 160 160 159 160
Cmcllr 3 2 2 2 2 266
6.2.8 Analysis: Calibration Robustness to Unseen Conditions
From those previous observations on low and good quality, the robust-
ness of unseen low quality deserves attention. Experiments towards
robustness are conducted regarding pooled conditions but without
knowing low quality conditions during calibration training, i.e., ev-
ery condition afflicted by 5 s, 10 s or by 0dB, 5dB is excluded from
calibration training. Thus, calibration functions are assumed to be
solely trained on good quality. In evaluating calibration methods, the
whole range of duration and SNR conditions (including low quality)
is tested.
Table 6.2: QMF and FQE robustness comparison of pooled conditions with
limited data during calibration training: variable duration (D),
variable SNR (S), and combined (D+S) conditions (in Cminllr × 103,
Cmcllr × 103), with differences to Tab. 6.1 in brackets.
Pool Metric Qduration QSNR Qduratio & SNR Qq-vector
D
Cminllr 69 (-1) 69 (+1) 69 (+1) 67 (0)
Cmcllr 23 (+19) 23 (+19) 22 (+18) 19 (+15)
S
Cminllr 68 (+1) 68 (0) 67 (0) 73 (-10)
Cmcllr 35 (+32) 36 (+33) 37 (+34) 38 (+33)
D+S
Cminllr 160 (0) 160 (0) 160 (0) 159 (0)
Cmcllr 15 (+13) 17 (+15) 17 (+15) 14 (+12)
Tab. 6.2 provides the calibration performance for each experimental
setup on pooled scenarios (evaluations are depicted separately in ac-
cordance with the three above pools D, S, D+S). In general, QMFs and
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the proposed FQE are still outperforming the conventional scheme, al-
though Cmcllr costs have increased significantly: on pool D, the Qq-vector
scheme yields the lowest Cmcllr as well as the lowest Cllr. On pool S,
Cmcllr costs of the QMFs are slightly lower than on the proposed FQE.
Cminllr gains are observed for Qq-vector. On combined conditions, pool
D+S, Cmcllr costs of the FQE are less affected than on the QMFs.
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Figure 6.14: Cmcllr comparison of combined low-quality, which is excluded
from calibration training.
In order to gain more insight into the robustness of quality based
calibration, more detailed analyses are performed that look into the
individual duration/SNR conditions. Figs. 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 depict
the Cmcllr costs of a calibration training without low quality conditions.
Visual comparisons to oracle and conventional calibration schemes
are spared (redundant information). Comparisons to results of the
previous section are spared as well since the impact pattern of quality
conditions is emphasized here for quality based calibration schemes.
Changes in miscalibration costs are (nothing but) expected.
Q
duration
Q
SNR
Q
duration & SNR
Q
q-vectorfu
ll/
5d
B
fu
ll/
0d
B
40
s/
5d
B
40
s/
0d
B
20
s/
5d
B
20
s/
0d
B
10
s/
cle
an
10
s/
20
dB
10
s/
15
dB
10
s/
10
dB
5s
/c
lea
n
5s
/2
0d
B
5s
/1
5d
B
5s
/1
0d
B
0
50
100
200
CalibrationCondition
C
m
c
llr
×
1
0
3
Figure 6.15: Cmcllr comparison for having either short probe samples (6 10 s)
or high level of noise (SNR 6 5dB) present in the probe sample
with excluded low quality conditions from calibration training.
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Miscalibration cost, as was expected, increases on low quality and
decreases on higher quality conditions (as of the held back calibra-
tion training data). Nonetheless, QMFs and the FQE still outperform
the conventional scheme on all low quality conditions. In contrast to
knowing low quality conditions in training, the Cmcllr pattern for low
quality conditions reverses (cf. Fig. 6.14): 5dB conditions suffer from
much higher calibration losses than 0dB conditions on short dura-
tions. Observing immense Cmcllr increases for the four conditions of
low quality in duration and SNR, the need of knowing low quality
conditions becomes eminent. In conditions of mixed low and good
quality (cf. Fig. 6.15), Cmcllr losses of 5dB conditions with full and 20 s
durations are much higher than for their 0dB variants. The same ap-
plies to the 15dB conditions with 5 s and 10 s durations compared to
the other short duration conditions, even if the 5 s/clean condition
also yields comparatively high Cmcllr costs across all quality based cali-
bration schemes. The calibration of unknown low-SNR conditions in
the midst of full durations results in better calibration performance
than the calibration of unknown short duration conditions at mid
noisy to clean speech. On testing with good quality data (cf. Fig. 6.16),
the performance of both QMF and FQE calibration schemes occasion-
ally falls behind the conventional approach. In contrast, for calibra-
tion training with low quality conditions, the Cmcllr costs reduce with
lower quality conditions. Here, worse calibration performance is ob-
served.
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Figure 6.16: Cmcllr comparison of good quality probe conditions (duration >
20 s and SNR > 10dB) to pooled condition with excluded low
quality conditions from calibration training.
The present analysis provides insights into the behavior of calibra-
tion schemes in combined conditions of high signal degradation and
short segment duration regarding accurate approximation of ideal-
ized linear calibration. QMFs and the proposed FQE reduce Cmcllr costs
down to 5% to 6% of the conventional calibration scheme if all condi-
tions are known; and down to 10% to 12% in the presence of unseen
low quality conditions. Quality based calibration schemes are essen-
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tial when facing unconstrained quality conditions since they are more
robust towards unknown conditions than the conventional condition-
mismatched calibration approach. A proper function is required to
account for single-valued conventional quality measures or vector-
based quality estimates in the calibration process. The performance
of q-vector based calibration using cosine function is investigated,
leaving analyses towards more efficient techniques for other FQEs
to further research. The current study indicates that quality based
calibration provides more reliable calibrated scores, especially when
confronted with samples of low quality conditions.
6.3 deep score normalization with quality estimates
The previous sections dealt with the impact of q-vectors to score
normalization. At first, a quality based cohort pre-selection was ex-
amined, a linear score calibration based on quality estimates was
assessed afterwards. The proposed score normalization scheme re-
sulted in better discrimination performance, and the proposed cali-
bration scheme resulted in lower calibration losses.
In this section122, emphasis has been placed on a deep neural net-
work (DNN) scheme to examine the robustness of quality informed
score normalization regarding SNR levels and noise types. The DNN
is not proposed here as a solution of some sort but for assessing the
limitations and possible gains of preceding studies. Eventually, con-
clusions are drawn by the following DNN study to further improve
the existing conventional and proposed methods. Depending on the
DNN design, its output123 can be assumed as well-calibrated (regard-
ing the empirical prior ˙˘pi of the application-dependent training data
set, see sections 2.1 and 2.4.4). By contrast, this study solely concerns
the discrimination performance since the mutual optimization of dis-
crimination and calibration performance (without following the LLR
paradigm by design) might lead to distorted performance (an appli-
cation-dependent coin tossing system which has no calibration loss
would still not be discriminant). In other words, solely targeting a low
calibration loss regarding the production of LLR scores is not feasible
when exploiting discrimination power by utilizing neural networks.
This study therefore solely concerns discrimination performance to
the benefit of sustaining lower computational efforts but at the risk of
higher calibration losses.
In this study, the input to a deep neural network comprises ref-
erence and probe i-vectors, corresponding q-vectors, and depending
122 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Søren Trads Steen and
Christoph Busch [72] which emerged from the collaboration with Søren on his mas-
ter’s thesis [247].
123 By the conventional use of softmax end layers, the output of neural networks is meant
to correspond to posterior probabilities, the generation of prior independent outputs
being LLRs lies outside the scope of this dissertation.
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PLDA scores. The DNN is trained using the I4U development set
(here, the cohort data).124 Noise levels and types are thereby removed
from the network training in order to gain insights into depending
score normalization functions in a fair evaluation setup to be com-
pared to preceding results. The expectation is that deep score nor-
malization schemes can yield discrimination gains. However, when
removing cohort data of low quality or of noise types, performance
losses are expected. Robustness is addressed in terms of whether
or not a soft relative bound can be sustained. In other words, al-
though the input data to the deep neural network has all informa-
tion about the conditions availabe, a re-disposition of the network
training task emulates a quality domain shift scenario. The following
analyses will thus investigate on how well the (oracle) discrimina-
tion performance can be sustained, despite an ill-disposition of the
network training task, given rich input data to the network.125 In
this section, two hypotheses are investigated: i) as a single neuron
(network) mathematically equals linear score calibration, and the pro-
posed FQE calibration sustains discrimination performance, a deeper
and more elaborate network architecture can achieve gains in Cminllr
across conditions; and ii) on changing the disposition of the (oracle)
score normalization training, i.e., by excluding cohort data compris-
ing conditions representing low quality from training (short duration
and low-SNR of both noise types versus all SNR levels of the biomet-
ric noise type), Cminllr discrimination performance will maintain within
a ±20% band.126
6.3.1 Conventional Deep Neural Networks
A conventional feed forward neural network is employed with soft-
max training scheme. Feed forward neural networks consist of layers
of units [58]: an input layer and an output layer are linked over a
number of hidden layers by numerous connections. The connections
between units of each layer are weighted. Weights are initialized with
small numbers in terms of a
√
2/nl standard deviation [248], with
124 To account for European data privacy regulations [55] has been partly motivated by
the collaborative work of [72]. The data privacy of cohort data subjects is preserved
as aggregated information and distributed in the form of network parameters rather
than distributed as voice samples of each cohort speaker. As such, data deletion
procedures would be easier to enable if cohort subjects revoked their data privacy
consent in the future (after network training).
125 As quality is a vastly broad area in speech processing and speech communication,
one may utilize quality estimates of other areas instead.
126 The 20% relative band is arbitrarily set. The value represents a (soft) measure for
robustness due to the lack of data (considering that real world data will differ from
training data) for recognition systems [24, 29] to maintain the tendency of its performance
when reducing the quality conditions of the data under examination. As any relative band
would be arbitrary, 20% are chosen, representing an upper bound for the purpose to
claim robustness. In other words, the aim of requiring a 20% relative band is to rather
reject robustness claims than to confirm them.
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nl representing the number of incoming connections to the unit. In
each unit, the response is constructed as a linear combination of the
outputs from the units of previous layers. A non-linear activation
function is evaluated on the response to achieve the output (activa-
tion) of the units by, e.g., the rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation
function [249] and the sigmoid function for bounded activations [58].
Networks are trained to optimize performance regarding the binary
cross-entropy cost function using gradient descent, where the Adam
algorithm [250] and backpropagation [58] are employed. A single-unit
output layer is utilized, representing a system’s normalized score. In
order to avoid over-fitting of the training data, different regularization
schemes can be employed, such as weight decay [58], dropout [251], and
batch normalization [252].
6.3.2 Contribution: Deep Quality Informed Score Normalization
Accounting for quality information as well as cohort-related data, a
feed forward neural network is constructed based on the compari-
son score, reference and probe i-vectors iref, iprb as well as correspond-
ing q-vectors qref,qprb as the concatenated input vector, cf. Fig. 6.17.
A normalized score between 0 and 1 (representing classes B and
A) is obtained via a single unit output layer with a sigmoid activa-
tion function. By training the network on the cohort dataset, the net-
work model is assumed to comprise cohort and quality information,
while achieving anonymity (not only pseudonymization) for the co-
hort speakers. For the purpose of accounting for linear normalization
approaches, e.g., linear quality calibration [38, 71, 79], the first hidden
layer of the proposed network employs a linear activation function
f(x) = a+ bx. During training, input features are adaptively normal-
ized w.r.t. the amount of genuine and impostor comparisons. Deeper
hidden layers are connected by non-linear activation functions, e.g.,
using the ReLU activation function. In order to achieve an effec-
tive class balance of equal priors, genuine comparisons are weighted
higher than the impostor comparisons during network training. The
network configuration is referred to as (L,U) with a network of a lin-
ear layer with U units, followed by L non-linear layers of U units, cf.
Fig. 6.17.
In order to examine network configurations127, L = 1, 2, 4 layers are
investigated. All layers comprise the same amount of hidden units,
i.e.,U = 50, 100, 200 units. Tab. 6.3 compares the different networks on
the test set: configuration (1, 50) yields the largest condition-average
Cminllr gain over a conventional i-vector/PLDA baseline system of 6.2%
127 Convergence is reached after 3 epochs on a randomly selected 20% held-out valida-
tion subset on which the best performing model is chosen. On a fixed number of
layers and units, a learning rate of 10−5 is found to reduce over-fitting well on the
hold-out validation set.
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Figure 6.17: Deep score normalization architecture with quality estimates.
The baseline system comprises a standard i-vector acoustic
feature extraction. Then, i-vectors are processed by linear dis-
criminant analysis (LDA), within-class covariance normaliza-
tion (WCCN), and length normalization (l-norm.), resulting in
biometric i-vectors (the input units uI, uI¯). As i-vectors are com-
pared by PLDA, resulting in a score S, this score is considered
as input as well. q-vectors qref,qprb are extracted from acoustic
reference and probe i-vectors iref, iprb, serving as q-vector input
units uQ,uQ¯ to the DNN. The DNN has L layers and h
1
1, . . . ,h
L
U
hidden units (per layer), resulting in a normalized score S ′.
with the lowest standard variation, i.e., with rather stable improve-
ments among all conditions. Configuration (2, 100) yields the second
largest gains regarding average and deviation in terms of Cminllr , but
also regarding pooled-condition performance, where the (2, 50) net-
work yields the largest gains. Accounting for potential over-fitting,
dropout is examined on (1, 50) and (2, 100) networks with a 20%
dropout rate: on average, Cminllr grows, which may occur due to an
excessive dropout rate. By contrast, the cohort normalization in [70]
yields up to 8.2% relative gains in Cminllr on single conditions, see sec-
tion 6.1.3. Further investigations are carried out on the (1, 50) and
the (2, 100) configurations, motivated by their gains in average per-
formance across conditions and in the condition pooled performance.
Table 6.3: Benchmark of relative Cminllr changes (in %) to PLDA baseline on
the test set regarding condition averaging (µ), standard deviation
(σ), pooling (p), and dropout training (DO).
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6.3.3 Robustness Analysis: Contained SNR Levels and Noise Types
For the purpose of examining the robustness of the proposed nor-
malization, training is conducted under two different test setups of
(simulated) unseen data:
• Targeting low quality, all conditions afflicted with SNR levels
6 5dB and with durations 6 10 s are excluded.
• Targeting the biometric noise type, all CROWD noise conditions
are excluded. In contrast to AC noise (ambient noise), CROWD
noise is biometric interfering noise. CROWD noise is derived by
mixing the speech of other biometric subjects in an overlapping
fashion.128
Fig. 6.18 compares the effects to (1, 50) and (2, 100) configurations,
with and without employing dropout, regarding whether or not the
Cminllr performance is not exceeding a ±20% performance band w.r.t.
the Cminllr performance of the (comprehensively trained) DNN in each
condition. In the low quality analysis depicted in Figs. 6.18a, 6.18b,
the (1, 50) configuration outperforms the (2, 100) in terms of robust-
ness. Also, employing dropouts sustain coherent and stable perfor-
mance, providing a rather robust network parameterization when the
network is trained without low quality conditions. By focussing on
robustness of noise type, both configurations perform stable and co-
herent results with slight benefits if dropout training is conducted,
as illustrated in Figs. 6.18c, 6.18d. Expectedly, all good quality condi-
tions benefit when low quality conditions are excluded from network
training.
Examining an exemplary deeper architecture, gains compared to
the baseline PLDA performance are observed. The use of the two
layer configuration does not increase the performance of the one
layer configuration much further. In the robustness analysis, i.e., by
excluding low quality conditions and the more challenging noise
type (CROWD noise), the proposed approach reveals to benefit on
good quality conditions. The performance of the (1, 50) configura-
tion is preserved within a ±20% performance band129 on unseen low
128 An equivalent for overlapping biometric noise (as speech signals from TVs running
in the background or the so-called cocktail party effect) are latent fingerprints at
border control sensors that overlap with latent fingerprints from previous biometric
capture subjects if the sensors are not cleaned. In that analogy, AC noise would
rather represent the finger pressure on a sensor.
129 In other words, the visualization of the 20% relative band in Figs. 6.18a and 6.18b
directly leads to the conclusion that, without knowing any short duration or low-
SNR conditions, the neural network is not robust. However, these conditions are
known to the setup in Figs. 6.18c and 6.18d. All CROWD noise type conditions are
removed, and all observations are observed within a 20% relative band. One can
thus conclude that knowing the degree of quality degradation is more important
than knowing various noise types, i.e., removing CROWD noise from the training
does not decrease performance by more than 20%.
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ditions excluded
Figure 6.18: Relative Cminllr change on test set (in %). Performance by dura-
tion and SNR regarding AC (A) and CROWD (C) noise as well
as whether dropout is conducted (DO). Red areas indicate the
conditions excluded from training. Crosses denote relative Cminllr
changes above ±20%.
quality conditions. By contrast, when excluding overlapping speech
(CROWD noise) conditions, both (1, 50) and (2, 100) configurations
perform comparatively stable. Thus, the proposed approach rather
benefits from training on a broad scale of SNR levels than on more
noise types. This poses a challenging scenario due to overlapping bio-
metric features of other subjects.
6.4 summary
In this chapter, score normalization and calibration methods were
proposed to cope with performance losses in unconstrained envi-
ronments. Thereby, the acoustic and biometric feature extraction as
well as the biometric comparison remained fixed—a state-of-the-art i-
vector/PLDA system that is trained in a condition pooled fashion.130
130 Oracle VAD is assumed, motivated by the observations in Chapter 5.
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These biometric subsystems, however, are also considered white boxes
as their signal processing is readable.
Based on acoustic features, q-vectors are proposed to characterize
quality conditions of audios. Motivated by UAC [38], a q-vector repre-
sents the posterior probabilities of each condition for a given acoustic
i-vector, i.e., from the signal processing perspective of the speaker
recognition system. Quality conditions are sampled by log-linear per-
formance observation, as performance changes are observed to de-
cline with logarithmic quality degradation. The goal is to exploit the
behavior of the signal processing subsystem to improve the scores
communicated from the comparison to the decision subsystem (see
section 2.2), such that discrimination and calibration performance are
improvable by biometric system owner, operator, and provider (as
well as by vendors).
Regarding the linkage and classification of conditions, q-vectors are
beneficial: linkage is achieved by the cosine of two q-vectors and by
the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence. Classification is achieved
by finding the maximum posterior element (here, the maximum value
in one q-vector). The classification of conditions, however, is not in-
vestigated in this dissertation. Condition classification is useful when
it comes to splitting the signal processing into subsystems depending
on the expected performance—by binning probe comparisons, scores
are put into different sets.131
Based on q-vectors, a novel pre-selection to cohort based score nor-
malization is proposed, targeting discrimination performance. Con-
ventionally, cohort data comprises data of idealistic quality (from
high quality conditions). When facing unconstrained environments,
multiple other conditions need to be considered as well. Therefore,
cohort data is also synthetically degraded (in the same manner). For
pre-selecting the relevant cohort data, cohort data of alike q-vectors
is found by the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence (proposed
method), i.e., the cohort data that is similar to the biometric probe
(which is of unconstrained quality).
Especially in low quality conditions, the proposed scheme increases
the discrimination performance. The proposed normalization scheme
131 In score calibration by pool adjacent violators algorithm (PAV) (section 2.4.4), scores
resembling alike LLRs are grouped. As this pinpoints the assessment of defined
requirements (see verbal scales, chapter 4), the variety of LLR groups determines the
amount of different (and meaningful) decision policies that could be employed by
using a system. Here, a meaningful manner means that not all policies share the same
threshold value and their differences may be interpreted within formally denoted
decision requirements. For each of these conditions, score subsets are created—here,
55 subsets—and as score calibration is algorithm dependent, i.e., on each condition
bin, LLR groups are calibrated for a 55th of the overall number of available scores.
The variety of verbal bands a system is capable of supporting might be reduced
drastically. Furthermore, by binning conditions, binning errors are introduced (when
samples are wrongly assigned to conditions), which would require further treatment.
In the context of this dissertation (for these reasons), if condition binning is applied,
it should target the bare minimum of bins necessary.
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re-biases and scales PLDA scores adaptive to the quality of a probe
sample (from the perspective of the signal processing subsystem).
Targeting calibration performance, FQEs are introduced. In FQEs,
q-vectors are linked in order to adaptively re-bias weighted PLDA
scores. Exemplarily, the cosine similarity is proposed as an FQE. In
comparison to QMFs—proposed in related work, based on proxy
measures to quality (duration and SNR)—, FQEs estimate quality
from the perspective of the signal processing subsystem. FQEs bridge
the gap on the outline of the term quality between the perspective
of task-independent speech quality (here: proxy measures to qual-
ity) and the perspective of a task-dependent utility predictor (biomet-
ric quality). This is done by encouraging the perspective of a task-
dependent speech quality estimator (that serves to improve decision
making, even if utility might be low). Generalizing over duration and
noise conditions, the proposed FQE achieves a slightly better cali-
bration performance than the compared QMFs. A detailed robust-
ness study, however, motivates to employ conventional calibration
schemes on good quality (neither QMFs nor FQEs), i.e., when the
duration > 40 s and the SNR level > 15dB. Otherwise, either QMFs
and the proposed FQEs yield similar results in discrimination as well
as in calibration performance. Originally, UACs (basis to q-vectors
and thus to FQEs) were also proposed for score calibration: UACs
are linked by a bilinear combination matrix. Employing bilinear com-
bination matrices to q-vectors, however, a number of additional cali-
bration parameters growing quadratic with the amount of conditions
are implied. QMFs and FQEs sustain a minimalistic degree-of-free-
dom regarding the amount of calibration parameters necessary to be
estimated. These calibration methods have a parsimonious degree of
freedom (sustain low complexity in their amount of parameters) and
are therefore assumed to provide higher robustness.
When reformulating the conventional and proposed score calibra-
tion schemes in terms of neural networks, they effectively resemble
single neuron networks. Although the cohort score normalization
study yields gains in Cminllr , no gains in discrimination performance
are observed for score calibration methods. Thus, an exemplary deep
neural network scheme is investigated regarding potentials and lim-
its of q-vector based score normalization (and calibration) methods
to discrimination performance. Calibration performance is not explic-
itly targeted; benefits in Cminllr result from employing a rather complex
score normalization scheme. Moreover, a robustness analysis on the
employed training data illustrates that one might consider to train
score normalization on a variety of SNR levels rather than training
score normalization on a variety of noise types (such analyses could
spare future efforts).
To sum up, quality mismatches can be estimated on pre-compar-
ison stages (from acoustic features) to aid Bayesian identity infer-
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ence by enhancing conventional score normalization and calibration
methods. Thereby, the proposed unconstrained cohort normalization
scheme yields very promising results compared to conventional ap-
proaches. The proposed FQE calibration scheme achieves compet-
itive results to the related work on QMFs. Meanwhile, the study
on deep score normalization employing quality estimates revealed
further discrimination gains and robustness towards parsimonious
training schemes, detaining conditions of low quality and biometric-
interfering noise types.
7
P R E S E N TAT I O N AT TA C K S E C U R I T Y, P R I VA C Y,
A N D D ATA P R O T E C T I O N
This chapter addresses security as well as privacy and data protec-
tion, concentrating on the applicability of log-likelihood ratios (LLRs)
and the Bayesian decision framework (BDF) in the real world. It par-
ticularly depicts research progress on i) presentation attack detection
(PAD) security for short term replay attacks and on ii) privacy and
data protection, targeting the research questions:
As security systems are subject to attacks, can text-inde-
pendent audio replay attacks which are based on unit-se-
lections of previously captured and rearranged speech se-
quences be detected?
Can data privacy and data protection be preserved while
sustaining performance? On privacy and data protection:
• Within the framework of the 2016 (EU) General Data
Privacy Regulation [55], considering biometric data as
sensitive, is privacy preservable for biometric capture
subjects while sustaining performance?
• Can the data of comparison subsystem vendors
be protected, meaning parameters of generative
comparison models, that are trained on vast data
amounts, while preserving privacy of capture sub-
jects and sustaining performance?
Modern text-to-speech algorithms, when employed for subversive
usage (to generate presentation attacks), pose a vital threat to the se-
curity of speaker recognition systems. In order to distinguish between
attack presentations and bona fide presentations, the use of PAD sub-
systems is of utmost importance, see section 2.2. To this day, the vast
majority of introduced spoofing countermeasures in speaker recogni-
tion has relied on speech production and perception based features.
In this chapter, emphasis regarding PAD security is put on an audio
replay attack, namely unit-selection. The classification of natural ver-
sus non-natural speech transitions is carved out based on (unfiltered)
wavelet and Fourier frequency features.
Furthermore, data privacy is crucial when dealing with biometric
data. Considering the 2016 European general data privacy regulation
[55] and the second payment service directive [253], biometric infor-
mation protection is essential for any commercial application. Bio-
metric information is protected [44], when i) unlinkability is ensured
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across biometric system owners, operators, and providers, ii) irre-
versibility of encrypted information is sustained, and iii) renewability is
guaranteed of, e.g., voice representations following the intermediate-
sized vector (i-vector) paradigm. Biometric voice-based systems need
to be prepared in compliance with the latest EU data privacy legisla-
tion. Therefore, LLR score properties need to be preserved in order
to sustain a wide application range, seeking biometric information
protection without performance loss. The protection of model param-
eters is also of interest for system biometric system vendors, such
that owners, operators and providers are fully unaware of the ac-
tual values involved in data processing (the model parameters of the
comparison subsystem) as well as the data processed (the biometric
information).
7.1 detection of unit selection attacks
In security scenarios, the performance of a biometric system is exam-
ined regarding subversive usage w.r.t. different system levels [254].
Attacks at the sensor level are referred to as presentation attacks [93].
Speaker recognition systems are particularly threatened due to the
advanced development of speech synthesis techniques [49]. Voice pre-
sentation attacks are classified into six attack types [255]: synthesis
[256], voice conversion [255], mock-up [257], replay [258], unit-selec-
tion [49], and mimicry [259]. Fig. 7.1 provides an overview on the
different types of presentation attacks. In a speech synthesis attack,
attackers create a synthetic voice of the targeted identity in order to
synthesize speech samples which are accepted by the speaker recog-
nition system [256]. In a voice conversion attack, an existing speech
sample of the impostor is altered, such that it becomes more similar
to the voice signal of the target subject [255]. In a mock-up attack, the
impostor generates a synthetic signal in order to circumvent speaker
recognition systems by causing high comparison scores that do not
necessarily contain speech signals [257]. Replay attacks refer to the
playback of a previous captured voice sample to the speaker recog-
nition system [258]. For unit-selection attacks, speech samples of the
attacked subject are captured, segmented into parts, called units, and
replayed in different sequences to the speaker recognition system. Im-
itation or mimicry is the attempt of a subversive user to mimic an
enrolled subject in order to get access to the system via the foreign
account [259].
This section concerns132 a certain type of presentation attacks,
namely unit-selection. Unit-selection presentation attack instruments
132 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Ulrich Johannes Scherhag,
Christian Rathgeb and Christoph Busch [73], which emerged from the collaboration
with Ulrich over his master’s thesis [260] (received the 2016 CAST IT-Security award
with first place distinction among six finalists).
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Figure 7.1: Structure of presentation attacks.
(PAIs) can be thought of as a collage of speech signals, introduc-
ing non-natural presentation artefacts, such as abrupt changes in fre-
quency transitions. In this section, the following hypotheses are in-
vestigated:
• Collages of sound units comprise non-natural speech transi-
tions, recognizable as edges by wavelet and Fourier based fre-
quency features.
• Unit-selection attacks can be detected language-independently.
7.1.1 Voice PAD: the ASVspoof 2015 Challenge
In the ASVspoof 2015 spoofing challenge, the detection of text-inde-
pendent attacks, in particular on voice synthesis, voice conversion,
and unit-selection [49] is being focused on. Five out of ten attack
algorithms are known during the PAD system development phase
in order to investigate the detection robustness against (the other
five) unknown attacks. State-of-the-art voice PAD systems [261–264]
achieve equal error rates (EERs) of about 0% for each of nine out
of ten presentation attack instrument speciess (PAISs), i.e., for all
PAISs of the ASVspoof 2015 challenge but the unit-selection as the
challenge’s tenth PAIS (referred to as S10, the tenth spoofing attack).
The unit-selection PAD performance resembles the attack potential of
all of the challenge’s PAIS. The countermeasures utilize phase-based
features, which detect non-natural phase shifts in generated artefact
samples. During the synthesis process, only amplitude information
is concerned in the vocoding stage, making phase-based features con-
venient for detecting such artefacts. In contrast to synthetic speech
signals, unit-selection creates artefacts by reusing previous recorded
samples [265]. The natural phase-shift of the sample is thus preserved
and the applicability of countermeasures utilizing phase-based fea-
tures is limited.
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However, a successful countermeasure against unit-selection at-
tacks, as proposed in [266], employs a feature-combination of cochlear
filter cepstral coefficients (CFCC), instantaneous frequency (IF), and
mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC). The CFCC, introduced in
[267], is calculated by utilizing an auditory transform (AT), followed
by a filter bank and discrete cosine transform (DCT). The AT itself
is a function emulating the filter function of the cochlear [268]. In or-
der to consider phase information, a CFCCIF is designed, combining
CFCC with IF. Fused with MFCCs, this approach yields an EER of
1.2% on the ASVspoof data and an EER of 8.5% on unit-selection at-
tacks, which is the best result achieved in the context of the ASVspoof
2015 challenge [266]. In [269], the same authors propose a unit-selec-
tion detection utilizing prosodic features, i.e., fundamental frequency
(f0) contour and strength of excitation, achieving an EER of 12.4% on
the ASVspoof 2015 data. Eventually, constant Q cepstral coefficients
(CQCCs) [144] are proposed.133 CQCCs are proposed in music pro-
cessing to analyze different frequencies with variable resolution. For
unit-selections, CQCCs yielded a 0.5% EER.
Most common features that analyze frequencies, such as MFCCs
and CFCCs, aim at emulating the perception of humans. However,
the human hearing is rather specialized for speech recognition. For
that reason, state-of-the-art presentation attack countermeasures are
capable of yielding significantly better PAD performances compared
to human observers [270]. On the contrary, CQCCs are successful as
their processing is motivated from music analysis. Here, features are
proposed based on artefact observations of unit-selection attacks.
7.1.2 Contribution: Countermeasure on Sound Unit Transitions
Examining the frequency-domain of unit-selection attacks, speech is
interpreted as a concatenation of phonemes or likewise sound units.
Concatenation points are referred to as transitions. Differences in the
frequency domain of unit transitions in bona fide presentations and
attack presentations are thereby exploited.
7.1.2.1 Frequency Analysis of Sound Unit Transitions
In bona fide presentations of (human speech), phonemes transition
smoothly into another. The continuous transition of a bona fide
speech signal is depicted in Fig. 7.2. Audio-signals, which are a com-
pound (like a collage) of multiple voice fragments (phonemes or other
units) and not smoothed afterwards, show more abrupt changes of
the frequency in the signal, as illustrated in Fig. 7.3.
133 The ASV spoof 2015 challenge leads to the proposal of different features. The CQCC
paper on the ASVspoof 2015 challenge and the collaboration this work [73] is partly
based on were in review/under submission simultaneously. CQCCs became the
baseline for the 2017 and 2019 ASVspoof challenges.
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(a) Human speech signal
(b) Close-up: transition in human speech signal
Figure 7.2: Example of a bona fide (human) speech signal and transitions.
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(a) Unit-selection speech signal
(b) Close-up: transition in unit-selection speech signal
Figure 7.3: Example of a unit-selection speech signal and transitions.
In bona fide presentations, smooth transitions result in natural tran-
sitions in the frequency-domain as exemplarily depicted in Fig. 7.4,
whereas the transformation of the non-natural concatenated signal
causes abrupt changes in the whole frequency band.
Fig. 7.5 illustrates unit-selection presentation artefacts in the spec-
trum: higher frequencies comprise abrupt changes in the magnitude,
which, compared to natural human speech, comprise more density
and occur more often. Motivated by this analysis, Fourier and wavelet
based features are proposed in order to distinguish between (bona
fide) speech and unit-selection attacks.
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(a) Spectrogram of human speech signal
(b) Close-up: spectrogram of transition in human speech signal
Figure 7.4: Spectrogram of a human speech signal and transitions.
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(a) Spectrogram of unit-selection speech signal
(b) Close-up: spectrogram of transition in unit-selection speech signal
Figure 7.5: Spectrogram of a unit-selection speech signal and transitions.
7.1.2.2 Fourier-Based Features
In contrast to the result of a short-time Fourier transform (STFT), as
visualized in Fig. 7.5, the Fourier transform omits any time infor-
mation. Thus, a Fourier-based feature vector is proposed as (in the
time domain) sudden changes of non-natural transitions cause (in
frequency domain) higher amplitudes for higher frequencies. The re-
sulting vector of the Fourier transform represents the amplitude as
real part a and the phase as imaginary part b i. The magnitude of the
signal |a+ b i| is calculated as |a+ b i| =
√
a2 + b2.
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7.1.2.3 Wavelet-Based Features
As depicted in Figs. 7.4 and 7.5, higher frequencies are more signif-
icant for distinguishing bona fide presentations from unit-selection
samples than lower frequencies. A successive decomposition of a
signal into bandpass-signals without information loss is possible, ac-
cording to the Mallat theorem [271]. The discrete wavelet transform
(DWT) can be understood as a bandpass filter decomposing the signal
in iterative steps.
Earlier iterations provide higher frequency bands, later iterations
provide lower ones. Assuming the discriminability of higher frequen-
cies, a feature vector extracting the fifth detail level is examined.
This choice was elaborated based on experimental results employing
10 343 bona fide and 10 461 attack samples. In order to cover multiple
frequency bands establishing more discriminative robustness, the pro-
posed DTW feature comprises information fused from third to fifth
iteration. As the DWT represents a bandpass filter, the dimension of
the result depends on the length of the analyzed signal. In order to
obtain features with a fix dimension, a Fourier transformation is ap-
plied.
7.1.3 Analysis: Detection of Unit-Selection Presentation Attacks
The unit-selection attacks on the GSDC dataset are generated using
Mary-TTS [265]. The proposed features are examined using support
vector machines (SVM) and Gaussian mixture model (GMM) classi-
fiers trained on the development set and optimized on the calibration
set. A third partition of the GSDC is held back to validate the cali-
bration results. The final performance of the classifiers is examined
on the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation set, namely on the unit-selection
partition (see chapter 3). In this section, the EER of attack presen-
tation classification error rate (APCER) and bona fide presentation
classification error rate (BPCER) is pointed out. The machine learn-
ing algorithms examined in this work are SVMs and GMMs. SVMs
are chosen as they represent a well-established machine learning al-
gorithm which provides binary classification and are known for good
pattern recognition performance [268]. Following the assumption that
Fourier based feature spaces comprise linear separable populations,
linear SVM kernels may yield adequate performance. As an alterna-
tive to the SVM approach, GMMs are trained. LLR scores are com-
puted on two 16-component GMMs, each representing bona fide and
unit-selection speech. It is assumed that the proposed feature space
results in different probabilistic clusters for each class.
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Table 7.1: Configuration for best observed EER (on German speech data).
Feature Classifier EER Number of
Frequencies
DWT-fusion+FFT
SVM 5.0% 600
GMM 5.6% 200
FFT
SVM 6.1% 1000
GMM 6.3% 1100
DWT-5+FFT
SVM 23.1% 100
GMM 20.0% 1600
7.1.3.1 Results on Calibration Set
The EER of the machine learning algorithms strongly depends on the
size of the analyzed feature vector. In an analysis of the frequency
resolutions from 100 to 3 000 (in steps of 100), the most promising
configurations are investigated, cf. Tab. 7.1.
In general, a frequency resolution above 1100 bins leads to a rapidly
increasing EER. This effect is likely to be caused by the machine learn-
ing algorithms as larger feature vectors require more training data in
order to converge to satisfactory results.
For SVMs, the Fourier-based feature yields an EER of 6.1% with
an FFT analyzing 1 000 frequencies. A feature fusion of FFT with the
fifth iteration of a wavelet fusion (referred to as DWT-5+FFT) yields
an EER of 23.1%. A feature that fuses the third to fifth DWT iteration
features (referred to as DWT-fusion+FFT) exceeds the basic Fourier
approach by 1.1 percent points, achieving 5.0%.
7.1.3.2 Results on Validation Set
The most promising configurations are examined on the validation
set (German speech data). The observed EERs are depicted in Tab. 7.2.
In general, the observed EERs are higher than those on the calibration
set. On the validation dataset, the performance of the SVMs is less
affected than the performance of the GMMs. The SVM classifying
DWT-fusion+FFT features result in an EER of 7.1%, a drop of 2.1
percent points from the calibration set.
Fig. 7.6 depicts the detection error trade-off (DET) and binary deci-
sion error trade-off (BET) plots the examined algorithms. The perfor-
mance DWT-5+FFT feature is behind the other features in all (visual-
ized) operating points of interest. Assessed with the SVM, the DWT-
5+FFT feature excels all other approaches for an APCER below 3%.
The performances of the FFT and DWT countermeasures FFT+SVM
and DWT-fusion+FFT+SVM are approximately identical in most op-
eration points, FFT+GMM is slightly inferior.
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Table 7.2: Best observed configurations evaluated with validation and
ASVspoof sets.
Feature Comparator EER Vali-
dation set
EER
ASVspoof set
DWT-fusion+FFT
SVM 7.1% 11.7%
GMM 15.0% 24.6%
FFT
SVM 8.5% 22.6%
GMM 9.5% 27.7%
DWT-5+FFT
SVM 27.0% 11.7%
GMM 40.1% 45.7%
CFCCIF [266] GMM — 8.5%
CQCC [144] GMM — 0.5%
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Figure 7.6: DET and BET plots for configurations on validation set.
7.1.3.3 Results on ASVspoof 2015 Unit-Selection Partition
Tab. 7.2 compares the performance on the ASVspoof 2015 unit-
selection partition (English speech data) to the validation set (German
speech data). The performance of the proposed algorithms (slightly)
reduces on the validation set but changes (vastly) on the ASVspoof
set. The EER of the DWT-fusion+FFT feature with SVM drops by 4.6
percent points to 11.7%. Remarkable is the performance increase of
the analyzed DWT-5+FFT feature, improving the EER by 15.3 percent
points to 11.7%. The error trade-off characteristic of the DWT-5+FFT
feature with SVM yields the best observed DET and BET characteris-
tics on the ASVspoof data, as depicted in Fig. 7.7.
The proposed features are able to detect unit-selection attacks with
an EER of 7.1% on the GSDC and 11.7% on the ASVspoof unit-se-
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Figure 7.7: DET and BET plots for configurations with best EER on the
ASVspoof unit-selection attacks.
lection set. Tab. 7.2 compares the proposed features and comparators
to the best performing algorithm submitted at ASVspoof 2015 [266]
and to the algorithm proposed in concurrence to this work [144]. To
the best performing algorithm of the ASVspoof 2015 challenge, the
introduced features DWT-5+FFT (SVM) and DWT-fusion+FFT (SVM)
yield competitive results. The benefit of the proposed feature is that
the computational costs are comparatively low since a Fourier trans-
formation (FFT) is utilized instead of the more expensive spectrogram
(STFT). The proposed feature space and classifiers represent a con-
trastive PAD system; in the presented approach, the unit-selection
attack scheme to face is known during the approach development,
which (on the contrary) is unknown for the countermeasures depicted
in related work. A fusion of the above-mentioned features with low-
level frequency analyses seems promising. Notably, this analysis com-
prised data shifts in terms of capture environments, the experimental
setup, and the examined language. The field of voice PAD is actively
researched in many international collaborations, especially the detec-
tion of replays, voice synthesis, and voice conversion, to countermea-
sure the various and also newly emerging forms of “fake audios” not
only in voice biometrics but also in a multimedia engaging society.
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7.2 privacy and data protection : homomorphically
encrypted biometric information and comparators
The 2016 EU general data privacy regulation [272] declares biometric
information as personal data, i.e., highly sensitive and entitled to the
right of privacy preservation. Similarly, the current payment service
directive [253] also requires biometric information protection to be
employed in biometric systems utilized for banking services. To that
end, the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [44] on biometric information protection
provides guidance on how to preserve the capture subject’s privacy.
It defines the following three main properties to be fulfilled by pro-
tected biometric information:
• Unlinkability. Given only protected biometric information, it
is not possible to say whether two protected biometric sample
representations belong to the same subject. This prevents cross-
comparisons for databases of different applications and ensures
the privacy of the subject.
• Renewability. If a protected biometric reference is leaked or
lost, the reference data can be revoked and renewed from the
same biometric trait without the need to re-enroll.
• Irreversibility. Recovering biometric data from leaked protected
biometric information is impossible without knowing the secret
(key or algorithm) used to protect the biometric information.
Restoring of valid biometric features or samples is thereby pre-
vented.
In addition to these properties, other performance metrics, such as
recognition accuracy, should be preserved.134
Even if some authors argue that there is no need for biometric
information protection (depending on the feature extraction) [274],
sensitive information can be derived from unprotected biometric ref-
erences, as has already been proved for other biometric character-
istics [275, 276]. In particular, linkability of state-of-the-art speaker
134 The implementation of privacy safeguards faces different challenges in the public
and commercial sector. For standalone systems (commercials), the proposed biomet-
ric information protection scheme can be easily implemented on top of existing sys-
tems (which is not always the case, especially when following the privacy-by-design
principle). For multi-owner systems (public sectors) that need to provide interoper-
ability among different owners (forensic labs in different countries), any standalone
solution for biometric information protection is difficult to implement. Ideally, in-
teroperability is provided through standards which are implemented and tested for
conformance. Nonetheless, the standardized biometric data interchange format—for
forensic biometrics, the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard [273]—has been modified by al-
most every country (as of communication with forensic experts). This lack of a com-
mon version (one might suggest the Interpol version) makes the implementation
of a common cryptosystem that still provides the demanded degree of freedom in
interoperability harder. This discussion, however, lies outside the scope of this dis-
sertation.
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recognition features is demonstrated in [143] with the motivation of
interchanging features among different voice biometric services. The
interchange of biometric data across services is ethically addressed in
[277], especially when targeting forensic scenarios. Accounting for lat-
est data privacy legislation, biometric information protection is elabo-
rated on in this work, especially for commercial but also for forensic
(dual-use case) application scenarios, to demonstrate that LLR scores
are computable with sustained precision in a distributed system ar-
chitecture, while privacy is preserved and data is protected.
In this section135, Paillier homomorphic encryption is made avail-
able to speaker recognition, targeting data privacy for subjects and
biometric system vendors, investigating on the following hypotheses:
• Homomorphic encryption can be made available to generative
comparators, considering the two covariance model (2Cov) com-
parator as a prototype scheme for probabilistic linear discrimi-
nant analysis (PLDA) comparators, sustaining the data privacy
of subjects.
• Homomorphic encryption can be employed to protect biometric
information as well as comparison model parameters.
7.2.1 Outline: Biometric Information Protection for Speaker Recognition
Current approaches to biometric information protection can be
broadly classified into three categories [279]: i) cancelable biomet-
rics [280], where irreversible transformations are applied at sample
or feature level; ii) cryptobiometric systems [281], where a key is ei-
ther bound or extracted from the biometric data; and iii) biometrics
in the encrypted domain [282], where techniques based on homo-
morphic encryption (HE) and garbled circuits are used to protect the
data. While cancelable biometrics and cryptobiometric systems usu-
ally report some accuracy degradation [279], the use of HE schemes
prevents such loss, since the operations carried out in the encrypted
domain are equivalent to those performed with plaintext data. For
this reason, HE schemes in this work are applied similarly to the
ones proposed in [283–286] to speaker recognition relying on gen-
erative comparators, such as PLDA. Here, data privacy is ensured
for data capture subjects as well as for comparison models using the
2Cov approach [133, 158] (which is the full subspace PLDA model;
here as a prototype generative comparison algorithm).
135 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Sergey Isadskiy, Jascha
Kolberg, Marta Gomez-Barrero, and Christoph Busch [74] (Odyssey 2018 best paper
award), which emerged from the collaboration with Sergey on his master’s thesis
[278], as well as the work with Abelino Jimenez, Amos Treiber, Jascha Kolberg, and
Nicholas Evans (among others) [19], a 23 co-author collaboration survey on data
privacy in speaker and speech characterization.
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Comparison scores of generative and discriminative models can
be probabilistic. In contrast to discriminative comparators, generative
models can emit features with associated likelihoods based on pre-
trained models and thus estimate probabilistic similarity. The parame-
ters of pre-trained models deserve protection by the biometric system
vendors who distribute the sensitive parameters to various biomet-
ric service operators. A mutual encryption scheme granting subject
and vendor data privacy is further proposed by employing well-es-
tablished Paillier homomorphic cryptosystems [287, 288], blindfold-
ing operators. Notably, while conventional image based biometric
systems employ comparators operating either on binary or nonneg-
ative integers [285, 286, 289, 290], the generative comparators used
in speaker recognition applications make assumptions on underlying
distributions, such as normal distribution [127, 130], consequently op-
erating on normally distributed float values.
7.2.2 Overview: Biometric Information Protection
In order to apply biometric information protection schemes of stan-
dardization, binarization136 can be employed [44]. Related work on
the binarization of traditional speaker recognition systems utilizing
universal background models (UBMs) targeting the GMM – UBM ap-
proach can be found in [291–293]. In addition, [294] proposes a bio-
metric information protection scheme for speaker recognition, based
on binarized GMM supervectors.
Due to the binarization process, however, the biometric perfor-
mance usually declines, and calibration properties are lost. Contrary
to performance-lossy information protection approaches such as bio-
metric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics [279], HE completely
preserves biometric accuracy. Therefore, Paillier HE schemes are in-
vestigated here, which are already introduced to other biometric
modalities, such as face [295], signature [283], iris [289], and finger-
print [290] recognition, considering Hamming distances (XOR opera-
tor), dynamic time warping (DTW), the Euclidean distance, and the
cosine similarity. Thus, for the remainder of this section, the focus is
put on homomorphic cryptosystems.
In [296] and [297], the authors provide an overview of several bio-
metric information protection schemes based on HE and garbled cir-
cuits. Barni et al. [290] present a way to protect fixed-length finger-
codes [298] using HE. This system is modified in [299] in order to ac-
celerate the process by reducing the size of the fingercode. However,
a reduction of information also leads to a degradation of biometric
recognition performance. Ye et al. present an anonymous biometric
136 Although it might appear counterintuitive to (re-) binarize data which is already
stored in a binary format (floats are discrete data after all), the term binarization is
often referred to in the literature.
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access control (ABAC) system [300] for iris recognition. Their system
setup only verifies whether a subject is enrolled without revealing
her identity and thus grants anonymity towards the subject. Another
ABAC protocol is proposed in [301] by Luo et al., and a secure sim-
ilarity search algorithm is presented for anonymous authentication.
Combining homomorphic encryption with garbled circuits, Blanton
and Gasti [302] implement secure protocols for iris and fingerprint
recognition.
Among the existing cryptosystems in the literature, the encryp-
tion algorithms based on lattices are assumed to be post-quantum
secure [303, conjecture 2], which is a convenient property for a public
key encryption scheme. Using ideal lattices in a somewhat homomor-
phic encryption (SHE) scheme, Yasuda et al. [304] efficiently compute
the Hamming distance of encrypted references and probes by using
a packing method before the encryption. By using binary feature vec-
tors with a constant size of 2 048 bits for all biometric data, Yasuda et
al. [305] present a new packing method in a SHE scheme for biomet-
ric authentication based on a special version of the ring learning with
errors assumption. Another privacy-preserving biometric authentica-
tion approach [306] splits a 2 048 bits iris code into 64 blocks with
32 bits each and encrypts these blocks using n-th degree truncated
polynomial ring (NTRU). As in the aforementioned works, scores are
computed in the encrypted domain without disclosure of biometric
information.
HE and garbled circuits schemes are not new to the speech com-
munication community (including speaker recognition). They have
been studied by the research group of Bhiksha Raj, cf. [307–311]
(among other works) for almost a decade. Regarding HE, their work
considers mostly protocols and cryptosystems for hidden Markov
models (HMMs) and GMMs. This dissertation contributes HE for
PLDA/2Cov comparison of probabilistic and discriminative embed-
dings, i.e., for the state-of-the-art comparison of i-vectors and x-
vectors.
7.2.3 Homomorphic Cryptosystems
Homomorphic encryption (HE) [312–314] has the property that com-
putations on the ciphertext are equivalent to those carried out on the
plaintext. Homomorphisms are functions which preserve algebraic
structures of groups [315]. The function f : G → H is a homomor-
phism for the two groups (G,♦), (H,) with sets G,H and opera-
tors ♦, if:
f(g♦g ′) = f(g) f(g ′) ∀g,g ′ ∈ G . (7.1)
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Example: Homomorphisms for Public-Key Cryptography
This property is used for public-key cryptosystems. Thereby, the
function f is seen as an encryption function using a public key.
The plaintext operation ♦ is the biometric comparison (e.g., PLDA);
its result is a (plaintext) score. Its equivalent for ciphertexts is the
operation , i.e., biometric comparison for encrypted references
and encrypted probes (f(g) f(g ′)); its result is equivalent to an
encrypted score f(g♦g ′) (the homomorphism). The inverse of f,
the function f−1, is the decryption which uses the secret key, such
that scores computed on ciphertexts can be decrypted.
In distributed system architectures, privacy is preserved,
whereas an authentication server alone knows the secret key. The
secret key’s security needs to be guaranteed. By contrast, the pub-
lic key is known by everyone. Client devices use the public key
to encrypt reference and probe features. For privacy, it is of utmost
importance that the entities involved with the authentication server
(those who could access the secret key and encrypt protected ref-
erences and probes) are prohibited from accessing protected data
but encrypted scores.
In the case of a database leakage with encrypted references, no
one but the holders of the secret key are capable of decryption (the
assumption is that without knowing the secret key, decryption is
infeasible and takes too much computational time). The responsibil-
ity of the secret key holders is then to generate a new public/secret
key pair with which the protected database is renewed: an authority
is granted access to the old secret key and the new public key to
decrypt (with the old secret key) and encrypt (with the new public
key) the biometric data. This property (renewability) is, beside the
unlinkability and irreversibility properties within biometric informa-
tion protection, crucial.
Public-key cryptosystems (K,M,C, enc, dec) with sets of keys K,
plaintexts M, ciphertexts C, and functions representing encryption
enc and decryption dec are homomorphic if:
∀m1,m2 ∈M, ∀pk ∈ K :
encpk(m1) encpk(m2) = encpk(m1 ♦m2) , (7.2)
where the public key pk is used for encryption and the secret key sk
for the decryption functions, respectively:
encpk :M→ C ,
decsk : C→M . (7.3)
7.2.3.1 Paillier HE Scheme
Motivated by asymmetric Paillier cryptosystems [287, 288], HE has
been made available to biometric information protection [283, 285,
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286]. Paillier cryptosystems are homomorphic, probabilistic encryp-
tion schemes based on the decisional composite residuosity assump-
tion (DCRA) [287]: for integers n, z it is hard to decide whether z is an
n-residue modulo n2.137 Due to this assumption, the Paillier cryptosys-
tem is secure against honest but curious users conducting chosen ci-
phertext attacks [287, 316, 317].
In the Paillier cryptosystem, the public key pk = (n,g) is defined by
n = pq and g ∈ Z∗n2 , where p,q are two large prime numbers, such
that gcd(pq, (p− 1) (q− 1)) = 1, and with Z∗n2 as the set of module
n2 integers having a modular multiplicative inverse. Based on p,q,
the secret key sk = (λ,µ) is defined by λ = lcm(p− 1,q− 1) and µ = ρ
mod n. Thereby, ρ is the modular multiplicative inverse to ρ = L(gλ
mod n2), where L(x) = x−1n . The modular multiplicative inverse ρ to
ρ is defined as ρ ρ ≡ 1 (mod n2). In modulo n2, the multiplication of
ρ and its inverse results in the identity (the mathematical identity, an
equality relation, such as the value 1 for ordinary multiplication). By
consequence, both terms (ρ and ρ) are relatively prime (coprime) to
another: gcd(ρ, ρ) = 1.
During encryption c = encpk(m, s) ∈ Z∗n2 of a message m ∈ Zn
with public key pk, a random number s ∈ Z∗n provides the proba-
bilistic nature of the cryptosystem, i.e., encpk(m, s1) 6= encpk(m, s2)
for two different s1, s2 ∈ Z∗n:
c = encpk(m, s) = gm sn mod n2 , (7.4)
which is abbreviated as encpk(m) in the following. Ciphertexts are
decrypted as:
m = decsk(c) = L
(
cλ mod n2
)
µ mod n . (7.5)
Similarly to [283, 285, 286, 288, 307–309], the following additive ho-
momorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem are used regard-
ing plaintexts m1,m2 and corresponding ciphertexts c1, c2:
decsk (c1 c2) = m1 +m2 mod n ,
decsk
(
c1
l
)
= m1 l mod n with a constant l . (7.6)
In other words, while the decrypted product of two ciphertexts is
equivalent to the sum of two plaintexts, the decrypted exponentiation
of a ciphertext and a (plaintext) constant l is equivalent to the product
of the corresponding plaintext m1 and this (plaintext) constant.
7.2.3.2 Homomorphic Biometric Information Protection
Targeting biometric information protection, data privacy friendly
comparison schemes are sought in which only encrypted references
137 In other words, while it is easy to multiply integers y n-times with another and to
compute the remainder z after division by n2, i.e., z ≡ yn (mod n2), it is assumed
to be hard to find the existence (and value) of y for given numbers z,n.
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(no plaintext references) are stored in databases. As such, the Eu-
clidean and cosine similarity comparison scores SEuc,Scos between two
D-dimensional vectors X = {x1, . . . , xD},Y = {y1, . . . ,yD} are compu-
tationally derived as [283, 285, 286]:
SEuc (X,Y) =
D∑
d=1
x2d +
D∑
d=1
y2d − 2
D∑
d=1
xd yd , (7.7)
and the corresponding encrypted score encpk (SEuc (X,Y)):
encpk (SEuc (X,Y)) =
encpk
(
D∑
d=1
x2d
)
encpk
(
D∑
d=1
y2d
)
D∏
d=1
encpk (yd)
−2xd , (7.8)
where the protected reference Y
encpk
Euc is defined as:
Y
encpk
Euc =
(
encpk
(
D∑
d=1
y2d
)
,
(
encpk (yd)
)D
d=1
)
. (7.9)
On the other hand, the cosine comparison is derived as [283, 285]:
Scos (X,Y) =
XT Y
||X|| ||Y ||
=
D∑
d=1
xd
||X||
yd
||Y ||
,
encpk (Scos (X,Y)) =
D∏
d=1
encpk
(
yd
||Y ||
) xd
||X||
, (7.10)
where the protected reference Y
encpk
cos is defined for length-normalized
features as:
Y
encpk
cos =
((
encpk (yd)
)D
d=1
)
= encpk(Y) . (7.11)
In [283, 285], solely positive integers are considered. Accommodating
a broader range of positive only float values, a 1012 scaling factor is
employed. Accounting for negative float values, this study relies on
an alternative float representation.
Fig. 7.8 illustrates a distributed client-server architecture employ-
ing HE with a cosine comparison: a client device C extracts the probe
feature vector X and requests the encrypted reference feature vector
encpk(Y) from the database DBcontroller (which is in the province of
the data biometric data controller). Scores are then calculated on the
client device (here as the biometric data processor) and sent to the au-
thentication server ASoperator (in the province of, e.g., biometric system
owners, operators and providers), which holds the key pair (pk, sk).
Based on a pre-defined threshold, ASoperator outputs the decision of
whether or not the decrypted score Scos is greater or equal to a thresh-
old η.138 Ideally, the DBcontroller is in the domain of an independent
138 Throughout this section, the LLR threshold notation η is used to indicate that scores
are assumed to be well-calibrated before threshold comparison.
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Client
DBcontroller
ASoperator
1. Extract probe: X
3. Compute:
encpk (Scos) = 2
X
encpk(Y)
2. Send:
encpk(Y)
4. Send:
encpk (Scos)
5. Decrypt score:
Scos = decsk (4)
6. Decision:
(η 6 5)→ yes / no
pk, sk
Figure 7.8: Architecture of homomorphically encrypted cosine similarity
comparison for length-normalized features, cf. [283], with client
device, servers (blue boxes) and communication channels (or-
ange arrows).
Table 7.3: Complexity analysis for the Euclidean and cosine comparators
during verification, cf. [283], assuming D = 250 dimensional fea-
tures, the size of an encrypted feature ν = 0.5 KiB, and the plain
feature size p = 64 bits.
Euclidean Cosine
No encryptions D 0
No decryptions 1 1
No additions D− 1 0
No products 2D+ 4 D− 1
No exponentiations 2D D
Plain reference size pD pD
≈ 2.0 KiB ≈ 2.0 KiB
Protected reference size ν (D+ 1) νD
= 125.5 KiB = 125.0 KiB
Channels: amount of ν (D+ 2) ν (D+ 1)
protected data exchanged = 126.0 KiB = 125.5 KiB
data controller, restricting access to operators, among others. Tab. 7.3
provides an overview of the complexity of the encrypted Euclidean
and cosine comparison. Numbers diverge from [283] as in the sig-
nature recognition scenario, five references are encrypted rather than,
e.g., an averaged reference model. As references are encrypted during
enrolment, cosine-based biometric comparisons require no additional
encryptions, whereas in Euclidean-based comparisons, the probe fea-
tures need to be encrypted.
7.2.4 Revisiting PLDA and 2Cov Comparators in Speaker Recognition
State-of-the-art i-vector comparators belong to the PLDA family [157,
158]. PLDA comparators conduct a likelihood ratio scoring compar-
ing the probabilities of the propositions that reference and probe
i-vectors X,Y stemming from A : the same source or from B : differ-
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ent sources. Therefore, within and between speaker variabilities are
examined in a latent (biometric) feature subspace. In this work, em-
phasis is put on the 2Cov approach [133, 158], the full-subspace Gaus-
sian PLDA. Notably, the 2Cov comparator can also be related to pair-
wise support vector machines [133, 158]. For the sake of tractability,
this study focuses on the generative 2Cov model. Also, i-vectors are
solely considered as point estimates, assuming ideal precision during
feature extraction. The closed-form solution to the 2Cov scoring is
denoted regarding within and between covariances W−1,B−1 with
mean µ [133], see Eq. 2.93:
S2Cov (X,Y) = XTΛY + YTΛX+XT Γ X+ YT Γ Y + cT (X+ Y) + k
with Λ =
1
2
WT Λ˜W, Γ =
1
2
WT
(
Λ˜− Γ˜
)
W ,
c =WT
(
Λ˜− Γ˜
)
Bµ , k = k˜+
1
2
(
(Bµ)T
(
Λ˜− 2 Γ˜
)
Bµ
)
,
Λ˜ = (B+ 2W)−1 , Γ˜ = (B+W)−1 ,
k˜ = 2 log |Γ˜|− log |Λ˜|− log |B|+ µTBµ . (7.12)
7.2.5 Contribution: Privacy Architectures
In the following section, two discriminative HE schemes are proposed.
The first emphasizes HE for (i-vector) embeddings during 2Cov com-
parison, seeking data privacy for biometric capture subjects, whereas
the second focuses on the encryption of embeddings as well as 2Cov
model parameters, targeting data protection for subjects and vendors.
An auxiliary float representation is implemented, encoding float val-
ues as nonnegative integers for the purpose of providing Paillier prop-
erties, cf. Eq. (7.6).
7.2.5.1 Auxiliary Float Representation: Nonnegative Integers
For the purpose of representing float values of i-vector embeddings
as nonnegative integer values, i.e., seeking conformance to Paillier
cryptosystems, the integer encoding scheme standardized in IEEE 754
is employed [318]. Floats are encoded by four terms S,M,B,E as
S ×M × BE (similar to scientific number notation): a boolean flag
S represents the sign of the float, an unsigned integer M represents
the mantissa of the float, an unsigned integer B = 16 represents the
base of the float, and an unsigned integer E represents the exponent
of the float. Non-negative integers are derived by seeking congruent
positive representations in modulo n2, i.e., regarding the public key
domain. Accounting for negative values [319], the plaintext integer
domain is divided into four intervals: [0, n3 ) for positive float represen-
tations, [2n3 ,n) for negative float representations, and [
n
3 ,
2n
3 ) as well
as [n,∞) for the purpose of detecting overflows resulting from previ-
ous Paillier HE operations. Targeting Paillier HE, the same exponents
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of m1,m2 are required. The mantissa is hence encrypted as a nonneg-
ative integer representation. The plaintext exponent of the depending
mantissa encoding is kept auxiliary.139 Security requirements are met
due to the DCRA employing randomized mantissa obfuscation dur-
ing encryption. In Paillier addition, encrypted mantissae are scaled
for equivalent addend exponents. In Paillier multiplication, modular
exponentiation of c = encpk(M, s) is conducted, during which man-
tissae are kept rather small by iterative multiplications than by right-
away exponentiation.
7.2.5.2 Data Privacy: Protecting Subjects
For the sake of tractability, a zero mean is assumed, causing c = 0,
and neglecting the normalization term, i.e., k = 0, such that the fol-
lowing scheme solely holds for discriminative 2Cov. However, cali-
brated scores can be easily achieved by adding the k term after score
decryption:
S2Cov (X,Y) = XTΛY + YTΛX+XT Γ X+ YT Γ Y
=
(
XTΛ
)
Y + YT (ΛX) +XT Γ X+ YT Γ Y . (7.13)
For the discriminative 2Cov, HE is employed, motivated by the
(symmetric) dot product for vector multiplication:
encpk(Y)X =
D∏
d=1
encpk(yd)xd = encpk(XT Y)
= encpk(YTX) =
D∏
d=1
encpk(xd)yd = encpk(X)Y ,
encpk (S2Cov (X,Y)) = encpk(Y)(X
TΛ) encpk(Y)(ΛX)
encpk(XT Γ X) encpk(YT Γ Y) ,
encpk(Y) =
(
encpk(yd)
)D
d=1
(7.14)
with auxiliary vectors are denoted as
(
XTΛ
)
, (ΛX), and the pro-
tected reference Y
encpk
2Cov =
(
encpk(Y), encpk(YT Γ Y)
)
.
Fig. 7.9 illustrates the proposed HE architecture for a distributed
system. Similar to the cosine comparison HE approach, the scores
are computed in the encrypted domain on the client device and
139 According to [319], by choosing a value for the base, the information leakage of the
plaintext exponent is outlined. By contrast, when varying the base term, decoders
need to be manually informed. When further denoting a fixed exponent, one needs
to decide on the minimal precision lost: when base and exponent terms are fixed,
float values are effectively multiplied with some large fixed integer, and remaining
precision digits are truncated (lost). By finding a lower bound for naturally arising
exponents in the data, a practical exponent term can be set. For plaintext exponents,
smaller base terms exacerbate information leakage.
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Client
DBcontroller
ASoperator
1a. Extract probe: X
1b. Encrypt:
encpk
(
X′ Γ X
)
3. Compute:
2a(ΛX)
4. Compute:
2a(X
′Λ)
5. Compute:
encpk (S2Cov)
= 1b× 2b× 3× 4
Γ,Λ
encpk(Y)
encpk(Y
′ Γ Y)
Γ
2a. Send:
encpk(Y)
2b. Send:
encpk(Y
′ Γ Y)
7. Decrypt score:
S2Cov = decsk (6)
8. Decision:
(η 6 7)→ yes / no
pk, sk
6. Send:
encpk (S2Cov)
Figure 7.9: Contribution: architecture of homomorphically encrypted
PLDA/2Cov comparison solely protecting subject data with
client device, servers (blue boxes), and communication channels
(orange arrows).
decrypted on the authentication server. Thereby, the 2Cov score is
computed in four parts. Notably, Eq. (7.13) computationally equals
Eq. (2.91), i.e., carried out 2Cov score computations are the same al-
gorithmic computations for Gaussian PLDA (during recognition, not
during training). Thus, the proposed architecture is also applicable
and extensible to other members of the PLDA comparator family.
7.2.5.3 Privacy and Data Security: Protecting Subjects and Vendors
Contrary to established biometric HE approaches employing non-
generative comparators, generative comparators require trained hy-
per-parameters, e.g., between and within covariance matrices in terms
of the 2Cov comparator. For the purpose of protecting subject as well
as vendor data, two key sets are employed (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2). Us-
ing the Frobenius inner product140, Eq. (7.12) is restated [133], see
Eq. (2.94):
S2Cov (X,Y) = 〈Λ,XYT + Y XT〉+ 〈Γ,XXT + Y YT〉+ cT (X+ Y) + k ,
= wTΛϕΛ(X,Y) +w
T
Γ ϕΓ(X,Y)
+wTcϕc(X,Y) +w
T
kϕk(X,Y) ,
= wTϕ(X,Y) with
ϕ(X,Y) =

vec(XYT + Y XT)
vec(XXT + Y YT)
X+ Y
1
 =

ϕΛ(X,Y)
ϕΓ(X,Y)
ϕc(X,Y)
ϕk(X,Y)
 ,
140 The inner Frobenius product denotes xTAy = 〈A, xyT〉 = vec(A)T vec(xyT), where
vec(·) denotes the operator stacking matrices into a vector and 〈A,B〉 is the dot
product between matrices, cf. [133].
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w =

vec(Λ)
vec(Γ)
c
k
 =

wΛ
wΓ
wc
wk
 . (7.15)
For the 2Cov, a mutual HE scheme sustaining data privacy for sub-
jects and vendors can be employed by extending the inner product
of vectors to the Frobenius inner product of matrices A,B. The latter
can be reformulated via the vec(·) operator as the inner product of
(column-stacked) vectors, such that the dot product can be employed
with a public key pk as well:
encpk (A)
〈〉(B) = encpk (vec (A))
vec(B) , (7.16)
where the encryption of a matrix A is denoted as:
encpk (A) =
((
encpk(ai,j)
)D
i=1
)D
j=1
. (7.17)
In the simplified 2Cov comparator, the encrypted vendor and oper-
ator communication takes the form:
S2Cov (X,Y) = wTΛϕΛ(X,Y) +w
T
Γ ϕΓ(X,Y) ,
encpk2 (S2Cov (X,Y)) = encpk2(Λ)〈〉(c1)encpk2(Γ)〈〉(c2+c3)
with c1 = XYT + Y XT, c2 = XXT, c3 = Y YT , (7.18)
where the computation of c1, c2, c3 is subdue to the encrypted oper-
ator, controller, and client device communication:
encpk1(c1) = encpk1(Y)X
T ◦ encpk1(YT)X ,
encpk1(c2 + c3) = encpk1(XXT) ◦ encpk1(Y YT) . (7.19)
Here, ◦ denotes the Hadamard product141, and the terms encpk1(Y)XT ,
encpk1(YT)X represent exponentiations in an outer product fashion,
resulting in the matrices encpk1(Y XT) and encpk1(XYT), respectively.
Finally, the protected reference is Y
encpk1
2Cov =
(
encpk1(Y), encpk1(Y YT)
)
.
Fig. 7.10 presents the proposed architecture. The previously pro-
posed architecture is extended by additional communication channels
between operators and vendors. Applications employ two key pairs,
such that privacy preservation and data protection can be achieved
dependent on both: i) different biometric services of an biometric sys-
tem operator, owner, or provider, and ii) multiple provisions of a
biometric system to service operators, owners, and providers by a
biometric system vendor. Consequently, additional servers are neces-
sary on the vendor site in terms of a database DBvendor and an au-
thentication server ASvendor. As the computations carried out during
141 The Hadamard product is an entrywise product of two matrices A,B with the same
dimension: A ◦B = (A)i,j (B)i,j.
7.2 privacy and data protection : homomorphic encryption 221
Client
DBcontroller
ASoperator DBvendor
ASvendor
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)
3. Compute:
encpk1(c1)
= 2aX
T ◦ 2aTX
4. Compute:
encpk1(c2+c3)
= 1b ◦ 2b
encpk1(Y)
encpk1
(
Y YT
)
2a. Send:
encpk1(Y)
2b. Send:
encpk1
(
Y YT
)
7. Decrypt:
c1 = decsk1 (5a)
8. Decrypt:
c2+c3 = decsk1 (5b)
9. Compute:
encpk2 (S2Cov)
= 6a〈〉(7) 6b〈〉(8)
pk1, sk1, pk2
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1
)
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3
)
encpk2(Λ)
encpk2(Γ)
6a. Send:
encpk2(Λ)
6b. Send:
encpk2(Γ)
11. Decrypt score:
S2Cov = decsk2 (10)
12. Decision:
(η 6 11)→ yes / no
pk2, sk2
10. Send:
encpk2 (S2Cov)
Figure 7.10: Contribution: architecture of protected biometric information
and comparison model hyper-parameters with client device,
servers (blue boxes), and communication channels (orange ar-
rows).
verification are the same for the depicted 2Cov comparator and for
other Gaussian PLDA comparators, the proposed architecture is also
applicable and extensible to other members of the PLDA comparator
family.
7.2.6 Proof-of-Concept Study
The prototype system comprises a dimension reduction to D = 250
by linear discriminant analysis, within class covariance normalization,
length normalization, and 2Cov comparison. For the Paillier cryp-
tosystem, n = 2 048 bits keys are used in accordance with the US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommen-
dation SP 800-56A revision 3 [320]. In contrast, plaintext operations
consider double floating-point precision, i.e., p = 64 bits per plain
real feature value. Implementations are based on the freely available
sidekit [146] and Python Paillier [319]. Fig. 7.11 illustrates the DET and
BET performance of conventional and HE 2Cov comparators on the
evaluation set in terms of false non-match rate (FNMR) and false
match rate (FMR): the baseline performance is preserved across all
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operating points (the same for all systems). The DET and BET are
depicted in terms of the ROC’s convex hull (ROCCH). For the ex-
emplary 2Cov system, a 2.5% EER, a 0.050 minimum DCF (minDCF)
(parameterized according to [36]), and a 0.099 Cminllr are preserved in
the protected domain. As the k normalization term is neglected in
this setup, the baseline system yielded a 9.560 Cllr. Calibration loss
can be reduced by a post score re-bias or by employing conventional
score calibration methods, cf. [79]. By using linear score calibration
trained on the development set with known labels, Cllr is reduced to
0.284.
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Figure 7.11: DET and BET comparison of the baseline PLDA/2Cov system
(orange) and the proposed HE PLDA/2Cov schemes, focusing
on subject data protection (blue, dashed) and the protection of
subject and vendor data (black, dotted) with rule of 30 bounds
(red, green).
As the verification performance is preserved, the proposed schemes
are further examined regarding requirements of the biometric infor-
mation protection standard [44]. This examination is performed in
terms of [283], stating the following criteria: i) only the client device
can have access to the plain probe features, ii) the plain reference should
not be seen by the client device, and only its encryption should be stored
or handled during verification, and iii) the score should also be protected in
order to prevent hill-climbing and inverse-biometrics attacks. Firstly, both
employed homomorphic Paillier cryptosystems provide semantic se-
curity: only secret keys are able to derive the plain probe after encryp-
tion, whereas the client device solely communicates encrypted auxil-
iary matrices
(
encpk1 (c1)
)
and encpk1 (c2 + c3), or the encrypted
score
(
encpk (S2Cov (X,Y))
)
. Secondly, biometric references are com-
municated from the controller database server to the client device
in the encrypted domain, assuming that the authentication server is
able to protect the secret key sk1 and that no other entities will be able
to put the protected biometric information into relation (to its plain-
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Table 7.4: Contribution: complexity analysis for the proposed PLDA/2Cov
HE schemes (verification) with the data sizes of the exemplary
employed system (p = 64 bits,ν = 0.5 KiB,D = 250).
Comparator 2Cov 2Cov
Protection subject subject & vendor
No encryptions 1 D2
No decryptions 1 2D2+ 1
No additions 4D (D− 1) 0
No products 4D2+ 2D+ 1 5D2− 1
No exponentiations 2D 4D2
Plain reference size pD pD
≈ 2.0 KiB ≈ 2.0 KiB
Protected reference size ν (D+ 1) ν (D2+D)
= 125.5 KiB ≈ 30.6 MiB
Plain comparator model size 2pD2 2pD2
≈ 1.0 MiB ≈ 1.0 MiB
Protected comparator model size — 2νD2
— ≈ 61.0 MiB
Channels: amount of ν (D+ 2) ν (5D2+D+ 1)
protected data exchanged = 126.0 KiB ≈ 152.7 MiB
text by using this secret key, which is inaccessible to them). Similarly,
the vendor data is protected in the sense that the vendor authentica-
tion server is assumed to be able to protect sk2. Finally, scores are
computed in the protected domain and can solely be decrypted us-
ing secret key sk2. The irreversibility criterion is consequently met.
Renewability is granted as depicted in [283]: if references are lost,
new key pairs can be generated for the purpose of re-encrypting
the database, such that i) re-acquisitions of enrollment samples are
avoided when revoking corrupted references, and ii) comparisons of
corrupt to renewed references result in non-matches, granting secu-
rity and data privacy. Thus, references can easily be revoked, pro-
viding data privacy. Unlinkability is granted due to the probabilis-
tic nature of the Paillier cryptosystem, where random numbers are
used for different encryptions, i.e., in order to encrypt the same data
Y twice, two different random numbers s1, s2 are drawn, such that:
ence(Y , s1) 6= ence(Y , s2), cf. [283, 287].
7.2.7 Complexity Analysis
In terms of complexity, each approach can be analyzed regarding
the amount of required resources, i.e., the number of operations per-
formed in the encrypted domain as well as the size of encrypted data
sent over a channel. For a single verification attempt, the chipertext
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channel bandwidth is ν = 2n due to the Paillier ciphertext length in
modulo n2 domain [283], i.e., ν = 4 096 bits 1 KiB8192 bits = 0.5 KiB for
the examined system. Tab. 7.4 summarizes the complexity of the pro-
posed HE schemes. Regarding an i-vector dimension D = 250, the co-
sine HE approach requires νD = 125 KiB for storing a reference i-vec-
tor. For transmitting the protected score to the authentication server,
0.5 KiB are necessary, i.e., a protected scalar. The subject protective
2Cov HE scheme stores a reference tuple with ν (D+ 1) = 125.5 KiB,
communicating a protected scalar to the authentication server as well.
However, the subject and vendor protective 2Cov HE scheme stores
protected auxiliary matrices, requiring ν (D2 +D) ≈ 30.6 MiB. There-
fore, the channel between client device and authentication server con-
siders two protected matrices, requiring 2 νD2 ≈ 61.0 MiB. The same
holds for the channel between the vendor database and the operator
authentication server. Regarding the protected data exchanged via
the communication channels, the first proposed scheme comprises
ν (D + 2) = 126 KiB as the protected reference and score are trans-
mitted. The second proposed scheme demands higher requirements:
as the model hyper-parameters are protected, the client device to au-
thentication server channel transmits auxiliary matrices comprising
2 ν (D2) ≈ 61.0 MiB. The same amount of data is loaded for the pro-
tected model from the vendor database server. Finally, a protected
score is transmitted to the vendor authentication server, making ap-
plication decisions. Conventional security protocols can be employed
afterwards.
By employing HE, data privacy is protected: non-HE comparisons
solely carried out by biometric service operators permit operators to
utilize plaintext biometric features for other (non-biometric) purposes.
HE prohibits operators to exploit data privacy by preserving unlinkabil-
ity, renewability, and irreversibility. One may additionally aassure data
security by utilizing transport layer security (TLS), e.g., with RSA.142
7.3 summary
In this chapter, PAD security towards unit-selection attacks and archi-
tectures ensuring privacy and data protection were examined. Coun-
termeasures for unit-selection attacks were examined in a cross-lan-
guage setup, detecting natural versus non-natural speech transitions
based on (unfiltered) frequency features based on wavelet (DWT) and
Fourier analyses (FFT). These unfiltered frequency-domain features
were found to be feasible for PAD even when data and language
142 This method preserves privacy and protects data, it does not aim at security for ma-
chine communication. Exemplarily, an attacker could use the public key to encrypt
a very high similarity score and send this score to an authentication server to get a
positive verification outcome. The maintenance of data security (in machine commu-
nication) while preserving privacy (of biometric information) and protecting data
(sensitive to vendors) is left to future work.
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shifts occur between development and evaluation data. Effective unit-
selection voice PAD countermeasures were proposed by examining
DWT and FFT properties of probe samples in a single-system fashion.
Therefore, neither speech production nor speech perception theory
was necessary. SVM and GMM classifiers were found to be capable
of distinguishing bona fide and unit-selection attacks samples. Fur-
ther research on the frequency analysis of unfiltered speech signals
seems promising.
Regarding privacy and data protection in state-of-the-art speaker
recognition, homomorphic information protection was made avail-
able, especially to generative comparators (comparators employing
statistical models). In contrast to the proposed approach, related
work in biometrics solely considers non-generative comparators, such
as XOR, DTW, Euclidean distance, and cosine similarity. Extend-
ing the HE scheme for cosine similarity comparison, biometric in-
formation protection is made available to the 2Cov comparator in
two architectures. These architectures are used for comparators re-
porting on the evidence of probabilistic and discriminative embed-
dings (i-vectors and x-vectors). The first proposed HE architecture
solely emphasizes on the protection of embeddings, which can be
sustained under a fair complexity trade-off. By contrast, the second
proposed HE 2Cov scheme provides subject and vendor data pro-
tection. However, the required complexity increases by a quadratic
term. By pre-loading both protected comparator model parameters,
the channel bottleneck is reduced to ν (3 F2 + F+ 1) ≈ 91.7MiB for a
single verification attempt. This, however, limits the application scope
to well-equipped infrastructures, e.g., call center and forensic sce-
narios. Depending on the application scenario, protected references
may also be pre-loaded, further reducing the overall transmitted data
amount to ν (2 F2 + 1) ≈ 61.0MiB. For mobile device voice biomet-
rics, one may prefer to employ the first proposed architecture. Both
approaches ensure biometric information protection requirements as
of the ISO/IEC 24745 standard.
As the proposed schemes target 2Cov as prototype generative com-
parators, i.e., the full-subspace Gaussian PLDA special case, exten-
sions to other members of the PLDA family and related comparators
can be easily developed, especially as the bilinear PLDA computa-
tion comprises six matrix dot products (beside sums). Accounting
for i-vectors not only as single point estimate features but also as la-
tent variables, uncertainties associated to the single point estimation
can be incorporated as well, e.g., targeting full-posterior PLDA. Also,
HE schemes seem promising for end-to-end neural network system
architectures, as the inner Frobenius product is computable in the
protected domain. Extensions of the proposed architectures and im-
plementations of alternative HE schemes are left to be the subjects of
future work.

8
C O N C L U S I O N
This dissertation addressed the problem of speaker recognition in uncon-
strained environments using the Bayesian decision framework (BDF),
primarily in decision making for voice biometric systems with appli-
cations in smart home, online banking and payment, and forensics.
A taxonomy for the visual performance evaluation considering the
BDF has been proposed, interrelating latest advances of the forensics
and speaker recognition communities in order to bridge gaps towards
the biometrics community, particularly its standardization, but also
to other machine learning disciplines targeting binary decision prob-
lems. The formalized way of decision making introduced by the BDF
builds on the computation of log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores and (if
not possible, on) the calibration of system outputs to LLRs. In uncon-
strained environments, effects such as speech duration and background
noise cause performance degradations. These impacts are examined
regarding their biometric distinctiveness in terms of the security level
speaker recognition systems are capable of supporting. By quality-
based score normalization, re-calibrating degraded system outputs to
LLRs, scores become optimizable for decision making without know-
ing decision requirements. Sustaining the LLR score property, deci-
sion making is formalized; magnitudes of belief ratios in decision pri-
ors and costs are definable, resulting in LLR thresholds that are com-
parable to well-calibrated scores. For the purpose of denoting and
assessing decision policies, the concept of verbal tags is transferred
from the forensic science community, when unable to compute LLRs,
to performance evaluation, when unable to define decision policies.
A guideline has been proposed in this dissertation for practitioners
on denoting and refining LLR thresholds. Decision trade-offs are in-
terrelated with the visualization of error rate trade-offs. Furthermore,
as voice biometric systems are subject to attacks at the biometric sen-
sor, but also in stored biometric data and at the comparator, counter-
measures against replay attacks are proposed. Privacy preserving as
well as data protective architectures are proposed based on homomor-
phic encryption (HE). Gaps are not only bridged between biometric
information protection and speaker recognition; preservation of the
LLR score property is made available to (biometric) cryptosystems.
Neither client devices nor data controller nor biometric system opera-
tors nor vendors are able to relate references and probes. Each entity
operates on protected data, i.e., operators compute encrypted scores
without being able to interpret the system parameters distributed by
vendors and client devices process encrypted biometric data.
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8.1 main results and contributions
The main results and contributions of this dissertation are:
To the Theoretical Framework
• Binary decision error trade-off (BET) plots are proposed. Dis-
tances between two coordinates of the BET canvas resemble
changes in the magnitude of prior and cost belief ratios (in LLR
thresholds). The BET plot reveals betting log-odds of decision
policy parameterizations. Decision policies are modeled, not er-
ror rates.
Conclusion: BET plots are applicable to the evaluation of any ma-
chine learning problem with binary decision outcome, as the la-
tent decision subspace is revealed, considering LLRs to encode
all comparison information in their value.
• The need to visualize verbal scales of least-favorable decisions in er-
ror trade-off plots is identified for the purpose of making LLRs
digestible in performance reporting.
Conclusion: The outline of verbal scales for encompassed LLR
values depends on the use-case, e.g., smart home applications
might demand narrower but many LLR scales, whereas forensic
case work might require wider but fewer scales.
• A requirement communication scheme is defined regarding
BDF thresholds is to be met by the strength of evidence reported
in the form of LLRs.
Conclusion: Formalized decision making is made available to re-
quirement specifications. LLR values ∈ [−5,+5] might already
satisfy the vast majority of application requirements, as LLR
values of 4.6 and 6.9 represent one over a hundred and one over a
thousand (trivialized). Seeking higher LLR values increases the
demand for evaluation data and discrimination performance.
• On any 2D error rate canvas, such as receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) plots, thresholds by error rate trade-offs change
when interpolating between them. Thresholds by trade-offs in ra-
tio magnitudes of prior and cost beliefs (by beliefs) change when
their canvas representation changes. That is, for well-calibrated
system score outputs, changing between line segments of the
ROC’s convex hull (ROCCH). For decisions by error rate re-
quirements, score thresholds interpolate between empirical er-
ror rate coordinates. For decisions by belief requirements, LLR
thresholds interpolate at angles of ROCCH edges.
Conclusion: Thresholds motivated from score observations (by
error rates) are fundamentally different from thresholds formally
derived from decision requirements (by beliefs).
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• To empirical cross-entropy (ECE) plots, normalized ECE (NECE)
plots are defined as an extension. This definition is analogous
to the normalization of applied probability of error (APE) plots.
Conclusion: NECEs plots visualize information performance
comparatively to a coin toss; Cllr and Cminllr values are read-off.
• The proposed taxonomy of performance evaluation differenti-
ates between criteria (errors, information), types (discrimina-
tion, calibration), and audiences (analytic, reporting).
Conclusion: Gaps between the speaker recognition, biometrics,
forensics, and machine learning communities are bridged; out-
lining implications of the LLR paradigm to evaluation.
To Novel Measures
• A measure is identified on voice activity detection (VAD) deci-
sion robustness and coherence in the speaker recognition task,
facing noisy scenarios.
Conclusion: Pre-comparison figures of merit on (vision/audio)
data segmentation decision robustness might aid technology
evaluations to first harmonize data segmentation across partici-
pants, then to benchmark systems.
• The information accumulation of biometric voice references
is demonstrated by increasing duration, sample completeness,
in terms of the relative information conveyed in the acoustic
intermediate-sized vector (i-vector) feature domain.
Conclusion: For i-vector point estimates, gaps are bridged to the
biometric distinctiveness of other modalities. In unconstrained
environments, features are extracted with uncertainty about
their (expected) value, forming feature distributions form for
subjects. Distinctiveness is more precise when the extraction un-
certainty is propagated. Technology evaluations might benefit
from employing pre-comparison figures of merit on the infor-
mation provided by feature extraction, regardless of the recog-
nition task (such as voice or face recognition) in the wild.
• Quality vector (q-vector) are proposed, motivated by unified
audio characterization (UAC) and quality measure functions
(QMFs). Duration and noise conditions are exemplarily exam-
ined and quality conditions are linearly sampled. On acoustic
i-vector features, q-vector conditions are found to be indepen-
dent. Q-vectors are applicable to condition classification and to
link related conditions from the perspective of signal processing
by posterior probabilities, assuming flat priors.
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Conclusion: Practitioners might employ non-flat priors to model
the belief in a specific operative environment. The advantage of
linking quality conditions by q-vectors rather than first classi-
fying conditions and then employing condition-depending pro-
cessing is the avoidance of condition binning errors. When dis-
continuing system architectures to follow the BDF, pool adja-
cent violators algorithm (PAV) based score calibration is limited
to each condition bin. The empirical range of ideal LLRs is lim-
ited towards the amount of comparisons within each condition.
However, if not subdividing quality by bins, scores over all con-
ditions are used for training score calibration, and wider LLR
ranges might occur as a result. Quality binning might result in
a narrower range of empirically supported decision trade-offs
(by magnitudes).
To Novel Methods
• The pre-selecting of cohort subsets is proposed based on qual-
ity by the divergence of q-vectors. By reflecting quality from
the acoustic feature space perspective, pre-selection schemes
that are based on (oracle) knowledge about present quality con-
ditions are outperformed. This holds true especially for chal-
lenging conditions, as errors arising from condition binning are
avoided.
Conclusion: Quality informed score normalization might aid
other (biometric) recognition tasks.
• Score calibration based on function of quality estimate (FQE)
is proposed, employing q-vectors. Comparison scores are re-
biased depending on the (cosine) distance between q-vectors
of the reference and probe. The yielded performance is compet-
itive to the related work.
Conclusion: For samples of high quality, conventional calibra-
tion schemes yield better discrimination and calibration perfor-
mance. Practitioners might distinguish between quality condi-
tions of negligible uncertainty due to high precision and medi-
um/low quality with uncertainty propagation.
• Based on the knowledge about noise to training score normal-
ization with deep learning (mapping scores, quality informa-
tion, and features to more discriminative scores), the availabil-
ity of a wider-range of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) levels (despite
unavailability of biometric noise during calibration training) is
identified to yield more robust recognition performance than
the availability of non-biometric and biometric noise types (at
unavailable low-SNR levels during calibration training).
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Conclusion: The relevance of noise types might be pre-screened
before seeking to cope a larger noise type variety, e.g., by fur-
ther targeting reverberation and Lombard effects. Such robust-
ness analyses might limit the number of conditions necessary
to investigate when targeting unconstrained environments.
• presentation attack detection (PAD) is demonstrated between
natural and non-natural speech of unit-selection attacks. Unnat-
ural transitions between sound units are detected by classifying
wavelet and Fourier components with support vector machines
and Gaussian mixture models (GMMs).
Conclusion: Effectively, research on PAD is a hill-climbing from
either side (attacks and countermeasures). Ongoing research is
necessary. For the field of speaker recognition, other research
fields in speech communication are suitable to simulate presen-
tation attack instruments (PAIs) created by experts.
• Homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes are proposed for two
covariance model (2Cov) and probabilistic linear discriminant
analysis (PLDA) comparators, preserving data privacy for sub-
jects and ensuring data protection for biometric system vendors.
LLRs are computed in the protected domain. Privacy and data
protection are provided without losses in discrimination or cal-
ibration performance.
Conclusion: The proposed protocols assure the usability of LLRs
in compliance to international standards and to the 2016 Eu-
ropean General Data Privacy Regulation. By extending the proto-
col to also protect the data of vendors, novel licensing schemes
could evolve. As encrypted data is licensed, the private key held
by a vendor is revocable at any time. Before model parameters
are distributed in plaintext to biometric service providers, and
data is protected by expiring licenses, the illegitimate use af-
ter expiration presents a risk. By implementing a public key
infrastructure between biometric service providers and compar-
ison subsystem vendors, vendors hold the private key that is
necessary for the operative status of a provider’s application.
Vendors are in full control of the operability of their distribted
software but need to guarantee to preserve the availability of a
provider’s service. Therefore, vendors could also simply delete
their private key when licensings discontinue. From the pro-
posed 2Cov cryptosystem, solutions for other members of the
PLDA family are directly derivable. They are also applicable to
other classification tasks in machine learning. Unprotected sys-
tems can currently be upgraded with the proposed cryptosys-
tem anytime without additional efforts in recapturing biometric
enrolment data.
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8.2 future perspectives
A number of research lines arise from the work carried out in this
dissertation. The following groups of specifically interesting consid-
erations are identified as perspectives to the theoretical framework,
novel measures, and novel methods.
To the Theoretical Framework. The understanding of the non-
linearity in PAV-LLR score calibration is promising to investigate. The
formal exploitation of the latent decision subspace might provide
models on how to design experimental setups in machine learning,
i.e., the amount of class A,B predictions to be conducted in tech-
nology evaluation. For one, as PAV-LLR segments empirical score
sets into groups of alike LLR representations, group homomorphisms
could be exploited in order to model the uncertainty of each LLR
group given an experimental setup and to define an experimental
setup that provides high precision for certain LLR ranges. For an-
other, the binary-decision LLR is a special case of the multi-class
LLR, also constituted by Cllr being a special case of the multi-class
strictly proper scoring rule (see language recognition). Investigations
on proper scoring rules for multi-class LLRs seem promising to better
understand (biometric) identification recognition tasks. Identification
is either a closed-set or an open-set task, the formulation of such
proper scoring rules might address uncertainty about identity class
representations in the feature space. These proper scoring rules on
identification LLRs would be useful, in principle, LLRs encode the rela-
tion of feature space representations in their value—the LLR of the LLR
is the LLR [39]. The quote summarizes a major property of LLR scores
for binary (two-class, not yet multi-class) decisions: LLRs encode the
class distribution within the feature space in their value. At the same
time, the class distribution within the score space is encoded by the
LLR value. For identification applications, LLR values could also en-
code the relation of multi-class decisions by their value. Eventually,
the outline of multi-class comparators might benefit from good deci-
sion making in identification scenarios.
To Novel Measures. In future theoretical work, figures of merit on
the appropriateness of an experimental design could be outlined, ei-
ther targeting specific applications or application-independent con-
straints. The technology transfer of q-vectors to other (biometric)
recognition tasks appears promising, as QMFs are already applied
in face recognition [321]. Considering privacy concerns, e.g., for tele-
phone conversations, end-users might want to countermeasure bio-
metric espionage by automatically altering their speech signals in or-
der to disguise or conceal their biometric identity. Conventionally,
these countermeasures serve as presentation attacks. In case of an
illegitimate use of voice biometrics to exploit private conversations,
however, they serve for the sake of preserving privacy in non-biomet-
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ric scenarios. Such privacy preserving methods would need to sus-
tain speech intelligibility as well: figures of merit depicting trade-offs
between PAD performance and the naturalness of speech data might
serve as future machine learning objectives.
To Novel Methods. In the speaker recognition evaluation (SRE) se-
ries of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
the vast majority of data is provided as 8 kHz sampled English tele-
phone speech data, transmitted over telephone communication chan-
nels, encoded as 8 bit µ-law files (with a-law encoded subsets in the
2016 and 2018 NIST SREs). As the usage of mobile devices has ex-
aggeratedly increased within the past decade, the impact of higher
bandwidths, video and speech codecs, and communication network-
ing protocols deem to be interesting for research on mobile communi-
cation and video conference data. One could consider to employ such
conditions in the q-vectors estimation. More types of intra-class vari-
ance appear promising to extend the scope of q-vectors to more oper-
ational scenarios, where voice quality is degraded by, e.g., reverbera-
tion [38], Lombard effects [322], and aging [323]. For training q-vector
extractors, the additional use of the well-studied PRISM dataset [40]
appears promising, especially as comparability to other related work
is provided, when targeting a broader diversity of speech signal dis-
tortions (like reverberation). q-vectors could aid cross-language solu-
tions by language-independent generalizations, such as systems that
are trained on English speech data but employed on German and
French speech data. Language and dialect adaptive calibration could
be investigated as q-vectors might be capable of linking dialects by
their representations within a system’s signal processing. Multi-algo-
rithmic system fusion on the score level might benefit from employ-
ing q-vectors, UACs, and QMFs [324, 325] in order to sustain high
discrimination performance in unconstrained environments, while sus-
taining low calibration losses. It seems promising to not only inves-
tigate the quality-adaptive re-bias of thresholds/scores but also their
re-scaling using comparison depending quality information as well
as combinations of re-bias and re-scaling.
To further advance privacy preservation and data protection, the
gap between secure two/multi-party computation and speech tech-
nology could be bridged more, e.g., by using the Yao’s garbled circuits
protocol [326]. The cryptographic community already provides frame-
works for implementing secure two/multi-party computations using
garbled circuits, HE, and combinations of both (among others), e.g.,
see the TASTY framework [327] and the ABY framework [328]. The
former provides non-linear functionality (e.g., comparisons) based on
which more flexible privacy-preserving PLDA/2Cov protocols are
possible. The latter accommodates alternative solutions to HE, e.g.,
multiplications carried out via arithmetic sharing based on symmet-
ric cryptography (whereas the Paillier HE uses asymmetric cryptog-
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raphy) and on oblivious transfer [329, 330]. As an alternative to Paillier
HE, whose security is broken when factoring large integers is effi-
cient, post-quantum secure lattice based fully HE seems promising
for preserving privacy in speaker recognition (e.g., see the PALISADE
library [331]).
Regarding speech segmentation by VAD, research is relevant to sus-
tain the robust estimation of q-vectors. On the one hand, VAD deci-
sion errors are propagated throughout biometric comparison and to
the q-vector estimation. On the other, an uncertainty about the VAD
decision could be formalized in a marginal estimation of q-vectors.
Moreover, fast and robust VAD on real-world speech data is not only
relevant to speaker recognition (and its relation to impact these sys-
tems [332]), but also to other fields in speech communication, such as
automatic speech recognition (ASR). The outline of end-to-end deep
neural network (DNN) architectures might employ layers inspired by
q-vectors in order to produce robust LLRs, perhaps as a variation of
the attention mechanism [154].
Finally, computations of LLRs with DNNs remain an interesting
research topic, as DNNs are, in principle, capable of estimating any
function mapping. Inference using DNNs is not yet fully solved: dis-
criminative embeddings are not interpretable, whereas conventional
models and approaches of signal processing are. Among the conven-
tional machine learning fields like variational Bayes, two directions
seem promising to follow: the extraction of meta-embeddings [54, 99]
and the thoroughly principled treatment of probabilistic input data
using mixed sum-product networks [333] and automated Bayesian density
analysis [334]. The first idea is based on conventional DNNs, enforcing
them to yield outputs, serving as meta-descriptors of reference and
probe embeddings, capable of computing LLRs by a principled uncer-
tainty propagation throughout a DNN. The latter two ideas enforce a
probabilistic data treatment throughout DNN layers in order to esti-
mate likelihoods for Bayesian inference, while being capable of report-
ing data anomalies. Such LLR estimating DNNs may be outlined for
verification and identification recognition tasks, making them appeal-
ing to serve in commercial and forensic scenarios as the principled
propagation of uncertainty and probabilities preserves interpretabil-
ity of decisions based on DNN outputs.
A Final Remark. In performance assessment by error rates, the
achievement of limiting error occurrences prevails. By contrast, in
performance assessment by information, the formal definition of deci-
sion requirement beliefs (e.g., class occurrences and cost trade-offs) is
accommodated with decision risk assessment on the benefit of using
the evidence reported by systems for one single or multiple settings.
Eventually, the elaboration on implications of LLRs from Frequentist
and Bayesian perspectives might serve well in further harmonization
of theory and technology across communities.
A
G R E E D Y P L D A - R B M A N D M O B I L E
E N V I R O N M E N T S
This section investigates143 the discrimination power of probabilis-
tic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA), which (as a graphical) is re-
formulated to the graphical representation of a restricted Boltzmann
machine (RBM). By using RBMs, deep neural network (DNN) archi-
tectures can be formulated for PLDA. This section focuses on lim-
ited availability of DNN training data, particularly, to limited mobile
speech data, see chapter 3. In commercials, small medium enterprises
(SMEs) can be confronted with limited training data. In forensics,
speech signal properties are often distinct for each case (if resources
for appropriate data collection are available, these collections are lim-
ited by the availability of the resources). As such, the following re-
search question is raised:
Not all vendors of comparison subsystems are able to de-
velop systems on datasets providing thousands of hours
of speech. Can PLDA classifiers thus be de-noised on lim-
ited mobile device speech training data?
In [336], a proof-of-concept study proposes PLDA-RBM as an ap-
proach, where units representing biometric (speaker) and non-bio-
metric (channel) factors are factorized, achieving a comparable per-
formance to PLDA. For this investigation (carried out on the MOBIO
dataset), mobile environments with limited training data are targeted.
Emphasis is put on the suppression of channel effects and the recov-
ery of subject discriminative information for the training of compara-
tors on a small dataset. The motivation of this study is drawn from the
motivation of the intermediate-sized vector (i-vector) paradigm that
originated from joint factor analysis (JFA) [127, 130]: discriminative in-
formation is still observed in JFA decomposed non-biometric factors
[130]. In this section, the following hypotheses are investigated:
• As limited training data is available, the conventional Gaussian
assumption for hidden layers might be insufficient, whereas a
Bernoulli assumption might better account for the binary deci-
sion task.
• Biometric information can be purified by exploiting (suppos-
edly non-biometric) channel units rather than (supposedly bio-
metric) speaker units when greedy architectures are employed.
143 Parts of this section are based on a collaborative work with Hong Hao, Themos
Stafylakis, Christian Rathgeb, and Christoph Busch [75], which emerged from the
collaboration with Hong on his master’s thesis [335].
235
236 greedy plda-rbm and mobile environments
a.1 plda with restricted boltzmann machines (rbms)
RBMs are used to distinguish between biometric and non-biometric
factors of PLDA in a JFA-like fashion.
a.1.1 Restricted Boltzmann Machines
An RBM is a bipartite undirected graphical model with no connec-
tions between units of the same layer [337]. This property makes the
distributions of the two layers conditionally independent and there-
fore allows the application of fast sampling-based training techniques.
RBMs can serve different purposes, e.g., probabilistic principal com-
ponent analysis (PPCA), feature reconstruction, and unsupervised ini-
tialization of DNNs [336, 338–340].
RBMs are two-layer structure models containing a visible and a
hidden layer v = {vi}i=1,...,dv ,h = {hj}j=1,...,dh with the numbers of
visible and hidden units ,dh, which are connected through a weight
matrix W = {wi,j} [336, 338]. The joint probability density function
(pdf) of (v,h) is a (dv + dh)-dimensional Gaussian that depends on
an energy function E(v,h):
P(v,h |W) = Z−1 e−E(v,h) , (A.1)
where Z is the normalizing constant to sustain that the area under
this pdf is equal to one.
Energy functions model the distribution of visible and hidden
units: Gaussian-Gaussian (GG) layers assume Gaussian distribution
for visible and hidden units, Gaussian-Bernoulli (GB) layers assume
Gaussian distribution for visible units and Bernoulli distribution for
hidden units. By assuming zero mean for GG energy functions, the
distributions take the form of PPCA [336, 339]. The GB energy func-
tion E(v,h) considers the hidden unit pdf to be Bernoulli-distributed
[339, 341], such that the GB energy function takes the form of [339]:
E(v,h) =
dv∑
i=1
v2i
2 σ2i
−
dv∑
i=1
dh∑
j=1
bj hj −
∑
i∈dv
j∈dh
vi
σi
hjwij . (A.2)
a.1.2 PLDA-RBM Algorithm
RBMs are used in a specific way to graphically represent the PLDA
comparator. Visible units representing i-vectors are decomposed into
hidden speaker units hspeakers and hidden channel units hchannelc , re-
spectively representing (biometric) speaker and (non-biometric) chan-
nel/residual factors. Fig. A.1c depicts the basic idea: during enrol-
ment, speaker-dependent RBM weights W(s) are learned with the
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constraint to purify hspeakers . During verification, the same weights
W(s) are used for purifying probe i-vectors [336].
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(a) PLDA [60]
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W
x xi . . .
wi,j
(b) RBM [338]
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PLDA-RBM
(c) PLDA-RBM enrolment [336]
h
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h
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prb
Comparator
(cosine)
(d) PLDA-RBM verification [336]
Figure A.1: Factorization concepts with data samples x, hidden variables h,
PLDA parameters θ = {µ,Φ,Λ}, and weights W.
The main difference between the presented approach and [336]
is the usage of Bernoulli hidden layers, i.e., a GB PLDA-RBM. The
PLDA-RBM is trained with single-step contrastive divergence (CD1), us-
ing mini-batches and standard L2 regularization, while no momen-
tum terms are added [339]. During recognition phase, features are
extracted using the speaker layer (one per i-vector). In the case of
multi-sample enrolments, references are created by taking the aver-
age representation. Reference and probe features are compared by
the cosine distance. Fig. A.1 depicts PLDA, RBM, and PLDA-RBM
architectures.
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One motivation behind the i-vector paradigm is the insufficiency
of JFA in distinguishing between (biometric) speaker and (non-
biometric) channel information, as channel factors were shown to
containing speaker information [130]. Incorporating both, a two-step
approach emerged: an acoustic total variability subspace is estimated
first, then a biometric subspace is estimated, where biometric com-
parisons are carried out (see section 2.5). In cases of limited labeled
training data, however, the problem of speaker information linkage
to channel factors may reappear.
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a.2.1 Greedy Architectures
To address this issue, a deep architecture is proposed in which the
channel factors of the initial PLDA-RBM are further processed using
a second PLDA-RBM model (greedy training). The same approach is
repeated N times, leading to a deep architecture that is trained using
greedy CD1. For completeness, the same idea is also applied to the
speaker layers. Both approaches are described below.
a.2.1.1 Stacking on Channel Units
Following the hypothesis of biometric information to still be present in
hidden channel units, the extracted hidden channel units are further
examined by deeper PLDA-RBM layers, i.e., hidden channel units of
the (N-1)th-layer are re-processed by the Nth-layer, resulting in the
hidden speaker units hˆspeakers . Thereby, CD1 training is performed
layer-wise (greedy). L2 regularization is only applied on the first
layer since the weights of deeper layers decrease dramatically in this
experimental setup on limited training data. For stacking on chan-
nel units, a feature fusion of the hidden speaker units of all layers{
h
speaker
s , . . . , hˆ
speaker
s
}
is proposed by concatenation in order to as-
semble an augmented reconstructed biometric feature, cf. Fig. A.2a.
a.2.1.2 Stacking on Speaker Units
Following the hypothesis of noisy speaker units, the reconstructed hid-
den speaker units are refined by deeper PLDA-RBM layers, i.e., hid-
den speaker units of the (N-1)th-layer are re-processed by the Nth-
layer, resulting in the hidden speaker units h˘speakers , which is proposed
as biometric features, cf. Fig. A.2b. However, this approach might also
lead to a further loss of biometric information if the original hspeakers
units already comprise well-reconstructed features that can be over-
fitted by re-assessment, e.g., due to limited training data.
PLDA-RBM
h
speaker
s h
channel
c
Layer-N
hˆ
speaker
s hˆ
channel
c
(a) Stacking channel units
PLDA-RBM
h
speaker
s
Layer-N
h˘
speaker
s h˘
channel
c
(b) Stacking speaker units
Figure A.2: Comparison of proposed deep PLDA-RBM designs with hˆ as
deep hidden units of deeper layers N. Gray layers indicate the
proposed biometric features.
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a.2.2 Experimental Validation
The baseline PLDA-RBM system is based on the Matlab Environment
for Deep Architecture Learning (MEDAL) [342]. PLDA-RBM layers are
CD1-trained by using the background set, where the mini-batches
comprise a quarter of the i-vectors per subject. Then, PLDA-RBM is
re-trained using the development set in order to cope with dataset
shifts on limited short-utterance mobile data.
Table A.1: Performance of baseline systems on development set.
System
Female Male
EER FMR100 Cminllr EER FMR100 C
min
llr
G-PLDA [132] 15.3 63.5 0.488 12.2 44.6 0.413
PLDA-RBM
GG 17.7 64.2 0.552 16.7 60.4 0.526
GB 13.5 51.2 0.451 12.3 48.3 0.418
Tab. A.1 indicates the baseline performance in terms of equal error
rate (EER) (in %), FNMR at a 1% FMR (FMR100) (in %) and Cminllr of
G-PLDA with 400 speaker factors and PLDA-RBM with 400 hidden
speaker units with GG and GB energy functions. Re-training is not
applied at this stage. GB PLDA-RBM significantly outperforms GG
PLDA-RBM. Performance gains to the G-PLDA baseline can also be
observed. However, this observation may change on big data back-
ground sets, such as the speaker recognition evaluation (SRE) scenar-
ios of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
An optimal configuration regarding the number of hidden speaker
and channel units is examined on the development set. Fig. A.3 de-
picts Cminllr for GB PLDA-RBM with development set re-training. Good
results are observed at 850 hidden units.
400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000
0.3
0.4
0.5
Number of hidden speaker and hidden channel units
C
m
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Male
Figure A.3: Comparison of different numbers of hidden speaker and chan-
nel factors incorporating development set re-training.
The hypotheses are examined on up to three layers on the devel-
opment set, cf. Tab. A.2. While stacking on hidden speaker units de-
creases information in terms of Cminllr , stacking on channel units re-
trieves information.
Tab. A.3 depicts Cminllr of channel unit stacked PLDA-RBM. In partic-
ular, the performance of hidden speaker units per layer is compared
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Table A.2: Cminllr comparison of stacking concepts for hidden speaker unit
extraction on up to three layers on the development set: channel
units (channel-stacked) and speaker units (speaker-stacked).
# Layers
Female Male
Channel-stacked Speaker-stacked Channel-stacked Speaker-stacked
1 0.420 0.370
2 0.392 0.481 0.341 0.452
3 0.394 0.487 0.346 0.475
to the performance of the proposed concatenation of hidden speaker
units (assembled from all layers). Subject information can still be re-
trieved on the fifth layer but without further significant gains. In this
setup, hidden speaker units are more prone to be zero on deeper
layers (to convey less biometric information).
Table A.3: Cminllr comparison of recovered i-vectors by the channel-
stacked PLDA-RBM architecture on Nth-layer (layer) and layer-
concatenated features.
# Layers 1 2 3 4 5
Female
Layer
0.420
0.505 0.551 0.691 0.715
Concatenated 0.392 0.394 0.398 0.394
Male
Layer
0.370
0.459 0.510 0.639 0.681
Concatenated 0.341 0.346 0.340 0.342
Tab. A.4 compares the half-total error rate (HTER)144 and Cminllr per-
formances of the examined GB PLDA-RBM with 850 hidden speaker
and channel units to female and male systems of the 2013 MOBIO
SRE, particularly, to those systems with one acoustic feature extrac-
tor and without multi-algorithmic comparator fusion (to compara-
ble systems). Contrary to state-of-the-art systems, either system com-
pares Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) with universal background
models (UBMs), following the traditional GMM – UBM approach. On
144 HTER is the primary evaluation metric of the 2013 MOBIO SRE [37]. Computation-
ally, the HTER equals the decision cost function (DCF) parameterized with p˜i = 0.5
weights (with corresponding threshold ηp˜i=0.5 = 0), i.e., the maximum entropy of
cost and prior ratios (e.g., unknown decision policy specifications). Contrary to the
DCF, however, the HTER threshold is determined on a development set as the EER
threshold. The EER threshold, in turn, is derived by the maximum value of all mini-
mum DCF (minDCF) parameterizations (see section 2.4.3). In other words, the EER
threshold can be different to ηp˜i=0.5; a different threshold also corresponds to a
different parameterization of the DCF criterion. Therefore, the HTER metric appears
incoherent for poorly calibrated systems, since the EER threshold equals ηp˜i=0.5 only
for well-calibrated systems. In other words, where the DCF criterion penalizes (dis-
crimination and) calibration performance on the evaluation set in a coherent manner,
the HTER criterion penalizes calibration mismatches on the evaluation as well as on
the development set (solely in a coherent manner if systems are well-calibrated).
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Table A.4: HTER (in %) and Cminllr comparison of best single systems to the
proposed systems on the evaluation set of the 2013 MOBIO SRE.
(None of the systems incorporates calibration.)
System
Female Male
HTER Cminllr HTER C
min
llr
MOBIO-female [37] 11.6 n/a 9.1 n/a
MOBIO-male [37] 12.8 n/a 8.9 n/a
G-PLDA (as of [132]) 16.4 0.522 9.9 0.326
GB PLDA-RBM 12.0 0.397 10.6 0.361
2-layer GB PLDA-RBM
(channel-stacked)
11.3 0.368 9.0 0.319
the evaluation set, these traditional systems outperform the con-
ventional PLDA (with Gaussian assumptions), which is baseline to
the proposed GB PLDA-RBMs. The two-layer (channel-stacked) GB
PLDA-RBM architecture achieves similar performance as the GMM –
UBM systems.
a.3 summary
PLDA-RBM benefits from GB assumptions on limited mobile data,
outperforming the conventional G-PLDA by reconstructing speaker
features and removing channel impacts. Moreover, deep PLDA-RBM
is shown to recover relevant biometric information from discarded
(supposedly non-biometric) channel units by using the proposed
stacking on channel units concept. Compared to (comparable) sys-
tems of the 2013 MOBIO SRE (which rely on the GMM – UBM ap-
proach), the proposed system achieves similar results. This is partic-
ularly desirable (e.g., for forensic scenarios) when processing efforts
are of minor concern but reliable evidence is rather important. Espe-
cially on female speech data (during comparator training, less female
speech data is available than male speech data in the 2013 MOBIO
SRE), performance gains are observed.
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PAV- L L R C A L I B R AT I O N : S T E P - B Y- S T E P E X A M P L E
Isotonic regression monotonically maps (uncalibrated) score groups
of equal posterior prediction to their depending log-likelihood ratio
(LLR) values. As such, (uncalibrated) scores are grouped by their con-
tribution to decision making. Fig. B.1 illustrates two examples of the
pool adjacent violators algorithm (PAV). The first example depicts
selected iteration steps on ten class B and seven class A scores145,
see Figs. B.1a to B.1i. The second example (see Fig. B.1j) depicts the
linking of (uncalibrated, synthetic) scores to their corresponding pos-
terior probabilities (after PAV). Initially, PAV aligns class labels 0, 1
according to their depending score values by sustaining monotonic-
ity (on same posterior values, zeros are aligned before ones). In each
iteration (assessing scores from left to right in a decision-by-decision
manner), a posterior group of a current score is determined. Even-
tually, previous posterior groups are updated in order to preserve
monotonicity.
For class A scores, the corresponding group represents the 100%
posterior probability, cf. the transitions to the second, fifth or final
iteration. Class A scores either start new posterior groups or are asso-
ciated to a previous posterior group, if their associated posterior prob-
ability is 100% (when class B scores are not present in that group). For
class B scores, the corresponding posterior group resembles an up-
date of the previous posterior groups. By observing one more class B
decision, a current group’s posterior is lowered. Thereby, different
posterior groups can collapse into one single posterior group (if the
update leads to an equal or smaller posterior probability to its pre-
ceding group).
Example: PAV-LLR Calibration of 17 Scores
PAV score calibration is an iterative regression. This example de-
picts certain iterations for the calibration of 17 scores. In the first
two iterations, class B scores solely contribute to the group of
0% posterior probability. Then (iteration five), a class A score with
a following class B score is observed. To sustain monotonicity, both
scores are mapped to the group of 50% posterior probability. At it-
eration six, two consecutive class A scores (which were in the group
that represented 100% posterior probability at iteration five) are fol-
lowed by one class B score. The group of these scores is alleviated
145 For class B scores, the set is {−5,−4,−2, 0, 1, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4.0, 4.25}; for class A scores,
the set is {−3,−1.5,−1, 2, 3, 4.5, 5}. The sorted score classes of this example are:
(B,B,A,B,A,A,B,B,A,B,B,A,B,B,B,A,A). Both classes are observed for the
score value of 3; the class B label is sorted in before the class A label.
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Figure B.1: Examples of the PAV-LLR algorithm with class A scores (blue
circles) and class B scores (red crosses): (a) to (i) depict an exam-
ple for 17 raw scores on distinct iterations, (j) depicts the final
PAV mapping on 106 class B and 104 class A synthetic scores.
The dotted line in the last row indicates the PAV score of the
group with the most uncalibrated scores.
to the group of 23 posterior probability. Then (iteration seven), an-
other class B score is observed, such that the previous group of 23
posterior probability is further alleviated to the group of 50% poste-
rior probability. As this group already exists as of iteration five, the
union of both groups resembles (eight out of seventeen scores are
processed, the posterior odds of the 50% group are 3 : 3). Until the
final iteration of this example, more scores are augmented to this
group of 50% posterior probability. First, the group is augmented
by two scores; one of each class, another 50% (iteration 9). Second,
two scores of different classes but same value are processed (itera-
tion 11)—in this example, two scores of the value 3.0—, the group
remains at 50% posterior probability (5 : 5 as odds). Then (iteration
14), three class B scores follow, alleviating this score group further
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(5 : 8 as odds, and 513 as posterior probability). Finally, two more
class A scores follow, which resemble the new group of 100% poste-
rior probability. LLRs are computed from PAV scores by Eq. (2.43),
i.e., after removing the database prior ˙˘pi from the posterior scores.
In this example, the database prior is ˙˘pi = 717 , such that the LLRs
of the 5 : 8 PAV group (representing most of these uncalibrated
scores) have the value − log 2825 ≈ −0.11. In the depicted example,
most of the uncalibrated scores are assigned to the same group.
These scores are calibrated to one LLR value. From the observa-
tion of uncalibrated score histograms, the latent decision space is
inferred, in which (effectively) decision making proceeds.
Notably, the magnitude of these LLR groups depends on the em-
pirical results. One might aim at systems that output LLRs on a host
of scales, e.g., which provide weak to extremely strong support to ei-
ther decision across all scales (see verbal scales and the scale of least-
favorable decisions in section 4.2). The example above, however, illus-
trates that the sorting of class labels by empirical score outputs (class
label permutations) limits the variety of LLR scales and therefore the
extent of decision scales a system is capable of supporting. Exemplar-
ily, the least-favorable extremely strong decision towards proposition
A requires an LLR of log 10
6
1 . By reformulating Eq. (2.43), necessary
values of PAV scores and database priors are exploitable. Exemplar-
ily, when assuming a database prior of ˙˘pi = 11000001 (e.g., one class A
score and a million class B scores), the PAV group representing 50%
posterior probability would be calibrated exactly to the above-men-
tioned LLR. By contrast, when assuming a database prior of ˙˘pi = 12
(equal amount of classA and classB scores), the PAV group represent-
ing 10000001000001 posterior probability (e.g., a million class A scores with
one higher class B score) would be exactly calibrated to the above-
mentioned LLR. Thus, depending on an experimental setup, (empiri-
cal outputs as) class label permutations appear to be more crucial: if,
for a class label sequence (e.g., A,B,A,A,B; odds 1 : 1 and 2 : 1, two
posterior groups of 12 = 50% and
2
3 ≈ 67%) two class labels change,
their scores might be differently sorted (e.g., due to insufficient sam-
ple quality). A permutation (e.g., A,A,B,A,B; odds: 3 : 2, one poste-
rior group of 35 = 60%) differs in the posterior groups. The range of
empirical LLRs depends on the split and merge of posterior groups.
Nonetheless, for deterministic system outputs, the change of an eval-
uation setup is not changing the (non-empirical) LLR values. If a sys-
tem is well-calibrated, empirical and non-empirical LLR values are
identical, otherwise an empirical LLR value (from PAV score calibra-
tion) approximates the depending non-empirical LLR value (which is
fundamentally linked to a comparator). For the latter, where the gaps
between empirical and non-empirical LLR values are relevant, one
could explore credibility intervals of PAV score calibration depend-
ing on experimental setups (see suggested future work in section 8.2).
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Independent of the research and evaluation field, in which systems
are assessed for binary decision making, finding credible intervals
to the most likely PAV outcomes of an experimental setup appears
very promising. By doing so, setups to yield the desired information
drawn from research and evaluation studies could be outlined and
the likelihood of remaining with the mere result “but more data is
necessary” minimized.
The PAV-LLR algorithm is formally addressed in [28, 78, 79]. The
family of binary strictly proper scoring rules and the multi-class log-
arithmic cost are addressed by Niko Brümmer in [116] and [28, ap-
pendix D]. By allowing PAV to result in posterior probabilities of
0% or 100%, infinite LLR values would be allowed. To prevent this,
one could employ PAV with Laplace’s rule of succession (see [78, 79,
107] for details). Effectively, two dummy class labels are added front
and back to the existing labels (A,B, then the actual class sequence,
A,B). As such, unobserved scores are acknowledged to occur outside
the range of observed scores (a minimum posterior larger zero and
maximum posterior smaller one are sustained), while the posteriors
assigned to groups of intersecting scores remain unchanged. As fur-
ther documented in the code of [79], the (convex) receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) in detection error trade-off (DET) and binary de-
cision error trade-off (BET) plots are stopped from approaching the
plot axes (on sparse data) and instead remain unchanged, i.e., in the
well-populated regions. Fig. B.2 illustrates the impact of Laplace’s rule
of succession on the visualization of ROC’s convex hulls (ROCCHs) in
BET plots.
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Figure B.2: Example of Laplace’s rule of succession impacting the visualiza-
tion of ROCCHs (in BET plots), exemplarily computed from syn-
thetic score sets (red versus green) sampled from 2.3a N(0, 1)
versus N(3, 2) (solid), 2.3b χ2(3) versus 25 Beta(2, 12 ) (dashed),
2.3c U(−4, 110 ) versus Beta(
9
10 ,
1
2 ) (dash-dotted).
G L O S S A RY
applied probability of error Bayes error rate for binary decision sys-
tems, cf. [28, 61] , 59, 154, 247, see also: BDF, LLR & DCF
attack potential measure of the capability to attack a target of evaluation
given the attacker’s knowledge, proficiency, resources, and motiva-
tion [93]
attack presentation classification error rate proportion of attack pre-
sentations using the same PAIS incorrectly classified as bona fide
presentations in a specific scenario [93].
Note: the APCER can be defined regarding a certain PAIS
(APCERPAIS) but also depending on an attack potential (AP)
across multiple PAISs [93]:
APCERAP = max
PAIS∈AAP
APCERPAIS, where AAP is the set of eval-
uated PAISs , 35, 126, 222, see also: presentation attack, bona
fide presentation, PAIS & attack potential
automatic speech recognition recognition using speech for non-
biometric purposes of, e.g., detecting words, phrases, or se-
mantically inferring the intention of natural speech, present
in interactive voice response (IVR) systems , 81, 156, 172, 252
Bayesian decision framework a framework for decision making, com-
bining Bayesian inference and decision theory, 4, 17, 24, 47,
59, 64, 70, 78, 108, 115, 127, 175, 192, 215, 245
binary decision error trade-off visualization of Type I versus Type II
error rates in a quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot that uses logistic
distributions to model changes in formally denotable deci-
sion thresholds derived from parameterized prios and cost
beliefs. The depending plot is motivated from the Bayesian
decision framework , 14, 110, 128, 141, 223, 246, 266, see also:
ROC, DET & BDF
biometric applicant individual seeking to be enrolled in a biometric enrol-
ment database [1]
biometric attendant agent of the biometric system operator who directly
interacts with the biometric capture subject [1], see also: biometric
capture subject
biometric capture subject individual who is the subject of a biometric
capture process [1] , 11, 29, 165, 209, 215, 226, 235
biometric characteristics examiner individual with authority to assess
biometric characteristics and who does so for the purpose of resolv-
ing a biometric claim [1]
biometric data controller person or organisation which, alone or jointly
with others, determines the purposes, means, and goals of the pro-
247
248 glossary
cessing of biometric data [95].
Note: the term is motivated by the EU GDPR [272] , 234
biometric data processor person or organisation that processes biometric
data on behalf of the biometric data controller [95].
Note: the term is motivated by the EU GDPR [272], 234, see
also: biometric system operator, biometric system vendor, bio-
metric system owner & biometric system provider
biometric distinctiveness referring to the fact that biometric charac-
teristics should be sufficiently different across subjects (com-
prising the population), cf. biometric uniqueness in [214] , 163,
see also: subject
biometric enrolee biometric data subject whose biometric data is held in a
biometric enrolment database [1]
biometric operational personnel individuals, other than the biometric
capture subjects, who take an active role in the operation of the
biometric system [1]
biometric system end-user deprecated term of [1] , 16, 27, see also:
biometric capture subject
biometric system operator person or organization that executes policies
and procedures in the administration of a biometric system [1] , 4,
21, 27, 55, 78, 135, 140, 184, 211, 216, 234, 239, 245
biometric system owner person or organization with overall accountabil-
ity for the acquisition, implementation, and operation of a biometric
system [1] , 27, 40, 135, 140, 184, 211, 216, 234, 239
biometric system provider person or organization that supplies a bio-
metric system to system users.
Note: the term reflects a biometric system supplier as a ser-
vice provider , 135, 140, 184, 211, 216, 234, 239
biometric system vendor person or organization that creates and pro-
duces biometric systems or their components.
Note: the term reflects a biometric system supplier as a cre-
ator of biometric system components , 4, 10, 16, 21, 27, 55, 71,
135, 140, 184, 211, 216, 227, 239, 245, 249, 255
bona fide presentation interaction of the biometric capture subject and
the biometric data capture subsystem in the fashion intended by the
policy of the biometric system [93], 215, 219, 221
bona fide presentation classification error rate proportion of bona fide
presentations incorrectly classified as presentation attacks in a spe-
cific scenario [93], 35, 126, 222, see also: presentation attack &
bona fide presentation
claimant individual making a claim that can be verified biometrically [1]
cooperative biometric capture subject biometric capture subject moti-
vated to achieve a successful completion of the biometric acquisition
process [1]
glossary 249
decision cost function weighted sum of error rates (weights not nec-
essarily sum up to one) with weights depending on the pa-
rameterization of the Bayes risk; conventionally used in NIST
SREs, e.g., with p˜i = 0.01 in the 2010 NIST SRE [34].
Note: the 2012, 2016, and 2018 NIST SREs [22, 35, 343] employ
more complex operating points, i.e., averages of two or three
DCFs. The 2016 and 2018 NIST SREs [22, 343] also examine
combined DCFs over 16 partitions, for which an average eval-
uation criterion is formed, 5, 59, 98, 118, 127, 177, 260, see also:
BDF, NIST & SRE
detection error trade-off visualization of Type I versus Type II er-
ror rates in a quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot that uses standard
normal distributions, cf. [88], to ease visual comparability by
modeling error trade-offs in Gaussian distributed scores as
straight lines rather than curves. The depending Q-Q plot is
motivated from the observation that cohort based score nor-
malization tends to Gaussianize scores, 32, 33, 62, 128, 223,
266, see also: ROC
empirical cross-entropy expected value of the posterior entropy,
given a set of binary decision scores, in which the values of
the scores are integrated over the entire domain [115].
Note: ECE plots are motivated from information theory as
the divergence between labeled score sets to the ground-of-
truth regarding the prior belief pi. In APE plots, the integral of
APE characteristics is Cllr. In ECE plots, Cllr can be read off as
the ECE value at pi = 0 (representing the generalized empiri-
cal cross-entropy). Other ECE values might be interpreted as
Cllr values that are pi dependingly weighted between propo-
sitions A and B, 70, 127, 164, 247, see also: BDF & APE
enrolment act of creating and storing a biometric enrolment data record in
accordance with an enrolment policy [1].
Note: act of creating and storing reference representation(s)
in accordance with an operational policy, 29, 31, 91, 184
equal error rate the value at which the Type I and Type II error proportions
are equal [95].
Note: EER estimates can be linear, based on theoretical score
distribution assumptions or based on the ROCCH. In this
dissertation, EERs are estimated as the ROCCH-EER, cf. [79],
45, 63, 113, 131, 168, 190, 217, 259, see also: FAR, FRR, FNMR,
FMR, APCER, BPCER & ROCCH
expectation-maximization algorithm iterative parameter estimation,
cf. [59]; statistical method to maximize the likelihood of a
model. Regarding members of the exponential family distri-
butions, their natural parameters are updated during maxi-
mization steps to derive expectational parameters, which are
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used during the next expectation step to estimate the data fit
of the updated model , 84
failure-to-acquire rate the proportion of acquisition processes for verifica-
tion or identification attempts for which the system fails to capture
or locate a sample of sufficient quality [25, 2019 CD1 revision].
In the 2016 re-confirmed standard [25] as: proportion of verifica-
tion or identification attempts for which the system fails to capture
or locate an image or signal of sufficient quality, 31
failure-to-enrol rate the proportion of acquisition processes for verification
or identification attempts for which the system fails to capture or
locate a sample of sufficient quality. [. . . ] [25, 2019 CD1 revision].
In the 2016 re-confirmed standard [25] as: proportion of the
population for whom the system fails to complete the enrolment
process, 31
false accept rate the proportion of transactions with false biometric claims
erroneously accepted. A transaction may consist of one or more
attempts depending on the decision policy. [. . . ] [25, 2019 CD1 re-
vision]:
FAR = FMR× (1− FTA).
In the 2016 re-confirmed standard [25] as: proportion of verifi-
cation transactions with wrongful claims of identity that are incor-
rectly confirmed, 32, 151
false match rate proportion of completed non-mated comparison trials
in which the non-mated probe and reference are falsely declared
“match”. [. . . ] [25, 2019 CD1 revision].
In the 2016 re-confirmed standard [25] as: proportion of zero-
effort impostor attempt samples falsely declared to match the com-
pared non-self template.
Note: speaker recognition and forensic science communities
may refer to the false alarm probability and the false acceptance
probability, respectively, 31, 58, 106, 118, 240
false non-match rate the proportion of completed mated comparison trials
in which the mated probe and reference are falsely declared “non-
match”. [. . . ] [25, 2019 CD1 revision].
In the 2016 re-confirmed standard [25] as: proportion of gen-
uine attempt samples falsely declared not to match the template of
the same characteristic from the same user supplying the sample.
Note: speaker recognition and forensic science communities
may refer to the miss probability and the false rejection probabil-
ity, respectively, 31, 58, 118, 240
false reject rate the proportion of verification transactions with true bio-
metric claims erroneously rejected. A transaction may consist of
one or more attempts depending on the decision policy. [. . . ] [25,
2019 CD1 revision]:
FRR = FTA+ FNMR× (1− FTA).
In the 2016 re-confirmed standard [25] as: proportion of verifi-
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cation transactions with truthful claims of identity that are incor-
rectly denied , 32, 151
FNMR at a 1% FMR security motivated theoretical error rate, de-
picting an indication to a preserved convenience level at a
targeted level of security.
Note: FMR100 requirements might denote FMR100 6 5%, i.e.,
requiring the EER to be lower than 5%.
Note: in this dissertation, FMR100s are estimated by the
ROCCH, cf. ROCCH-EER in [79] , 113, 160, 168, 191, 259, see
also: FNMR, FMR, EER & ROCCH
function of quality estimate additive term in score calibration based
on quality vectors for adaptively taking estimated quality
changes of a certain reference – probe comparison into ac-
count (as an alternative to QMFs) , 16, 195, 248, see also: sam-
ple quality, q-vector, UAC & QMF
Gaussian mixture model weighted sum of normal distributions for
which the sum of the weights equals one [126]; utilizations:
i) modeling of any multi-variate distribution, ii) statistic clus-
tering, iii) data generation (emission of possible observations
and its associated likelihood of observation), and iv) classifi-
cation (class discrimination) , 76, 167, 221, 249, 261
generalized false accept rate combination of enrolment, probe acqui-
sition, and comparison errors regarding false accepts [25]:
GFAR = (1− FTE)2 × FAR for scenario evaluation,
GFAR = (1− FTE)× FAR for technology evaluation , 32
generalized false reject rate combination of enrolment, probe acqui-
sition, and comparison errors regarding false rejects [25]:
GFRR = FTE+ (1− FTE× FRR) for scenario and technology
evaluation , 32
homomorphic encryption computation on encrypted data using op-
erations that preserve algebraic structures of the plaintext
data [344] , 9, 227, 245, 249
identity concealer subversive biometric capture subject who attempts to
avoid being matched to their own biometric reference [1] , 35
impostor subversive biometric capture subject who attempts to being
matched to someone else’s biometric reference.
Note: Oxford defines impostor as a person who assumes a false iden-
tity in order to deceive or defraud [1] , 35
indifferent biometric capture subject biometric capture subject who is
unconcerned with the achievement of a successful biometric acqui-
sition process [1]
intermediate-sized vector representation of acoustic space as a latent
variable after factor analysis, mapping duration-variable au-
dio samples into a fix-dimensional feature space, cf. [130] , 17,
76, 114, 163, 183, 216, 247, 255
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Kullback-Leibler divergence relative entropy; the divergence of two
probability distributions, cf. [64], 69, 166, 190, 211
likelihood ratio ratio of proposition-conditional probabilities, where
propositions are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in mod-
eling a specific world.
Note: the terminology is currently under debate as the
term likelihood ratio can be confused with the likelihood ra-
tio test, which is not applicable to Bayesian inference. The
term Bayes factor was proposed for likelihood ratios under a
Bayesian t-test. However, rather than testing hypotheses, the
Bayesian decision framework accommodates to formally de-
note thresholds for decision making on propositions based on
prior and cost beliefs. As the terminology debate is not in the
scope of this dissertation, the term is referred to as it is con-
ventionally used in the speaker recognition community, 19,
24, 47, 127
log-likelihood ratio log-compressed LR.
Note: conventionally, the natural logarithm is utilized in the
speaker recognition community, whereas the base 10 loga-
rithm is preferred in the forensic science community as the
score is intended to be reported in rather human-comprehen-
sible scales , 5, 17, 31, 39, 48, 56, 77, 109, 115, 127, 173, 183,
215, 245, 263, see also: LR
mel-frequency cepstral coefficient sound representation [122, 123];
acoustic signals are processed by the short-term Fourier am-
plitude spectrum (for 20 to 30ms time windows); powers
of the spectrum are processed by a triangular filterbank
mapped onto the mel scale [124] (motivated by a psycho-
acoustic study on melodic perception); the inverse spectrum
(cepstral from the anagram cepstrum) is obtained by the cosine
transform of the log-compressed mel powers, resulting in the
amplitude information (and omitting phase information) , 17,
76, 109, 117, 174, 183, 218
minimum DCF minimum of the DCF. For fixed weights, a minimum
is found by evaluating the DCF across all thresholds (equiv-
alent to the DCF value after PAV) , 60, 71, 118, 130, 240, 261,
see also: DCF & PAV
minimum ECE minimum of the ECE; equivalent to the ECE value
after PAV, 71, see also: ECE & PAV
non-subversive biometric capture subject biometric capture subject
who does not attempt to subvert the correct and intended system
policy of the biometric capture subsystem [1]
non-subversive user user of a biometric system who does not attempt to
subvert the correct and intended system policy [1]
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normalized Bayes error rate normalization of APE plots to enhance
visual comparability; y-axis values are normalized by the de-
fault performance (that a coin tossing system would have) de-
pending on the parameterization summarized by the x-axis
value [28, 79] , 61, 155, see also: APE
normalized ECE normalization of ECE plots to enhance visual com-
parability (motivated by NBER plots). Y-axis values are nor-
malized by the default performance (that a coin tossing sys-
tem would have) depending on the parameterization summa-
rized by the x-axis value.
Note: in NECE plots, Cllr can be read off at pi = 0 as the nor-
malization denominator is one at pi = 0 , 15, 129, 247, see also:
ECE & NBER
pool adjacent violators algorithm non-linear mapping of (uncali-
brated) scores to (log-) likelihood ratios by isotonic regression
[28, 78, 105, 106] , 142, 211, 248, 263, see also: LR & LLR
presentation artefact artificial object or representation presenting a copy
of biometric characteristics or synthetic biometric patterns [1, 43],
34, 217, 219
presentation attack presentation to the biometric capture subsystem with
the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system [1,
43].
Note: depending on the evaluation type, the scope of presen-
tation attacks is extended to also incorporate modified biomet-
ric samples, i.e., in academic evaluation, see [93]. The speaker
recognition community synonymously uses the term spoofing
for presentation attacks and the terms physical access and logical
access for presentation attacks at the sensor level and as modified
biometric samples [45] , 2, 8, 34, 125, 215, 219, 251
presentation attack detection automated determination of a presentation
attack [1] , 8, 34, 46, 109, 113, 215, 249, see also: presentation
attack
presentation attack instrument biometric characteristic or object used in
a presentation attack [1, 43], 34, 125, 217, 249, see also: presenta-
tion attack
presentation attack instrument species class of presentation attack in-
struments created using a common production method that is based
on different biometric characteristics [93], 218, see also: PAI
probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (binary) classifier examin-
ing latent feature subspaces regarding within and between
class covariances to return (log-) likelihood ratio scores [60,
131], 10, 18, 76, 98, 111, 114, 163, 183, 227, 249, 255, see also:
LR & LLR
quality measure function additive term during score calibration
based on (proxy) quality measures taking into account ob-
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servable quality changes of a certain reference – probe com-
parison (e.g., duration and SNR) (as an alternative to FQEs) ,
7, 193, 247, see also: sample quality & FQE
quality vector estimated posterior probabilities of (audio) quality con-
ditions based on latent acoustic features (i-vectors), repre-
sented in vector form (motivated by UACs). For the purpose
of speaker recognition, conditions are sampled according to
well-studied quality impacts to recognition performance (tar-
geting more detailed levels of certain quality types rather
than broad levels ranging over a variety of audio character-
stics), 16, 78, 109, 162, 184, 247, see also: UAC & sample quality
receiver operating characteristic trade-off (plot) between the true pos-
itive rate and the Type I error rate , 33, 62, 111, 127, 246, 266
ROC’s convex hull isotropic performance bound to the comparison
of empirical Type I and Type II error rates in an orthogo-
nal diagram of linear axes scale; the ROCCH is derived by
i) the geometric convex hull and ii) by the PAV-LLR algo-
rithm, mapping the DCF of well-calibrated scores onto the
ROC space—the ROCCH is where minDCF lives [79], 62, 71,
111, 127, 240, 246, 266, see also: minDCF, PAV & ROC
rule of 3 a rule of thumb (motivated by the Bernoulli distribution
[91]). When observing zero errors on N sample points, the
true error rate has an upper bound of p ≈ 3N , holding in 95%
of all samplings (confidence interval). For a 90% confidence
interval, the rule of thumb refers to p ≈ 2N .
Note: the rule of 3 is part of the informative annex of the stan-
dard [25] , 33, 38, 41, 110
rule of 30 a rule of thumb (motivated by the Bernoulli distribution
using the Wald test, assuming a large amount of sampling
points and very low error rates) for sustaining that the true
error rate is bounded by a relative margin of ±30%, at least
30 errors need to be observed. This hypothesis holds in 90%
of all (experimental setup) samplings, i.e., with a 90% confi-
dence interval [92].
Note: the rule of 30 is part of the informative annex of the
standard [25] , 33, 38, 41, 61, 110
sample quality in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED)
[86] as: the degree of excellence of something. The COED further
provides a phonetics definition: distinguishing characteristic or
characteristics of a speech sound.
Note: the harmonized biometric vocabulary [1] defines sam-
ple quality as a predictor of biometric performance (to its
biometric utility), since the biometrics standardization com-
mittee puts emphasis on black box testing rather than on the
research and development of biometric systems (where white
glossary 255
box testing is practiced). Regarding this term, this disserta-
tion differs from ISO/IEC 2382-37 [1] by considering qual-
ity as a distinguishing characteristic or characteristics of a
speech sound before and within acoustic feature processing ,
27, 28, 183, 193
signal-to-noise ratio ratio of the power of the (speech) signal to the
power of the noise signal, conventionally in dB, i.e., at a
10 log10 compression , 7, 118, 172, 183, 248
speaker recognition evaluation technology evaluations for speaker
recognition, e.g., the NIST evaluation series , 6, 58, 113, 174,
198, 251, 259, see also: NIST
strictly proper scoring rule a cost measurement of the accuracy of
probabilistic predictions, where the minimal expected cost
reflects the true set of probabilities; strictly proper scoring
rules uniquely minimize the expected cost [28, 98] , 39, 49, 72,
110, 154, 250, 266
subject biometric system data subject: individual whose individualized
biometric data is within the biometric system [1] , 6, 24, 67, 118,
163, 182, 217, 247, 249
subversive biometric capture subject biometric capture subject who at-
tempts to subvert the correct and intended policy of the biometric
capture subsystem [1]
subversive user user of a biometric system who attempts to subvert the
correct and intended system policy [1] , 217
two covariance model binary classifier which is formulatable as full
subspace PLDA and as a primal support vector machine [133,
158] , 10, 98, 102, 117, 227, 249, see also: PLDA
uncooperative biometric capture subject biometric capture subject mo-
tivated to not achieve a successful completion of the biometric ac-
quisition process [1]
unified audio characterization estimation of posterior probabilities
of audio characteristics.
Note: originally proposed in [38] regarding eight classes of
characteristic audio properties, i.e., clean telephone or micro-
phone sensors, noisy in 8dB, 15dB, 20dB, reverberated speech
with reverberation time factors 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 7, 185, 247, see also:
sample quality, FQE & q-vector
universal background model model representing/clustering the ob-
served acoustic space [126].
Note: in traditional GMM – UBM systems, GMMs model cer-
tain subjects, where by contrast, UBMs (approximatively)
model all other subjects, sometimes referred to as a cohort
model. In conventional i-vector/PLDA systems, the UBM is
basis to the extraction of probabilistic embeddings (i-vectors)
[130] , 76, 82, 114, 170, 228, 261, see also: GMM & i-vector
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US National Institute of Standards and Technology measurements
standards laboratory; non-regulatory agency of the US de-
partment of commerce , 6, 58, 113, 174, 198, 240, 251, 259
user (of a biometric system) any person or organization interacting in
any way with a biometric system [1] , 27
voice activity detection automated segmentation of biometric voice
samples into speech and non-speech frames, cf. [225], 81, 118,
163, 171, 183, 247
zero-effort impostor randomly selected pair of a non-mated reference
and probe for the purpose of creating a non-mated compari-
son trial in (technology) performance evaluation , 33, see also:
impostor
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